PLOTINUS ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE
(ENNEADS VI, 9)

AMSTERDAM CLASSICAL MONOGRAPHS

VOLUME 1

P.A. MEIJER

PLOTINUS ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE

(ENNEADS VI,9)

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PLOTINUS ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE (ENNEADS VI,9)

AN ANALYTICAL COMMENTARY

J.C. GIEBEN, PUBLISHER
AMSTERDAM 1992

ἵνα τηρῇς τὸ Ἕν
(Plotinus 9[VI,9],6,50)

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To my dearest friend

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PREFACE

Plotinus is a difficult author for people who would like to do more than read quickly and take things at first glance, and particularly for those who wish to translate him and to write a commentary. Problems tend to emerge abundantly not only in the field of pure philology, but also if one attempts to understand the sequence of Plotinus' argument. The only form of commentary that would satisfy the demands of understanding the coherence and development of Plotinus' thought seems to me a running, or rather an analytical commentary. It is on the eleven chapters of VI,9, entitled "On the Good or the One" that I offer such an analytical commentary here. Many issues and sentences of this most important and innovatory treatise are tantalising in their obscurity. Unfortunately we only have a preliminary commentary in the shape of R. Harder's notes and the little work of J. Igal, *Commentaria in Plotini "De Bono sive Uno" librum (VI,9)*, Helmantica 22 (1971), 273-304 and of course we have translations and introductions to these translations. However, the reader gets hardly any help to explain the series of sometimes difficult sentences and arguments that constitute the chapters of VI,9. I therefore thought it would be useful to fill in this gap. The help I provide, however, will often only be and remain provisional. For no one can be so pretentious as to believe that he will present the ultimate commentary and final solutions to all the problems that come up in Plotinus' treatise. Although philology is of the greatest importance and indispensible, in my discussions it is made a servant of and subordinate to analysis. It is my hope that readers will find my analyses of sentences and arguments, as well as the philological contributions I offer are up to their wants and needs.

It took me a considerable amount of time to eliminate the prejudices I had acquired through reading the secondary literature, although the very same secondary literature has been of great help. I have to confess that as a result of those previous prejudices I became aware of the right position of the One only rather late. As the tradition teaches, I believed that Plotinus' concept of the One was a monolithic doctrine, well circumscribed and characterized by the specific type of 'oneness' of the One. Thus it was unclear to me why Plotinus exactly had organized his treatise *as if the One were still to be discovered,* for VI,9 seems to be intended as a quest for the One. But why should a mature philosopher have to use the childish device of pretending to have to seek the One as he does in VI,9, if he was already known by his readers to have the complete system available? Was this quest a sort of literary device to stir the curiosity of his readers? I have learned to take another point of view.

When studying V,4 I faced problems with regard to the notion of the One, I realized that with the One as a concept things were not as smooth and easy as the tradition depicts it. For in V,4 Plotinus surprisingly seems to promote *Meso*platonic rather than *Neo*platonic thoughts concerning the One. There is a (Mesoplatonic) multiplicity in the notion of the One in the early treatise V,4 which does not square with later developments, especially of VI,9, according to which the oneness of the One does not admit of any multiplicity in its structure. If, indeed, there is any development 'from Mesoplatonism to Neoplatonism' in Plotinus' doctrine itself during his period of writing, then the position of VI,9 should no longer be seen as that of a didactical device to carry his readers with him, but rather to introduce the novelty of a super form of the One and to convince his students and contemporaries of the necessity to have a very specific conviction on the oneness of the Supreme Entity. In this connection it is of relevance to notice that the first eight treatises in the chronology which Porphyrius offers to be Plotinus' own, still do not have the notion of the Supreme Entity as the Superone. Thus VI,9 launched a historical innovation: the very introduction of this Superone.

When I was still under the impression that 'the One' was the dominant expression to denote the Supreme Entity, I even held that the scholar (the editor of Plotinus' scriptures, Porphyrius?) who in antiquity gave VI,9 its title "On the Good or the One" would have done better to reverse the word-order: "On the One or the Good". However, I learned to recognize that although this new form of oneness of the One was now introduced in VI,9, it was not done at the cost of the other qualification of the Supreme Entity: the Good. I came to see that with equal right we may call the Supreme Entity 'One' or 'Good' and that, apart from contextual needs sometimes, Plotinus hardly had any preference, even though he had a rather revolutionary view on the exclusive oneness of the Supreme Entity. In view of all these considerations I prefer to speak of 'Supreme Entity' rather than of 'the One' or 'the Good'. When diligently working on the issue, one breaks through the curtain the tradition has dropped before the Supreme Entity and becomes aware of the fact that in spite of the new concept of oneness of the Supreme Entity, for Plotinus the name of that Supreme Entity was of secondary importance.

All this explains the efforts I made in Part I to portray the history of the concept of the One and to try to fathom Plotinus' own contribution to this history and to acquire an understanding of his own position in it. It is in this part that I have developed my ideas on the status of the One in Plotinus' philosophy and the growth of his thought in this respect. That there is *some* growth during the period of writing is undeniable, even for those who refuse to assume any *substantial* development or change in his thought. In order to be constantly aware of the position of the treatises in the chronology, I call them by their chronological denotation for the knowledge of which we are so largely indebted to Porphyrius, who, on the other hand, spoiled the perspective on the development of Plotinus' thought by introducing his division of the treatises into Enneads. Therefore I use the following formula: 9[VI,9] *etc.* in denoting the treatises.

After the rather long introduction the bulk of the present work consists in an analytical commentary on the eleven chapters of VI,9. Philological problems affecting the interpretation of important sentences or arguments have been embedded in the analyses of the chapters, minor (often philological) problems are treated in notes at the bottom of the pages. I should let my readers know that I had no opportunity to incorporate secondary literature published after 1988.

Although my views may be assumed to deviate from most of the previous scholars as far as the notion of the One is concerned, the commentary is meant to be helpful for all readers, whether traditionalists in their views on the Supreme Entity or not. The same holds true for Part III which is wholly devoted to the problem of mysticism as the culmination of what is said by Plotinus himself in VI,9 on the issue of unification with the Supreme Entity. I adhere to a 'holistic' view of this unification according to which in the 'moment suprême' the soul vanishes into the Supreme Entity and is as it were obliterated, with the proviso that one should be mindful of the nuances of Plotinus' not wholly coherent views on the issue. Anyway Plotinus' philosophy is quite promising in as far as it presents this unification with the Supreme Entity as an absolute reality and a real possibility for those who follow his instructions.

My view on the unification does not seem to be shared by the majority of Plotinian scholars, but there might be an increasing understanding for this position. Be this as it may, I hope my description of the event of the union will be useful to anyone who is interested in what for Plotinus was the zenith of the system, nl. the vanishing of man's soul into the Supreme Entity resulting in the amazing, complete unification.

I am greatly indebted to Miss A.W. Steenbeek, Dr.J. den Boeft, and Prof. Dr.A.P. Bos, whose criticism and advise have helped me considerably. Dr.J. Spruyt was so kind as to correct my English, an almost impossible task. For any shortcomings, failures and errors in this book only one person remains responsible.

P.A.Meijer,
Leiden 1990

PART ONE

PLOTINUS AND THE HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF THE ONE

Introduction to Part I: Plotinus and the History of the Concept of the One

Not only to gain insight into the history of Neoplatonism but also for philosophical reasons it is extremely important to distinguish a notion of the One that does not admit of any plurality or parts and a conception of Oneness that amounts to a unity of essential parts of aspects. For the latter type of One does not dominate the transcendent domain and as an aspect of the highest part of the transcendent world it is rather innocent inasmuch as it does not, unlike the Superone, radically divide the transcendent. Since any plurality must be removed from this type of One, this purified One cannot have any other aspect than its oneness. The abstraction of plurality makes it unfit to display any other aspect than its essence. So it can no longer be connected with entities as mind[1]. This pureness of the One leads to a reorganisation of the transcendent world, since the One can no longer be an aspect of the transcendent domain, which, from a (Meso)platonical point of view, at its highest level is mind. The One must be placed above mind, which contains a plurality (Ideas). The reorganisation of the transcendent world by placing the One above and absolutely separated from mind and all lower entities leads to a new form of hypostasation, which in the Mesoplatonic world of Albinus and Numenius, Plotinus' immediate predecessors, seems impossible, or at any event does not emerge. The transcendent world can no longer be rather simply defined as what is above the world of the sensibilia, the intelligibilia, but above the intelligible world there is a supertranscendent level, where the One is the only inhabitant. Here the term "intelligible" does not even work, because no form of intellect can grasp the Superone any more.

The question of how mind stems from that Superone becomes intriguing and in Plotinus even a virulent problem. In the Mesoplatonism of Albinus and Numenius this issue of origin was not much discussed or considered. Mostly the relationship between the highest God and lower levels was thought of as the relationship between a first God and a lower God or Gods, an explanation that satisfied Mesoplatonian demands, which were confined to indicating the levels rather than deducing them from each other. In any philosophy that puts the Supreme Entity in a superior position placing it beyond mind, the question must come up how to understand the relation, if any, between the Supreme

---

[1] I shall call Plotinus' second hypostasis, νοῦς, 'mind' rather than 'intellect'. For 'intellect' is too much connected with the notion of rational thinking, which is the function of the best part of soul. Mind has its own peculiar way of thinking, which has nothing to do with reasoning. The problem of naming of the νοῦς is dealt with in the discussion following Armstrong's paper "The background of the doctrine that the intelligibles are not outside intellect" (*Sources*, 424). It was Cilento, who raised the problem. Armstrong discusses several modern ways to translate νοῦς: intellect, intelligence, mind, spirit, Geist. Because of its broadness and its not being immediately associated with rational thinking I prefer 'mind' and will stick to this translation.

Entity and lower entities. It is even the possible to deny any relation, as is done in the anonymous Commentary on the *Parmenides*, the *Anonymus Taurinensis*[2]. However, such complications need not concern us now. The philosopher has to consider the issue whether there is a relation and how it functions. We shall see Plotinus struggle with this question, and as far as I can see, he himself believed that this revaluation of the relationship between the levels was his most important innovation, even more than his innovatory concept of the One, or at any event, an equally important one. This is what we shall discover when studying what I call his *Apology*, the famous chapters 8 and 9 of treatise 10[V,1], which he wrote after 9[VI,9] with its broad discussion of the One.

The problem of who was the first to introduce this novel One, an innovation that led to such a large amount of rethinking what Mesoplatonism had to offer, is a very subtle and thorny issue, which has provoked a great deal of scholarly discussion. To present a panoramic view and to take a standpoint in the argument seems inevitable to me. It is therefore that I have examined the recent positions in the first chapter of Part I. It has a historical setting insofar as it deals with previous views on who introduced this Superone-concept into Preplotinian philosophy. Was it Moderatus or perhaps Ammonius Saccas, Plotinus' inspiring teacher? In any case the contents of chapter I seem logical enough. However as it will turn out that according to my examinations Plotinus himself created and introduced this concept of the Superone, and did not inherit it from Ammonius Saccas, it will not come as a surprise that I shall devote some words to Plotinus' own way (chapter II). Since it will be shown that Plotinus found this new concept of the One after he had begun writing his treatises, it will be necessary to examine the first eight treatises, which far from having the Superone, merely have, if any, a rather vague concept of it (chapter III). The position of the One in 9[VI,9] will be a topic for discussion, because the new One is introduced in this most 'epochemachend' treatise, chapter IV. Chapter V will review the several names that Plotinus applies to the Supreme Entity. It is highly remarkable that Plotinus has no uniform denotation of the Supreme Entity, ruling out all other names, replacing them by 'the One', but instead uses a variety of terms. Among them the name 'the Good' is of primary importance. This name is not abolished, but even after the introduction of the name 'One' this name will turn out to be dominant as we shall see. This name, which, of course, Plato himself in the *Republic* coined to name his Supreme Entity, is maintained, because, as I believe, it connected Plotinus' new supreme Entity, 'the One', with all previous Platonism, beit Plato's own or Mesoplatonism. Presumably, another important reason for using the name 'the Good' was that it was meant to prevent Plotinus' colleagues to be driven away a name? Whatever name Plotinus will use, his new Supreme Entity will be equally supreme. Here we have the contents of chapter V.

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[2] Peyron and Kroll were the first to edit this commentary, found on a palimpsest, see Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus*, I,103, and II, 61.

CHAPTER ONE

THE HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF THE ONE

1) Was it Moderatus who introduced a Superone? Dodds' break-through, and Krämer on Speusippus' One and Xenocrates' One

There has been a lot of discussion about how the notion of a Superone[3] has been introduced into the history of ancient philosophy. One matter in particular has exercised many minds, namely to what extent Plotinus may be considered to have depended on predecessors for his remarkable and unique notion of *Oneness*. The main present-day contributors to these investigations are Dodds[4] and Krämer[5]. Dodds[6] traces Plotinus' One back to a stream of Pythagorizing-Mesoplatonic thought which emerges in Moderatus of Gades (first century AD), whereas Krämer, while accepting Dodds' thesis, is more specific in that he denies that Plotinus is directly dependent on a predecessor. It is only due to the variety in predominance of the different structures in Mesoplatonic thought that at one time the Plotinian type of One emerged in philosophy, a reiteration of a model that already figures in Speusippus, the One that is above and separated from everything else (Krämer's "reine Eins").

Dodds' article "The Parmenides of Plato and the origin of the Neoplatonic One" of 1928 was a breakthrough and for a long period of time it influenced scholarly thought about the problem. In this article Dodds did his utmost - indeed a considerable effort - to locate the origins of the developments that had led to the formation of the Plotinian One-concept. According to his view, the first time a Plotinianlike system prefigures is in Moderatus of Gades. This system (a Superone entirely separated from and above two lower levels, *viz.* the realm of mind and the realm of soul both separated from each other and from the sensible world) emerges in a text in Simplicius[7]. It must be said in advance that Moderatus could have been an author known in Plotinian circles, for we learn from Porphyrius' *Life of Plotinus*, 14 that other Preplotinian masters, such as Severus, Cronius, Numenius, Gaius and Atticus were read in Plotinus' class-room and in ch.20 Moderatus is mentioned together with Numenius and Cronius by Plotinus' contemporary Longinus, who obviously read him. So did Origenes the Christian (cf. Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.*, VI,19,8). So if Dodds is right that Moderatus was the first to display the system of three 'Ones', *i.e.* the Superone, and a One both in the second and third level, it is quite possible that Plotinus knew about this. Dodds produces convincing evidence that the three-Ones-system was based on a certain interpretation of the Platonic Parmenides, and thus the three Ones correspond to the Ones of the first, second and third hypothesis[8] respectively. Krämer[9] rightly points out that what the *Timaeus* had to say about soul and "Körperwelt" must have been embodied in this interpretation of the Parmenides. Thus the system contains three levels with three Ones: *viz*. One, mind /One, and soul/One, and four when the sensible world is included in the system, in which case, of course, we do not have a specific One. Krämer (like Dodds) considers what Simplicius has to say about Moderatus and the system as authentic and sees a skeleton of later Neoplatonism in Simplicius' report, which will be presented below.

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[3] The Superone has two decisive features: it is free from all plurality and consequently it is supranoetic; see below 21 ff. and above 1.

[4] Dodds, *Origin*, 129 ff. See also Armstrong, *Architecture*, 23 ff.

[5] Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 355 ff. and 372 ff.

[6] Dodds, *Origin*, 140.

[7] Simplicius, *in Phys.* A 7,230,34 ff

> Ταύτην (*sc*. that matter is quantity) δὲ περὶ τῆς ὕλης τὴν ὑπόνοιαν ἐοίκασιν ἐσχηκέναι πρῶτοι μὲν τῶν 'Ελλήνων οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, μετὰ δ' ἐκείνους ὁ Πλάτων, ὡς καὶ Μοδέρατος ἱστορεῖ. οὗτος γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς Πυθαγορείους τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἓν ὑπὲρ τὸ εἶναι καὶ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἀποφαίνεται, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἕν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ὄντως ὂν καὶ νοητόν, τὰ εἴδη φησὶν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τρίτον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ψυχικόν, μετέχειν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν, τὴν δὲ ἀπὸ τούτου τελευταίαν φύσιν τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὖσαν μηδὲ μετέχειν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἔμφασιν ἐκείνων κεκοσμῆσθαι, τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ὕλης τοῦ μὴ ὄντος πρώτως ἐν τῷ ποσῷ ὄντος οὔσης σκίασμα καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ὑποβεβηκυίας καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου.
>
> καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ὁ Πορφύριος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ *Περὶ ὕλης* τὰ τοῦ Μοδεράτου παρατιθέμενος γέγραφεν ὅτι 'βουληθεὶς ὁ ἑνιαῖος λόγος, ὥς πού φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, τὴν γένεσιν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τῶν ὄντων συστήσασθαι, κατὰ στέρησιν αὑτοῦ ἐχώρησε τὴν ποσότητα πάντων αὐτὴν στερήσας τῶν αὑτοῦ λόγων καὶ εἰδῶν. τοῦτο δὲ ποσότητα ἐκάλεσεν ἄμορφον καὶ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον, ἐπιδεχομένην μέντοι μορφὴν σχῆμα διαίρεσιν ποιότητα πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον ....

> It seems that this opinion concerning Matter was held first among Greeks by the Pythagoreans, and after them by Plato, as indeed Moderatus tells us. For he (*sc*. Plato or Moderatus, see my discussion below), following the Pythagoreans, declares that the first One is above Being and all essence, while the second One -which is the 'truly existent' and the object of intellection - he says is the Forms; the third - which is the soul-realm - participates in the One and the Forms, while the lowest nature which comes after it, that of the sense-realm, does not even participate, but receives order by reflection from those others, Matter in the sense-realm being a shadow cast by Not-Being as it manifests itself primally in Quantity, and which is of a degree inferior even to that (Translation J.M. Dillon).
>
> And quoting the words of Moderatus Porphyrius wrote those things in his second book on Matter, namely that the Principle of the One, wishing to establish the genesis of beings, provided the quantity of all things according to privation of itself, by taking away from it the principles and forms of itself. This he called quantity, without form, division and shape, however, being able to receive form, shape, division, quality and so on.

Dodds has tried to prove that the system is to be ascribed to Moderatus as his own identifying οὗτος of the third line with Moderatus. This οὗτος is alternatively identified with Moderatus (Dodds) or Plato (Vacherot, Zeller,

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[8] Dodds, *Origin*, 137 ff.

[9] Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 252.

Krämer[10]). Krämer is of the opinion that whoever the οὗτος may be, the report is guaranteed for Moderatus and does not stem from Porphyrius[11], who quoted the words from Moderatus. However, if Plato is the οὗτος, I am not so sure whether the whole report (including what is said about the three Ones) is Moderatus' own presentation. It could be that Moderatus only comes in as having said something about matter as quantity as an originally Pythagorean and also Platonic concept. However, albeit reluctantly[12] I agree that the whole report goes back to Moderatus[13], although initially, my own feeling about

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[10] Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 252, n.218 for literature.

[11] Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 252, n.221.

[12] Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 347 has some *incidental* doubts as to "the identifications of the second and third 'Ones' ", which "sound like explanations of Porphyrius". Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus*, I, 166 affirms that a system of four levels, *viz*. the intelligible, the soul, the sensible and matter, is characteristically Porphyrian, and that there is a Neoplatonic vocabulary, which is manifest in the following phrases, denoted by italics:

Ταύτην δὲ περὶ τῆς ὕλης τὴν ὑπόνοιαν ἐοίκασιν ἐσχηκέναι πρῶτοι μὲν τῶν Ἑλλήνων οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, μετὰ δ' ἐκείνους ὁ Πλάτων, ὡς καὶ Μοδέρατος ἱστορεῖ. οὗτος γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς Πυθαγορείους τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἓν *ὑπὲρ τὸ εἶναι καὶ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν* ἀποφαίνεται, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἕν, *ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ὄντως ὂν καὶ νοητόν*, τὰ εἴδη φησὶν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τρίτον, *ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ψυχικόν*, μετέχειν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν, τὴν δὲ ἀπὸ τούτου τελευταίαν φύσιν τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὖσαν μηδὲ μετέχειν, ἀλλὰ *κατ' ἔμφασιν ἐκείνων κεκοσμῆσθαι*, τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ὕλης τοῦ μὴ ὄντος πρώτως ἐν τῷ ποσῷ ὄντος οὔσης σκίασμα καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ὑποβεβηκυίας καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου. καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ὁ Πορφύριος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ ὕλης τὰ τοῦ Μοδεράτου παρατιθέμενος γέγραφεν ὅτι 'βουληθεὶς ὁ ἑνιαῖος λόγος, ὥς πού φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, τὴν γένεσιν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τῶν ὄντων συστήσασθαι, κατὰ στέρησιν αὑτοῦ ἐχώρησε τὴν ποσότητα πάντων αὐτὴν στερήσας τῶν αὐτοῦ λόγων καὶ εἰδῶν. τοῦτο δὲ ποσότητα ἐκάλεσεν ἄμορφον καὶ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον, ἐπιδεχομένην μέντοι μορφὴν σχῆμα διαίρεσιν ποιότητα πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον ....See further the following note.

[13] It is a rather complicated matter. Simplicius says that the doctrine of *hyle* (turning out in what follows to be a part of the system) is Pythagorean and Platonic as Moderatus too (καὶ Μοδέρατος) *records* (ἱστορεῖ). In connection with the foregoing the Greek word ἱστορεῖ suggests that Moderatus reported a historical view on Plato and Pythagoreanism on *hyle*. What Moderatus records must have been borrowed from his eleven books which according to Porphyrius, *Vita Pythagorae*, 48, he devoted to Pythagoreanism. The word καί (not taken into account by the debaters) suggests that what at least is expounded is in any case a view of Moderatus on *hyle* as originating from Pythagoreanism and Plato. It is not difficult to understand why Moderatus emerges as a witness for the doctrine of *hyle*. For he amply interprets the Platonic *pandeches* from the *Timaeus* as ποσότης, quantity. This is in accordance with his inclination to reduce all later (? or Platonic) philosophy to variations of the doctrine of numbers of Pythagoreanism see Porphyrius (!, again Porphyrius), *Vita Pythagorae*, 50. It could be in line with this tendency that in the system the three levels are each reduced to its One. Porphyrius is reported by Simplicius to have quoted this exposition of the system (τὰ τοῦ Μοδεράτου παρατιθέμενος). However, to infer from all this that it was Moderatus' own doctrine is unwarranted. Nevertheless, it does seem that Moderatus was a firm and aggressive adherent of Pythagoreanism (see Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 346). So the system could be possibly his own, although by the same Porphyrius Moderatus is portrayed as ascribing another system to the Pythagoreans: a One next to a *duas*, which is held responsible for difference in a broad sense (Porphyrius, *Vita Pythagorae*, 49). If his Pythagoreanism is not decisive, then, at the minimum, it could be equally supposed that the system was Moderatus' own interpretation of the relation between Plato and Pythagoras, or even that it was an already existent interpretation. All this would not alter the fact that in Moderatus' time the system of the three Ones was present (designed by whomever and adhered to by whomever). Thus it could have influenced Plotinus, who plausibly read Moderatus. We must accept that it did because of what is said in Plotinus' *Apology* of ch.8 and 9 of

Simplicius' report was that the system is almost too Neoplatonic that is, that it is too well in line with later Neoplatonism, to be true. On the other hand, it seems undeniable that there has been a history of the One-conception before Plotinus, and it is unlikely that Pythagoreanism as reported by Moderatus had no part to play in the story. Even before Moderatus there had been a (Pythagorizing) theory about the One as Supreme Entity: this theory can be traced back to Eudorus (who lived *ca.* 25 BC) or even before him[14]. The difference between the Eudorean system and Simplicius' report about Moderatus is the form of the transcendental system because of the important part of the δυάς in the Eudorean system. What in the report is called the One of the second level, is called μονάς in this system. The two systems seem to have existed next to each other.

For my argument all this comes down to the statement that even before Moderatus there had been question of the One as Supreme Entity. It is, however, only Moderatus, of whom we may suppose that he was read by Plotinus. We do not know whether Plotinus was acquainted with Eudorus. In this connection it is curious to notice that what Plotinus later has to say, in what I call his *Apologia*, about the deep Platonic roots of his novel teaching, concerns almost exactly the three-Ones system Simplicius mentions as Moderatus'[15], which incidentally does not mean that the system with the δυάς was unknown

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10[V,1] see below 21 ff. But there may be an argument against the idea that the *whole* system can be attributed to Moderatus, although Dodds and Krämer accept this attribution completely, and Hadot and Dillon partly, without denying the system as Moderatus' (see my note 11). It remains a real possibility, which cannot definitely be ruled out, that only what is said about matter stems from Moderatus. After all it is what bears on matter that Porphyrius discusses. In that case, who can be held responsible for the description of the first three levels with their Ones: Porphyrius, or Simplicius himself? Ultimately I favour the opinion that the whole system was Moderatus' property, because it is all announced as 'according to the Pythagoreans (κατὰ τοὺς Πυθαγορείους)'. This reduction of Platonism (and other philosophies) to Pythagoreanism was characteristic of Moderatus' preoccupation, as we have said already. If the system was *not* Moderatus', we cannot easily explain why Simplicius did not confine himself solely to the *hyle* and surely we can not explain easily why he *announces* that the Pythagoreans and after him Plato were the first to have this particular interpretation of *hyle*, and yet continues with an example of *reducing the whole system of Plato to Pythagoreanism*, which as such was not required by his argument, for only the argument about *hyle* satisfied the demands of the general argument. For in the report the so called ἐνιαίος λόγος is confined to the problem of matter only. All this points to Moderatus as having the system, either as its originator (which I regard as highly possible), or only as the transmitter.

[14] This, of course, is mentioned by Dodds, *the One*, 136 n.1. It is Simplicius who provided what is announced as a verbatim quotation from Eudorus (Simplicius, *in Phys.* 181, 27 ff.): ὡς μὲν ἀρχὴ τὸ ἕν, ὡς δὲ στοιχεῖα τὸ ἓν καὶ ἡ ἀόριστος δυάς, ἀρχαὶ ἄμφω ἓν ὄντα πάλιν. καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν ἐστιν ἓν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν πάντων, ἄλλο ἐν τὸ τῇ δυάδι ἀντικείμενον ὃ καὶ μονάδα καλοῦσιν. According to Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 119 "it is perverse of scholars to take such a passage as Eudorus' account of Pythagorean doctrine...as a mere historical report". It is possible that other Pythagoreans like Brotinus teached previously to Eudorus doctrines of the kind (see Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 121).

[15] See later on 21 ff .

to Plotinus[16]. It is even possible that Plotinus gathered the system with the δυάς from Moderatus' eleven books on Pythagoreanism, for we know that such a system was also ascribed to Moderatus by Porphyrius (there he is again![17]). In any case there is evidence for the thesis that systems like Moderatus' one influenced Plotinus' thought.

What as regards *Krämer's* view I cannot understand, is that he recognized the authenticity of Simplicius' account of Moderatus, and was aware of Moderatus being read by Plotinus' contemporaries, but denied any direct historical dependence of Plotinus on predecessors like Moderatus. According to Krämer, it was a broad *oral* tradition of Pythagorizing Platonism[18] that inspired Plotinus or his immediate predecessors to the system: an undercurrent: "eine unterirdisch vorhandene noch nicht virulent gewordene Überlieferung"[19]. Elsewhere[20] Krämer concludes that both the first hypostases with the One above mind were present in a Platonic-Pythagorizing tradition, which was "im Rücken des mittleren Platonismus". Even Plotinus is assumed to belong to this current: ".. und darum wohl selbst in den platonisch-neupythagoreischen Überlieferungsstrom seiner Zeit hineingehört"[21]. However according to Krämer it is senseless and superfluous (müssig[22]) to ask for a definite source ("eine bestimmte Quelle") for Plotinus' choice of this kind of Platonism, which although of a Pythagorizing type, may also be called Mesoplatonism, as Krämer himself at one point emphasizes[23].

What seems to me unnecessary, even implausible, is to refer to an *oral* tradition as Krämer does; it is quite probable that Plotinus had read Moderatus (as we pointed out before), if Longinus compared him to Plotinus (incidentally preferring Plotinus as a philosopher) and Moderatus was read by Origenes. So Plotinus must have had some knowledge of this writer. There is no need to introduce an oral tradition as Plotinus' source, where so many Mesoplatonian written texts were available. We shall see (below 21 ff.), when we come to speak about Plotinus' *Apologia* that Moderatus' account of Platonism displays a strong resemblance to what Plotinus has to say in it. We shall argue on the basis of an examination of this *Apologia* that there is evidence for a view contrary to Krämer's.

I would like first to add some more on the issue of (Meso)platonic influence on Plotinus. Krämer[24] advises us to distinguish between two wings in the old Academy, *viz.* the *Speusippean* and the *Xenocratean*. Plotinus, if anywhere, stands in the tradition of Speusippus. Speusippus had elevated the One above the mind and denied the One any characteristic whatsoever, including Goodness and perhaps even being a God[25]. We will see that Plotinus in precisely the same way tried to purify the One from any lower entity, except divinity[26]. At any rate Krämer seems to be right in saying that there are *structural* agreements. Be this as it may, Plotinus did not mention Speusippus in the *Enneads* and his system is only visible in Moderatus. However, Moderatus' system is clearly launched within the framework of (Neo)pythagorizing Platonism (or perhaps better: Platonizing Pythagoreanism), which as such is fully recognized by Krämer. Plotinus too, he holds, belongs to this current of Mesoplatonism as we saw[27].

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[16] See 7[V,4],2,7, and 10[V,1],5,6-9, cf. Bussanich, *The One*, 14-16

[17] See my note 13.

[18] Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 294,295.

[19] Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 391.

[20] Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 375.

[21] Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 294.

[22] Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 295.

[23] Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 294, n.400 ad finem.

[24] Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 388 ff.

Xenocrates is another thinker who developed Platonism into a Mind/One system, however, he maintained a system of two levels, namely a transcendent world in which mind dominates and of which Oneness, however important, is only an aspect, next to a sensible world. What is rather strange in this connection is that Plotinus' immediate predecessors, Numenius (whom he was even accused to have plagiarized[28]) and Albinus, adhered to the Xenocratean concept of a Mind/One. They had no room for nor any interest in a Superone, detached from everything else, especially mind. We must not make the same mistake as Schwyzer in his highly useful and valuable treatment of Plotinus in *RE*[29], who suggests that the Superoneconception is already present in Albinus. Even another favourite of Plotinus' lectureroom, a rather obstinate philosopher of the generation of or after Numenius, Atticus, can not have been Plotinus' source concerning the One. Atticus' position regarding the Supreme Entity is not very clear, *e.g.* whether or not the Ideas were inside or outside his Supreme God and whether this God was on a higher level than the Ideas. Apart from these uncertainties we may assume that his teaching was within the Mesoplatonical framework. This means that for Atticus, the highest God was in any case gifted with intellect or identical with intellect. Dillon's surmise about his Supreme God, that "he would naturally think of him as One or the Monad, (as well as Intellect)", must remain but a guess[30]. So we are still left with the question of Plotinus' source. Was it Moderatus or, more generally, Pythagorizing Platonism?

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[25] See Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 17, Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 214 ff., and Tarán, *Speusippus*, 376 ff.

[26] See below 64.

[27] Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 294, see above 10.

[28] Porphyrius, *Vita*, 21. Porphyrius mentions the total dedication of Plotinus' most industrious pupil, Amelius, to Numenius, whose works he collected and knew by heart (*Vita*, 3).

[29] Numenius, according to Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 368, did not have the concept of *the* One. In spite of this vigorous denial Dillon permits himself to say two pages later that the Father (being Numenius' Supreme God) is described in fr.16 as "*the* (my italics) One and the Good" (Dillon, *ib.*, 371). One page further (*ib.*, 372) he says that this is not the Plotinian One, which is absolutely true. In Numenius only one fragment (fr.19) has the word ἕν, in a phrase, referring to Plato's lecture 'On the Good' τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἕν. This remark is interpretable as "that the Good is *the* One (the *nomen* of the predicate generally loses the article in Greek)" but in this case, the article is probably not added to avoid ambiguity. Its absence suggests it should be rendered: "that the Good is one", assigning priority to the concept of the Good. In accordance with the Xenocratean principle unity is ascribed to the Supreme Entity, but as an attribute, it has no ontological priority. In Albinus (*Didaskalikos*, ch.X, par. 3, a chapter to which we will return later on, see 191), too, the Supreme Entity is said to be ἕν, but this attribute has nothing to do with the Plotinian concept of the One, it merely designates unity as indivisibility. Albinus enumerates a series of predicates one can ascribe to the Supreme Entity: ἀίδιος, ἄρρητος, αὐτοτελής, ἀειτελής, τέλειος, θειότης, οὐσιότης, ἀλήθεια, συμμετρία, ἀγαθόν. He immediately adds, however, as a precaution, that the predicates are not meant to introduce a separation, but are said as from an entity which in every respect is thought of as one (Λέγω δὲ οὐχ ὡς χωρίζων ταῦτα (the predicates), ἀλλ' ὡς κατὰ πάντα *ἑνὸς* νοουμένου). It is rather misleading that without any proof, Schwyzer should infer from Albinus' utterance that Albinus' Supreme Entity is regarded as ἕν, which he presumably takes as 'the One', in any case as a predecessor of Plotinus' One, see *RE*, 560. As to the presence of the One in Plotinus' early works Schwyzer has a similar

One might suppose, that Plotinus borrowed his interest in a supranoetic Superone from his venerated teacher Ammonias Saccas, of whom, unfortunately, we hardly know anything, but whose teaching was so novel and gripping that he completely convinced the hesitant Plotinus, whom, dissatisfied with the philosophical activity and the mediocrity of the philosophers of his days, he definitely directed to philosophy[31].

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bias, see below 27. Kleve (*Albinus on God and the One*, 67) attempted to show that the One is meant. Although considering the possibility of Albinus wishing us to take the predicates as one, and thus maintaining the unity of the many-predicated God, Kleve thinks that we may with equal right assume that according to Albinus God is apprehended as *the* One. Kleve believes that with the predicates Good and Beautiful we are in fact dealing with *the* Good and *the* Beautiful. Likewise we meet the God as *the* One. The absence of the article does nothing to tip the balance, for in the predicate position the article is not needed. Apart from other considerations (I can hardly believe that with Good Albinus meant *the* Good, for it is one predicate among many, it is *e.g.* never said that God is *the* Symmetry), my main objection would be that other predicates are elaborated in the following (see my appendix on the negative theology 191), whereas ἕν is not. If the God were *the* One, Albinus would scarcely have been in the position to leave out any comment on it. However, it is entirely understandable that he does not comment if he only meant to stress the unity of the predicates.

[30] Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 256. In his furious polemic against the categories of Aristotle Atticus seems to have influenced Plotinus, Des Places, *Atticus*, 18. Dillon, *ib.*, 250 suggests that the polemic might have been directed at Aristocles, who published a "History of Philosophy", which entailed, still according to Dillon, (*ib.*, 250) an insidious eulogy of Plato precisely by positing that Aristotle *perfected* Plato's doctrine. It seems plausible that Atticus would not only have militated against the single doctrine of the categories of Aristotle (as Nicostratus had done, see Dillon, *ib.*, 234), but that he also launched a full-scale attack on Aristotelian philosophy, since Aristocles wrote a *complete* History of ancient Philosophy. For a summary of all Atticus' points against Aristotle, see Des Places, *Atticus*, Notice, 8. On the categories see below 131 ff.

[31] Porphyrius, *Vita*, 3.

2) *Ammonius Saccas and the One*

One statement of Krämer may be considered characteristic of the deplorable situation as regards research on Ammonius: "Es empfiehlt sich indessen, die Ammonios-Diskussion (in view of the Superone) einstweilen als unergiebig ruhen zu lassen[32]". I cannot refrain from devoting some words to Ammonius' position - if he held any: the scantiness of data (he was one of the non-writers in a long series of ancient thinkers, who perhaps imitated Socrates or for reasons of Pythagoreanism did not wish to record their thought) does not allow for any decisive conclusion. None the less is it important to know where we stand.

The most important piece of information, in which the basic term ἕνωσις emerges in Ammonius, is found in Nemesius of Emesa, *De natura animarum*, ch.3 (ed. M. Morani, 1987, p. 39,16 ff.). The ἕνωσις forms a very important part in the argument of Dörrie[33], as it should lead up to the theory about Ammonius having the doctrine of the One. Dodds[34] has nothing to say about this ἕνωσις in his attack on Dörrie, because he rejected the fragment as authentically Ammonian. Dillon,[35] in his survey of the doctrines of Ammonius, does not even mention the passage in question nor the problems concerning this ἕνωσις. Well then, what does Nemesius say? Nemesius tells us that Ammonius, attempting to solve the problem of the unity of body and soul, affirmed that the noetics display a special type of unity, which is immune to corruption from the part of the bodily. Thus the soul is not affected by its staying in the body. The Greek text of Nemesius runs: ἔλεγε γὰρ τὰ νοητὰ τοιαύτην ἔχειν φύσιν ὡς καὶ ἑνοῦσθαι τοῖς δυναμένοις αὐτὰ δέξασθαι (καθάπερ τὰ συνεφθαρμένα), καὶ ἑνούμενα μένειν ἀσύγχυτα καὶ ἀδιάφορα (ὡς τὰ παρακείμενα). As far as I can see, this noetic unity has nothing to do with any influence from a (supposed) One, as Dörrie maintains. In his view Ammonius' formula supposedly explains: "Sondern durch ihren Bezug auf die Eins erhalten alle νοητά, ja alle ἀσώματα die Fähigkeit, eins zu bleiben"[36], which, to my mind, is totally unproven and amounts to pure speculation; the same speculative considerations come up in his remark: "nur vermöge ihrer Eins-Bezogenheit kann die Seele in den Körper eingehen und Leben schaffen"[37], whereas ἕνωσις or ἑνοῦσθαι in Nemesius' passage do not signify 'Eins-Bezogenheit'; they have only to do with the special unity of mind and the bodily *as components*, a unity that does not affect the structure of the mind. In Ammonius' view the soul is a noetic entity, which as such is not affected by bodily impediments. Its unity as a noetic entity is undoubtedly on a noetic level, and therefore of a special type, but this is not mentioned in the text nor is there anything that suggests a connection with a type of the One[38]. Consequently we cannot but agree with Krämer that the notion of ἕνωσις does *not confirm the assumption of Ammonius having the One*, although my reasons for coming to such a conclusion are different from his. We must add that both Dodds[39] and Dörrie agree in assuming that the whole context in Nemesius is more Porphyrian than Ammonian. Schwyzer even goes sofar as to deny that there is anything Ammonian in the fragment[40]. However, the scantity of data does not allow for a persuasive theory about Ammonius' position.

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[32] Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 294, note 400 .
[33] Dörrie, *Ammonios, Der Lehrer Plotins*, 449 ff.
[34] Dodds, *Numenius and Ammonius*, 25.
[35] Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 380 ff.
[36] Dörrie, *Ammonios*, 453.
[37] Dörrie, *o.c.*, 456.

There has been another attempt to show that Ammonius did not had the concept of the Superone. We know of another important pupil of Ammonius, Origenes, the Platonist[41], who openly attacked the Superone-conception, as we learn from Proclus, *Theologia Platonica*, II,31,8 ff., ed. Saffrey-Westerink. Origenes, who had enjoyed the same education as Plotinus (under Ammonius), as Proclus says, and non *sine causa*, adhered to the opinion that the (super)One is not existent (ἀνυπόστατον/ ἀνύπαρκτον) and that the first Being and the First One coincide on the level of mind, which is the best (τὸ ἄριστον[42]), which means that there is no better or higher Entity. The title of one of Origenes' books points in the same direction: "That the King is the sole Creator" (ὅτι μόνος ποιητὴς ὁ βασιλεύς). To use this title seems to imply that the Supreme Entity (the King[43]) is to be taken personally, *i.e.* as Mind and as the Demiurg. We know that demiurgical activities or functions in Plotinus have nothing to do with the productive power of the One, which operates by superabundancy rather than by activity. It would be rather odd, that if it belonged to the legacy of Ammonius to adhere to a Superone, the very idea had been under attack by his pupil Origenes[44]. The reverse, that Ammonius had no concept of a Superone, seems more likely. If it is true that Origenes represented the orthodox Ammonian line one could venture to say that Ammonius adhered to the notion of the Supreme Entity as the king or at least as the Demiurg of the *Timaeus*[45]. This could explain, why Plotinus' first treatises sometimes deal with the relation between the Demiurg and the Idea of the Living Creature[46].

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[38] We will soon come to learn that Dörrie did not ascribe to Ammonius (*Ammonios*, 457) a One separated from being because of the attack of Origenes, we will describe in the next lines, but Dörrie is eager to establish at least a doctrine of a One for Ammonius. Plotinus was the one who carried this Oneconcept to its limits. Schwyzer will turn out to be less careful in the distinctions of Oneness. We will see that he ascribes the doctrine of the (super)one to Ammonius (*Ammonios Sakkas*, 77, 78) without much ado.

[39] Dodds, *Numenius and Ammonius*, 25.

[40] Schwyzer, *Ammonios Sakkas*, 9 ff.

[41] See on him Dörrie, *Ammonios*, 457, Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 382, Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 284. He must be distinguished from Origenes, the Christian, see Schwyzer, *Ammonios Sakkas*, 22 ff., the latest writer on this controversial issue.

[42] Saffrey-Westerink, *Theol. Platon.*, II, XVIII call τὸ ἄριστον "le maître-mot dans la finalité dans le Timée".

[43] The name 'king' in this connection derives from Plato's *Second Letter* (312 E) and there is a history of interpretation of this enigmatic Platonic passage onwards in Platonian circles (see Dörrie, *Der König*, 218 ff. and Saffrey-Westerink, *Theol. Plat.*, II, XLIII ff.). It is in this chain of interpretations that Numenius has an important place, by naming his first God the King, and portraying his SE as rather inactive in contradistinction to the second God, who is the δημιουργικὸς θεός (fr.12). Probably Dörrie is right to consider Origenes' tract as a reaction to the thesis of Numenius (*ib.*, 221, 222). According to Origenes the king (SE) is the maker, *i.e.* the sole Creator, but it seems to me more convincing that this work of Origenes was directed against Plotinus.

To return to Dörrie, of course he knows of Origenes' attack on Plotinus[47]. His conclusion is that to assume that the One is already separated from being and mind in Ammonius is doubtful. However, if we grant this restriction, we will lose the Superone and we be still in Xenocratean and Mesoplatonian waters with Ammonius. The standpoint of Dörrie is self-destructive, for if Ammonius had any view in regard to the One at all, he did not deviate from the commonstock opinion of Mesoplatonism. Therefore it is highly unlikely that in his doctrine there was any incentive or inspiration for Plotinus to develop a new doctrine of the One.

The upshot of all this is that we should avoid any attribution of a Superone-notion to Ammonius. It is remarkable, however, to see Schwyzer struggle for the preservation of the doctrine of the One in Ammonius[48]. He cannot make an appeal to the fragment of Nemesius we have just discussed: he has radically undermined it in such a way that we no longer can ascribe it to Ammonius[49]. His argument is wholly based on the fact that Proclus was astonished to see Origenes betraying his master by his (Xenocratean) view of the One, and Porphyrius, who presumably provided Proclus with the knowledge of Origenes' betrayal, according to Schwyzer did not doubt that the doctrine of the One was Plotinian *and* Ammonian. Now this is only an indirect argument, exploiting the historical perspective of Proclus and Porphyrius, who, however, were by no means able to judge the question concerned. Proclus considered the Superone-doctrine as orthodox Neoplatonic and Porphyrius was not there when Plotinus wrote his first treatises, which, did not have the Superone-concept, as we shall see[50]. Besides, Porphyrius himself seemed to have had a subtle doctrine according to which the Supreme Entity had a type of ***being***, ***viz.*** ὕπαρξις in a triad with life and mind[51]. Thus Porphyrius was far from impartial and had every reason to adduce the criticism of Origenes, not because Porphyrius agreed with the doctrine of the Superone, and was convinced that not only Plotinus, but also Ammonius had the doctrine, as Schwyzer wishes to think, but, what is more likely, to strengthen his own philosophical position.

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[44] Schroeder, *Ammonius Saccas*, 522 holds that Proclus' information about Origenes indicates "that Origen did not follow Ammonius in positing a transcendent One as supreme hypostasis". But it is precisely a questionable point whether or not Ammonius had a transcendent One as supreme hypostasis.

[45] This is the opinion of Saffrey-Westerink in their introduction to the second book of the *Theologia Platonica* of Proclus (see II, XLVIII, XLIX and XIII, see also Aujoulat, *Hiéroclès*, 60). This opinion depends on the degree of Ammonian orthodoxy one assigns to Origenes. In fact we are facing a dilemma: either Plotinus or Origenes was the orthodox Ammonian. If Plotinus himself was the one who invented the notion of the Superone and was dissociating himself from the *Timaeus*-concept of the Supreme Entity in his early treatises as we will see in our text (cf. below 49), this would mean that Origenes was the orthodox supporter of Ammonius.

[46] We shall go into this subject later on, see below 49, 50.

[47] Dörrie, *Ammonios*, 457, but he tries to neutralize and to minimize Origenes' attack.

[48] Schwyzer, *Ammonios Sakkas*, 77.

[49] Schwyzer, *Ammonios Sakkas*, 51 ff.

After all one might wonder in precisely what respect Ammonius' teaching was so attractive in the eyes of Plotinus, considering that the dogmatic teaching of Ammonius perhaps did not really reveal anything new about the One. It seems that his scholarly approach to the 'classical' texts the Platonists read rose far above the arid scholarly methods of the time. We are told in *the Life of Plotinus*, ch. 14, that commentaries of Severus, Cronius, of Numenius *et ceteri* were read in Plotinus' classroom by a student and that nothing of what was read was taken over by Plotinus, that he was very personal in his consideration (θεωρία) and, finally, we are told that in the investigations (ἐξέτασις) on the theme Plotinus brought in the 'mind (νοῦς) of Ammonius'[52]. The 'mind of Ammonius' seems to have to do with the personal approach of the master, for Porphyrius tells us that Plotinus was 'personal' (ἴδιος) and varying (ἐξαλλαγμένος), which probably means that he gave a completely different turn to the theme. This, indeed, is what is actually seen in many of the treatises: when a quotation is offered, Plotinus gives the meaning of the quotation in a wider context of his own, elevating the problem to the high personal level of his treatment[53]. Perhaps the word ἴδιος is the most revealing characteristic of Pophyrius' description of Plotinus' method. After having spoken about Plotinus' personal approach Porphyrius goes on -as we already said- with the phrase: "bringing (or showing) the mind of Ammonius in the investigations". So Plotinus' modification of the direction of the theme in the investigation seems to reflect Ammonias' mental activity in treating certain themes. Thus the remark about 'the mind of Ammonius' seems to me to refer to Ammonius' and Plotinus' mental profoundness and their personal way of dealing with subjects[54], whereas 'normal' scholars as e.g. Longinus[55] tried to examine the text as it stands and to make it fit in with or explain it in the terms of theories of the author concerned, perhaps adducing numerous interpretations. Contrariwise, Plotinus did not say anything about works of those who were read (ἐλέγετο ἐκ τούτων οὐδὲν καθάπαξ[56]). So I would not have the expression 'the mind of Ammonius' refer to Ammonius' 'technique' as Dillon[57] tentatively suggests and Baltes argues[58], or it must be his highly personal 'technique', *i.e.* handling texts of others or making them his startingpoint in the framework of his own philosophical thought and digressions. Quite to the contrary, Plotinus' 'technique' in writing and speaking may have been rather underdeveloped in comparison with his inspiration and persuasiveness. It is of relevance here to point to Porphyrius' message in the *Life of Plotinus* (ch.3,16) that Ammonius' taught a philosophical *attitude* (ἕξις)[59] rather than a philologico-philosophical technique, an attitude which inspired Plotinus even to seek contact with Persian and Indian philosophy. One is struck by the fact Plotinus scarcely discusses anything explicitly with his predecessors, giving chapter and verse; he explains his own thought and from time to time he refutes (general) theses of preplotinian philosophy. Finally, the given interpretation of νοῦς as profoundness squares nicely with Porphyrius' remark that Plotinus was able to give the sense (νοῦς) of a profound argument of writings of others in a very concise and pointed wording: Ἐπληροῦτο δὲ ταχέως καὶ διὰ ὀλίγων δοὺς *νοῦν βαθέος θεωρήματος* ἀνίστατο[60].

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[50] See below 54.

[51] See Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus*, I, 97 (on the triad), 112 (on ὕπαρξις), see also 258-260. If Hadot is right in ascribing the Commentary of the *Anonymus Taurinensis* to Porphyrius, Porphyrius had a doctrine according to which the Supreme Entity was purely the activity of being, while this activity was participated by the being of the second One (Hadot, *ib.*, II, 104, XII, 22 ff.).

[52] For the use of the words θεωρία and ἐξέτασις see Goulet-Cazé, *Professeur*, 263 who has a sensible discussion of the terms.

[53] 13[III,9],ch 1 is an iliuminating example, see below 48.

[54] After the sentence which launches 'the mind of Ammonius' Porphyrius speaks about Plotinus as rather laconically presenting the νοῦς (the significance) of a profound study written by other scholars. It seems erroneous to me to connect this remark with Porphyrius' description of the methods in the classroom as Goulet-Cazé, *Professeur*, 262, 266 holds. If

In any case, I do not adhere to the opinion that Ammonius inspired Plotinus to his Superone-concept. Perhaps there were other philosophical

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she were right, Plotinus was rather brief in his treatments, directly leaving the classroom (ἀνίστατο) after the succinct remark. This is contrary to Porphyrius' description of the three-days-discussion of Plotinus with Porphyrius on the subject of the connection between body and soul (*Vita*, ch. 13). Only in writing he was concise *etc.*, as Porphyrius - as an antithesis to his oral teaching- expressly remarks in the opening of ch.14. To my mind the phrase: Ἐπληροῦτο δὲ ταχέως καὶ διὰ ὀλίγων δοὺς νοῦν βαθέος θεωρήματος ἀνίστατο is to be connected not regressively with the observations on the procedures in the classroom, but progressively with the sentence that follows which offers an example of the fact that Plotinus quickly absorbed what was read and that he could in a laconical way strikingly characterize the meaning of a profound study. When a major work of Longinus was read to him (Plotinus did not read himself in the classroom, having difficulties with his eyes), he was able to word his feelings about this work of Longinus very concisely: φιλόλογος μὲν Λογγῖνος, φιλόσοφος δὲ οὐδαμῶς ("A philologist Longinus is, in no way a philosopher").

[55] See Goulet-Cazé, *Professeur*, 266.

[56] See for the meaning of these words, especially καθάπαξ, combined with οὐδὲν, Goulet-Cazé, *Professeur*, 262.

[57] Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 381. Rist, *Road*, 169 ff. has a chapter on 'the Originality of Plotinus'. Rist (*o.c.*, 171) first translates νοῦν by 'insight', which could be correct, later he jumps to 'intuition', which seems incorrect. See also Goulet-Cazé, *Professeur*, 266, and Baltes in his review of Schwyzer's book, Gnomon (1984), 204-207.

[58] Baltes, *Review* on Schwyzer's Ammonius, 207.

[59] I do not understand how Baltes, *Review* on Schwyzer's Ammonios, 207, is able to interpret this passage as testifying to "die in der Auseinandersetzung mit den Vorgängern angewandte Methode des sorgfaltigen Prüfens".

[60] See above note 54.

doctrines of Ammonius which influenced Plotinus. There is a genuine fleet of eight doctrinal issues, that circles among scholars as Plotinian novelties. Schwyzer gathered eight doctrinal points of which Dodds provided five issues, whereas Dörrie added a methodical point[61]. However, an Ammonian origin is all speculation. Not even the doctrine of the One, which Schwyzer in the end desperately wishes to save as Ammonian, can be attributed to him: "und da wir andererseits wenigstens *ein* (italics of Schwyzer) Lehrstück suchen, das die lange Schulerschaft bei Ammonios verständlich macht, glauben wir nicht fehl zu gehen, wenn wir gerade diese Lehre bereits Ammonios zusprechen *etc.*".[62]

Krämer suggests the possibility of more sources of the Superone-conception which could have inspired Ammonius and (indirectly via Ammonius) Plotinus: Eudorus, Moderatus, Philo, the Valentinians[63], and Ammonius' contempories like Clemens Alexandrinus, or Origenes, the Christian[64]. The expressions we come across *e.g.* in Philo and Origenes about the ineffability of the One[65] and its position beyond its inferiors, however remarkable they may seem, are all to be seen as different ways of presenting the mind-character of the One, sometimes denying mind and sometimes ascribing mind to the One, which Krämer himself observes[66].

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[61] The general three issues are:

1) The subject of the mind is identical with its objects,

2) The three hypostases, the One, mind and soul as extracted from the Parmenides of Plato.

3) The proceeding of the mind from the One and the soul from the mind.

Dodds pointed to five innovations as being of more importance :

4) The dynamics of the producing power of the One constantly descending into the sensible world.

5) Causality is not due to the act of Creation, but is an atemporal relation between the intelligible world and the Origin.

6) The golden rule: the higher levels are immune to the influence of the lower.

7) The return of the soul to the mind and via the mind to the One is a turning to the inner self.

8) The core of the Plotinian philosophy is the examination of the self.

9) Dörrie added: Plotinus tried to establish an ontology culminating in the One, whereas earlier philosophers only gathered commenting notes. As I feel it, this systematical tendency in Plotinus, although predominant, is also present in the Mesoplatonic systems, *e.g.* in Numenius. See for the whole problem of the difference between Mesoplatonism and Plotinus, Dörrie, *Sources*, 191 ff.: *Die Frage nach dem Transzendenten im Mittelplatonismus*. As to Plotinus' method compare what is said in the text. See for the nine points Schwyzer, *Ammonios Sakkas*, 75,76, and Dodds, *Tradition*, 3.

[62] Schwyzer, *Ammonios Sakkas*, 77, see Baltes' criticism in his Review on Schwyzer's Ammonios, 207: "vor allem hat Ammonius noch nicht die Lehre vom Einen über dem Seienden vertreten, die seine übrigen Schüler nicht gelehrt haben".

[63] Although it is not unreasonable to consider Gnostic sources as important for the development of Plotinus' theory of the position of the supranoetic One and his derivation-system, something in fact suggested by Jonas, (*Gnosis uns spätantiker Geist*, II,161 passim), Krämer (*Geistmetaphysik*, 263) himself ultimately does not convert himself to this view: "Nicht, alsob Plotin etwa von Valentin abhängig wäre". He sees the presence of a preplotinian ontological tradition as an independent source of both Gnosticism and Neoplatonism as well. See on Plotinus and Gnosticism below 332 ff.

[64] See Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 294, n.400.

[65] See Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 282, n.342.

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[66] See Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 287, n.365.

CHAPTER TWO

PLOTINUS' OWN WAY: THE CHRONOLOGICAL TRAUMA, PLOTINUS' REFUTATION OF THE CHARGE OF MODERNISM

If it is true that Plotinus had to clear his own way, beit that he might have gathered some honey (Moderatus *et ceteri*[67]) in the garden of Platonic thought in the past, we are facing a dilemma, of which one horn is the question whether Plotinus had a well rounded and well balanced system before he started to write at the age of 48/49, and the other whether he had to go his own way, continuously reconsidering his thought in an evolutionary manner. Now evolution is commonly denied to his philosophy: chronology, so industriously exercised in the field of research on Plato and Aristotle (Jaeger), has thus far failed to make itself be taken seriously. There are some scholars, *e.g.* Heinemann[68], who by jumping to conclusions have killed any desire to be involved with this disresputable activity. We may speak of a chronological trauma. Heinemann's theories are rejected by dominant scholars such as Bréhier[69], Theiler[70], Armstrong[71] and Schwyzer[72]. Moreover, a man 48/49 years of age, is not supposed to change the foundations of his thought. Atkinson is a fine example of someone who represents the current conviction: "It is not too misleading to say that each treatise takes for granted the whole of his philosophy"[73]. Nevertheless, in this supposedly monolithic system there are some odd phenomena to explain, which are not in line with current views. In the first eight treatises the conception of the Superone of *e.g.* 9[VI,9] (chronologically 9) nowhere emerges. They are 'Superoneless', as we shall see. There is, of course, a Supreme Entity. However, it was not named 'One' in the sense of the later Superone, but it is called Beauty (or perhaps the Good, 1[I,6]), Noeton (7[V,4]), the Good, and sometimes One 7[V,4], and in 6[IV,8],16 One in a more Xenocratean way. Why in the current view, is the notion of the Superone absent in the first treatises? I know of no satisfying answer to that. It has not gone unnoticed, but that is where the matter stops. Armstrong affirms: "It is, however, just possible to follow Heinemann in postulating a period after Plotinus began to write when he had not yet come to regard his supreme principle as the Neo-Pythagorean Unity-Absolute"[74]. Armstrong maintains that such Neo-Pythagorean systems with a Unity-Absolute at the top were known to Plotinus. But in the end he leaves it at that, without paying any attention to a possible development, even rejecting it. Plotinus himself, however, seems to be fully aware of the novelty of his main doctrinal framework. This curiously appears in 10[V,1], chronologically the next one to 9[VI,9]. It is important to notice that in 9[VI,9] Plotinus introduces the Superone and that in the next treatise, 10[V,l] he writes in defense of his (new) system. Tentatively one might suggest the rather unorthodox view that apparently the first eight treatises have been written in a period of Plotinian development, which was characterised by the absence of the notion of the Superone. This absence could be a coincidence, but we shall come up with arguments leading to another direction.

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[67] See above 3 ff. and 18.

[68] Heinemann, *Plotin*, 15 ff.

[69] Bréhier, *Introduction* to his French edition, 18 - 20 .

[70] Theiler, *Vorbereitung* (1934), 62, 63 finds Heinemann's book one of the most exciting recent books about Plotinus ("in dem aufregendsten Plotinbuche der letzten Zeit") to continue with an almost overall rejection of its chronological winding paths.

[71] Armstrong, *Architecture*, 23 -25.

[72] Schwyzer, *RE*, 559.

[73] Atkinson, *Ennead V. 1*, X. This phrase of Atkinson may be seen as the upshot of modern Plotinusresearch, see Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 295 and Schwyzer, *RE*, 548: the doctrine is as a whole behind the tracts. Bussanich, *The One*, 6 agrees, but sees "significant developments in his use of terminology and, in the later treatises greater penetration into particularly difficult problems". I do not think that these developments are confined merely to terminology. I believe Matter, *Einfluss*, 16,17, to be more convincing when positing that there is in Plotinus a continuous elaboration, starting from the problems of the soul and adapting in following treatises the soul to the three-level system, building up this system during the first eleven treatises, which is the core of his philosophy. He was continuously occupied with reworking and elaborating themes that were more in the background in the earlier tracts. Also in O'Meara, *Structures*, 125-128 there is a tendency to deny that there is a rigid or monolithic system. His conclusion is: " ... la notion d'un système preétabli et inchangé s' avère défectueuse, et nous la remplacerions plutôt par une interpretation plus dynamique et plus nuancée de la pensée plotinienne".

First of all I would like to draw my readers' attention to the *Apologia* in 10[V,1], 8-9, chapters written in a conscious effort to refute any reproach of modernism (καινοτομία[75]). Plotinus provides a short characteristic of the new system. At first glance it seems to amount to what we find in Simplicius' report of Moderatus[76]: a supranoetic Good, above mind and soul, and even a theory of the three Ones emerges. The difference is that Plotinus insists on the proceeding of the mind from the Good and the soul from the mind, an account apparently extracted from the *Republic* (the Good as superior to mind and being) and from what the *Sixth Letter* (323 D) had to tell about the father of the cause (mind) and the *Timaeus* (34 B and 41 D) about mind's creation of the soul in the 'mixing-bowl'. It must not escape notice that the system of proceeding is the one which is especially claimed as the essence of Platonic thought. Plotinus does not yet speak about the One but calls the top the Good (from the *Republic*). Only at the end of ch.8 the three Ones-system emerges, obviously based on the *Parmenides* and provoked by Plotinus' wish to describe the three Ones-system of the Platonic dialogue *Parmenides* as more appropriate than what there was to find in the poem of Parmenides itself. Not without satisfaction Plotinus affirms that he (Parmenides, *i.e.* Plato' s Parmenides), too, is proved to have the system of the three natures[77], which seems to be Plotinus' own name for the system (the opening of the chapter, too, talks about the three layers[78]). In Moderatus the system was fourfold, including the sensible which *hyle* as such was made part of, but apart from *hyle* there was similarly only a three-Ones-system. For in *hyle* there is no one, but only a reduction to plurality. It is noticeable that in fact Plotinus does not apologize for the three-Ones-system as original Platonic philosophy, but only for the system of proceeding. This does not alter the fact that it is mainly[79] the emergence of the Superone in preplatonic history that is demonstrated in ch.9. Thus in the eyes of Plotinus it is essentially the same system: the combination of the elevated One (derived from the *Parmenides)* and the theory of the mind and soul's proceeding from the Good (as it is reconstructed from the *Sixth Letter* and the *Timaeus*). I think one is allowed to extend his defense and attempt at reconciliation with his critics to the three-Ones-system, although his reconciliatory utterance is related to the system of proceeding of the mind and the soul from the Good. In my paraphrase: 'This entire approach is not new, not presented now for the first time (μηδὲ νῦν, ch.8, line 11), but it was already said long ago, (ἀλλὰ πάλαι μὲν εἰρῆσθαι μὴ ἀναπεπταμένως) by Plato and his predecessors beit not explicitly (ἀναπεπταμένως[80])'. For establishing the early date Plotinus appeals to the writings of Plato himself[81]. Especially his remark that 'it is not now for the first time' (*μηδὲ νῦν* line 11) makes it clear that apparently in Plotinus' days the system and the special place of the One was considered as brand new and offensive. The emphasis laid on the separate place of the One in the system manifests itself in Plotinus' observation that in Parmenides the One was more properly one (κυριώτερον ἕν ch.8,26) and that in Anaxagoras the first principle is separated (χωριστόν ch.9,3).

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[74] Armstrong, *Architecture*, 25, see also Armstrong, *Translation* I, vii.
[75] Atkinson, *Ennead V. 1*, 185 refers to Dodds, *Tradition*, 1-2.
[76] see above 7 ff.

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[77]'Nature' (φύσις) not only can mean hypostasis in Plotinus, but it is even his favourite term to express what later is a fixed term, ὑπόστασις (cf. 33[II,9],1,20.) 'Υπόστασις in the *Enneads* never means 'hypostasis' in the later sense, *i.e.* in the sense of one of the three ontological principles according to Wolters, *Eros*, 11. However, I think in 33[II,9],1,42 ὑπόστασις is employed in a manner which approximates the meaning of level. In 33[II,9],1,42 Plotinus objects to other philosophers, who wish to distinguish more levels of mind, but only in our thought, because they abandon a plurality of levels (τῶν πλειόνων ὑποστάσεων ἀποστήσονται) which implies that the mind itself can be called a ὑπόστασις. Incidentally it can be said of time or wisdom, see Atkinson, *Ennead V. 1*, 55. Due to Porphyrius, ὑπόστασις was later a fixed term, Dörrie, *Hypostasis*, 50 and see also Atkinson, *Ennead V. 1*, 55, 56, 198. See for other meanings of φύσις, below note 353.

[78]Plotinus says that all things are threefold around the King of all, the One, see Dörrie, *Der König*, 224 ff., and Atkinson, *Ennead V. 1*, 186 ff.

[79]However, not only the position of the Superone is studied, for in Parmenides' poem it is the equation of being and mind that is paid attention to. Plotinus also realises that the concept of the One in the poem entails too much of a plurality.

[80]This word is a hapax in Plotinus. Curiously Dörrie thinks that it comes from ἀναπέτεσθαι (*Der König*, 225, n.9). Atkinson is right in deriving it from ἀναπεταννύναι, see Atkinson (*Ennead V. 1*, 192).

[81]This remark could be supposed to refer to Plotinus' exploitation of the *Parmenides* for describing Parmenides' doctrine about the One, but be this as it may, it refers to a wide range of Platonic works as well.

A most interesting point is that Plotinus feels forced to conclude that Plato knew the doctrine of the proceeding of the soul from the mind and the mind from the Good (ὥστε Πλάτωνα εἰδέναι κτλ. ch.8,line 9). So he fully recognizes that one has to go beneath the surface of Plato's works to detect the system and needs to combine data in order to find it. He announces his comments (λόγοι) as explaining (ἐξηγηταί) what was implicit in Plato and the preplatonici[82]. He goes on with measuring Parmenides (both the historical and the Platonic one from the dialogue *Parmenides*), Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, and Aristotle by the standard of the new system. After reviewing these predecessors from a distant past he concludes that some of the early philosophers worked out the conception (of the One[83]) in books, others in unwritten groupdiscussions or even left it alone altogether (9, 30-32). Armstrong (*Translation* V, p. 45) suggests that the unwritten groupdiscussions may refer to Ammonius' meetings (cf. Porphyrius, *Life*, ch.20), which would make Ammonius a plausible candidate for being the inventor of the system, which I have rejected above. I would add that also on the basis of ch.9, 30-32 itself doubt may be cast on Armstrong's suggestion. For the groupdiscussions referred to are said to be held long ago, by ancient philosophers (line 28 ἀρχαίοι). He speaks about Pythagoras and does not seem to go beyond his followers (οἱ μετ' αὐτόν[84]). So I do not think that Atkinson is very convincing either when referring to the unwritten doctrines of Plato. This reference would not work if in line 32 Plotinus confined himself to ancient (*i.e.* preplatonic) philosophers. Plotinus speaks about οἱ ἀρχαίοι, undoubtedly referring to παλαιὰς δόξας of ch.8, line 14 and ἀρχαιότητα of ch.9, line 3[85], which is the excuse for Anaxagoras' indefinite view of the One. So it seems extremely unlikely that with ἀγράφοις συνουσίαις Plotinus referred to Plato and his unwritten doctrines (ἄγραφα δόγματα). Incidentally, Atkinson could have referred to lectures as *On the Good*, but even so there is scarcely any need to refer to them, because Plotinus had already indicated the writings (γράμματα) of Plato in which he considers the system to be present in a veiled manner, as we have seen. My impression is that Plotinus, when speaking of unwritten, *i.e.* more or less secret, lecture-room doctrines, attempts to explain away the absence of information about the One in particular philosophers, which is in line with his remark that others had left it alone altogether.

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[82] I do not think that πάλαι εἰρῆσθαι (line 12) is confined to Plato's works only. It is in line with the entire development of the chapters 8 and 9 with their historical interest (Parmenides *etc.*) to regard παλαιὰς δόξας (line 13) as including the opinions of the preplatonici. This does not alter the fact that Plotinus considers himself and his λόγοι as the interpreters of Plato' s hidden system (see on this point Atkinson, *Ennead V. 1*, 191).

[83] Atkinson (*Ennead V. 1*, 210) is right in interpreting ταύτην ... τὴν ch.9, line 30 as the nature of the One, although this is far from clear at first glance (see also Harder's translation, who adds "das Eine"). For it is not unjustified to consider it to refer to the intelligible universe as treated in what directly precedes it. If Atkinson is right, we may conclude that Plotinus is fully aware of the beginnings of the history of the One in Pythagoras. He himself suggests that the system of the three Ones is thought of in the framework of Platonism. The system of the three Ones as offered in ch.8 lines 25 ff. is obviously based on Plato's dialogue, the *Parmenides*. This may be regarded a substantial deviation from Moderatus' presentation of the system. Moderatus emphasizes the Pythagorean character of the system: κατὰ τοὺς *Πυθαγορείους*. Apparently, Moderatus aimed at Pythagorizing Plato, whereas Plotinus wishes to Platonize the system.

[84] Also Pherecydes is mentioned after οἱ μετ' αὐτόν. This is rather strange, since Pherecydes is supposed to be Pythagoras' teacher. In Neoplatonic circles this fact was known (see Atkinson, *Ennead V. 1*, 210), but we cannot be completely sure whether Plotinus was acquainted with it. If he was, his mentioning of Pherecydes could have been an afterthought. Otherwise Plotinus made a chronological mistake. Müller, Harder and Atkinson (*Ennead V. 1*, 210) take it to be a learned gloss. However, I cannot see the need to insert such a gloss right here. Moreover who was to do this, Porphyrius? and if so, why? In any case Plotinus remains in the preplatonic atmosphere. Maintaining Pherecydes' position in the text has its importance, because it strengthens the evidence for maintaining that the context is restricted to *preplatonic* philosophy.

Having discussed the *Apologia* we are now in a better position to judge the question of Plotinus' indebtedness to Mesoplatonic thought and Krämer's view on it. Krämer tends to deny a great dependence on Speusippean Mesoplatonism, especially in so far the conception of the One is concerned. He prefers speaking of a "subterranean tradition"[86] and "structural correspondences"[87], ending up in the emergence of the Speusippean model after the predominance of the Xenocratean paradeigma, as we already saw[88]. It is highly curious that Krämer gives no attention to Plotinus' *Apologia* in this connection. For by its view on the introduction of the Superone in ancient philosophy and its description of the three-Ones-system this *Apologia* confirms that there is palpable influence of (Pythagorizing) predecessors (Moderatus), although Plotinus himself tends to Platonize the system, knowing however that Pythagoras was the initiator of the whole[89].

It is perhaps Krämer's tendency to reject a direct historical influence that is to blame for his suppressing the *Apologia*. This *Apologia* is no doubt the most important evidence to suggest that Moderatus or similar philosophers have had an influence on the system. So as far as the question of Plotinus' indebtedness is concerned, to leave out the *Apologia* damages the historical perspective. Krämer believes, as we already saw[90], that Plotinus' adoption of the system of the One above the mind was inspired by an oral tradition. However, Plotinus' suggestion of the doctrine's novelty (μηδὲ νῦν) in the *Apologia* indicates that the doctrine was absent in his time. This implies and confirms that an oral tradition is not very likely to have been a source for transmitting the doctrine. It is far more acceptable that he picked it up by reading Moderatus or authors of his kind. This seems in line with the fact that Plotinus had to develop the whole concept himself, since apparently his immediate predecessors did not have it; and as we shall see, he presumably worked out the idea of the Superone during his first period of writing. If this view carries any weight, then oral tradition did not have much to do with the conception of the notion of the Superone. Nevertheless the importance of the influence of Pythagorizing Mesoplatonism may not be overestimated. In that respect I believe Krämer is right in maintaining that Plotinus' Neoplatonic doctrines as he works them out in the *Enneads* originate from a fresh start of thought ("aus einem denkerischem Neuansatz"[91]). Indeed, we have in Plotinus a working up and rethinking of all that philosophy had had to offer so far, including a great deal of Mesoplatonic 'Gedankengut', within the new framework of the three-natures system, which has to be seen especially in its dynamics, *i.e.* the proceeding of the lower hypostases from the higher ones, as Plotinus himself realised[92]. It is the reconsideration of precisely what the new hypostases entail and how the lower ones proceed or emanate from the Superone or *Arche* that is vital in Plotinus' philosophy and that is to be regarded as the incentive of the entire effort of rethinking.

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[85] Aristotle is announced as being 'later' (ὕστερον). The discussion of Aristotle' s view reveals that he may not be reasonably considered as having the doctrine of the One. Thus with ὥστε in ch.9, line 28 Plotinus returns to the ancients (= preplatonici).

[86] Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 391.

[87] Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 375: "Das Verhältnis zwischen Plotin und mittelplatonischer Theologie ist vielmehr von vornherein weniger im Sinne historischer Abhängigkeit als im Sinne eines Strukturvergleichs zu behandeln", and *ib.*, 389 " Die eigentümliche Stellung Plotins beruht dann - strukturell, nicht etwa im geschichtlicher Deszendenz betrachtet -" *etc.*

[88] See above 10.

[89] 10[V,1],9,29.

[90] See above 10 ff.

Now once more I would like to call attention to what I consider to be of particular importance: the unmistakable fact that this *Apologia* of Plotinus' 'ancient' modernism comes after 9[VI,9], the first treatise to bring together the notion of the Superone with mind and soul, the first to introduce the Superone at all in the *Enneads*. Is it too farfetched to assume that the *Apologia* is closely linked up with this introduction of the Superone? Assuming such a connection would cast some new light on the *Apologia* and its functioning, by its gaining actuality in Plotinus' development. It may be that the novelty of this type of One, figuring in 9[VI,9], had met with strong objections from co-platonists or from Plotinus' pupils. In any case, we have already heard about the attacks launched by Origenes, Plotinus' co-pupil in the lecture-room of Ammonius[93]. The upshot of it all is that it must be considered absolutely possible that Plotinus, later in the *Enneads*, did introduce a new system, in which the One had a new role to play[94].

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[91] Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 389. He rightly rejects any attempt (like Armstrong's) at explaining noetical aspects of the Superone as repristinations or rudiments of Mesoplatonic thought.

[92] See above 21.

[93] See above 14.

[94] It is very curious to notice that some notion about this possibility emerged in the mind of R. Harder which he expressed just before his death in the presence of Dörrie, when there was a discussion about the sources of Plotin in Vandoeuvres (fifth 'Entretiens'). The breakthrough of the doctrines of the three hypostases would have presented itself in the 9th and 10th treatise of the *Enneads* (Harder's words quoted in Dörrie, *Der König*, 225 with ac-

I shall now adduce some more arguments to undermine the orthodox position as regards the moment of introducing the Superone. For we may ask whether there is any trace of possible development of the position of the One in the early *Enneads*. There are some curious facts to be noticed.

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ceptance of Dörrie). I think that it is a correct statement that the breakthrough came in the 9th and 10th tract. However, this doctrine of the three hypostases emerged as early as in 7[V,4] in sofar as Plotinus tries to separate the mind from the One, see below 35 ff.

CHAPTER THREE

THE NOTION 'ONE' IN THE EARLY TREATISES OF THE *ENNEADS*

There are treatises that do not know of the Superone. Heinemann based his definition of early treatises (2,4,19,1,20) *inter alia* on the absence of the One, but he does not stick to the Porphyrian chronology, as Cochez and I do[95].1[I,6] speaks about the Beautiful, the God and the Good, but has nothing to say about the One[96], nor do 3[III,1][97], 8[IV,9]. More problematical are 2[IV,7], 4[IV,2], 5[V,9], 6[IV,8] and 7[V,4], for in these treatises we find the term 'One', but, as we hope to demonstrate, they do not contain the notion of the *Super*one. Schwyzer[98] adduces 1[I,6] to prove his thesis that the One already figures in the early treatises. Although he recognizes that the name and word as such are absent from 1[I,6] he infers from the fact that the Good is present in 1[I,6] and in 2[IV,7],10,36 that we are entitled to assume a role for the One, for the Good and the One are identical according to 33[II,9],1,5. However, this argument is far from convincing for someone who, of all things, has to be persuaded that in the early treatises the One is present, since 33[II,9] is chronologically advanced (no 33). Schwyzer makes a - methodical - error by using material from later treatises to settle a problem in regard to a possible early phase of Plotinian thought. For in the early treatises there is the Good, and the Good is one (has unity, is indivisible *etc.*) but the Good is not *the* One: that had to be proved in the first place. I will focus attention on these 5 treatises respectively, maintaining the chronological order of Porphyrius.

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[95] Heinemann, *Plotin*, 122 ff. For Cochez see Heinemann, *ibidem*.

[96] In 1[I,6],9,37 ff. Plotinus is rather undogmatic or if you wish not yet dogmatic in that he leaves it to the reader a) whether he prefers to consider Beauty as the porch of the Good (προβεβλημένον τὸ καλὸν πρὸ αὐτῆς ἔχουσαν), and speaking in a loose way of Beauty as the primal Good or b) if the reader wishes to carefully distinguish the Good from the intelligible and to adhere to the opinion that the place of the Forms is intelligible Beauty, whereas the Good is the source and origin of beauty or c) whether he would place the Good and primal Beauty on the same level. According to Armstrong, *Translation* I, pp. 262, 263 Plotinus is prepared to tolerate a variety of ways to express the relationship between Beauty and the Good, pointing to 32[V,5],12 and 38[VI,7],22, where Beauty is discussed in different ways. In 32[V,5],12,37 ff. Beauty is said to be the younger not in time but in truth and the Good not to be what comes from it. Beauty can even detract those who not know, from the Good. In the previous treatise, the 31th, he had already stated a similar utterance: "what is prior to beauty (the SE) does not wish to be beautiful" (31[V,8],8,5). In treatise 38, however, he retracts this statement somewhat telling us that what is the origin of beauty must itself be beautiful in a way. In 38[VI,7],32,25 ff. Plotinus is willing to assign to the Good a form of beauty, different from intelligible beauty. This form of beauty is beauty above beauty: κάλλος ὑπὲρ κάλλος (38[VI,7],32,28 ff.), or as a substantivated adjective τὸ ὑπέρκαλον (38[VI,7],33,19), Plotinus also calles the beauty of the SE the nature of the Good. This willingness to assign some form of superbeauty to the SE does not appear as 'naive' as his utterance in 1[I,6,],9,37 ff. So I do not believe it is a question of tolerance but rather one of development. In the last mentioned passages he had thought out the real relationship between the two, whereas in the first treatise of the *Enneads* he does not seem ready for a fixed opinion or completely aware of the difficulties. See about this whole issue also Kremer, *Seinsphilosophie*, 29, 30 and 169, and Armstrong, *Translation* VI, 162-163 and *id.*, *Beauty*, 160-162.

[97] "Nothing is without a cause", Plotinus affirms. According to Armstrong (*Translation* III, 9) the One is to be indicated as cause of the intelligibilia. However, Plotinus solely claims that among the eternal entities one cannot reduce the first entities (plural!) to other causes (plural): Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀιδίων τὰ μὲν *πρῶτα* εἰς ἄλλα αἴτια ἀνάγειν οὐχ οἷόν τε πρῶτα ὄντα (line 9). Harder (*I b*, 412) also mistakenly speaks about the intelligibilia as depending *on the First*, *singular* (τὰ πρῶτα... : "von den Dingen, die innerhalb der geistigen Welt von *dem Ersten* abhängen"), whereas Plotinus talks of first entities and causes, *plural* (τὰ πρῶτα, αἴτια), expressions which can never indicate the One.

[98] *RE*, 559.

1) 2[IV,7] 'On the immortality of the soul'

Opinions differ as to ch.13,15 ff. Schwyzer[99] adheres to the opinion that Plotinus, by saying that from time to time the soul goes to the third (τὰ τρίτα) realm after leaving the first, implies the presence of the three-level system that dominates the later treatises. There is some *vis comica* in the fact that Harder, *I b*, 407 remarks: "man versuche nicht, dieser legeren Zählung (vgl. Plato, *Gesetze* 728 D) einen Aufriss der plotinischen Seinsstufen abzupressen". These positions seem to be irreconcilable. I would agree with Harder on the grounds that the third level could be and should be understood as the world of genesis, the world of the body, as appears from εἱς δὲ τὰ τρίτα προελθοῦσα *εἱς τὰ ἐπὶ τάδε*. The expression 'εἱς τὰ ἐπὶ τάδε' definitely refers to our world (Armstrong translates: "the things down here"). So according to my interpretation the first should be the highest level, of mind, the second should the level of soul and, as I have said, the third the level of our world. However, this interpretation holds only when we read the sentence in the following manner: αὕτη ὁτὲ μὲν ἐν σώματι, ὁτὲ δὲ σώματος ἔξω, ὁρμηθεῖσα μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων, εἱς δὲ τὰ τρίτα προελθοῦσα *εἱς τὰ ἐπὶ τάδε*, νοῦ ἐνέργεια νοῦ μένοντος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ διὰ ψυχῆς πάντα καλῶν πληροῦντος καὶ διακοσμοῦντος.... Now this interpretation depends on the connection of the first νοῦ. Only one ms connects it with the following ἐνέργεια, whereas most mss (as HS) take it with ἐπὶ τάδε, but now in the form of ἐπίταδε: *citra* (intellectum). If this connection should be the right one, the soul descends from the first (level) to what comes after the mind: the realm of soul. In this case one could assume τὰ πρῶτα to be the realm of the One, the second the world of mind, τὰ τρίτα the domain of the soul. It is by taking the text in this manner that Schwyzer wants us to understand that in this treatise the classical Plotinian three-level system is already present.

It is curious to observe that Schwyzer left out the words εἱς τὰ ἐπίταδε νοῦ for it would have lent support for his view, but he is very concise in his argument. In any way, now we have built the strongest case possible for the traditionalists. Even if the reading εἱς τὰ ἐπίταδε νοῦ should be the right one, we must conclude that it is rather odd to name the realm of the One τὰ πρῶτα (plural!). Moreover, nowhere in this treatise does the One emerge. Finally, this reading, understood as Schwyzer would have it, is not in tune with the chapter taken as a whole. For in the beginning of it, there is the question how the soul comes into the body, since the intelligible is separate from body. The purely intellectual part of the soul remains in the intelligible, whereas the desiring part of the soul, that immediately follows that intellect (second realm!), wishes to impart order and beauty in the sensible world according to what it sees in the mind, and this particular soul (partly remaining a part of the directing all-soul of the universe) comes to be in that part in which it is: the body. The mind of the soul stays out of this process and is not subjected to affection. On the other hand, the soul is sometimes in the body and sometimes out of the body. At this point our pericope emerges: αὕτη ὁτὲ μὲν ἐν σώματι, ὁτὲ δὲ σώματος ἔξω, ὁρμηθεῖσα μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων, είς δὲ τὰ τρίτα προελθοῦσα *είς τὰ έπὶ τάδε*, νοῦ ἐνέργεια νοῦ[100] μένοντος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ διὰ ψυχῆς πάντα καλῶν πληροῦντος καὶ διακοσμοῦντος.... It is precisely what is depicted in the chapter what presents itself in the pericope: the soul comes down from the realm of mind, and goes to the realm of the body. This is exactly Plotinus' point. The realm of the soul does not interest him in his eagerness to explain how it may happen that the soul is alternately in, and out of of the body, whereas the intelligible remains separate. So τὰ δεύτερα is not mentioned. If we adhere to the traditionalist view, we would not be able to explain how the pericope fits in with the remainder of the chapter. The traditionalist theory can not explain soul's being in the body, for then τὰ τρίτα must be identified with the realm of soul, whereas it is precisely its appearance as νοῦ ἐνέργεια in the body and its disappearance from it that should be explained.

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[99] *RE*, 559.

It is interesting to notice that Plotinus does not employ the word φύσις, which we have learned to be his favourite term in denoting levels in the three-level system[101]. In any event, the places discussed are hardly compelling. Equally little ch.12, line 7 does have to say, where we are told that the soul (sometimes) ascends to the First *Arche*. For to ascend to the First Arche is not necessarily to ascend to the (Super)One. The highest region of mind is sometimes regarded as the supreme God, not as the One[102]. We already spent some words on Schwyzer's attempt to elicit the mentioning of the Good from the text in ch.10, line 36[103]. Taking all these arguments together we must conclude that as far as of the presence of the Superone is concerned, 2[IV,7] is disappointing.

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[100] Harder reads τοῦ in stead of νοῦ. Indeed, to read νοῦ twice, seems somewhat abundant, but if we take νοῦ ἐνέργεια appositively with soul - as the activity of the mind - then one can suitably twice read νοῦ.

[101] See above 22.

[102] See below ad 4[IV,2].

[103] See above 27.

2) 4[IV,2] 'On the essence of the soul'

This short early treatise about the essence of the soul concludes with the phrase (4[IV,2] ad finem): "The soul is one and many (ἓν καὶ πολλὰ οὕτως) in this way, the forms in the body are both many and one (πολλὰ καὶ ἕν). The bodies only many (πολλά). The Supreme is only one (τὸ δὲ ὑπέρτατον ἓν μόνον)". Armstrong[104] believes that this ending might be an addition of Porphyrius: a comment or summing-up. It could also be a gloss. Armstrong is prepared to go along with Heinemann that the early treatises do not have the One as Unity-Absolute (his term for the Superoneconcept). However, he will recognize it in 4[IV,2], ad finem. This is an unnecessary concession, for obviously in a Xenocratean way, 4[IV,2] ad finem only asserts that the Supreme Entity is one, *i.e.* has unity, which as such it is far from being the One. According to Heinemann[105], the sentences of 4[IV,2] quoted above can be identified with what is called a κεφάλαιον (summing up, sommaire) by the hand of Porphyrius. Perhaps he is wrong in naming this a κεφάλαιον (which are mostly at the head of a treatise), for at the end of a treatise (or in a treatise) the name of the argumental help from a commentator is called ἐπιχείρημα[106]. Heinemann holds that the conception of unity of the Supreme Entity must be regarded as mind, otherwise mind would be left out in the threefold scheme of the little passage. I agree. Besides, the notion 'unity' is frequently used in 4[IV,2] for the top of being, of mind (together with unity, ἕν, and indivisibility), of the soul (together with unity, but being divisible, in the forms that match with bodies and indivisible, as a totality), and of body (being one and divisible). In the second chapter in a discussion with the purely divisible soul of the Stoics, body is reduced to being solely many, and the notion of oneness of the body fades away. So the conclusion of the chapter as a summary is quite acceptable as to its contents, which has been doubted, *e.g.* by Heinemann and Armstrong. Whoever (beit Porphyrius or Plotinus himself, which I assume[107]) wrote that the Supreme (τὸ ὑπέρτατον) is only one, is right inasmuch as the Supreme refers to what in the first chapter of the treatise is called that which is primarily indivisible and chief in the intelligibles and among beings (τούτου δὴ τοῦ πρώτως ἀμερίστου ὄντος ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ τοῖς οὖσιν ἀρχηγοῦ κτλ.,4[IV,2],1,29), which is a remarkable way of denoting the Supreme Entity. If ever Plotinus had available the notion One, he could not have introduced it in a better place than here. Well, he did not, apparently because it had not yet dawned on him. Throughout the two chapters of 4[IV,2] the notion ἕν means unity and nothing else.

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[104] Armstrong, *Architecture*, 24

[105] Heinemann, *Plotin*, 101,102.

[106] See on κεφάλαιον and ἐπιχείρημα the thorough and most useful study by Goulet-Cazé, *Professeur*, 315 ff. Bréhier, too, considers the concluding lines of 4[IV,2] as as an ἐπιχείρημα (*Introduction*, XXIII-XXIV).

[107] This is also Harder's opinion, *I b*, 424.

Armstrong, at any event, turns out to be wrong in his conception of this ἓν in the last sentence as a possible candidate for being the Unity-Absolute as he calls it, beit that he tries to neutralize it by pointing to its being a possible gloss or summing up or a comment by Porphyrius. However, there would be no need for such a move if ἓν were interpreted correctly (as unity). The name of the Supreme Entity: τὸ ὑπέρτατον is well chosen, for it leaves all other distinctives out and it does not conflict with the previously mentioned ἀρχηγοῦ and τούτου δὴ τοῦ πρώτως ἀμερίστου. It does seem correct to translate the latter indication by 'this primarily indivisible being' as Armstrong does, for repeatedly this Supreme Entity is called οὐσία (4[IV,2],1,16-17; *ib.*,24). This means that, although Plotinus is well aware of some negative distinctive features[108], which also play an important role later on, he seems still to include the Supreme Entity in the level of being, beit the most superior of being: its chief. Later he will make the One absolutely distinct and separate from the level of being[109].

3) 5[V,9]'On mind, the forms and being'

Plotinus asks 5[V,9],2,24 ff. whether we must stop at the mind as the First, or whether we must go beyond the mind. Is mind only in the porch of the Good, as it were, proclaiming to us all that is in it, like an impression of it in greater multiplicity, whereas the Good remains altogether in one (ἐκείνου πάντῃ μένοντος ἐν ἑνί)? Schwyzer[110] holds that it is in this context that the One is mentioned for the first time in the *Enneads*. Plotinus is alluding to the well known place in the *Timaeus* (37 D) where Plato affirms that the αἰών remains in one, whereas the Demiurg creates an eternal image of this αἰών in plurality. According to Schwyzer Plotinus considers this one the Superone ("mit dem aber Plotinus sein überseiendes Eine meint"[111]). However, it would be odd to say of the Good that it is '*in* the one', instead of being *the* One, or simply one. Being one, *i.e.* having unity, however, is typical of *Meso*platonism and is not yet *Neo*platonism.

Curiously enough this is not the whole story. For there is a remarkable chapter, ch.14 in which τὸ ἓν rather unexpectedly emerges. I wonder why Schwyzer did not draw attention to this chapter, for it fits in with his theory far better than what he quoted from ch.3. What are the facts? Suddenly ch.14 opens with the message that the nature that embraces all things in the intelligible must be posited as the origin (ἀρχή). This origin is called, according to the translators, the real origin (τῆς μὲν ἀρχῆς τῆς ὄντως). This origin is one and altogether simple. Plotinus asks: "How can this origin be one and altogether simple (τῆς μὲν ἀρχῆς τῆς ὄντως *ἐνὸς* καὶ πάντη ἀπλοῦ), whereas in the beings there is multiplicity?" The word ἐνὸς expresses its 'unity', as the addition of ἀπλοῦ makes clear. This question of the unity of the mind and its plurality will enter the stage later[112]. So far, so good. But now Plotinus attributes to another discussion[113] the question how this multiplicity can exist besides the One: *παρὰ τὸ ἕν* and a series of other panging questions, mainly concerning the origin of the mind and its plurality. This could be the *first* time in the *Enneads* that the One *as a name* is introduced in Plotinus! If one should consider this true, it must not escape notice that this One refers to "the nature that embraces all things in the intelligible". This formula entailing περιλαβοῦσαν displays hardly any compatibility with what is later ascribed to the Superone. Consequently, I would refrain from labelling this *arche* as 'the One'. Τὸ ἕν rather seems to mean 'that one', 'that origin that is one as we were just told'.

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[108] Thus Armstrong (*Architecture*, 24) is wrong in admitting that there is no trace of the negative theology in the early treatises: "Elsewhere in these treatises the supreme principle, though, like the Platonic Good (but this refers to I,3,5, which is chronologically number 20), it transcends being, it is not ever actually spoken of as the One, *or in terms of the negative theology* " (*my* italics). Plotinus denies the SE division, place, extension, basis, and entering an other being (4[IV,2],1,17 ff.). He uses for the first time the metaphor of the centre and its rays (see below 242) and the Numenian expression: ἐποχουμένη, see Dodds, *SP*, 17,18 and below 161. The accumulation of these features may be explained as indications of the development of Plotinian thought only towards a Superoneconcept.

[109] See below 107 ff.

[110] *RE*, 559.

[111] *RE*, 559.

This last chapter (14) makes a rather disorderly impression. I would not be surprised if the first seven lines were an ἐπιχείρημα brought in by Porphyrius. In this case mentioning the One would have no consequences for the view of the One in the early treatises. However, this impression is weakened by the rather loose remark that the problem of putrefaction *etc.* will be more clearly spoken of when we return to the problem of multiplicity coming from (what is) one (πῶς ἐξ ἑνὸς πλῆθος). So this issue seems rather clearly defined in the eyes of the writer. It is not very likely that this writer be Porphyrius and not Plotinus himself, for the promise is carried out in later tracts. In 15[III,4],6,37 ff. fresh light is cast on the issue of putrefaction by treating the problem of the origin of multiplicity in one. We are told how in the framework of the (special, non-quantative) divisibility of *one* soul among *many* bodies *one* soul before the death of an animal or a plant generates *many* worms from their corruption. In ch.14 of 5[V,9] Plotinus comes forward with a solution to the problem of putrefaction which is not contrary to that of the later tract[114]. So when speaking about the issue of multiplicity from one, Plotinus seems to have in mind the special non-quantative type of divisibility of the soul. He must have had a similar solution in mind when speaking of how besides the one there can be multiplicity (ch.14, line 4). This is a completely different manner of approaching the problem of the relation between one and many from how he explains this relation in connection with the One and τὰ πάντα[115]. Ultimately, his mention of the One (if at all) is so marginal, and, moreover, this is so remote from the later Superone, that all we can say in this connection is that Plotinus is now becoming aware of the problem how the highest principle can be made responsible for plurality and that he is curious about to the origin of the mind with all its contents.

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[112] See below 172.

[113] Armstrong, *Translation*, suggests 7[V,4] which seems rather appropriate. But the lines 1-15 of the first chapter of 11[V,2] would do as well.

[114] Perhaps, Plotinus suggests (5[V,9],14, lines 15 ff.), the products of putrefaction are due to the exhaustion or impotence of soul, otherwise it would have produced something natural, which implies that products of putrefaction are regarded as unnatural by Plotinus, in as far- I presume- as they are not conform an intelligible model.

4) 6[IV,8] 'The descent of the soul into bodies'

Heinemann[116], rejecting Cochez[117], does not find any evidence for the early stage of Plotinian thought in this treatise, because he thinks that the One is present in ch. 6. In my opinion, he wrongly rejected Cochez' conviction that 6[IV,8] belongs to Plotinus' first period, for we cannot be sure that the notion 'one' in this tract already has its later meaning. Indeed, I must clarify my suspicions about the tract being representative of an early stage. To attain my goal I must examine the text of ch.6, 1-8 in detail.

In the last section of ch.5, line 34, Plotinus referred to the hidden potencies present in producing entities. He imagines what would be the case, if there were no procession in the highest realm of the transcendent world. In that case later entities would not have come into existence. So there cannot be just one alone (ch.6,1 ff. εἴπερ οὖν δεῖ μὴ ἓν μόνον εἶναι). Otherwise all things would have been hidden (in it), such that they would have no form in it, and not one single being would have existed if that entity stayed in itself, nor would the mass of things have been generated from that *One*, if the things after them (or with Vitringa after it') had not taken their procession, the things that have received the rank of souls. The sentence in Greek goes on as an anacolouthon, saying about the soul that it must be productive in the same manner. The text with τὰ μετ' αὐτά (line 5) as it stands makes no sense, although HS keep the text of the mss and Armstrong translates it as if there were no problem. The difficulties oscillate between the meanings to be attributed to τὰ ὄντα ταῦτα and τὰ μετ' αὐτά. If τὰ ὄντα ταῦτα were entities on the level of mind, then the sentence would imply that they would not be in existence if the entities after them (τὰ μετ' αὐτά having the rank of souls) had not proceeded from them (the mind-entities). Well then, this is sheer nonsense, for the level of being is in no way dependent on what proceeds from it. This would be the transcendent world in reverse! Consequently τὰ ὄντα ταῦτα cannot be supposed to refer to the level of mind, but rather they must denote the ordinary beings of this world (Harder

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[115] See below 47.
[116] Heinemann, *Plotin*, 122,123.
[117] Cochez, *L' Esthétique de Plotin*, 9.

'Erdendinge'; we may add in support that Plotinus speaks about the mass, πλῆθος, which seems to indicate this world). Indeed, it is the ordinary things dependent on the soul that are to be informed. If there were no souls, the things of our world would not be in existence, *i.e.* neither a particular thing (τι) nor the multitude of things. We are forced by the impossibilities of the first interpretation to interpret the sentence as we just did. But in this case τὰ μετ' αὐτά cannot be explained satisfactorily, if there is any explanation at all. Therefore the only escape from this critical situation is to read τὰ μετ' αὐτὸ, with αὐτό as referring to the One (whatever type of one it may be). This has its own pecularities. In this case, we must assume the One-entity to be the same as mind, or rather not to be as separated from the mind as the One in later Plotinianism is supposed to be. For now we are told that *after* this One, soul-entities emerge which are held to be responsible for τὰ ὄντα (in the colloquial sense). In this case τὰ ὄντα cannot be identified with the noetics. Plotinus' message may be assumed to contain the following teaching: 'Just as the One/ Mind did not stay in itself, and was productive of what proceeds from it, so the soul in its turn had to follow this example by being productive of the world'. We have reasons to believe that this model of mind not so sharply distinguished from the Supreme Entity, or even coinciding with it, emerges elsewhere in this early treatise. So there is every reason to doubt the claim that the Superone is involved, completely separated from the level of mind. It may be, as I suggested already, that in the first line ἕν refers to the hypothetical situation that only one entity should be in existence. Some translators use a minuscule translation of ἕν. It could be that in the following lines this supposedly unique entity is spoken of.

There are at least two items that confirm this interpretation. Firstly we have a good reason in ch.3 and secondly, the first chapter of the treatise may lend support. In ch.3,10 ff. we are told that the mind contains all sorts of intellectual powers and individual minds. In parenthesis Plotinus remarks: "for mind is both one on its own (εἷς μόνος) and one and many (ἀλλ' εἷς καὶ πολλοί)". We meet the same combination of εἷς and μόνος as in ch.6, line 1. This perhaps strenghthens the position of our interpretation of ch.6,l. The text of ch.3,25 ff. suggests a same proceeding of the soul as mentioned in ch.6. Everything could not be stationary in the mind (ὅτι μηδὲ οἷόν τε ἦν στῆναι τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, cf.6,2 ἐκέκρυπτο γὰρ ἂν πάντα μορφὴν ἐν ἐκείνῳ οὐκ ἔχοντα ..... στάντος ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκείνου), when it was possible for something else as well to exist next in order to it (ἐφεξῆς), something less, but something which must exist if that before it were to exist.

We may also adduce the first chapter of the tract, which is not only interesting from our point of view, but also because it is the only outspoken ego-text in Plotinus, focussing attention on his own experiences. He describes how he enters into himself, wakes up out of his body to his self. He becomes identical with the divine, is established in it in the intellectual realm above all else (ὑπὲρ πᾶν τὸ ἄλλο νοητόν). For a moment one could assume Plotinus to be at a level higher than mind[118], but we must realise that, in any event, Plotinus does not employ the word 'One' for this top-realm; it is all confined to τὸ θεῖον. After having spent some time in the divine he portrays himself as descending, in remarkable terms: εἰς λογισμὸν ἐκ νοῦ - from mind to discursive reasoning (which is characteristic of soul[119]). So I am under the impression that ἐκ νοῦ means that the entire realm above can be called *mind*. The top of the realm is not once called 'the One' or even 'one', 'the divine' is the one and only name used for this level. So I venture to conclude that there is indeed question of the presence of a Supreme Entity, which may be considered to qualify for the name of τὸ θεῖον, the top region of mind, to be considered as one, not as *the* One. All this amounts to Krämer's "Xenocratean" view. The same type of view is found in the remarkable treatise 7[V,4] which has strange elements for any adherent of the orthodox opinion.

5) 7[V,4] 'How that which comes after the first comes from the first and on the One'

1) The One as Noeton

The One, or rather what later in Plotinus is called the One, figures in 7[V,4] as the First (Πρῶτον), as the First Good, or as the Thinkable (Νοητόν, see 7[V,4],2,10 ff.), which is a better rendering than 'intelligible', because the translation 'intelligible' is employed to indicate the whole world of transcendency, as in Plato. In 7[V,4] it is a word meaning precisely that the Supreme Entity, which is also called one, is the object of thinking for the next level (mind). This meaning is rather rare in Plotinus. We find it used in the same way in 13[III,9] which is a hotch-potch of little treatises, and merely a series of early[120] sketches, that hardly display any unity, collected by Porphyrius to enable him to complete the third *Ennead*. Not rarely, they are regarded as pieces of writing originating from Plotinus' youth, whatever that may be[121]. Henry[122] claims not to know about other places than 24[V,6],2,4 whereas Hadot[123] adds 13[III,9],1,16 and 7[V,4] to have this specific meaning, not 'belonging to the transcendent world or hierarchy' but 'capable of being thought (by some other entity)', which is, in fact, its essential meaning as *adiectivum verbale*. We may notice here, that νοητόν in 7[V,4] has to do with the *Primum*: 'being thinkable (object of thought) for mind', whereas in 13[III,9],1,16 it means 'mind', 'thinkable (object of thought) for the thinking mind'[124]. The chronologically rather late treatise 34[V,6],2,4 has the same sort of notion of νοητόν. Here Plotinus' message is that not everything (*i.c.* the Supreme Entity) that is object of thought (for a next entity) is necessarily itself a thinking principle. Thus we are entitled to conclude that there is a similar notion of νοητόν in 7[V,4], 13[III,9],1,16 and 34[V,6],2,4, although we shall learn some important differences as regards its function in these chapters, as will be clear from our argument.

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[118] Ἄλλο in ὑπὲρ πᾶν τὸ *ἄλλο* νοητόν as such is not decisive. In Greek ἄλλο could generically include the One or exclude it. For the first case compare Ζεῦ ἄλλοι τε θεοί (Homer, *Il.* 6,476) for the second μήτηρ ἠδὲ πατὴρ ἠδ' ἄλλοι πάντες ἑταῖροι (Homer, *Od.*, 9,367), see *LS sv* ἄλλος .

[119] See below 165 ff.

[120] It is possible that they stem from different periods, before and after 9[VI,9].

[121] See below 53.

[122] *Entretiens V*, 143.

[123] *ibidem.*

Returning now first to 7[V,4], it is important to be aware of the fundamental fact that surely the notion 'one' is applied to the *Primum*, and - we might add - as the predominant attribute, or rather, as going beyond an attribute. For Plotinus says expressly that it is not some other thing, *i.e.* something different from being one and than (as an attribute of this other thing) one, but it is really one (7[V,4],1,9 ὂν ὄντως ἕν, οὐχ ἕτερον ὄν, εἶτα ἕν, a formula, which will be examined later on[125]). It is simple and falls outside all having an attribute[126] and composition. In line 17 it is called τὸ ἕν, which, if this privilege should not be entitled to 5[V,9],14,1-7, is *the first time* the *Primum* is denoted by that name[127] in the *Enneads*, but - as it seems - in passing, not yet like the 'official' name it has later on, in spite of its occurrence at the end of 7[V,4],2,41. Anyhow, I am convinced that the incidental name 'One', if already a name, has not yet the value it has in later Plotinian thought.

Returning again to the curious name '*Noeton*', we must first of all point to the fact that in 7[V,4] this name has an important role to play in order to clarify that what proceeds from the One must be a *thinking* entity. As *Bonum Primum* the Supreme Entity has to lend its Good to other entities (7[V,4],1,22 ff.), which also makes it productive, in fact, productive of a second entity. As *Noeton* (Thinkable) it produces an entity which has to think: mind. This implies that the Supreme Entity itself does not possess mind in the same sense as mind itself does. Later on we shall say something about what the Supreme Entity does have, *i.e.* self-perception. We shall also see that the mind too must be regarded as a *noeton* (just like in 13[III,9],1), somehow a copy or clone of the Supreme Entity[128]. In 24[V,6],2,8,9 *noeton* is not used as a title but only attributively, denoting a 'property' of the One: the One is thinkable (for mind), which does not affect its being without any property. For the fact that it is thought of does not alter the One in any respect or aspect whatsoever, in contradistinction to Being in the *Sophistes* of Plato (248 E), which *Plato* supposes to be affected (πάσχειν) by being the object of thought of a thinking subject (γιγνώσκεσθαι). In Neoplatonism it is entirely impossible that the One be affected by being thought of, and this in virtue of the rule that a higher Entity is immune to the influence of anything of a lower status[129]. Productive energy never operates backwards, only forwards.

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[124] What has to be regarded as 'thinking mind' here, is very difficult to find out, see Dodds, *SP*, 19. Dodds observed connections with Numenius in III,9, ch.1.

[125] See below 177, 181.

[126] Σύμβασις is an interesting word, rendered by Armstrong as "coincidence", which is far from clear. Harder has, equally wrong: "Zufälligkeit". As the substantive of συμβαίνειν it denotes having an attribute by participation in an entity, which is of a superior level in the transcendency. In fact it comes down to what Plotinus attempts to express in ὂν ὄντως ἕν, οὐχ ἕτερον ὄν, εἶτα ἕν. In 42[VI,1],26,34 ff. Plotinus has a very instructive exposition of what σύμβασις is assumed to mean. There it is connected with μετέχειν and κατὰ συμβεβηκός, see below 81.

[127] Perhaps one has to render οὐ γὰρ δὴ σώματα λέγομεν δύο ἢ τὸ ἓν πρῶτον σῶμα: 'for we are certainly not talking about two bodies or calling the first (just mentioned) One (taking τὸ ἓν πρῶτον together, 7[V,4],1,16 ff.) body' instead of - as is usually done - 'or call the One the first body'.

Becker[130] holds that the terminology by which the Supreme Entity is called *noeton* is rather undeveloped and belongs to an early stage in Plotinus' work. This point of view is under attack by Schwyzer[131] who looks upon this view as 'unangebracht' ('inappropriate'), because *noeton* in 7[V,4] displays the same meaning as in 24[V,6],2,7, where Schwyzer apparently takes it as 'thinkable by a lower entity', and not 'intelligible', that is, a term denoting the province of transcendency. This view of Schwyzer presupposes that the *noeton*-s in 7[V,4] and 24[V,6] are equivalent, which is only partially valid. To be sure, in both the meaning is 'thinkable for'; however, the method of using *Noeton* as a title in order to explain why the Supreme Entity's product is *thinking*, is a special feature of 7[V,4], unrepeated in the *Enneads* and likely to be a token of early Plotinian thought, and thus a chronological issue, which is hotly debated[132]. Indeed, if the One as Superone has only gradually developed in Plotinus' mind, and there is a stage containing a strongly unified One, it is a basic problem how and in what manner mind as a hypostasis can originate from a One, which as such does not possess mind in any way.

We cannot deny that the method Plotinus makes use of in 7[V,4] has some sophistical elements in it. First of all call your Supreme Entity *Noeton*,

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[128] See below 51 and note 174.

[129] Nevertheless in the late treatise 49[V,3] Plotinus forbids the One to be knowable: γνωστόν, for then it will be plural (see 49[V,3],13,10). See on the 'rule' below 206.

[130] Becker, *Plotin und das Problem der geistigen Aneignung*, 31, makes his remarks about "eine frühere Stufe" rather casually.

[131] Schwyzer, *RE*, 561.

[132] Becker (see note 130) with his reference to an early layer of Plotinian thought (accepted by Harder) has roused a lot of emotional reactions among later scholars. Two parties emerge. The "unionists" who try to neutralize 7[V,4] and the "chronologists", who accept an early stage in Plotinian thinking that principally differs from his later utterances about the One. Unionist are Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 398, Hager, *Das Eine*, 298 ff., Bussanich, *The One*, 7 ff., Szlezák, *Nuslehre*, 164, n.539, hesitantly in regard to συναίσθησις (see below 45): "Wenn schon keine offene Selbstkorrektur vorliegt, so doch "eine Art (οἷον) Selbstkorrektur"'. Chronologists are Becker and Harder.

i.e. Thinkable, which is a rather arbitrary name, and, then, its first product must be thinking. Thus the result is what you started off with: a vicious circle. Understandably, Plotinus renounces the method, as a result of which '*Noeton*' as a name never emerges again. On its own what has been said so far, would not suffice to claim that 7[V,4] shows divergent opinions stemming from an early stage of Plotinian thought, but together and in combination with other facts it has its say.

2) Further strange attributes assigned to the SE

Treatise 7[V,4] has something extraordinary to tell, *at least from the point of view of later Plotinian thought.* The characteristic of the One as capable of being both subject of a possible type of thinking (νοῦς, νόησις) and object of thought (νοητόν) is very important in Plotinism. It was a key problem that from the beginning of his activities as a writer was at the centre of Plotinus' attention. As we shall see later on, in 9[VI,9],6[133] we meet the first discussion of the problem in the sense of later Plotinism. There we are told that on the one hand, the One has no νόησις, since it presupposes an object, which would lead to the One having ἑτερότης and κίνησις. On the other hand, we are advised to range the One at the side of νόησις as a *cause* of thinking. Moreover, we learn that the One has no ἄγνοια: not-knowing, since it is with itself, although even the expression 'being with itself' (συνεῖναι, a very important notion in Plotinus[134]) turns out to need correction. The One must be assumed to be - as is implied in the text of ch.6 - something that precedes thought, possessing a special type of self-knowledge. This rather diffuse view of the 'knowledge' or perception of the One was not so vague in the earlier treatise 7[V,4], where the rather pronounced utterances differ widely and disturbingly from what we are persuaded to believe in 9[VI,9],6:

1) in 7[V,4],2 Plotinus - nobody doubts his authorship - ascribes to the One a peculiar (οἷον[135]) type of αἴσθησις, very carefully defining his thought: it

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[133] See below 212.

[134] See below 140.

[135] I call this type of οἷον with the special name of οἷον *metaphoricum* ("as it were"). It is applied on a large scale by Plotinus to make clear that he uses the following word not in the literal sense but as an expression of the unsayable which in the end has to be named in order to give at least a (vague) description of what essentially is unexpressable. Its use derives from the wellknown ἄρρητον of the SE which is already present in 7[V,4],1. Plotinus has several methods to say something about the ἄρρητον (the three ways, the via analogiae, the via negativa and the via eminentiae see below 181 ff.). Plotinus is fully aware of the functioning of the οἷον metaphoricum. In this case Plotinus tries to make clear that is not the normal kind of perception (of mankind) that becomes the SE. It is something similar but of a higher level, with all the (transcendent) consequences of being on this (transcendent or supertranscendent) level. In the wellknown tract on the will of the Good, 39[VI,8], Plotinus is at his most metaphorical. He, then, employs it even with verbs (ch.16, 13 οἷον φέρεται). Chapter 13 prefixes the οἷον metaphoricum deliberately to each word he says in the

is not -as it were- without perception: οὐκ ἔστιν οἷον ἀναίσθητον (a remarkable significance of the *adi.verbale*[136]). Then, after this already disquieting (from the point of view of later Plotinism) remark, he carries on in even more drastic terms:

2) all its things are *in* it and *with* it ἔστιν αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ. This sentence is often misunderstood and incorrectly translated. Armstrong renders it: "all things *belong to it* and are in it and with it". Bussanich does the similar[137]. This translation is absolutely impossible for it requires another (extra) καί before ἐν αὐτῷ. Better Harder: "alle seine Inhalte sind in ihm und bei ihm". It must not escape notice that we have to distinguish between two types of πάντα. In the same treatise 7[V,4],2,40 Plotinus explicitly declares that the One is *beyond* being and all things (πάντα), and *before* all things (the second type of πάντα). Thus the expression 'all things' (πάντα) in line 17 can hardly refer to what is inferior to the One, but only to its own (αὐτοῦ) contents. I shall call this the *contentional* πάντα. One has to be careful to distinguish the two types of πάντα, otherwise one will fail to see that the first πάντα is confined to the One as *its* characteristic and thus comes to hold that 11[V,2],1,1-3 does not differ significantly from 7[V,4],2,1 ff., as Bussanich[138] thinks. Very soon (11[V,2],1,1-2; V,2 being chronologically 11!) Plotinus, although starting with the observation that the One is πάντα and οὐδ' ἕν (is everything and not one single thing) will explain this paradox by denying that the One is πάντα, and will only admit that πάντα have to do with the One as ἀρχή and strangely enough, their return to the One[139]. The One is everything ἐκείνως, *i.e.* as an *arche*. This *arche*-aspect of the One in regard to πάντα is lacking in 7[V,4]. But this non-contentional πάντα is of the second type.

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subsequent speculations on the free will of the Good. For as he himself confesses in the beginning of this chapter, although one is not allowed to make the Good two not even for the sake of forming an idea of it, nevertheless, he feels obliged to depart from strict reason (*παρανοητέον*) in his argument. At the end of the chapter he launches his prefix οἷον *metaphoricum*, which is profusely employed in the following chapters. See also Bussanich' interesting note on οἷον (*The One*, 206).

[136] I know of no other example of an adiectivum verbale to be actively translated. Instead of the expected 'not perceptive', or 'not percepted', we are undeniably obliged to render it by 'not without perception', see also *LP s.v.*

[137] Bussanich, *The One*, 8.

[138] Bussanich, *The One*, 21.

[139] Here Plotinus seems to allude to a periodical(?) return to the One. Or perhaps we must explain this return as ἐπιστροφή (cf. 11[V,2],1,10 ἐπεστράφη). A periodical or an ultimate return does not belong to commonstock Plotinian doctrine: a formula like 52[II,3],18,20 "as long as mind and soul exist, forming principles will flow into the lower soul" does not seem to imply a stop of this flow. A same phrase, now applied to the One, figures in 9[VI,9],10,11. The One provides life *etc*, as long as it is what it is. In both places there is a comparison with the sun and its permanent irradiation, which exists as long as the sun exists. On periods of the All, see 27[IV,3],12,15 and the whole of ch.12.

Distinguishing between the two types of πάντα will provide Corrigan[140] with an answer. He believes there is an unresolved contradiction present in the text. How, then, can an object (the *Noeton*) which contains everything, in lines 12-19 (of ch.2), also be transcendent to everything, in lines 37 ff., the problem we just met? Well, not by Corrigan's tortuous efforts to construct an opposition between a *Noeton* and the One[141], but simply by recognizing two types of πάντα. Plotinus' line later remains the same as to the second type of πάντα: we are taught that the One is above all things in 9[VI,9],2,42 ff. and in V,3,11,19 (V,3 being chron. 49), πάντα - as Ideas - are supposed to be in the mind, as in 7[V,4],2,45 ff.; 30[III,8],9,40 also has a very impressive treatment of the relation between the One and πάντα.

In 7[V,4] Plotinus felt the need to emphasise that the *Noeton* has all its things in and with it, because he wanted to demonstrate the completeness and autarky of the *Noeton* (οὐκ ὂν ἐνδεές, line 14), in contradistinction to mind and seeing, which are deficient in as far as they necessarily need an object to think about or to look at.

3) it is able to discern itself πάντῃ διακριτικὸν ἑαυτοῦ, which seems to be a variation on the theme of self-perception. In 44[VI,3],17,20,21 διακριτικόν denotes the ability of dilating the eye and the tongue as to what one sees or tastes, see also *LP*, and *Tim.* 67 E, also Aristotle, *Met.* 1057 b 8. In Plato it also means 'able to distinguish' (see *LS sub voce*), *Crat.* 388 C (τῆς οὐσίας). This meaning is more welcome here. In any case it seems to bring about that the Supreme Entity is able to distinguish itself (πάντῃ completely, or perhaps in itself, because of πάντῃ which can also mean 'everywhere', see *LP*). Bussanich[142] suggests the translation: "self-differentiation", implying that it has - as in later Neoplatonism - to do with procession. However, no such notion of procession can be found in the immediate context. On the contrary, we only find terms of knowledge: συναίσθησις, κατανόησις or of contents of the One. Bussanich himself has the good sense to reject this whole idea and concludes with the remarkable affirmation that on this occasion Plotinus employs a rather inappropriate term to define the One's inner life[143]. However, one may wonder by what standard it is "inappropriate"? Plotinus' following remark is indeed curious:

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[140] Corrigan, *Enneads 5,4,2*, p.196.

[141] Corrigan, *Enneads 5,4,2*, p.196 ff. There he explains that *Noeton* would function in an (intellectual) universe of discourse different from the universe of discourse in which the One is supposed to function. I cannot make much of these distinctions. For it is the *Noeton* of line 12 of ch.2 that remains in itself and in its realm in the process of generation, just as we might suppose the One or *Arche* to do in lines 37,38. I might refer to Bussanich' criticism (*The One*, 196), who has had his own struggle with Corrigan's suggestions.

[142] Bussanich, *The One*, 22,23.

[143] Bussanich, *The One*, 23.

4 a) life is in it ζωὴ ἐν αὐτῷ. To mention life within a context of perception makes sense as the former is an essential condition for the latter. But there is more to say (see 4b).

4 b) "all things are in it" (καὶ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ), a repetition not without significance: καὶ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ seems a repetition of the contentional πάντα from his previous remark in line 16 (ἐστιν αὐτοῦ πάντα *ἐν αὐτῷ* καὶ *σὺν αὐτῷ*). If it is true that Numenian influence is palpable in Plotinus' concept of the One in 7[V,4], as we shall see[144], we might suggest that with καὶ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ Plotinus refers to the all that features in the Model of Life in the *Timaeus* (39 E ... τὰ *πάντα* ζῷα ἐντὸς αὐτοῦ γεγενημένα). There is evidence for this suggestion. However, it could also be that in πάντα there is more than in Plato's Model, *e.g.* Plotinus could have been thinking of a more general πάντα. This would be an interpretation from the part of Plotinus, for in the Model of the *Timaeus* we solely find Ideas of living beings. Be that as it may πάντα in line 16 (meaning all that has to do with the One) is somewhat wider than καὶ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ, which completes the enumeration starting with ζῷα. Plotinus' last observation is even more odd:

5) "'Its understanding of itself' is it (the *Noeton*) self (αὐτό), the self-understanding being, as it were, by self-perception in a state of eternal rest and thinking in a manner different from the thinking (νόησις) of mind" (to quote Plotinus' remark in Greek: καὶ ἡ κατανόησις αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ οἱονεὶ συναισθήσει οὖσα ἐν στάσει αἰδίῳ καὶ νοήσει ἑτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν νοῦ νόησιν). *Κατανόησις* is rendered in several manners: Armstrong has: "its thinking of itself", Harder has a better translation: "sein Sichselbstgewahren", self-perception[145], for it is explained as συναίσθησις, which will turn out to be self-knowledge, as we shall see. As such *κατανόησις* (see *LP sv*) means understanding, in 20[I,3],3,4 ff. it is the understanding of the uncorporeal, whereas 2[IV,7],10,44 comes closest to our passage, because it speaks about the soul's understanding of the soul (ἐν τῇ κατανοήσει ἑαυτῆς) and the same goes for 49[V,3],1,5, where we read about both soul's and mind's understanding itself by thought (κατανόησις ἑαυτοῦ). I can understand why Plotinus chose *κατανόησις*, and not νόησις, to characterise the knowledge the One has of itself. *Κατανόησις* seems to refer to a more direct kind of knowledge, it can be used to denote the (direct) understanding by the senses: 43[VI,2],4,15: τὴν δι' αἰσθήσεως *κατανόησιν*, whereas νόησις is not linked with the senses (cf. *LP*). So I agree with the Rist's suggestion[146] that the κατά of *κατανόησις* could perhaps suggest intensity, but in the sense that it is its complete direct perception, whereas νόησις entails more of a process. According to

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[144] See below 50.
[145] See below 46.
[146] Rist, *Road*, 81.

Sorabji[147] κατανοεῖν would mean: *downright* thinking, a variant of Rist's proposal. This only has relevance to Plotinus' usage of κατανοεῖν when the directness of Plotinus' use of *κατανόησις* is taken into account. This is in complete agreement with Plotinus' bringing it in connection with a type of συναίσθησις, self-knowledge or simultaneous self-perception. So I cannot go along with scholars like Rist[148], Sorabji,[149]and Bussanich, who deny the term *κατανόησις* a significance of its own and take it to be synonymous with the ὑπερνόησις of 39[VI,8],16[150].

6) συναίσθησις has been the object of thorough study, especially by Schwyzer in his contribution to "*The sources of Plotinus*" in his famous paper: "*Bewusst*" *und* "*Unbewusst*" *bei Plotin*. Summarizing his results one may distinguish a threefold meaning of συναίσθησις: 1) Selbstbewusstsein, 2) Selbsterkenntnis 3) Perception of one's being perceptively active: one's perceiving one's hearing or seeing[151]. Although this last meaning, which stems from

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[147] Sorabji, *Time*, 154, n. 97.

[148] Rist, *Road*, 43.

[149] Sorabji, *Time*, 154, n.97, who affirms that ".. even this qualified ascription cannot be taken seriously. For one thing, the treatise is early, and for another, a contemporary work, 3,9,9,22 denied κατανοεῖν to the One after all". Notice : after the incision of 9[VI,9] (!) in Plotinus' philosophy it is risky to consider the subsequent treatises as providing evidence in support of one's view regarding treatises previous to 9[VI,9] (see later on 53 ff.). Sorabji's first argument, in terms of the early date of the treatise 7[V,4], does nothing to disqualify Plotinus' early utterances as essentially neglectable. It only has weight, if one does not accept a development in Plotinus' thought: in that case, the previous thoughts are explained by what comes later.

[150] Bussanich even thinks that κατανόησις comes down to ὑπερνόησις of 39[VI,8],16,32, which is also more or less Rist's view (*Road*, 49 ὑπερνόησις replaces κατανόησις) and is already brought forward by Henry in the discussion of Schwyzer's contribution to the *Sources of Plotin* (386). This is an awful misunderstanding. The two words are not synonymous, for κατανόησις can have an object in the genitive and has it in Plotinus' text: κατανόησις *αὐτοῦ*, whereas ὑπερνόησις can not and does not. Κατανόησις is an 'ordinary' word that has the special meaning I described in the text, a meaning Plotinus had to explain (by means of συναίσθησις), whereas ὑπερνόησις is an 'extraordinary', deliberately chosen, even *ad hoc* created, word to denote the special kind of superknowledge of the SE, which is no knowledge at all. In the case of ὑπερνόησις Plotinus is fully aware of the grave problems of ascribing to the SE any attribute, whereas with κατανόησις Plotinus is on his way to deal with them. Later κατανόησις is rejected (see my text p.45), whereas ὑπερνόησις is never denied to the SE. The term ὑπερνόησις is a *hapax* in Plotinus, especially created to denote the type of thinking required by the self-creative being awake of the SE, which is equally a *hapax* (thought). Small wonder that it never returns. Rarely a hapax (ὑπερνόησις) has drawn so much attention on the part of scholars. Much has been made of it, irrespective of the remarkable context of self-creation and the sequence of thought. So from a philosophical point of view, too, it must not be identified with κατανόησις. Κατανόησις has a cognitive ring, whereas ὑπερνόησις is part of a voluntative process and fundamental to the SE's process of self-creating. There can be no will, if there is no kind of thinking (and life). The will, as ch.6 points out, almost coincides with thinking (ch.6,35 ff. ἡ δὲ βούλησις ἡ νόησις, βούλησις δ' ἐλέχθη ὅτι κατὰ νοῦν). This has no connection with cognition whatsoever and self-knowledge or self-perception, but it is all relevant for the intentions of the SE to be as it wills and likes to be, which are the concluding words of ch.16 (ἀλλ' ὡς ἠθέλησεν αὐτός ἐστιν).

[151] See 49[V,3],2,5, see also Schwyzer, "*Bewusst*", 366 ff.

Aristotle, is present in Plotinus, it is the first two significations that matter now. In the vicinity of perceptive terms like κατανόησις and διακριτικὸν ἑαυτοῦ, the first meaning of συναίσθησις will not do. In Plotinus' late treatise 49[V,3],13 we are informed about the role of συναίσθησις in regard to thinking (νοεῖν). Thinking in the proper sense, that is the specific form of thinking of the *mind*, which is the most essential and legitimate form of thinking, *i.e.* mind's thinking of itself, seems to be the perception of the totality of many things having come together in the mind (συναίσθησις τοῦ ὅλου *sc.* of the things which came together). It is the perception of many things (simultaneously), as, according to Plotinus himself, the etymology of the very word συναίσθησις brings out (line 21 ff. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ συναίσθησις πολλοῦ τινος αἴσθησίς ἐστι, καὶ μαρτυρεῖ καὶ τοὔνομα). Although 49[V,3] is a rather late treatise, it is not impossible that Plotinus in 7[V,4],2 has the same meaning in mind: having perception of the totality (συν) of what is in the *Noeton* (συναίσθησις next to αἴσθησις in line 15-16 of 7[V,4]). What scholars are unaware of, as far as I can see, is the fact that συναίσθησις in 7[V,4],2 is not used in connection with the *Noeton* itself, let alone in regard to the One[152], but as characteristic of the *κατανόησις* of the *Noeton*[153]. Hence our thesis that κατανόησις is the *Noeton*'s direct perception of itself is confirmed and its equation with ὑπερνόησις as adhered by Sorabji, Rist and Bussanich becomes more unlikely.

The idea of everlasting rest or immobility in line 18 originates, I think, in the self-presence of the One. Everything is in the One, and thus ready at hand (ἔστι... σὺν αὐτῷ) . There is no need for motion to recede in the One in order to get knowledge of what there is: those recesses do not exist. The difference between the forms of thinking of the One and those of the mind is not as perspicuous, for elsewhere (see *e.g.* what has just been said about συναίσθησις[154]) we are told the same as regards the thinking of the mind; there, too, there is no need for motion to recede to get knowledge.

Treatise 7[V,4] is deliberately organised in order to explain why that which proceeds from the One must be thinking. When the One *qua Noeton* remains in it self, its product must be thinking that *Noeton*. Consequently this product must be mind. In this connection it is curious that Plotinus adds some remarks about the One as an Entity with a special type of *thinking*, whereas, strictly, he only needed the One *qua Noeton*, as mind's *object*. However, as we said already, he felt a need to stress the One's completeness in comparison with the deficiency of seeing and thinking. It is fortunate for us, then, that he made his remarks, because now we can see that in his early thinking the One (not yet the *Super*one) is a kind of '*subject*'. What he has told us about the *Noeton*'s self-perception is not provoked by the demands and needs of his argument. What he says, then, cannot be neutralized by making reference to any contextual requirements: it is a *donum superadditum*.

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[152] See also below 46.

[153] See *e.g.* Bussanich, *The One*, 23, 206.

[154] See also below 166.

3) The strange attributes rejected in later treatises

By using the terms 'hypostasis', 'being', 'life', 'being awake' (ἐγρήγορσις[155]) and ὑπερνόησις[156] in 39[VI,8], he deliberately breaks his own rules concerning the attribution of such 'properties' to the One; and he vigorously apologises for this, by saying that he has abandoned the domain of correct thinking, and by profusely using the *οἷον metaphoricum*[157]. He was forced to use these expressions because of the demands of his arguments, but elsewhere, where there is no contextual need for transgressing his own rules, he is very careful to denounce such attributes as utterly inappropriate to ascribe to the Supreme Entity. So in 7[V,4] we find in the One what he rejects in it in later treatises: a kind of perception, the notion of self-perception, life, and a type of thinking which contains everything. All this is banned from the later One.

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[155] This remarkable feature seems to Bussanich, *The One*, 217, 218 to derive from Aristotle's *Metaphysica* 1072 b 15 ff. Plotinus transfers *to the Good* the psychological state of being awake (by 'absolutizing' it, as Bussanich puts it). In Aristotle this state of being awake is counted among the activities which as activities give pleasure to *man*. In Plotinus its meaning has nothing to do with the being awake of man as a pleasing activity, for it merely expresses the self-awakening as self-causating of the Good.

[156] Bussanich, *The One*, 218 rightly indicates the polemical side of Plotinus' argument as correcting Aristotle's views on the thinking of the Divinity. Surely Plotinus' Good has only *ὑπερνόησις*, whereas Aristotle's God thinks himself as νοῦς. However, this must not make us close our eyes to the intrinsic contextual development of the argument, in which *e.g.* ὑπερνόησις has a (non-polemical) part to play, as we expounded earlier.'Υπερνόησις participates in the process of selfdecision of the Good for its self-causation. Bussanich considers it perplexing that Plotinus persists in employing noetic terminology, albeit literally hyper-noetic, to describe the One. As an answer to this question he quotes Krämer, who pointed to the potentiality of the One and his being the cause in producing mind *etc*. However, the products that derive from the SE are in germ present in the SE, but not in actuality. The much quoted ὑπερνόησις has nothing to do with the potentiality of the SE, nor its being an ἀρχή, but rather with its self-causation. One must be cautious not to get carried away by optical misleading impressions. Bussanich's phrase 'it is perplexing why Plotinus persists in employing noetic terminology, albeit literally hyper-noetic, to describe the One' suggests that there is a rather broad 'supernoetology' of the SE. There are only four or five terms which belong to this arsenal: ἐγρήγορσις, ὑπερνόησις, κατανόησις, συναίσθησις and perhaps (οἷον) νόησις. The term ὑπερνόησις is a hapax and contextually determined, which holds for ἐγρήγορσις as well. Συναίσθησις is only *indirectly* connected with the SE (via κατανόησις) and κατανόησις emerges in a *donum superadditum*, in which it it satisfies similarly contextual demands. The expression (οἷον) νόησις is required by Plotinus' attempt to have something like ἐνέργεια in the SE in order to establish its free will (39[VI,8],16,15-16). All these words have their own part to play in the so-called 'supernoetology' without having any connection whatsoever with the SE's potentiality. It is all a question of contextual and argumental requirements ad hoc. This is not to deny that the capacities as cause of mind, life, *etc* are not in the SE and that they in their turn are somehow present in the One. However, the terms which Bussanich experiences as perplexing are appropriate in that stage of Plotinus' thought and are not to be linked with the causative capacities of the SE.

[157] See note 135.

Thinking is out of the question as we already saw. Later he explicitly denies the One any form of self-perception, αἴσθησις, κατανόησις and discerning itself (διακριτικὸν ἑαυτοῦ), life *etc*.

1) Αἴσθησις (even of itself) is out of the question: φύσις οὐκ οὖσα ἐν αἰσθήσει καὶ γνώσει αὑτῆς, 38[VI,7],38,10.

2) Κατανοεῖν is disapproved of in 13[III,9],9,22: Τὸ ἄρα κατανοεῖν ἐξαιρετέον (in regard to the Good). This form of κατανοεῖν in 13[III,9],9 is on the same footing with κατα(!)μανθάνειν and νοεῖν αὑτό. They are denied of the SE (*i.c.* the Good) because they imply deficiency in it: what you have to learn, you did not have in you. If the SE had to become acquainted with itself, this means it was deficient in the first place and had to complete itself by acquiring self-knowledge (νοήσει is here obviously self-knowledge, see line 18 of 13[III,9],9 τὸ νοοῦν *αὑτό*).

Chapter 9 of 13[III,9] is a very firm one when it comes to an exhaustive denial of attributes to the SE (the Good). As to movement/rest, desire, thinking, consciousness (παρακολούθησις is almost the same as συναίσθησις[158]) of itself as being good, life (it only gives life), self-consciousness (as itself), and κατανοεῖν, they are all denied of the SE. The chapter seems to have been consciously written to correct earlier statements (of 7[V,4]). However, there are also other scattered utterances in Plotinus, which vigourously refuse to ascribe attributes to the SE.

3) According to Schwyzer συναίσθησις[159], "Selbstbewusstsein", selfconsciousness, by Schwyzer distinguished from "Selbsterkentniss", is rejected in 49[V,3],13, 21-23 because it implies multitude (a's πολλοῦ τινος αἴσθησις). As I see it, it is not "Selbstbewusstsein", that is rejected in 49[V,3],13,21-23 (this passage we already described earlier under the heading of 6, see p.42). Moreover, in these lines nothing is directly rejected in regard to the *SE*. Earlier in 49[V3],13 the difficulty is raised whether the One must be called ἀναίσθητον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ οὐδὲ παρακολοθοῦν[160]ἑαυτῷ (49[V3],13,6). However, we are only told about the *mind*, since, according to this passage, the SE has nothing to do with thinking, which in its best form is thinking of the *mind*. The passage then intro-

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[158] See note 160.

[159] Schwyzer, *Bewusst*, 374. Incidentally, it is very funny to see that mss ABxUC have σὺν αἰσθήσει in 7[V,4],2,18. If this would be the correct reading, our treatment must be reduced to what is said about αἴσθησις.

[160] Παρακολούθησις is almost synonymous with συναίσθησις, see Schwyzer, *Bewusst*, 374. See however Graeser, *The Stoics*, 135, who characterises παρακολούθησις as *concomitant* consciousness. In 13[III,9],9,12-16 παρακολούθησις does not entail any notion of concomitancy. It is said that the One does not has any *knowledge* of itself as good. In the context παρακολούθησις is equated to καταμανθάνει and νοοῦν αὐτό. In Graeser's treatment one finds abundant references to secondary literature on συναίσθησις.

duces συναίσθησις, which, as we saw, must be interpreted as simultaneous perception of what is in the mind. So in connection with the mind I would rather speak about "Selbsterkenntnis" than of "Selbstbewusstsein". What this comes down to is that in this passage συναίσθησις does not directly concern the SE and that as simultaneous perception of the mind it is rather "Selbsterkenntnis" than "Selbstbewusstsein". So Schwyzer is not justified in thinking that "Selbstbewusstsein" is denied of the One in the passage under discussion. I would question too his thesis that "Selbstbewusstsein" be it in a mitigated form (by a οἷον *metaphoricum*) could ever be applied to the One, for which he makes an appeal to 7[V,4]. The term συναίσθησις, however, in 7[V, 4] cannot but mean self-knowledge as it is explained in the context. I doubt if "Selbstbewusstsein" or "Selbsterkenntnis" ever have anything to do with the SE except for "Selbsterkenntnis" in 7[V,4][161].

Very clear on the issue of συναίσθησις is 24[V,6],5,1 ff., where again the SE is denied a cognitive συναίσθησις[162]. In 38[VI,7],41,26 we are explicitly told that the SE does not operate along the lines of γνῶσις, νόησις and συναίσθησις αὑτοῦ (again I would emphasize that συναίσθησις, because of its being a part of a *noetical* triad, in this case, too, is not an issue of consciousness but of knowledge or perception of the SE of itself). Finally, it is interesting to notice that nowhere in Plotinus' later work the SE is called *οἷον* συναίσθησις, not even in 39 [VI,8] about the Will of the SE, except in the rather early treatise10[V,1],7,12, where *οἷον* συναίσθησις - as in 7[V,4],2 - namely τῆς δυνάμεως, is ascribed to the SE. However, in this case nothing points to *Selbst*bewusstsein.

To conclude this paragraph, again I would emphasize that συναίσθησις in 7[V4],2 has to be connected with the κατανόησις of the *Noeton*/One (οἱονεὶ συναισθήσει οὖσα, οὖσα, being the feminine particle linked with κατανόησις). As an explication of the *Noeton*'s not being ἀναισθητόν it is an epistemological term, denoting the all-in-one form of 'thinking' of the *Noeton*!

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[161] Henry believes that Plotinus is less hesitant in ascribing "Selbsterkenntnis" to the One than he would be as regards "Selbstbewusstsein" (in the 'Discussion' with Schwyzer in *Entretiens* V, 387): "... je le vois plus prudent pour attribuer a l' Un des termes désignant la 'conscience' que des termes désignant la 'connaissance'". He argues that the One never has an object to perceive, that is, neither itself nor any other object, during which process it would be aware of itself. I would rather say that neither "Selbstbewusstsein" nor "Selbsterkenntnis" are ascribed to the One except for "Selbsterkenntnis" as self-perception in 7[V,4].

[162] There is no stage where the SE needs συναίσθησις, for the SE is identical with itself and superior to συναίσθησις and νοήσις. In this context it is again the tendency of the plural to seek itself, to converge and to συναισθάνεσθαι αὑτοῦ that is at issue. Συναισθάνεσθαι αὑτοῦ is not "to be conscious of itself" (Armstrongs' translation), but apparently the simultaneous perception of a multitude. Graeser, wrongly, believes that 10[V,1],7,5 also has to do with the SE (*The Stoics*, 133). This contention is a conclusion on Graeser's part: the ἐπιστροφὴ πρὸς αὑτό would presuppose "a reflexive state on the part of the One". Apart from the fact that it is dubious whether this ἐπιστροφὴ πρὸς αὑτό is said in regard to the One, if it is true that the ἐπιστροφὴ πρὸς αὑτό would presuppose "a reflexive state on the part of the One", this state is not to be characterized as συναίσθησις. Graeser mentions in one breath with συναίσθησις the word νεῦσις from 39[VI,8],16,25. This νεῦσις, however, is connected with the self-production of the SE and is not a cognitive notion.

An overall-view teaches that in the remainder of Plotinus' work there is no need whatsoever to speak of συναίσθησις as a property of the One. By no means it must be considered following Henry[163] as an equivalent of ἐγρήγορσις, which in the context of 39[VI,8] denotes the SE's awakening to itself, or rather its having been awakened by itself to come to existence. Ἐγρήγορσις has nothing to do with the One's knowledge of itself nor with its so-called self-consciousness[164].

4) As to life (ζωή) we hear that the One is none of the things of which it is the origin: "Η ἐστι μὲν τὸ μηδὲν τούτων, ὧν ἐστι *ἀρχή* ... μὴ ὄντος, μὴ οὐσιάς, μὴ *ζωῆς*, 30[III,8],10,28 (see also 10[V,1],7,19). In 39[VI,8],7,52, of all later treatises the most positive[165] about the One (because of its contents: the Free Will of the SE), we are told that what we might call the life (*οἷον* ζωή (οἷον making it life as it were, a mode of speech which reveals its own impossibility) of the Supreme Entity does not spring from its being, but has to do with its ἐνέργεια, as it were. Even in this daring treatise the Supreme Entity is not provided with life in the same 'careless' manner as in 7[V,4],2. In 39[VI,8],16,36 we are told that the Good is above life (ὑπὲρ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ *ζωήν*). Now we have to deal still with the remarkable concept of contentional πάντα and the extremely interesting στάσις (ἀίδιος).

5) Πάντα in the contentional sense we met previously is bound to leave the stage. From a later point of view the remark that all things, the first type of πάντα, are in the One is quite impossible. 11[V,2],1,6 emphatically asserts that there is nothing in the One: "How then do come all things from the One, which is simple, because there is no diversity to reveal in the same, nor any doubleness whatsoever?", and line 9 of the same chapter affirms that the One does not seek anything, nor has anything nor needs anything. So we see Plotinus rather surreptiously denying (as in 13[III,9],9) what in 7[V,4] seemed certain to him. This seems to be his method of self-polemics.

6) Στάσις (ἀίδιος). We are already acquainted with the fact that in 13[III,9],9 στάσις, rest, one member of the pair 'rest-movement', is rejected. Similarly in 9[VI,9],3,45 ff. Plotinus turns away στάσις from the One[166]. For if

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[163] Henry, *Entretiens* V, 386,387.

[164] Rather it has to do with the fact that the One has a form of 'hyperthinking'. For ἐγρήγορσις and ὑπερνόησις are mentioned in one breath in 39[VI,8],30 ff. Nevertheless, this a special case, where ὑπερνόησις has nothing to do with self-consciousness but being awake. See on ὑπερνόησις notes 150 and 156.

[165] See Schwyzer, *RE*, 561.

[166] See below 134 ff.

the One has no movement, there cannot be rest either. Bussanich[167], acknowledging the rejection of both motion and rest in 9[VI,9],3,45 ff., tries to neutralize this rejection by referring to the fact that the soul in the eleventh chapter of the same tract, on the peak of the ascent, is said to be ἑστὼς πάντη καὶ οἷον στάσις γενόμενος (9[VI,9],11,15-16). He could have added στάσις in line 24 of ch.11, but this word is problematical[168]. Bussanich[169] supposes the soul then to have taken an attribute of the One: στάσις. This is a very weak, even inadmissable argument. For the characteristic ἑστὼς πάντη καὶ οἷον στάσις γενόμενος is given to the soul not because of a supposed taking part in an attribute of the One (στάσις), which it is precisely said elsewhere in 9[VI,9] to have not, but as a consequence of the soul's losing any motion, which is affirmed in the previous to line 24 of ch.11.

In my view στάσις is of the utmost importance to understand the One in 7[V,4] and its early development. The word στάσις emerges in the opening chapter of 13[III,9]. This is a curious chapter because of its scrupulous and meticulous attempt to unify the active principle νοῦς ὁρῶν and the passive principle νοητόν into one νοῦς, νοητόν being the Idea of the living creature as in *Tim.* 39 E. As we know, Porphyrius for a long time, like Longinus, thought that the Ideas were outside the mind and prior to it[170]. Plotinus does his utmost to demonstrate the possibility that Ideas (νοητόν) and active mind (νοῦς ὁρῶν) are to be localised in one unitative mind, which embraces both components. He says that there is nothing against the idea that the intelligible object itself is a form of νοῦς, namely a νοῦς ἐν στάσει καὶ ἑνότητι καὶ ἡσυχίᾳ. Since the chapter concerns the problem inherent to the Platonic idea of the living creature of the *Timaeus*, what is in στάσις in the mind is to be identified with the Idea(s) as the objects of thought. They are in complete rest and unity. So what in the mind is the object of its activity is part of the mind and, contrary to the active part of the mind, in rest.

When we return now to 7[V,4],2 and its message that the *Noeton*'s κατανόησις is a form of συναίσθησις ἐν *στάσει* ἀιδίῳ καὶ ἐν νοήσει ἑτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν νοῦ νόησιν, we are - in regard to στάσις- apparently on the same ground as in 13[III,9],1. Consequently a comparison with 13[III,9],1 teaches us that it is likely to understand the στάσις of the *Noeton* to refer to the Ideas[171]. It denotes the contents of the *Noeton* and portrays those contents as that which in the *Timaeus* is the Idea of the living creature. Thus the *Noeton* is a concentration of Ideas in a condition of repose, just as the *Noeton* of 13[III,9],1 is. We may now understand why Plotinus tells us in 7[V,4], 2 that the *Noeton* has *life* and everything in it (πάντα): it is still the Idea of the living creature from the *Timaeus* that occupies Plotinus' mind. We also come to understand that the κατανόησις of the *Noeton* can be called a kind (οἷον) of self-perception and *thinking:* συναίσθησις may be regarded as the simultaneous perception of the totality of the contents of the *Noeton*; indeed, this simultaneous self-perception may be considered as a type of νόησις, albeit of a structure entirely different (ἑτέρως) from the νόησις of the νοῦς (which is active).

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[167] Bussanich, *The One*, 26.

[168] See below 281 and note 798.

[169] Bussanich, *The One*, 26.

[170] See Armstrong, 'The background of the Doctrine', *Sources*, 392 ff., cf. Porphyrius, *Vita*, 18.

[171] In spite of Bussanich's prohibition (*The One*, 19, 20) to interpret 7[V,4] with the aid of 13[III,9],1. He has a whole series of arguments against attempts by Dodds (*Numenius and Ammonius*, 20) and Rist (*Road*, 43) to consider 13[III,9],1 as under Numenian influence. According to Dillon (*Ennead III,9,1*,70) 13[III,9],1 should stem from Amelius' notes. This would precisely be an argument in defense of assuming an early stage in Plotinus' thought from a source different from Plotinus. Bussanich stresses the differences between 13[III,9],1 and 7[V,4], which indeed are undeniable but insufficient to reject any comparison as

The attribute ἀίδιος regularly goes almost unnoticed. Nevertheless, in connection with the One it is a rather strange attribute. It is employed in regard to the One only twice in one early treatise, which concerns a compendium of Heraclitus' doctrine of the One (10[V,1],9,4, in the *Apologia*): τὸ ἓν ... ἀίδιον καὶ νοητόν and it is also said of *the production* of the One (10[V,1],6,38): "what is always perfect produces everlastingly". Nevertheless, in connection with a possible knowledge of the One it is rather peculiar. Furtheron ἀίδιος is solely used in connection with that what is *below* the One (see *LP* and see for its meaning in connection with being Beierwaltes[172]). It would imply eternity, which, as the

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Bussanich does. It is very remarkable to see Armstrong omitting 13[III,9],1 in his discussion of the background of the doctrine "that the intelligibles are not outside the intellect", although this treatise is the first discussion of the problem in Plotinus. So the coherence of this problem with mind's emanation from the One escaped his attention. Perhaps that explains his leaving out the development of the system of proceeding of the hypostases by tracing Plotinus' point of view to Aristotle's influence. This proceeding of the mind from the One in the system, defended as early in 7[V,4], forced upon Plotinus the coincidence of νοητόν, *i.e.* the Ideas, and νοῦς. For otherwise the Ideas would not have found a place in the system and have been bound to be erratic boulders. They were no longer as welcome in the SE as they were in Mesoplatonism. The 'primitive' generation of the mind from the One via the *Noeton*-name in 7[V,4] supposedly provoked discussions about the place of the Ideas, as they took shape in 13[III,9],1. Incidentally, Armstrongs' applauded introduction of passages of Alexander's *Mantissa* and *De Anima* to explain Peripatetic influence on Plotinus' concept of the mind thinking itself remains important (cf. Armstrong, *Background*, 406 ff.). However, I cannot see as right his assertion that Alexander's notion of the simplicity of the divine intellect would have provoked Plotinus to a conviction that this form of simplicity would lead to the assumption of a Source transcending intellect (*ib.*, 409,410) and thus to a notion of the One. Armstrong is of the opinion that without Alexander's concept, Plotinus would have remained content to be a Mesoplatonist. I would prefer to believe that the concepts concerning the One (and not so much mind or divinity) that Moderatus or someone like him had offered, provided Plotinus with an incentive to a new concept of the SE and in this manner inspired him to think about the One and the emanation of an entity with a mind-character from it. In this connection it is remarkable that it was not necessary for this interest in the forthcoming of the mind from the One that the One should be the Superone, for in 7[V,4] it is, not the *absolute* simplicity of the One that furnished inspiration to think about mind's emanation. For the One is not yet completely a unity and a complete simplicity, as we have demonstrated in our text. The One has every thing in it and with it and even possesses knowledge of itself.

[172] Beierwaltes, *Über Ewigkeit*, 156.

root of time, can at best signify everlastingness and cannot be formally used in connection with the One. However, I must draw attention to 12[II,4],15,15 ff. where Plotinus supposes that the unlimitedness of intelligible matter is produced from the unlimitedness of the One, from its power or from its everlastingness (τὸ ἀεί); this utterance could be assumed to contain the following contradiction. The intelligible matter would be produced from the limitedness or the power or the everlastingness of the One, whereas *there is in the One no unlimitedness*, it is its producer, as Plotinus expressely says (οὐκ οὔσης ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἀπειρίας ἀλλὰ ποιοῦντος). So the options of power or everlastingness must be regarded as corrections of the phrase ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀπειρία, for the One has no unlimitedness. However this may be, this τὸ ἀεί of the One apparently is thought of as unlimitedness in time. I have the impression that in this early treatise the term τὸ ἀεί is rather a means to rescue the One's unlimitedness than it is normal part of the doctrine. An other possibility to avoid contradiction would be to connect δυνάμεως and τοῦ ἀεί with ἀπειρία; in this case Plotinus would speak of the unlimitedness of the power or of the everlastingness of the One, which would free the One *itself* from being everlasting.

In 7[V,4],2 ἀίδιος must mean that rest will never change into activity which is an essential part of mind. It could have been the influence of Numenius, that brought Plotinus to come up with στάσις. Therefore we shall now introduce some fragments of Numenius.

Armstrong (*Translation* V, 146, n.1) remarks: "the view which Plotinus adopts here (as to its thinking) is close to that of Numenius". Indeed, in Numenius we come across some concepts which may be regarded as models for Plotinus. In Numenius' fragment 17 the Supreme Entity is called mind: the first Mind (πρῶτος νοῦς) or First God. Most people, Numenius affirms, are not aware of the fact that there is above the (second) νοῦς another νοῦς. This first Mind is called (Numenius fr.17) older (or more dignified) and more divine, and that from which the mind of the Second God is *differing* (ἀλλ' ἕτερος πρὸ τούτου (the second mind) νοῦς πρεσβύτερος καὶ θειότερος, see also the opening of fr.16). The notion of difference may have influenced Plotinus, who affirms his One to be *different* (ἑτέρως) in thinking as regards the thinking of mind, the second level. The curious remark about the rest (στάσις) of the Supreme Entity in Plotinus could reflect Numenius' ascription of the rather strange notion of being ἑστώς to the Supreme Entity (Numenius fr.15). However, this ἑστώς of Numenius seems to be of a peculiar type of στάσις: a στάσις which can be circumscribed strangely enough as *κίνησιν* σύμφυτον, from which the order of the world proceeds, its eternal persistence and from which emanates salvation (σωτηρία) spreading over the totality. Furthermore, according to Proclus' observations (Numenius fr.22) it seems that the Supreme Entity of Numenius must be identified with the Idea of Life: ὅ ἐστι ζῷον (a concept borrowed from the

Timaeus, 39 E). This could help to explain Plotinus' remark that the One has life in it and contains everything (τὰ πάντα)[173].

In connection with the detection of a Numenian influence it is remarkable to see that in the context of 7[V,4],2,26 Plotinus affirms that the mind is *a copy and image* of the One: καὶ μίμημα καὶ εἴδωλον[174]. This recalls strongly the utterance of Numenius in fr.16, where the world of genesis is said to be the εἰκών and μίμημα of the world of being. There is, of course, a shift as to the levels in Plotinus and Numenius, since Numenius does not distinguish the One and Mind[175], but the idea of mimesis in Plotinus in 7[V,4] must display a strong influence from Numenius fr.16, that in addition twice speaks about μιμητής and once about μίμημα[176].

To sum up what we have said so far, we may say that it is not only the notion of thinking (what Armstrong indicated), that conflicts with later Plotinian thought: the notions of self-knowledge and of the One containing all things and having κατανόησις and life do not fit in either. We are apparently confronted with a Numenian influence, *i.e.* a type of *Mesoplatonism* in Plotinus. This means that during Plotinus' activity as a writer there must have been some philosophical turning-points, which in their turn imply *philosophical development.*

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[173] Καὶ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ seems a repetition of πάντα from his previous remark in line 16, but see above 41.

[174] This idea of the mind being a copy of the One, especially of being something like a second thinkable (ἄλλο οἷον νοητόν) parallels the being thinkable of the One itself. This being a second thinkable of the mind is presumably already expressed in 7[V,4],2,12: ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλο τῷ μετ' αὐτὸ νοητόν, which should be rendered by: "and it (the mind) is also another (or a second, whereas the One is the first) thinkable for that which comes after it (*i.e.* the mind)". This ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλο τῷ μετ' αὐτὸ νοητόν explains Plotinus' previous remark that the mind is thinkable (νοητόν): line 11, ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς νοητόν. The question is, thinkable for what? Apparently for what follows: the soul, although this is not said in the treatise. I see that Bussanich (*The One*, 17,18) now has the same interpretation, preferring a slightly different reading: ἄλλῳ (mss BUC) in stead of ἄλλο, but regarding ἄλλο as a good possibility. I would give preference to ἄλλο because of the parallel with line 25 *ἄλλο* οἷον νοητόν. However, although Bussanich notices the parallel with ch.2 line 25 (*The One*, 27), he believes that ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλο τῷ μετ' αὐτὸ νοητόν is a brief remark belonging to a so-called Plotinian habit of interjecting brief remarks "that are not strictly relevant" (to the context), but which he added for completeness' sake. I do not know of this habit of Plotinus. We rather may see in ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλο τῷ μετ' αὐτὸ νοητόν an explanation of the message in line 11:ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς νοητόν that the mind is also itself thinkable, and at the same time we may see in it a prelude of line 25 ἄλλο οἷον νοητόν : a second thinkable, object of thinking. This would mean that the remark is far from irrelevant. Incidentally, Bussanich (*The One*, 17, 18) has a very good discussion of the numerous other solutions to get a grip on the sentence: ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλο τῷ μετ' αὐτὸ νοητόν. These discussions often start from the interpretation of τῷ μετ' αὐτὸ proposed by Hadot (*Review* of Harder, 160), who takes it to mean "par le fait (τῷ, dativus causae in stead of dativus commodi) d' être posterieure à cet Intelligible-là (αὐτό)". HS: "est etiam diversus ab uno eo quod post illud intelligibilis est". This interpretation also makes good sense as an explanation of line 11: ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς νοητόν. It has the advantage that one need not to add: thinkable for the soul, which does not enter the treatise again, although according to the traditional interpretation νοητόν must also ultimately be understood as thinkable for an other entity (soul). However, the traditional interpretation has the disadvantage as Bussanich saw that in this case αὐτὸ (in τῷ μετ' αὐτὸ) must refer to the SE, which in this context rather is remoted. Moreover, as an explanation of line 11, *i.e.* ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς νοητόν to take τῷ as a dativus commodi makes more sense than taking it as a dativus causae, because it tells us more exactly why the mind is νοητόν. So ultimately I would prefer the dativus commodi-interpretation.

[175] Numenius' Supreme Entity is also called Being Itself (αὐτοόν). This feature is unparallelled in Plotinus' 7[V,4].

[176] See for the Numenian background, Dodds, *Numenius and Ammonius*, 17 ff.

One might ask whether this remarkable 7[V,4] SE-type emerges in other early treatises. Well then, we should notice that 7[V,4] has something peculiar to say about the relation between the Supreme Entity and mind, something we do not encounter in the other tracts: for the Supreme Entity having or being mind is expressely denied. It is steadily emphasized that the Supreme Entity produces an entity that differs and is separated from it: cf. 7[V,4],2,2,3 ἐπέκεινα νοῦ τὸ γεννῶν; τὸ νοητόν remains by itself ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μένει, line 13, see line 20. This separation was not found in the tracts previous to 7[V,4]. Hence we have an important stage in the development of Plotinian thought. The Supreme Entity is one, and displays unity, but it has not as yet developed into the Superone of 9[VI,9]. It has κατανόησις and πάντα with and within it. This same feature in regard to πάντα is found in 6[IV,8],6, where it says that τὰ πάντα are without form in the Supreme Entity[177]. However, in this passage the Supreme Entity is still said to have the features of mind. In 7[V,4] the purifying of the One by unification is not yet brought to completion, although it must not escape our attention that we have in 7[V,4] a further developed unity of the Supreme Entity than we ever have been confronted with in previous tracts.

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[177] See above 34.

CHAPTER FOUR

NEW LIGHT ON THE POSITION OF 9[VI,9]

To consider what has been said so far about the SE in the earlier treatises is of prime importance to establish the position of the One before 9[VI,9] and the position of Plotinus' concept of the Superone in the historical development. As we have already suspected, Plotinus did not borrow the Superone-concept from any immediate predecessor. What we have learnt about the absence of such a One in Ammonius is completely in line with our results concerning the treatises before 9[VI,9]. Plotinus had to find his own way to the One. If he had really adopted the One-conception from Ammonius, there would have been no trace of earlier developments in regard to the One in his writings. He must have been a slow starter. It was not until rather late that he came into full bloom as a philosopher, for it was only at the age of 39 that he parted with Ammonius. He started writing at the age of 48/49. Since he apparently had to pave his own way at a rather late stage in his career, it cannot strike anyone as odd, that in the early treatises the concept of the Supreme Entity is rather diffuse.

What is astonishing from my point of view is that it is so sudden that such a well-rounded view of the One as Superone appears in 9[VI,9]. Although in 7[V,4] we do see him displaying growing interest concerning the unity of the Supreme Entity and this concern becomes predominant even at this stage, this unity is inconsistently connected with containing τὰ πάντα and having forms of self-knowledge. In 9[VI,9], on the other hand, the doctrine of the One seems to have become completened, for in the treatises that follow it is essentially presented as having a definite form, leaving behind the former inconsistencies (where the doctrine seems divergent, there is contextual influence). If one considers it curious that after the hesitant beginning of the era of the new One in 7[VI,4] the doctrine is rather abruptedly completened in 9[VI,9], one should realize the possibility that quite some time might have elapsed between the two, the first 21 treatises have been written within a period of ten years. For we know that they have been written before Porphyrius' arrived at the school[178], whereas the rest of the works (33 treatises) were written in a much shorter period: 6/7years! So there might have been a rather large interval between 7[V,4] and 9[VI,9].

When I was not aware of the possibility of a progress in Plotinus' thought, I wondered why and for the benefit of whom 9[VI,9] was - in such a persuasive way - written. I believed - just as Atkinson affirms - that the whole of Plotinus' thought may be present in the background. Porphyrius' placing 9[VI,9] at the end of the *Enneads* seems rather innocent from the orthodox point of view: in fact, if the entire doctrine is to be considered as settled, it does not make much difference at what stage of the *Enneads* the treatise emerges.

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[178] See the following note.

However, if it is really true that Plotinus' thought underwent a change, then the perspective from which 9[VI,9] was written has completely altered. It seems that there was no way Plotinus could have introduced the Superone at an earlier stage, simply because it was not there to begin with. This casts new light on the cogency of the position of 9[VI,9]. It was not the *end* of the development, as Porphyrius makes us believe, by giving it the position of the climax of the end and so spoiling our perspective considerably; on the contrary, 9[VI,9] is the *startingpoint* for the new development of the One. If so, its protreptical character is fully explained: Plotinus had to make his new conception acceptable for his readers, be it his pupils or fellow Platonists. There were only *Meso*platonists to convert to the new doctrine. The *Neo*platonists were yet to come, once 9[VI,9] had introduced the basic system: a Superone, supranoetic, productive of mind and mind productive of soul.

We may now fully understand Plotinus' *Apologia* of the system in V,1, chronologically no 10 (9[VI,9] = 9!). All this makes a new reading of 9[VI,9] more interesting. The introduction of the Superone is the most incisive happening in Mesoplatonism, it is the birth and Genesis of Neoplatonism. Although it may be possible that Plotinus was partly inspired by predecessors like Moderatus, in whose work we may have an early sketch of the system, as we have seen, he himself had to think up the consequences and review all the current doctrines (whether they originated in Mesoplatonism, Aristotelism or Stoicism) and had to accomodate them to the new system. Many doctrines were already somehow embodied in Mesoplatonism, or Aristotelism, but their contents and merits had to be revaluated. Hence the appearance of the bundle of treatises we now have in the *Enneads*. The consequence of considering Plotinus' thought as a development is that we must realise that it was not until very late, let us say, after he had reached the age of 48/49[179], the system took its definite form and the One was made the centre of his philosophy. So the current view on his philosophy, as expressed in Atkinson's summary, has to be thoroughly revised.

It is interesting to notice that Porphyrius has not personally experienced the development of Plotinus towards the Superone. For when he met Plotinus, 21 tracts on a great variety of subjects had already been written, as we said. Equally curious is the fact that Porphyrius began his edition of Plotinus' 54 tracts *30 years after* his death[180]. So, I believe, traces of development respecting the One were no longer virulent in Porphyrius' mind, although fortunately, as a scholar he was scrupulous enough to provide us with the chronological order of the treatises. If, indeed, there is a development in Plotinus' thought, the chronological order has more to say then ever. In Porphyrius' eyes, however, obviously the system of Plotinian philosophy was already settled, which also appears from the fact that Porphyrius seemed to have had no qualms about reorganising the order of the tracts according to his principles of editing: he collected the tracts dealing with one and the same subject in one and the same *Ennead* (see Porphyrius, *Vita,* 24)[181].

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[179] When Porphyrius met Plotinus for the first time, Porphyrius was 30 years of age and Plotinus 59. Plotinus had already been writing for 10 years producing 21 tracts, including the development as to the One of 7[V,4] to the One of 9[VI,9]. Plotinus started writing in the first year of the reign of Emperor Gallienus: 253 (Plotinus was born in 205), and was 48/49 when he started writing, see *Vita*, 4 about which Goulet, *Système*, 190, 191 and Goulet-Cazé, *Edition*, 280, 281, 285. See also Schwyzer, *RE*, 474, 484.

[180] It is unclear why Porphyrius had postponed the editing so long, see Goulet-Cazé, *Edition*, 287.

Now that the doctrine of the One had been established (since 9[VI,9]) one may be under the impression that the era of the Good has passed in the same way as *e.g.* the name '*Noeton*' (if it was a name at all) only had a temporary validity for Plotinus. Readers of Plotinus should know better. Do they really? The situation concerning the Supreme Entity is considerably more complicated than is generally assumed. From the start of my investigations of the *Enneads* onwards, I believed that the Supreme Entity had to be called 'the One'. This name emerges everywhere in books and articles. I know of no excentric who exclusively employs the name 'Good' instead of 'One'. In this connection I would like to draw attention to the recent book of P. Hadot, *'Plotin, Traite 38'* , where he says : "notre traité (38) est un traité du Bien"[182], rightly, for, as we shall see, the One is as good as left out in this tract of Plotinus' maturity. A few lines later Hadot adds: "Dans l'oeuvre de Plotin le thème du Bien est beaucoup moins fréquemment développé que le thème de l'Un". Wisely, he warns us not to overestimate the number of texts that deal both with the Good and the One. Next he gives an enumeration of the two themes: "On trouve des discussions importantes sur' l'Un dans les traités 7[V,4], 9[VI,9],10-11[V,1 et 2], 13[III,9], 24[V,6], 30[III,8], 32[V,5], 33[II,9] tandis que le problème du Bien ne fait l' objet de développements priviligiés que dans les traités 24[V,6], 32[V,5], 38,39[VI,7,VI,8] et 54[I,7]".

Hadot speaks of the Good and the One as if they were two separate themes. Plotinus himself, however, indicates that the two terms concern same nature. In his treatise against the Gnostics (33[II,9],1,5 ff.) in which he refers to 32[V,5],13,33-36, a treatise we shall quote later on as to the relation of the names "the Good" and "the One", Plotinus himself affirms that the nature (φύσις!) of the so-called One is the same as the nature of the Good, which is simple and first : "when we speak about the One and when we speak about the Good, ...we should think that it is the same nature and we must call this nature one, not as predicating anything of this nature, but as making this nature clear to ourselves as far as we can (... ὅταν λέγωμεν τὸ ἓν καὶ ὅταν λέγωμεν τἀγαθόν, τὴν αὐτὴν[183] δεῖ νομίζειν τὴν φύσιν καὶ μίαν λέγειν οὐ κατηγοροῦντας ἐκείνης οὐδέν, δηλοῦντας δὲ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς οἷόν τε)". So Plotinus is well aware of the limitations of both the name 'One' and the name 'Good', and their objective to name a nature which ultimately surpasses these names. We will revert later on[184] to this question of naming the unnamable, and especially Plotinus' affirmation that we do not wish to predicate (κατηγορεῖν) something of the One by these names.

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[181] Goulet-Cazé, *Edition*, 295. Andronicus applied the same method in reorganising Aristotle's works, *e.g.* in the *Politics*, see Meijer, *Chronologie en redactie van Aristoteles' Politica*, 120 ff.

[182] Hadot, *Traité 38*, p.43.

As to Hadot's enumeration of tracts as dealing with either the theme of the Good or the theme of the One, we must be careful. We already know enough of treatise 7[V,4] to be able to realize that although the One comes to the stage in 7[V,4], it is the (early) One and that the problem of 7[V,4] is how mind proceeds from the Origin 7[V,4],1,19,20. We will see that *e.g.* in 9[VI,9] which Hadot includes in his enumeration as dealing with the theme of the One, the Good, too, has a role to play.

There are important chapters in 32[V,5], chapters 9 and 10, about the aspects of the SE: "When remembering[185] the SE (here called αὐτός, He) you realise that the SE is *good,* because it is the productive power of thoughtful, intelligent life, the source of life, intelligence, and whatever there is of beingness and being[186], that the SE is *one,* because he is simple and first, and the *origin,* because all things come from him (32[V,5],10,12 ff.). Plotinus is well aware of the fact that all these attributes *only* name an aspect of "Him", and that the SE transcends these aspects. However, Plotinus feels he is free to operate rather loosely with the attributes as names and in respect to the name 'good', even *with its meaning.* We find an illuminating example when comparing what we just quoted from 32[V,5],10,12 ff. with 43[VI,2],11,16 ff. In 32[V,5],10,12 ff.: the SE is called 'Good' inasmuch as it is the power that brings life *etcetera,* but we also find the name 'Good' because it is the teleological expression of the SE as that which all things strive for; we shall see this in a very curious passage in his later work: 43[VI,2],11,16 ff., where the Good is the τέλος of all things, and even responsible for the unity of things[187], and where the One is even said to have nothing to do with the unity of what is on a lower scale in the hierarchy than the One. So Plotinus is not altogether uniform in what he means by the aspect of 'Good'. Even in the passage 32[V,5],10,12 ff. the distinctions are not very sharp. Does he really believe that being productive of mind, life and being is that much different from being the origin of all things?

All this tends to call for a different, less naive approach to the naming of the SE than what Plotinus suggests by saying that the names 'Good' and 'One' refer to the same nature, and than what we usually find in the secondary literature. This is the problem I shall concentrate on in the following chapter.

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[183] Reading with Heigl, HS 2 and Armstrong τὴν αὐτὴν instead of mss ταύτην.

[184] See below 183, 184.

[185] See about remembering the SE, below 276.

[186] Plotinus is here exploiting the analogy of the sun that features in the *Republic* (509 B), cf. 38[VI,7],16,25 ff.

[187] See below 104, 105.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE NAMES OR INDICATIONS OF THE SUPREME ENTITY (ONE, GOOD, GOD, FATHER, THE FIRST, ORIGIN, IT, HE)

The title of 9[VI,9], given perhaps by Porphyrius[188], is 'On the Good or the One'. When reading 9[VI,9] one is struck by the fact that the name 'Good' is hardly mentioned and the name 'One' seems to be used in an overwhelming majority. At closer inspection one discovers that the name 'One' is often replaced or referred to by ἐκεῖνο(ς), or αὐτό(ς), θεός, πατήρ, ἀρχή, πρῶτον. In fact, the name 'One' is less used than a superficial glance, fed by habit, would suggest. So we must not let our first impression run away with us. One could easily defend the position that the Supreme Entity could just as well be named 'the Good'. In many places in the *Enneads* this is the name that emerges. Our habit of employing the name 'One' may lead us astray and spoil the perspective. Plotinus did not use the name 'One' exclusively or by preference. In 9[VI,9] we encounter the curious fact that from ch.6 onwards, in the description of the ultimate ascent to the Supreme Entity, the name 'One' seems to be abolished. Before Plotinus carries on with this description of the mystical union, the last mentioned name of the Supreme Entity is 'the Good' (at the end of ch.6). Elsewhere[189], when he describes the mystical union, we almost never read the name 'One': it is always the Good or God or He or It that is the entity we are said to be unified with. Often the name 'Origin'[190] emerges where the SE is brought into contact with its offspring. Obviously, when treating different subjects Plotinus had different aspects of the Supreme Entity in mind and called it by different names, but as we know, *the Supreme Entity transcends its names*. According to its different aspects the SE is indicated by different names, although this is no rigid rule. Therefore we have chosen to generally speak about the Supreme Entity. We should also, however, be careful when using the name 'Supreme Entity', and should empty the word 'Entity' as far as possible from its original meaning and connection with being (*ens*). I think it is the most abstract word in English to denote the highest principle[191]. We have heard Plotinus himself already speaking about the *Supreme*: ὑπέρτατον[192]. With some obstinacy we shall use the name 'Supreme Entity', where Plotinus apparently did not make a choice or is careless in naming the SE.

Although Plotinus did not always employ both names 'One' and 'Good' indiscriminately, he is prone to switch over immediately from the One to the

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[188] There were often various titles, because of the fact that Plotinus did not adorn his treatises with a title, nothing uncommon in Greek editorial practise, see Goulet-Cazé, *Edition*, 283, n.1. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, Porphyrius is even so careful as to add the first lines of the treatises to the titles he mentions.

[189] See *e.g.* 38[VI,7],34,35, cf. below Part III on the mystical union, 297.

[190] See above 56.

[191] See above 30 on 4[IV,2] and also 39[VI,8,]16,8-9.

[192] See above 30.

Good and *vice versa* and also to other indications. His choice, however, is not always arbitrary. Sometimes it seems to be influenced by contextual considerations. Nevertheless, the names 'the Good' and 'the One' are on an equal footing. In this connection it is very interesting to see that Plotinus applies the same treatment and methods of thinking to the One as to the Good, liberating the Good from movement, thinking *etc.* (in *e.g.* 38[VI,7],36 ff.)[193] like he did the One in 9[VI,9][194]. In 32[V,5] we find a typical example of the interchange: in the first part of the treatise, till ch.9, Plotinus speaks of the One, whereas in the remainder of the treatise the Good figures, which is methodically treated in the same way as the One. Obviously he had a reason for the interchange. In this section he deals with the relationship between Beauty and the SE. Beauty is the aim of many, as is the Good, and as such its influence on people is different (more painful and temporaly) from that of the Good, which is never absent from people. In the last part of treatise the One emerges, when Beauty and Good (in this context not the ultimate Good) are said to participate in the One (ἀλλ' οὖν ἡ τῆς πλάνης αἰτία τὸ μετέχειν ἄμφω τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ πρότερον τὸ ἓν ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι *etc*, 32[V,5],12,30,31: "The cause of the error is that both (*sc*. the lower Good and Beauty) participate in the same and the One is before both"). At this stage of the argument, the name 'Good' had to be avoided, for, otherwise would it be said that the Good (the lower) participated in the Good (the Highest), which would have been less convincing in the context. Immediately (line 32), subsequent to this manoeuvre the name 'Good' for the SE continues to play its dominant role. We find the same contextual need to drop the name 'Good' in favour of the name 'One' in 24[V,6],6,29[195].

Even the Good itself is ultimately denied the name 'Good'[196], in the same way in which the name 'One' is rejected as saying something positive about the One[197]. In fact, what we encounter is the meeting of two Platonic conceptions which in preplotinian thought are rivals, as we know, though the concept of the One was made subordinate to the concept of the Good in Mesoplatonism. We have already seen that the concept of One was to Albinus *e.g.* merely an attribute of the Good[198]. And also in Numenius the concept of *Good* was predominant. However, one easily forgets that the victory of the One was not at the expense of the Good. It kept its preponderant position even after the introduction of the Superone. In the enumeration of Hadot we just mentioned[199], we see that the Good figures more often than the One in highly important treatises.- Plotinus did not like to abolish concepts or names, but, as in English law, he recolours them. In the case of the Supreme Entity, he thought his task was solely to elevate the concept of the One. In the works of his full maturity, as *e.g.* on the Will of the One, VI,8 (chronologically 39) it is under the name of the Good that the Supreme Entity appears. Only in four chapters does the indication 'one' emerge (as I think, not the name 'One', but one in the sense of unity), *viz.* in the sixth line of ch.1 of 39[VI,8], in ch.18, where contextual reasons are the incentive to make the dominant Good be indicated by the One[200], in ch.20[201]and finally in ch. 21[202]. In the remainder of the work it is indeed only 'the Good' that is mentioned as the name of the Supreme Entity. This does not prevent *e.g.* Bréhier from bringing the One to the stage, e.g. 39[VI,8],7,12 in spite of the fact that in Greek we have the feminine participle τυχοῦσα. There are a lot of other places in 39[VI,8] in which Bréhier and others introduce the One for no good reason where Plotinus simply has the Good[203]. In defense of Brehier's behaviour one might adduce the fact that whoever it was,who gave

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[193] See also 24[V,6],2,15 ff. and passim in 24[V,6], also 30[III,8],11,10 ff.

[194] In the same manner αἴσθησις is denied to the Good as it is to the One (see above 45), 38[VI,7],41,9: Οὐκ αἰσθάνεται οὖν ἑαυτοῦ.

[195] See note 193.

[196] See 49[V,3],11,24 ff. and below 000.

[197] See below 181 ff.

[198] See above note 29.

[199] See above 55.

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[200] In ch. 18 a comparison is made with the centre of a circle, which is as a point (see below 242ff.). The transcendence of this one-point is emphasized in regard to the radii which originate in this centre-point (πρὸς κέντρον *ἕν* line 11). This aspect of unity dominates the following development of thought. The mind-being which originates in the Good must be poured out from this Good as its origin, which implies that in this origin there is something like 'mind in one'. The word 'one' in this context obviously means unity: a type of mind which is one. Armstrong renders οἷον ἐν ἑνὶ νοῦν by 'something like intellect in the One' (where the capital indicates that according to Armstrong the One is at stake), without grasping the possibility of the contextually more plausible rendering: 'something like a mind in unity' (which, as Plotinus acutely and carefully points out, is essentially not mind, for it is one, *i.e.* displays unity). Bréhier has the correct translation: "et ils témoignent qu'il y a une sorte d' intelligence où tout est en un". In line 27 the SE is called the archetype of the mind being one (ἐν ἑνὶ νοῦν). This makes clear that οἷον ἐν ἑνὶ νοῦν (line 21) does not refer to the One. Likewise τὸ ἐν ἑνὶ ἐκείνῳ in line 34, referring to ἐν ἑνὶ νοῦν as said of the mind in line 27, in all probability means 'what is in That (Supreme) which has or rather is unity', instead of, as Armstrong has it, "in that *O*ne". Exploiting the parallellism of ἐν ἑνὶ *νοῦν* (line 21 and 27) and ἐν ἑνὶ *ἐκείνῳ* we are entitled to conclude that the third word is the dominant one.

[201] Ch.20, line 14 has the expression '(οὐχ) ἓν τηρεῖ', which refers to the maintaining or preserving the unity of the origin, and, as the following sentence says, the First; cf. 9[VI,9,]6, 50 where we read ἵνα τηρῇς *τὸ* ἕν *i.e.* with the article, meaning *the* One. But here we have it without article. Harder (Beutler, Theiler) translates by: "Und wenn man die Wirksamheit erst hinzusetzte, so beliesse man ihm nicht seine *Einheit*". Bréhier is also right: "on ne lui conserve pas son *unité*".

[202] Plotinus talks about the the superpower of the SE, which is at its best when it does not depart from its unity: ὅταν μὴ ἐξιστήται τοῦ ἕν. Armstrong, Harder, and Bréhier have 'the One' here. Armstrong, *e.g.* translates: "when it does not go out of the One". I doubt this solution is correct. For as the *LP* says, the verb ἐξίστασθαι means 'to depart from one's own nature'. One finds a comparable and classical passage for 'the departure from its own nature' in*Timaeus* 50 B: ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἑαυτῆς τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἐξίσταται δυνάμεως. If I am wrong, this would the one and only place where the One could be involved. However, this does nothing to alter the fact that, in my opinion, the One as such does not play a relevant role in 39[VI,8] even if the other places I just treated were all talking about the One instead of 'unity'.

[203] The same applies to Armstrong's translation of 24[V,6],2,12, where he adds [One] and in 24[V,6],3,9, where he translates 'One' where we only read τούτῳ. Thus far it is only the First that figures in the treatise. Later on it is replaced by 'The Good'. At the end of the treatise the name 'One' finally emerges, necessitated by the context, where the issue is discussed how 'two' originates in the One, 24[V,6],6,29.

39[VI,8] its title: 'On the free will and the will of the *One* [204]' (Περὶ τοῦ ἑκουσίου καὶ θελήματος τοῦ *Ἑνός*), perhaps Porphyrius, the editor of the *Enneads*, this fellow likewise had the mistaken impression that the One was involved and therefore similarly corrupted the perspective. The so-called 'Grossschrift', Harder's combination of 30, 31, 32 and 33[III,8; V,8; V,5 and II,9][205] brims over with the Good. Continuing this enumeration is not a difficult task. So also in the mature period of the *Enneads*, the name 'Good' has an important part.

An intriguing question now emerges. One could ask for what reason Plotinus decided to stick to the name "The Good" and to maintain it. To be sure, Plato coined the name in the *Republic*, and in itself this is a sufficient explanation to use it. It is also of relevance that in its krasisform τἀγαθόν could be interpreted as an expression of the unity of the SE[206]. Moreover, the word 'good' brings out some aspects of the SE which could be used in arguments (as we saw already[207]). Perhaps one of the most important motives, however, was that 'the Good' was the name which all (Middle-) Platonists before him (Albinus, Numenius) and those around him used to refer to the SE. By using a familiar name Plotinus could mitigate the renovation of his new concept of unity of the SE and thus make it more acceptable for his fellow Platonists. This, perhaps, is the explanation of the fact that in later treatises (*e.g.*38[VI,7]) and elsewhere Plotinus time and again tries to prove that the *Good* is above and the origin of mind, and as such simple and absolutely free from thinking, the characteristic feature of mind. The *Apologia* of 10[V,1] had apparently failed to convince everybody and to at least make Plotinus' new position acceptable for his contemporaries. It is striking to see how in the works of his middle period also he time and again spends energy on defending this new position of the Good[208] and how often he started from the Good. Had his views on this position been widely accepted, those defensive actions would have been a waste of time. So it is not unlikely that he tried to keep in touch with his adversaries by continually proving that the *Good, a concept that was more acceptable to most of his contemporaries than the One*, at least to his fellow-Platonists, has such a position above mind. However, obviously, this new concept of the place of the Good was not easily accepted by his fellow-philosophers (whether Platonici or Aristotelici or perhaps Mesoplatonic thinkers who put a lot of Aristotelism into their philosophy, like Albinus did[209]). In treatise 38[VI,7],ch.37 ff., Plotinus vehemently attacks Aristotelici who consider *thought* the main and most majestic feature of the Supreme Entity. Indeed, it was Aristotle who first introduced the notion of a thinking Supreme Entity, which thinks itself as its most elevated object. Rejecting this Aristotelian notion, Plotinus indirectly rejected all contemporaries, who, perhaps as important a target for him as Aristotle himself, adhered to the idea that the SE is thinking itself, like one generation earlier, Albinus, in an 'Aristotelizing' way, had taught[210]. Apparently this kind of philosopher was by no means extinct and obviously there were many thinkers not convinced by Plotinus' plea for a SE above mind, clinging to the opinion that the Supreme God is thinking himself and as far as Platonists are concerned - that God is thinking himself *and the Ideas*, as Albinus had said[211]. Thus Plotinus tried to get down to the roots of this conception as it is unfolded in the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, in order to demonstrate that the position of all thinkers who ascribed thought to the Supreme Entity is untenable. I think that we must assume that perhaps Plotinus directed more general polemics against contemporaries as one usually does. We should not be misled by the suggestion that he was above any confrontation with contemporaries[212].

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[204] See note 156

[205] Harder, 'Eine neue Schrift Plotins', in *Kleine Schriften*, 303-313.

[206] See below 214.

[207] See above 56.

[208] See *e.g.* 38[VI,7], 20, 11 he asks: "Why, then, someone will say, do we not stop at mind and posit this as the Good?" As an answer Plotinus points out that "not every thing desires mind, but all things desire the Good". See also *ib.*, 41, where it is proven that mind cannot but fail to be the Good (ἐκεῖνο, line) referring to the Good in the previous chapter, in which it is also proven that the Good (just like the One see 211) does not think (cf. ch.41,35,36). See also 32[V,5],ch.13 and 33[II,9],ch.1.

Another remarkable fact remains to focus some attention on. What is amazing is that the new concept of the One in the treatises 12-21 of Porphyrius' order hardly comes up at all. It is only in 10[V,1] (with the defense of the new system of the One and the three Hypostases we dealt with earlier[213]), 11[V,2], only in the opening chapter and at the end under the name ἐκεῖνος[214], 12[II,4],15,19[215] and 13[III,9] only once in passing (ch.7,4), perhaps also in ch.4, that we come across the One; the other eight treatises, written before Porphyrius met Plotinus for the first time, do not mention the One at all. Plotinus' interest in his new conception had apparently diminished considerably. The focus of his interest was elsewhere, or perhaps the resistance against his new doctrine of the One was, despite Plotinus' defense in 10[V,1],8,9 still too strong to continue stressing its importance. We may venture to conclude that the concept of 'the One' and the name 'One', although important, were of far less relevance and importance for Plotinus than they are for our traditional view. Even in 9[VI,9] the treatise to which the remainder of this book is devoted, the dominant position of the concept of the One crumbles away, it is: He, or It, the Father or the God that is the name of the Supreme Entity.

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[209] See note 30.

[210] See note 211.

[211] Albinus, *Didaskalikos*, X, 3: 'Επεὶ δὲ ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς κάλλιστος, δεῖ καὶ κάλλιστον αὐτῳ νοητὸν ὑποκεῖσθαι, οὐδὲν δὲ αὐτοῦ κάλλιον· *ἑαυτὸν* ἂν οὖν καὶ *τὰ ἑαυτοῦ νοήματα* ἀεὶ νοοίη κτλ.("Since the first mind is most beautiful, it must have the most beautiful object of thought, and nothing is more beautiful than itself. Thus it (the first mind) will always think itself and its thoughts (the Ideas)).

[212] Cf.what is said on polemics with Stoics below 89.

[213] See above 21.

[214] We devoted some words to it above 39, see at the end of 11[V,2],2,25 for ἐκεῖνος.

[215] See above 49.

In connection with the name 'God' for the Supreme Entity, I may draw attention to a most remarkable aberration in respect of the title 'God' in Plotinus. Arnou[216] has devised the seemingly impressive theory that in Plotinus the One is not God, but the principle of divinity; of course, that holds true, but to jump to the conclusion that hence the One is not God, is remarkable, for it is completely out of character. In 9[VI,9] and elsewhere in Plotinus, the Supreme Entity is time and again called God. Arnou's theory derives from an unjustified interpretation of συνημμένον in 9[VI,9],8,8: Θεὸς γὰρ τὸ ἐκείνῳ συνημμένον: "what has been unified with it (the centre of centres), is God", implying that, then, the One is not God. What Plotinus has to say here is that Gods are always unified with the centre of the soul-circles, in contradistinction with the temporary unification of human (and animal) souls. Nothing more, nothing less[217]. Arnou's theory is quite attractive because it suggests deep understanding. In reference to the part of Arnou's book on theology in Plotinus Krämer[218] says: "Dort die treffende Feststellung das ἕν sei nicht Gott, sondern Götter*prinzip*, vgl.dazu die Definition 9[VI,9],8,8 ff.: "Θεὸς γὰρ τὸ ἐκείνῳ (*sc.* the SE) συνημμένον". However, it is easy to see that this sentence is a definition of what *a* God is[219], not of the divinity of the One, and surely not an indication that permits the conclusion that the One is but a principle of divinity, instead of God itself. Krämer is too hasty in drawing this conclusion, for Arnou himself refers to places which unmistakenly speak about the One as God[220]. A series of places is given by *LP sub voce*. To give two examples: I may refer to 9[VI,9],9,55 which is *luce clarius* :"and there is no part with which we do not touch the God (the Supreme Entity)" and in 39[VI,8],19,11 Plotinus warns us that during contemplation the soul must not abandon God by looking elsewhere. However, according to Arnou, just as we speak about the One as being and as not being, likewise we must deny divinity to the One. This is a theory, but it is not one of Plotinus. Arnou is outdoing Plotinus in systematical rigor. He argues that in the entire chapters of 39[VI,8] (On the Will of the One) Plotinus manages to not mention the One as God[221]. So what ! Plotinus also 'forgets' to speak about the One in chapters where he could have used this name.

Arnou continues thus: in 9[VI,9],6,12 we are invited to consider the One as superior to mind and god (when you imagine him as οἷον ἦ νοῦν ἦ θεόν, πλέον ἐστί). This argument has no validity, either, for Plotinus means that he is superior to mind and *a* god[222]. I do not think, that this utterance implies that the One is *not* a God. Admittedly, Plotinus could have been on the verge of saying that the One is not God and perhaps he could have removed the name 'God' from the Supreme Entity, as he did with the name 'One' and the name 'Good' as we saw. But we never find the *via negativa* in the sense that divinity should be denied to the Supreme Entity. Arnou's argument is overorthodox, poorly demonstrated and without value, but - as in the case of Krämer, an eminent scholar- Arnou's influence palpably leads one astray.

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[216] Arnou, *Désir*, esp.133.
[217] See below 230.
[218] Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 344, note 556.
[219] See below 230.
[220] Arnou, *Désir*, 131 n.4, see also *Désir*, 134 ff.
[221] Arnou, *Désir*, 131.

After these considerations regarding the Supreme Entity we are now more prepared to evaluate what the position of the One and of 9[VI,9] is. I may stress again that in spite of what I have said about the preservation of the position of the Good in 9[VI,9], this treatise is revolutionary in its tone, tune and approach in comparison with the earlier treatises, especially in sofar as it concerns the new concept of oneness of the One and its systematical consequences.

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[222] See below 201.

PART TWO

COMMENTARY ON 9[VI,9]

CHAPTER ONE

Not only for the sake of convenience I suggest that ch.1 be divided into two parts, the preamble (1-17 a, discussed in part I) and an account of soul (17 b - 34 discussed in part II). Such a division has much to say for it. The preamble (1-17 a) sets out to confront unity with body and contains a transition to soul, whereas the second part of the chapter (17 b - 34) is devoted to the relation between unity and soul in connection with soul's being a candidate for being the One.

It seems appropriate to divide the preamble into two parts as well, lines 1-14 a (Complex I, corporeal unity) and lines 14 b-17 a (Complex II, the transition to the level of soul).

Part I The preamble

I) Complex I, Corporeal unity (Lines 1-14 a)

1) The categories of corporeal unity

Translation

> It is by their unity that all beings are beings, both those which are beings in the first manner and those which are said to be in whatever way among beings. For what could even exist if it was not one? For deprived of the one that is said (of them), they no longer are those things. For neither an army exists if it is not one, nor a chorus or a flock if they are not one. But even a house or a ship would not exist if they do not possess the one, since the house is one and (so is) the ship, and if they lose this one, neither would the house be any longer a house nor would a ship be any longer a ship. Well then, the continuous magnitudes, if the one were not present in them, would not exist. At any rate, if they were cut up (into (the orginal?) pieces), they would change their being in so far they lose their one. And again also the bodies of plants and animals, each of which is one, if they would escape their one by being broken up into a multitude, they would lose the being which they had, being no longer what they were, but they would have become other things, even those things that are one.

Plotinus opens the preamble with the statement that all beings[223], from the highest primary beings (πρώτως ὄντα) down to the lowest, in what way they can claim to be called one[224], are by means of unity (τῷ ἑνί)[225]. It is the last group that is Plotinus' first concern, inasmuch as they form the lowest grade at the scale of being. Plotinus wants his readers to mount a ladder of increasingly higher levels in order to reach the vicinity of the One and ultimately the One (SE) itself. So he starts with entities displaying the lowest grade of oneness in our world in order to demonstrate that it is necessary to assume unity (we might even say the influence of the One) even at this stage. The corporeal entities display unity in a hierarchical order and can therefore be divided into three groups:

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[223] Line 1: πάντα - Porphyrius reads ἅπαντα (*Vita* 4, 40), which does not emerge in any other source. This may warn us not to overestimate the reliability of our text.

A) Entities isolated from each other, that are on their own but embodied in an embracing order; the arrangement of individuals into a useful military order, an army, or into a musical unity, a choir or the arrangement of animals into a unity, a flock (a sort of anticlimax). In line 32 and elsewhere in Plotinus they are called 'discrete' (διεστηκός, see Appendix II).

B) The next type embraces things like houses or ships. Plotinus calls them συνεχής (line 8), *continua*. Unlike the army *etc.*, built up from discrete elements, they display a continuous character. Stones and bricks are connected to be shaped into a unity that transcends not only the original discrete parts, but makes them continuous as well.

C) The third type Plotinus distinguishes displays a far stronger type of unity: the organisms of plants or animals. The form of unity these things have is characterised by the formula ἓν *ὄντα* (line 11), whereas category B is characterized by ἓν *ἔχοντα* (line 6).

Plotinus introduces a curious method of demonstration by investigating the consequences of loss of unity. As far as I can see this approach is to be regarded as a novel one. Later on we shall expound and evaluate the Stoic influence on Plotinus (see below in this chapter p. 73 ff.), which is evident in the examples of the categories and in the form of categorizing. However, his method of considering what would happen if the entities lost their unity, seems to originate from Plotinus himself, be it that Plotinus has an example in what is said in the last hypothesis of Plato's dialogue, the *Parmenides* (165 E ff.): Plato shows the consequences of the non-existence of the one in regard to the other things (τἆλλα). There is difference, however. In the *Parmenides* Plato examines the consequences for the existence in general of the other things, drawing general conclusions (the other things, too, like the One are not), whereas Plotinus specifies the loss of unity and confines it to embracing entities. Plotinus shows the practical consequences for the compounds, in the event of them losing their oneness, and for the components. Upon losing their embracing entity, the components return to their original own existence.

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[224] Line 2: ὁπωσοῦν - Some mss read πως οὖν. The primus corrector (cf. *RE*, 491) corrected this, which appears from A pc, rightly adopted by HS. 'Oπωσοῦν is a possible combination in Plotinus, whereas πως οὖν is not, see *LP*.

[225] The problem whether τὸ ἕν must be considered as unity or the One itself will be discussed later on, see Appendix III of this chapter.

The new method is announced in line 3: "For what could be (*i.e.* exist[226]), if it were not one?" If you deprive (ἀφαιρεῖν, a wide term, entailing all categories, A, B, C) the entities of their unity, *viz.* the type of unity that is said of the ὄντα (τοῦ ἓν [227] ὃ λέγεται[228]), they no longer are what they were. The method is set into operation with regard to the three categories of the corporeal. Applied to A the new approach results into the non-existence[229] of the army, the choir and the flock, and what is left are individuals only. When the method is applied to B, we no longer have a house or a ship[230], for they lose the unity they possessed. Continuous magnitudes (συνεχῆ μεγέθη) as entities of category B are baptized now, by the absence of the one are not being (οὐκ ἂν εἴη), their original components only remain, bricks *etc.* In fact, we are told they no longer exist. Εἶναι in the sense of 'exist', is, although generally speaking not the most common connotation in Greek (and in classical times even hardly present[231]), nevertheless, the main signification in the preamble as far as loss of unity is concerned. It is to Aristotle[232] that we owe the term ὑπάρχειν for expressing 'to be in existence', and to the Stoa ὑφίστασθαι, an expression the Stoics needed badly to indicate a form apart from εἶναι, since εἶναι in Stoic philosophy[233] has a corporeal connotation, but ὑφίστασθαι has a special meaning in Plotinian philosophy, 'to come to exist'[234]. In the context of the preamble Plotinus does not employ ὑπάρχειν, an expression he does use elsewhere as we shall see[235]. The absence of this term in the preamble is understandable: in this context he prefers forms of εἶναι for what he intends to do is to demonstrate the connection between ἓν and *εἶναι* and to explain what their disconnection implies.

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[226] Line 3: Τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ εἴη, εἰ μὴ ἓν εἴη - Although he translates otherwise than I do, Harder (*Translation*, 171) makes the sentence quite understandable. He takes πάντα τὰ ὄντα as the subject of εἴη instead of τί: "Denn was könnte es sein, wenn es nicht eines ist?" Armstrong (*Translation* VII, 303): "For what could anything be, if it was not one?". However, I assume that Plotinus himself wants us to understand some thing other than what Harder (and Armstrong) will have us understand. In the following sentences Plotinus speaks about losing being (in the sense of existence), when losing unity. Thus we may assume that in the sentence Τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ εἴη, εἰ μὴ ἓν εἴη he commences this argument. In 9[VI,9],2,15 Plotinus says: ἀλλ' ἔλεγεν λόγος, εἰ ἀπολεῖ ἕκαστον τὸ ἕν, μηδ' ἔσεσθαι τὸ παράπαν. The λόγος in this sentence obviously refers to the preamble. It implies that every thing, upon losing its unity, ceases to exist (ἔσεσθαι can only mean 'exist' because of τὸ παράπαν and μηδὲ). In my view we have here a decisive argument in support of Bréhier's rendering (*o.c.*,170): "Quel être *existerait*, s'il n' était un ?" (see also HS, who comment: "εἴη existeret"). In the following we shall refer to the translations of Harder, Armstrong *etci.* only by their name, without providing the page, for it will be easy to find what is needed in their translations.

[227] Line 4: τοῦ ἕν - ἕν frequently indeclinabile.

[228] Line 4: ἓν ὃ λέγεται - these words are liable to be misunderstood. They denote the type of unity ("what is said") which is different from stage to stage. In line 27 this idea comes to the fore: τῶν γὰρ ἓν λεγομένων οὕτως ἕκαστόν ἐστιν ἕν, ὡς ἔχει καὶ ὅ ἐστιν. Support for my opinion is provided in my note 248.

[229] Line 5: ἔστιν (line 5) - Dodds, *Selected Passages*, 34 reads ἔσται (Οὔτε γὰρ στρατὸς ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἓν ἔσται), but the future tense in the *protasis* in Plotinus does not require a future tense in the *apodosis*, see 46[I,4],9,7 and 26[III,6],2,52.

[230] Line 8: ἡ ναῦς - supplement: ναῦς.

[231] See the interesting article of Kahn, *Why Existence does not emerge as a distinct concept in Greek philosophy?*, 323. In Plotinus εἶναι can be used for all levels; sometimes even of the SE *e.g.* 38[VI,7],40,42 (εἰλικρινῶς ἐστιν ὅ ἐστιν) beit as a deviation (οἷον, see about this word note 135) of the normal rejection of being in regard to the SE (39[VI,8],16,20 τὸ *οἷον* εἶναι αὐτῷ, *sc.* the SE). It is employed in connection with things that have no life, meaning 'to be and function in the world as a non - living thing' (cf. 38[VI,7],23,24), where the translation 'existing' is little bit to meagre. It is not even denied to *hyle*, see 25[II,5],5,35 ff.

As to the category B Plotinus adds the observation that, when 'cut' (τμηθέντα) the συνεχῆ modify their being inasmuch as they lose their unity (τὸ ἕν). As a term τμηθέντα (cutting) is used appositely as far as συνεχῆ are concerned. Καὶ δὴ καὶ marks off a new category (C)[236], be it a species next to the previous as we shall see (see later on p.92). If bodies of plants or animals, each being one (ἓν ὄντα), escape their unity by being broken into small pieces, they lose their being, and they no longer are what they previously were. Indeed, they have become other things, even though they are still one.

There are two issues that remain to be discussed. Firstly, notice the rather curious wording: 'if they *escape* (φεύγει) unity'. I have to leave it at noticing for I have not been able to detect why Plotinus did use the word φεύγει (escape). Θρυπτόμενοι "being broken small" *LP* (*LS* "break in pieces"), seems to be more than a mere synonym of τμηθέντα, and seems to suggest a different type of action. Did Plotinus have something like milling or butchery in mind?

Secondly, Plotinus expressly says that those muchdivided organisms no longer are what they were, and to this he adds a rather mysterious phrase:

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[232] Cf. *Met.*1046 b 10, and Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus*, 788 b.

[233] See Dörrie, *Hypostasis*, 26 ff. and especially Long-Sedley, *Hellenistic Philosophers* I, 162 ff. Long-Sedley fail, however, inasmuch they believe to be able to translate εἶναι rather safely by "exist" causing much confusion. The consequence would be that topos *etc.* does not "exist", but according to Stoic philosophy void, place and what is only in the mind, lekton, and time, or something like a Centaur are present in our world, or in our minds only. Εἶναι is in the Stoa purely corporeal, that is having ἀντιτυπία (*SVF*, II, 381, cf. Long-Sedley, *Hellenistic Philosophers* I, 270, 296 and Mansfeld, *Zeno*, 158 ff.). So for non-corporeal phenomena (void, place and what is only in the mind, lekton and time, or something like a Centaur) the Stoics badly needed a term to make them be present in our world, or to our minds for which they choose ὑφίστασθαι or perhaps also ὑπάρχειν; the term εἶναι was already used up. Long-Sedley cause a lot of confusion by translating εἶναι by "exist". They believe to can put it this way: "There is such a thing as a rainbow and such a character as Mickey Mouse, but they don't actually 'exist'". But they are in our world or in our mind, so they do exist, but they cannot be denoted with the (corporeal, 'antitypial') εἶναι.

[234] To come to exist by the producing power of a higher (proximate) entity, see below 198, see also Dörrie, *Hypostasis*, 46 ff. who has but little to say on the *verb* ὑφίστασθαι.

[235] See Appendix III.

[236] See below 78.

(οὐκέτι ὄντα ἃ ἦν) *ἄλλα δὲ γενόμενα καὶ ἐκεῖνα*[237], ὅσα ἕν ἐστι, "but they have become other things (just as in the case of A and B), *even those things which are one*". I read this addition in a different manner than Harder[238], who has a high comma after ὄντα ἃ ἦν where I prefer a comma (with HS). I read γενόμενα as on the same level as ὄντα ἃ ἦν, with καί added to give more force, and I take ἐκεῖνα to refer to σώματα and, finally, ὅσα ἕν ἐστι to refer to the qualification of σώματα, *i.e.* ἓν ὄντα ἕκαστα. We thus get a statement completely different from Harder's, one which I regard more satisfactory. Harder renders the sentence; "Indem sie dann etwas anderes geworden, sind sie aber auch das nur soweit sie Eines sind"[239]. The organisms which were originally unified, are split into parts. Here, too, according to Harder, the unity of the now shattered parts of the organism is responsible for their being something other than they were before, *i.e.* a new entity (*e.g.* an arm, the branch of a tree). In this way a new idea, different to type A and B and, in fact, alien from them, is introduced. In these types the unity of the original parts was in no way emphasized. What is emphasized, is the loss of the entity composed of the original parts when unity is lost. It does not seem very likely to me that Plotinus wished to say something about the so-called unity of arms, branches and so on, but rather about the nature of the organism that comes to lose its unity.

If the text is taken in the sense I have suggested, then it appears to say something about the status of the desintegrated organisms, which no longer are what they were before, but became other things (arms, branches) as is the case in the examples of types A and B, in which the original elements as such return by losing the unity they had had in the composed entity. Plotinus actually says that something similar also occurs in the case of organisms of type C, although this was not to be expected, because the parts of the organisms form such an integrated whole with the organism itself. In this case there is question of a greater degree of unity than in type B, where unity is characterized by τὸ ἓν *ἔχοντα*, whereas type C is characterized by ἓν *ὄντα*. Nevertheless, even organisms with such a high degree of unity and coherence fall into pieces when they lose their unity and even the entities that were one (ἓν ὄντα) are no longer what they were.

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[237] Line 13: ἐκεῖνα - Vitringa reads ἕκαστα, a reading which would be quite in line with my interpretation but not really necessary (cf. my analysis).

[238] Harder *I a*,171.

[239] Bréhier (170) translates: "il (singular !) se change en d' autres êtres, qui tous en tant qu'il sont, sont chacun un être". This is a typical example of Bréhier's rather loose and paraphrasing way of translating: ἐκεῖνα is taken as a singular, although in Plotinus it is a plural; in the phrase ὅσα ἓν ἐστι, ἕν is omitted (for these characteristic shortcomings see B.S. Page in S. MacKenna, *Plotinus, the Enneads*, in the preface to the second edition, p.XVIII). Moreover, he presents almost the same concept as Harder does. The same holds good for Armstrong's rendering: "and are no longer what they were and are those other things in so far as each of them is one".

Other objections can be raised against Harder's view. Ἐκεῖνα can hardly refer to the parts which come into existence after the organism has been split up. It is much more likely that the word at issue refers to organisms in their original state of unity. One reason for taking such a view is to consider ἐκεῖνα in line 4: ἐπείπερ ἀφαιρεθέντα τοῦ ἓν ὅ λέγεται οὐκ ἐστιν *ἐκεῖνα*. Here too ἐκεῖνα obviously refers to the entities before having been deprived of their unity. This view is supported by the fact that the words ὅσα ἓν ἐστι are added to ἐκεῖνα. They undoubtedly refer to the characteristic features of the bodies of line 11: σώματα *ἓν ὄντα* ἕκαστα. This proves that ἐκεῖνα has to refer to organisms (bodies) and cannot be interpreted, as Harder wishes, as designating the isolated parts which came into existence after the organism had been split up. If he were right, we would rather have expected τάδε instead of ἐκεῖνα. Moreover, we can also object to taking ὅσα as 'soweit' ("aber auch das nur (?) soweit sie Eines sind"). So there seem to be enough reasons to consider an alternative to the traditional interpretation. We shall turn to the use of the examples of the three categories elsewhere in the *Enneads* later on (see Appendix I of this chapter).

A last question in connection with part I is whether or not the examples involved are Plotinus' own invention or part of a tradition. We shall discuss this problem in our next paragraph.

2) *Stoic influence on complex I*

It has not escaped notice that to work with stages or types of unity was a *locus communis* in Greek philosophy and belonged to a rich tradition of mainly Stoic signature. There are many texts in which the same distinctions can be observed as in Plotinus: Plutarch, *Praec. coni.*, 34; *id.*, *De Defectu Orac.*, 29 and Achilles, *Isagoge*, 14 (*SVF* II, 366, 367, 368 respectively):

SVF II, 366 Plutarch, *Praec. coniugalia*, 34

> Τῶν σωμάτων οἱ φιλόσοφοι (*sc.* the Stoics) τὰ μὲν ἐκ διεστώτων λέγουσιν εἶναι καθάπερ στόλον καὶ στρατόπεδον, τὰ δ' ἐκ συναπτομένων ὡς οἰκίαν καὶ ναῦν, τὰ δ' ἡνωμένα καὶ συμφυᾶ καθάπερ ἐστὶ τῶν ζώων ἕκαστον.

> Philosophers say of bodies that some are composed of separate elements, as a fleet or an army, others of elements joined together, as a house or a ship, and still others form together an intimate union as is the case with every living creature (Translation F.Cole Babbitt).

SVF II, 367 Plutarch, *De Defectu Oraculorum*, 29

> οὐ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα μὲν ἓν συνίσταται σῶμα πολλάκις ἐκ διεστώτων σωμάτων, οἷον ἐκκλησία καὶ στράτευμα καὶ χορός. ὧν ἑκάστῳ καὶ ζῆν καὶ φρονεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν συμβέβηκεν, ὡς οἴεται Χρύσιππος

Do we not in this world of ours often have a single body composed of separate bodies, as, for example, an assembly of people or an army or a band of dancers, each one of whom has the contingent faculty of living, thinking, and learning, as Chrysippus believes (Translation F.Cole Babbitt).

SVF II, 368 Achilles, *Isagoge*, 14 p. 134 in Petav. Uranol.

(Τί μὲν ἀστήρ, τί δὲ ἄστρον;) σώματα ἡνωμένα λέγεσθαι ὅσα ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἕξεως κρατεῖται, οἷον λίθος, ξύλον. ἔστι δὲ ἕξις πνεῦμα σώματος συνεκτικόν. συν-ημμένα δὲ ὅσα οὐχ ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἕξεως δέδεται, ὡς πλοῖον καὶ οἰκία. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ πολλῶν σανίδων, ἡ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν λίθων σύγκειται. διεστῶτα δὲ ὡς χορός. τῶν δὲ τοιούτων διτταὶ αἱ διαφοραί. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ὡρισμένων σωμάτων καὶ ἀριθμῷ· ληπτῶν ὡς χορός, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἀορίστων ὡς ὄχλος. εἴη οὖν ⟨ἂν⟩ ὁ μὲν ἀστὴρ σῶμα ἡνωμένον, τὸ δὲ ἄστρον ἐκ διεστώτων καὶ ὡρισμένων. ἀριθμὸς γὰρ ἀστέρων ἐφ' ἑκάστου δείκνυται.

(What is a star, what a constellation?) *unified* bodies are said to be such as are dominated by one condition, *e.g.* a stone, piece of wood. Condition is a breath unifying a body. *Composed* things are those things which are not connected by one condition, a ship and a house. The first is composed of lots of beams, the other consists of stones. *Separated* things are like a choir. Of this type of things there are two distinctions. Some consist of limited bodies and are composed by number, like a choir, other in unlimited things like a crowd. Well, then a star is a unified body, a constellation consists in separated and limited elements. For with each of the constellations a number of stars can be pointed to.

Texts like Seneca, *Epist. Mor.*, 102,5 are also worth quoting and here we find a romanized example too (senatus), *SVF* III, 160:

at quae a dialecticis contra hanc opinionem dicuntur segreganda fuerunt et ideo seposita sunt. Nunc quia omnia exigis, omnia quae dicunt, persequar. Deinde singulis occurram. Nisi aliquid praedixero, intellegi non poterunt, quae refellentur, quid est quod praedicere velim ?

quaedam continua esse corpora, ut hominem, quaedam esse composita ut navem, domum, omnia denique, quorum diversae partes iunctura in unum coactae sunt. quaedam ex distantibus, quorum adhuc membra separata sunt, tanquam exercitus populus senatus. illi enim per quos ista corpora efficiuntur, iure aut officio cohaerent, natura diducti et singuli sunt.

But the remarks of dialecticians in opposition to this idea had to be sifted out, and were accordingly laid aside. Now that you demand an answer to them all I shall examine all their statements and then refute them singly. Unless, however, I make a preliminary, it will be impossible to understand my rebuttals. And what is the preliminary remark? Simply this: there are certain *continuous* bodies, such as man; there are certain *composite*, such as ship, house and everything which is the result of of joining separate parts into one sum total; there are certain others made up of things that are *distinct*, each member remaining separate - like an army, a populace or a senate. For the persons who go to make up such bodies are united by virtue of law or function (Translation Gummere).

1) *continua* corpora, *e.g.* men.
2) *composita* corpora, *e.g.* ship, house

3) *corpora ex distantibus, e.g.* exercitus, populus, senatus

One of the most important and characteristic texts is Sextus Emp., *Adv. Math.*, IX, 78. Unfortunately, this text is in danger of losing its importance, although it may be characterized as thoroughly Stoic. We find it in *SVF* II, number 1013[240]:

> τῶν τε σωμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἡνωμένα, τὰ δὲ ἐκ συναπτομένων, τὰ δὲ ἐκ διεστώτων. ἡνωμένα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὰ ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἕξεως κρατούμενα, καθάπερ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα, ἐκ συναπτομένων δὲ τὰ ἔκ τε παρακειμένων καὶ πρὸς ἕν τι κεφάλαιον νευόντων συνεστῶτα ὡς ἁλύσεις καὶ πυργίσκοι καὶ νῆες, ἐκ διεστώτων δὲ τὰ ἐκ διεζευγμένων καὶ [ἐκ] κεχωρισμένων καὶ καθ' αὑτὰ ὑποκειμένων συγκείμενα, ὡς στρατιαὶ καὶ ποῖμναι καὶ χοροί.
>
> Of bodies, too, some are unified, some formed of things conjoined, some of separate things. Unified bodies are such as are controlled by a single attraction, such as plants and animals; those formed of conjoined parts are such as are composed of adjacent elements which tend to combine into a main structure, like cables and turrets and ships; those formed of separate things are such as are compounded of things which are disjoined and isolated and existing by themselves, like armies, and flocks and choruses (Translation Bury).

We have the same examples or examples of the same type:

1) φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα
2) ἁλύσεις, πυργίσκοι, νῆες
3) στρατιαὶ καὶ ποῖμναι καὶ χοροί

So in the Stoa, too, we find a clear and well determined difference in degrees of unity. The sequence of the several types or stages is determined by the viewpoint of the context. We soon see that from the ontological point of view in the Stoa the sequence and order of things is connected with the decreasing or increasing amount of Logos (pneuma) within the things (see *SVF*, II 391). Ontologically Stoics think preeminently downwards as it were (stars *e.g.* enjoying a higher status than earthly things *SVF* II, 681-692, see also 650), whereas Plotinus thinks upwards in the context of a different perspective: the road to the One as clarified by the increasing amount of unity to be met within things.

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[240] See Theiler, *Vorbereitung*, 97. Theiler sees Posidonius' hand in this passage. However, Edelstein and Kidd (Edelstein - Kidd, *Posidonius I, The Fragments*, Cambridge 1972, see also Graeser, *The Stoics*, 73) did not wish to include this passage in their collection of Posidonian fragments, making clear that we cannot be certain that Sextus' passage originates in Posidonius. This passage is liable and likely to be underestimated as a testimony of the Stoic doctrine of unity. In *SVF* II, 366-368 we do not find it under the heading 'corpus', but we do find it under the heading: "proof for the existence of the Gods", *SVF* II 1013, see also Graeser, *The Stoics*, 73 and n.7.

It is not only in complex I that one can find traces of Stoic influence. We shall see that this influence has its impact on complex II as well, and that the *iunctura non callida* between the two complexes is perhaps due to the use of Stoic models.

II) Complex II, second part of the preamble: transition to the level of soul (14 b - 17 a); again Stoic influence

Translation

> And also health [exists] when the body is organised into one, and beauty exists when the nature of the one dominates the parts. And virtue of the soul exists when the soul is unified into one and into one harmony. And virtue of the soul [exists] when the soul is unified into one and into one harmony.

This part concerns the existence (as an effect of unity) of

1) a) the health of the body
  b) the beauty of the soul
2) the virtue of the soul

The form that manifests itself at the end of this part is called non-corporeal. Here we have to deal with the transition from the corporeal to the less corporeal or non-corporeal (virtue of the soul). What the form of unity of the soul in this complex means for Plotinus, and how this form is evaluated, is apparent from 34[VI,6],13,25-27 (a pericope we will meet again, see p.91). Here we learn that the unity of entities that have no parts (τὸ μὴ μεριστόν) is to be regarded as superior to the unity of entities that do have parts: "If then it is more one in the continuous and [still] more one in the indivisible, it is clearly because the one is a particular nature, which has existence" (Translation Armstrong, εἰ οὖν μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τοῦ συνεχοῦς καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ *τοῦ μὴ μεριστοῦ*, δῆλον ὅτι ὄντος τινὸς φύσεως τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ὑφεστώσης).

What brought Plotinus to speak about the unity that reveals itself in health and beauty after discussing the unity of organisms (type C of Complex I)? To say that here body is involved in the same way as it is in type C, is not enough. It will be more clear what Plotinus' method was, if we take the Stoic influence[241] into account explaining the presence of health and beauty as a pair. Already in Chrysippus we come across the remarkable and conspicuous combination of health and beauty in the body as well as in the soul (*SVF* III, 278= Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II,62, 15 W., see also *ib.*, 279):

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[241] Theiler, *Vorbereitung*, 98.

> Ταύτας μὲν οὖν ῥηθείσας ἀρετὰς τελείας εἶναι λέγουσι περὶ τὸν βίον καὶ συνεστηκέναι ἐκ θεωρημάτων· ἄλλας δὲ ἐπιγίνεσθαι ταύταις, οὐκ ἔτι τέχνας οὔσας, ἀλλὰ δυνάμεις τινάς, ἐκ τῆς ἀσκήσεως περιγιγνομένας, οἷον τὴν ὑγίειαν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὴν ἀρτιότητα καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ κάλλος. Ὥσπερ γὰρ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν εὐκρασίαν εἶναι τῶν ἐν σώματι θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ ξηρῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὑγίειαν εὐκρασίαν εἶναι τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ δογμάτων. Καὶ ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἰσχὺς τοῦ σώματος τόνος ἐστὶν ἱκανὸς ἐν νεύροις, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς τόνος ἐστὶν ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ κρίνειν καὶ πράττειν ἢ μή· ὥσπερ τε τὸ κάλλος τοῦ σώματός ἐστι συμμετρία τῶν μελῶν καθεστώτων αὐτῷ πρὸς ἄλληλά τε καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος ἐστὶ συμμετρία τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον τε αὐτῆς καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα.

> They say that the virtues just mentioned are perfect in regard to life and consist in theorems, and there are others next to them, which are no techniques, but powers of a certain kind, a product of exercition, *e.g.* health of the soul and its aptitude and strenght and beauty. Just as health of the body consists in the right mixture of the warm, cold, dry and moist in the body, so they say that health of the soul is the right mixture of dogmas of the soul. And just as bodily strength is the sufficient tension in the muscles, in the same way the sufficient tension of the soul lays in the faculty of judging and acting or not. And just as beauty of the body is the well blended mixture of its limbs in relation to each other and the whole, in the same way also the beauty of the soul is its well blended mixture of the logos and its parts in relation to the whole and to each other.

According to Chrysippus health is determined by a well balanced proportion of cold and heat, *etc.* (εὐκρασία). That also applies to the 'health' of the soul (ὑγίεια τῆς ψυχῆς). Beauty is thus connected with the body and the soul. They both consist in συμμετρία; in the body it is the συμμετρία of the parts, whereas in the soul it is the reciprocal relation between the logos and its parts that counts. In the Stoa all this is purely corporeal[242]. For Plotinus there is more to it, for as soon as the soul appears, the purely material level is transcended. Admittedly, in the Stoic passage from which we draw, unity as such does not play a direct part, although it does play an indirect one as the result of mingling (εὐκρασία, συμμετρία). Nevertheless, the connection between health and beauty both in Stoa and Plotinus as well as the associative connection between beauty of the body and virtue of the soul, which could be called beauty, in Plotinus, are hardly a coincidence. Obviously there is a question of Stoic influence.

It is very interesting to see that in 9[VI,9],1,15,16 Plotinus displays himself as adhering to the notion that beauty consists in the power of the nature of the One exerted on the parts: καὶ κάλλος, ὅταν ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς τὰ μόρια κατάσχῃ φύσις and this fits in perfectly well with *Enneads* 1[I,6], chapters 1 and 2, contrary to what one might think[243]. To be sure, in 1[I,6],1,23 ff. he criticizes the Stoic idea that beauty consists in συμμετρία; for how could an independent unity, which is not made up of parts, be beautiful? Rather, in Plotinus' view beauty comes from seeing the influence and effects of the Idea of Beauty (*ib.*,13 ff.). Nevertheless, beauty does consist also in the agreement of the parts[244], which are made one by the uniting power of the form. It is this last idea that fits in so well with the Stoic conception of beauty as συμμετρία, that Plotinus had no trouble to adapt the Stoic influence in the development of his thought in 9[VI,9],1, in spite of the fact that theoretically (in 1[1,6],2) it is the form that operates as formative of beauty.

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[242] For the corporeal and matter in the Stoa, see Mansfeld, *Zeno of Citium*, 158 ff.; 169 ff.

If we take in Stoic influence into account, one particular oddity of the text becomes more understandable. In complex I the effects of the entities losing their unity and the entities as such have a predominant position in Plotinus' treatment. This train of thought is so suddenly interrupted, that it affects the understanding of the text. The following pattern recurs: if X loses its unity, then X is no longer what it used to be or even no longer exists. At first Complex II seems to follow alongs these steps, but then suddenly it takes a completely different syntactical turn. Health,..... and now (line 14) we do not read as hitherto: *disappears* when unity falls off ... when *etc*. The dots now should apparently filled in by: *exists* (when *etc*.). The same applies to what is said about beauty, and the virtue of the soul is treated in the same syntactical construction. The sudden change in the train of thought can best be explained by assuming that there is question of Stoic influence in the background and that Plotinus has connected various different Stoic ideas or even texts. If we do not take this background into account, we could not explain why Plotinus so abruptedly introduced the notion of beauty.

We may now ask: is it beauty as such that Plotinus is dealing with at this point, or is it corporeal beauty? Considering the connection between beauty and health in the Stoic fragment we presented, there is no room for doubt. It is corporeal beauty that is at stake. This can also be shown linguistically by examining the particle's in Plotinus, which are employed with the greatest care. Δὲ connects various levels: καὶ ὑγίεια δὲ... καὶ κάλλος. The first mentioned καὶ means 'also', the second puts κάλλος on the same footing with ὑγίεια, and thus it is corporeal beauty that the passage deals with. Ἀρετή is connected by δὲ to both entities. So with ἀρετή we have reached a next level.

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[243] In my article, *Stoicism in Plotinus' VI,9,1*, p.72 I believed that 9[VI,9],1 deviated from 1[I,6]1; I hope that the interpretation I have developed in the present work is a more sensible one.

[244] Προσιὸν οὖν τὸ εἶδος τὸ μὲν ἐκ πολλῶν ἐσόμενων μερῶν ἓν συνθέσει συνέταξέ τε καὶ εἰς μίαν συντέλειαν ἤγαγε καὶ ἓν τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ πεποίηκεν ἐπείπερ ἓν ἦν αὐτὸ ἕν τε ἔδει τὸ μορφούμενον εἶναι ὡς δυνατὸν αὐτῷ ἐκ πολλῶν ὄντι. Ἵδρυται οὖν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τὸ κάλλος ἤδη εἰς ἓν συναχθέντος καὶ τοῖς μέρεσι διδὸν ἑαυτὸ καὶ τοῖς ὅλοις: "The form, then, approaches and composes that which is to come into being from many parts into a single ordered whole; it brings it into a completed unity and makes it one by the agreement of its parts; for since it is one itself, that which is shaped by it must also be one as far as a thing can be which is composed of many parts. So beauty rests upon the material thing when it has been brought into unity, and gives itself to parts and whole alike" (1[I,6],2,19 ff., Armstrong's translation).

In Complex I Plotinus was equally careful. So there is a chain of conjunctions to be noticed. Type B is opposed to type A by ἀλλ᾽ (line 6) and the increasing amount of unity entailed by οὐδέ (line 6). Καὶ δὴ καὶ applies this form of unity to plants and living beings, type C, which displays even more unity than type B. Complex II is added to this. Carefully elaborated as this may be, there remains a break in the junction between Complex I and Complex II, by the combination of divergent Stoic complexes. We shall discuss the question of Stoic influence in the preamble of 9[VI],1 in more detail in our Appendix I.

Part II) Lines 17 a - 43: soul as a candidate for being the One

Translation

> Can it be that, since soul brings everything into one, by creating, moulding, shaping and organizing them, we should, having come to it, say that it is this which provides the one and that this is the One ? Or should we hold that the soul, just as when it furnishes other things to the bodies it is itself not what it gives, *e.g.* shape and form, but things different from itself, it so, if it also gives one, it gives something different from itself and that by looking to the One it makes every thing one, just as by looking to Man it creates man, taking along with (the form of) man the one in it (the form). For of the things that are said to be one each is one in the same way as its condition is and it is what it is, so that things that are to a lesser degree have the one to a lesser degree, and those that (are) to a greater degree, (have the one to) a greater degree. And indeed also the soul, being a thing different from the One has more a one to a greater degree in proportion to its being to a greater degree and its real being. To be sure, it is not the One itself. For the soul is one and has its one in a way by participation and these things, soul and one, are two, just like body and one. And what has separate parts, like a choir, is farthest removed from the One, the continuous is already nearer, but soul is nearer still, for it furnishes also itself [oneness]. For the soul is one and the one is somehow an attribute. But if because of the fact that without being one there would not even be soul, for this reason someone would lump soul and the One together, (then he must consider) that in the first place also the other things each are what they are along with their being one, but all the same the One is different from them - for body and the One are not the same, but the body participates in the One - and (he should realize) secondly that the soul is multiple, even the soul which is one, even if it is not composed from parts. For there are very many powers in it, reasoning, desiring, perceiving, which are, as it were, held together by the one as a bond. Indeed, the soul being one itself bestows the one on another thing and it possesses this (the one) by participation in another.

It appears that by mentioning the soul (ἐπὶ ταύτην ἐλθόντας) and its unity, it suddenly occurred to Plotinus that the soul might be a suitable candidate for being the One. However, the argument he presents is too well structured for us not to recognize it as a strategical trap. Plotinus considers two main aspects, which could suggest an identification of the soul with the One:

1) The soul bestows unity on the (lower) entities
2) The soul itself displays unity.

ad 1) Well then, Plotinus begins, if it is true (ἐπειδή) that the soul confers unity to all things (below its level), by creating, forming, shaping and organising them *into a whole* (συντάττουσα), must we, then, say that the soul bestows oneness and *is* the One? Well, it is rather the case that just as the soul bestows other characteristics upon bodies without being those properties itself, such as shape and form as properties different from the soul itself[245], likewise, when the soul gives oneness[246] in addition to those other properties, this oneness must be considered something different from soul itself. Plotinus now (line 24) introduces a comparison with the Idea of Man. Soul looks up to the Idea of One, just as looking up to the Idea of Man soul produces[247] a (particular) man, providing simulteaneously with the form of man the oneness that belongs to man and that is required for being a man (συλλαμβάνουσαν μετὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου *τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἕν*, line 25). Now that he has implied in his argument the notion of a special form of unity belonging to a special entity, introducing in fact different degrees of unity, that accompany specific forms of being (*i.c.* being a man), he continues to develop his theory of the relations between unity and being. He connects with the phrase συλλαμβάνουσαν μετὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου *τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἕν* (line 25) the following explanation (γάρ). For everything that is called one, is one to such a degree (οὕτως ἕν) as it is (structurally) what it is (ὡς ἔχει καὶ ὅ ἐστιν[248]). Consequently, Plotinus says, some things, being to a lesser degree, possess less unity and vice versa some, being to a greater degree, have more the one[249].

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[245] This argument has only any validity for those who think about the soul in the same manner as Plotinus had expounded in earlier treatises.

[246] Line 22: ἕν - Vitringa wishes to read: *τὸ* ἕν. This desire to conjecture the article is perhaps due to Vitringa's idea that it is the One that is involved. However, it is only unity that is Plotinus'concern, see my Appendix III. See on συλλαμβάνουσαν Harder, *I b*, 469.

[247] Line 25: ἄνθρωπον - sc. ποιεῖν. See on the whole problem concerning the Idea of Man and of oneness Appendix III.

[248] Each of the things to which the predicate 'one' applies, is one in the manner of the ἕξις it possesses (ὡς ἔχει), *i.e.* according to the structure of unity belonging to the several types of unity and each of them (and now I venture a conjecture) is what it is ἐστιν ὅ ἐστιν). This is precisely the philosophical theme at the basis of the context of line 26: the more being a thing possesses, the more unity it has, the more one it is. My conjecture ἐστιν ὅ ἐστιν can be supported by line 13 οὐκέτι ὄντα ἃ ἦν (cf. 9[VI,9],9,11). For other views see HS *ad locum*:: "sicut se habet" taking ὅ ἐστιν as subject of ὡς ἔχει. I cannot regard this interpretation as elegant, the construction is rather awkward (καὶ) and the sense is far from clear. Against HS see Puelma, *Vorschläge*, 90, who points to the next ἔχειν, line 28 as a proof for ἔχει being transitive. To me this does not seem conclusive, however.

[249] See for the degrees of unity Appendix III.

This formula is now applied to the soul. The soul, being different from the One, has in accordance with its higher ratio of more and real[250] being, in fact more unity: τὸ *μᾶλλον* ἕν. Notice the position of μᾶλλον[251] between τὸ and ἕν. Although Harder draws attention to this position, he translates: "besitzt das Eine in höherem Grade". It would have been better to translate otherwise, so that there would be no suggestion that the soul possesses more of the *One*. Plotinus intends to express the idea that soul's type of unity has more unity in it than *e.g.* material entities, which is not to say that the soul has more of the *One*. Plotinus continues: if the soul has only a degree of unity, the soul cannot be a candidate for being the One. Having more unity implies that there is an entity that has or is *the* unity. Unity apparently comes to soul from another entity. Its unity is only attributive, ψυχὴ γὰρ μία καὶ συμβεβηκὸς πως[252] τὸ ἕν· Οὐ μὴν αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν. Harder: "Das Eine ist für sie eine Art Accidens".

We shall have to say something more on the subject of συμβεβηκός[253]. We must state that in the context of the transcendent domain the expression συμβαινειν + dative indicates having a property by its descending from a higher entity. The perfect tense συμβεβηκός means 'having descended as an attribute'; I entirely agree with *LP* to drop the rendering 'to have an accident (accidental property)'. Συμβεβηκός refers to having attributes, or rather properties that are borrowed by participation from entities belonging to a higher transcendent level. In Neoplatonism (and Mesoplatonism) every property of a thing comes down to the bearer from higher levels. In the domain of the transcendent these properties are fundamental to and vital for the nature of the thing, and far from being accidental (in the Aristotelian sense). Accidental being is characteristic of things in the world of *genesis*. The form of συμβεβηκός in our passage has nothing to do with accidental being in our world, and as we said, one should avoid translating with 'accidental'. In 42[VI,1],26,34 ff. Plotinus has a very instructive exposition of what κατὰ σύμβασιν / κατὰ συμβεβηκός is supposed to mean. In this passage μετέχειν and κατὰ συμβεβηκός are connected. The problem discussed in 42[VI,1],26,34 ff. concerns the problem that an entity cannot have a property but by participation. If seize is one it can only have oneness by participation and κατὰ σύμβασιν. Quite to the point Plotinus adds "that before what is κατὰ σύμβασιν there must be what is first and in the proper sense (δεῖ τοίνυν εἶναι τὸ πρώτως καὶ κυρίως πρὸ τοῦ κατὰ σύμβασιν)". If the Stoics, Plotinus says, had been so keen as understand how the expression κατὰ σύμβασιν is used, then they had perhaps discovered the One that is not one κατὰ συμβεβηκός, which seems to be the same as κατὰ σύμβασιν, attributively (implying: but they would have discovered what is 'one' in the proper sense: 'The One'). Κατὰ συμβεβηκός is painstakingly described as "which is not one by being one itself, but from something other (λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὃ τῷ μὴ αὐτὸ ἕν, ἀλλ' παρ' ἄλλου)". I believe that we have here the standard model for all that has an attribute in the transcendent domain.

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[250] *ὄντως* εἶναι marks its transcendental character.

[251] Kirchhoff was the first to delete this μᾶλλον because of the abundancy of μᾶλλον in the sentence. Harder restored it to its position between τὸ and ἕν. Igal, *de Uno*, 273, 274 rightly defended Harder's restoration by pointing to the fact that this μᾶλλον signifies "possessionem maioris unitatis" and "quantitatem unitatis". HS, *editio minor* (HS 2, see note 410) elegantly read *τὸ* μᾶλλον *ἕν* in line 29, bracketing it in line 30.

[252] Line 31: πως, it is the mind that conveys oneness to the soul, as we learn from ch.2,6.

[253] See also 135.

According to Plotinus' views on the transcendent domain, the sentence καὶ συμβεβηκός πως τὸ ἓν implies that the oneness of the soul must come from outside, from a higher form of oneness. So from his point of view the conclusion that there are two entities, soul and one, just as was the case with body and one (καὶ δύο ταῦτα ψυχὴ καὶ ἕν, ὥσπερ σῶμα καὶ ἕν, line 31) is valid. Now with regard to the degrees of unity he again follows the hierarchy of his examples in the preamble in a succinct form: 1) furthest removed from the One is the discrete (τὸ διεστηκός, type A), quoting his example of a choir, 2) closer to the One is the continuous (τὸ συνεχές apparently embracing both types B and C, see Appendix II) and 3) soul is even nearer to the One because soul, too, communicates oneness - so we interpret his brief phrase ψυχὴ δὲ ἔτι μᾶλλον κοινωνοῦσα καὶ αὐτή [254].

Now (line 34) Plotinus considers the problem of the relation between soul and One no longer from the point of view of what soul bestows on other (lower) entities, *viz.* unity, without being the One itself, but from the unity of the soul itself: the second side of the problem of identification of the soul with the One.

ad 2) He makes his mouthpiece a τις, with whom apparently he does not wish to be identified. If such a τις, who, insisting on the fact that without being one the soul would not be in existence and using that as an argument (ταύτῃ), would venture to throw together the soul and the One, then firstly (πρῶτον) he must realize ('then he must realize' has to be added in the elliptical manner of saying) that this argument has no validity, because also other entities (he has body in mind, see line 38) go together with being one[255]. Nevertheless, we found that they are not identifiable with the One. So the concommitancy of unity will not suffice to prove that soul and One can be identified. Secondly (ἔπειτα) he (the τις) must realize that soul is plural although it is one, even though soul, admittedly, has no parts. The plurality of the soul consists in its capacities: *viz.* reasoning, reaching after and perceiving[256], which are all connected by the one, as it were by a bond. According to Blumenthal parts and capacities are sometimes interchangeable in Plotinus' psychology[257]. In this case, however, they are not.

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[254] It is usually translated as if κοινωνεῖν means 'to participate', see *e.g.* Armstrong; "but still participates in it, (*sc.* the One)". However, κοινωνεῖν never means 'participate' in the way the technical term μετέχειν (see *LP*) does. So κοινωνεῖν perhaps signifies that the soul is more a communion, but according to *LP* it does not seem to be used absolutely (without an object). Soul's most distinctive feature in the context is its providing unity to lower entities, as is twice expressed in ch. 1: line 21 (εἰ καὶ ἓν δίδωσιν) and lines 42,43 ('Επάγει ...... τὸ ἓν ... ἄλλῳ). Κοινωνεῖν can be transitive: in 5[V,9],11,22 it means 'to communicate something to'. Plotinus supposes the case that arts like rhetoric, generalship, or administration or kingship communicate excellence to their actions (εἴ τινες αὐτῶν (*sc.* of these arts) τὸ καλὸν κοινωνοῦσι ταῖς πράξεσιν). In that case, if they contemplate that intelligible excellence, they get a part from the knowledge of that excellence to put in their own knowledge. The phrase εἴ τινες αὐτῶν (*sc.* of these arts) τὸ καλὸν κοινωνοῦσι ταῖς πράξεσιν can only mean that these arts bestow some beauty on their actions. Müller changed κοινωνοῦσι into κοινοῦσι, from κοινόω, Bréhier accepted this modification, but Harder, HS and Armstrong are right not to do so. Hence we can support the transitive meaning of κοινωνοῦσα in 9[VI,9],1,34 by means of the transitive meaning of κοινωνοῦσι in 5[V,9],11,22. The two places mutually support eachother. There is no reason to 'correct' κοινωνοῦσα in 9[VI,9],1,34 into κοινοῦσι as I once thought necessary.

Before starting on his next candidate (Being/Mind, ch.2) Plotinus concludes with a short roundup: soul, being one itself, confers oneness to other entities, but in turn it has its unity from elsewhere, its unity comes to it (as an attribute πάσχει) from something else. I may add a few words about πάσχειν. This verb can be equivalent to having something κατὰ συμβεβηκός as Hadot puts it[258]. So πάσχει can mean: having a characteristic by participating in a higher entity.

Three problems of vital interest for the understanding of chapter one are still to be examined, which will happen in three Appendices. Appendix I examines the issue of Plotinus' Stoicising. Appendix II will discuss the employment of the examples of the three categories elsewhere in Plotinus, whereas Appendix III will be devoted to the problem of the relation of the One and of unity as is manifest in bearers of unity.

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[255] Line 36: ἐστιν - I can understand Kirchhoff, who deleted this ἐστιν for one of the two seems redundant, although I would prefer to expunge (as A did) the second ἐστιν. Harder's solution to the problem seems elegant, supplying ἅ before the second ἐστιν: cf. line 13 οὐκέτι ὄντα ἅ ἦν. HS read ἅ for the first ἐστιν, which has the advantage of perhaps being provoked by haplography after ἄλλα, see Igal, *de Uno*, 275. Nevertheless, I would prefer Harder's solution for it provides a smoother running sentence.

[256] No reader of the early treatises will be surprised by these activities of the soul: λογίζεσθαι is a characteristic property of the soul already in 2[IV,7],8/1,5ff. (and also later, see below 167).The same goes for percieving, ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι (2[IV,7],8,3). 'Ορέγεσθαι longing for, striving after is as such not bad (it can be said of the longing for the good, see *LP s.v.*) and also a function of the soul, see Blumenthal, *Psychology*, 32 ff. Blumenthal, *ibidem*, 34 does not know in this case, whether or not anger and desire are involved in ὀρέγεσθαι. I do not think that doubt is necessary. For it is pure functioning what Plotinus' is interested in here. Why in this passage should he envisage such suspect activities as anger and desire at all?

[257] Blumenthal, *Psychology*, 21.

[258] as Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus*, II, 109 n.3 puts it: "πάθος synomyme de συμβεβηκός comme chez Aristote, *De Anima*, I, 1,402 a 9 et surtout *Metaphys.*, XIV, 1, 1088 a 17".

Appendix I: Plotinus' Stoicising

1) Introduction

No scholar denies that there are traces of Stoic influence is present in Plotinus', both in 9[VI,9],1 and elsewhere, although Graeser reduces this influence to the minimum[259]. He believes that to speak about 'Stoicizing' of Plotinus is of little value, because we are dealing with a variant of the famous *argumentum e gradibus entium* which has its origin in Platonic-Aristotelian sources[260]. Thus Plotinus may reasonably be called the legal inheritor, rather than Posidonius for example, whose name is not without relevance, as we shall see. Graeser puts 'Stoic elements in Plotinus' view of the mundus sensibilis' between inverted comma's, although he feels himself forced to acknowledge that in the preamble Plotinus comes very close to Seneca, *Epist. Mor.*, 102,5. However, if we take the Stoic passages we quoted above (p.73 ff.) into account, we can only conclude that the correspondences are striking and hardly deniable. Nevertheless, it is not enough to say that Stoic influence undoubtedly exists. What we have to determine is in what way the Stoic doctrine of degrees of unity is used by Plotinus. Is his use of relevant Stoic ideas merely superficial? What are his objectives? It is hardly likely that a philosopher of his stature merely aimed to take the easy way.

Before going into these questions I wish to examine the methods with which Stoic material was adapted. Looking closer into Plotinus' discussion of the types of unity and his use of Stoic material, one is struck by the fact that Plotinus employs Stoic *terminology* only scantily, although he makes full use of their *examples*. This will be the object of my investigation in the next section.

2) Plotinus and Stoic terminology of unity: why did Plotinus not use the term ἡνωμένα in complex I and why he did he leave out συναπτόμενα alltogether?

We may summarize the Stoic terminology used in connection with unity as emerging in the previously quoted passages as follows:

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[259] Graeser, *The Stoics*, 74,75.

[260] I do not think that the *argumentum e gradibus entium* (see Graeser, *The Stoics*, 29, 56 and above all 74,75) as such has any direct relevance as to 9[VI,9], see below 93.

1.ἡνωμένα	συμφυᾶ	continua
II 366 (Plut.)	II 366 (Plut.)	(III 160 Sen.)
II 368 (Ach.)		
II 1013 (Sext.)		
2.συναπτόμενα	συνημμένα	composita
II 366	II 368	III 160
II 1013		
3.διεστῶτα		distantia
II 366		III 160
II 367		
II 368		
II 1013		

Besides striking correspondences there are also obvious differences. Διεστῶτα is not used in the case of type A, whereas διεστηκός *is*, in the reference in 9[VI],1,32, and elsewhere in Plotinus. However, this is only a minor point. Type B is not described by συναπτόμενα, which in this connection is absent in Plotinus, but by συνεχής. ʼΗνωμένα is also absent. Although this expression is eminently suitable to denote type C, Plotinus obviously does not regard it as such. The impression (cf. what we have said on p. 82) that συνεχής can characterize both type B and C is correct, as is evident from 9[VI],1,33: τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς ἐγγυτέρω κτλ. (nearer to the One), in which συνεχές obviously characterizes both type B and type C. This telescoping of types B and C raises two questions:

a)Why should ἡνωμένα be avoided?

b)Why should συναπτόμενα be absent in Plotinus? What makes συνεχές suitable to type C, so as to be applicable to organisms?

Plotinus needed a term to refer to a degree of unity that was higher than the one the Stoa had ever come up with, namely the unity of complex II. Apparently he preferred to reserve the term ἑνόω to designate complex II, and more specifically the concept of the soul, which is broadly discussed after the preamble, whereas the Stoa used ἑνόω to denote category C and even as a general term to characterize the coherence of all that displays unity in the cosmos[261]. In Plotinus the soul displays a form of unity superior than that of the body, because it conveys unity to other entities (line 20 τὸ ἓν χορηγεῖ) and unity (ἐνόω) is expressly said of the soul: 16, 17 εἰς ἓν καὶ μίαν ὁμολογίαν *ἐνωθῇ*. Since the term ἡνωμένα was no longer available for lower entities, Plotinus stretched the word συνεχής to take over the function of the Stoic term ἡνωμένα, συναπτόμενα being less suitable for characterizing organisms. Συνεχές emphasizes to a greater degree the idea of continuity, whereas συναπτόμενα stresses the connection between elements that were not originally connected. Consequently, of συναπτόμενα we can say that it is not a suitable term to denote the unity of organisms, whereas συνεχές is connected with type B and not inappropriate for designating type C (although it is less fit to denote type C than ἡνωμένα as such; for Plotinus to use this term, however was now out of the question). In this way it is understandable that Plotinus should avoid συναπτόμενα and employ συνεχές to denote both type B and C. We shall go into the question of Plotinus' use of συνεχές in our Appendix II. In exploiting the possibilities of συνεχές, an expression that is absent in the *Greek* Stoical texts we quoted, Plotinus had the chance to continue a line of thought which must have been already present in the Stoa, in the *continua* of *Epist. Mor.*, 102,5 of Seneca (see above p.74), the offshoots of which occur in Plotinus' work (43[VI,2],11; 34[VI,6],13,26, see Appendix II)[262]. In Seneca *continua* also contain organisms.

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[261] Sometimes we come across stones as examples of ἡνωμένα, *SVF* II 368, compare, L. Edelstein, *The Philosophical System of Posidonius*, 299, n.5. Graeser, *The Stoics*, 73 refers also to Sext. Emp., *Adv.math.* IX, 81. However, in this passage we should observe the

The fact that there are differences between Stoic and Plotinus' own terminology does not mean that the correspondences have no significance, especially when the examples are taken into account. That Plotinus borrowed from Stoic unitarian doctrine seems to me unquestionable.

3) Final assessment; what did Stoicizing mean in Plotinus?

Although I do not believe that Plotinus' doctrine of the One is *fundamentally* based on, or influenced by, Stoic thought (it seems to me that Plotinus' doctrine is too distinctive to allow for a *basic* influence from elsewhere, Platonism excepted of course), in constructing his scale of unity he obviously incorporated Stoic ideas as I have tried to show in my analysis, at least in Complex I. Another group of Stoic ideas provided him with inspiration for Complex II, in the sense that it enabled him to create a domain of transition between the purely corporeal and the purely psychic. Whether he based the concept of the soul as the conveyor of unity on Stoic thought (especially on

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Stoic interest in the problem of coherence of all bearers of unity in the cosmos. Therefore ἡνωμένα in this connection is used in a general sense, which has to be carefully distinguished from ἡνωμένα as characteristic of category C. See for *literature* about this whole question Graeser, *The Stoics*, 73, 74.

[262] Theiler, *Vorbereitung*, 98.

that of Posidonius, as Witt assumed[263]), is something I am unable to judge. At all events my analysis shows that the preamble was actually formed with the help of Stoic material, both in the field of pure philosophy and that of linguistic technique. My analysis also makes it apparent that to reject or minimize Stoic influence will not do (against Graeser). To do so would mean to close one's eyes to some remarkable correspondences with the Stoic doctrine of unity. To state and outline this influence, however, cannot be considered the end of our task. The question that now remains is how to evaluate this influence.

Theiler's efforts to trace Stoic influence led to the discovery of a lot of correspondences, but are not entirely unquestionable, for the reason that he wished to see in Posidonius Plotinus' one and only purveyor [264]. The material he adduces does not support the conclusion that Posidonius is isolated in this respect. Other positions are possible and have actually been held (cf. Edelstein-Kidd[265]).

Armstrong considers the influence of Stoic thought in regard to the scale of unity "to be no more than a useful argument to support his own teaching in discussion with people habituated to Stoic way of thinking"[266]. He presents the *Stoica* as polemical borrowings with a protreptic aim. Ultimately, Graeser, too, sees polemical purposes at work. Here, however, we have to observe that Graeser's attempts to minimize Stoic influence to practically zero, are contradicted by his conclusion that Plotinus aimed at polemics. If the Stoic influence is minimized, the preamble can not contain a polemical attitude, for no one would feel that the preamble was adressed to him and least of all a Stoic, for it was 'established' by the minimizers that the preamble had no, or almost no Stoic element, or mark. My analysis shows that this Stoic influence was neither superficial and polemical in character, nor merely adhortatively polemical (Armstrong). Polemics, even protreptical polemics, cannot explain the preamble. Polemics are certainly not Plotinus' first objective, if they are any objective at all. The Stoic ideas or concepts are fully incorporated and absorbed in Plotinus' thought as we have seen in complex I. This view is confirmed by the fact that elsewhere in Plotinus, as we shall see in Appendix II, the collection of examples of complex I appears to be a *locus communis*, which can only be regarded thus if it is *rooted in his own thought*. Armstrong's conclusion - "It (the Stoic scale of unity) does not add anything important to his system and does not represent any important influence of Posidonius or later Stoicism in general on him" - seems to be an overreaction to Theiler's overestimating Posidonius and, as such, it is inexact, or even wrong. Indeed, my analysis demonstrates that the scale of unity has its own place in Plotinian thought, and it even suggests that Plotinus owed the idea of constructing such a Jacob's ladder to reach the One to the Stoic doctrine of unity itself.

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[263] Witt, *Posidonius*, 203, see also Armstrong, *Architecture*, 79 and Graeser, *The Stoics*, 75.

[264] Theiler, *Vorbereitung*, 97, 98.

[265] See above note 240.

[266] Armstrong, *Architecture*, 79. The same point of view is found in Harder, *I b*, 468: "Für Plotin jedenfalls ist diese Einteilung lediglich Material".

4) Plotinus' knowledge of Stoic doctrines

That Plotinus had knowledge of Stoic doctrines and used them in his work is supposed by Porphyrius, who in the *Life of Plotinus* expressly mentions this influence, suggesting that Plotinus embedded and processed Stoic doctrines into his thought ("In his writings one finds mixed covert Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines", cf. *Vita*,14,5[267]). The question is how did Plotinus become acquainted with these doctrines. It cannot be proved that he had acquired direct knowledge by reading Stoic literature himself[268], nor can it be proved by what we have discussed so far about the examples. However, the interpretation I have presented so far suggests that Plotinus had done some reading of Stoics, either from Stoic writings or anthologies. In this connection it is important to notice that Longinus, in his highly interesting tour d' horizon of contemporary philosophy and philosophers, mentions four Stoics, whose writings had appeared, *viz.* Themistocles[269] and Phoebion, and two others, who had their prime somewhat earlier, Annius and Medius (Porphyrius, *Vita*, 20, 34 ff.) and four Stoics (Herminus, Lysimachus, Athenaeus, and Musonius) who preferred teaching to writing. If we evaluate the position of the Stoics among their contemporary philosophers in Longinus' panorama, the Stoics of the last generation[270] hardly seemed to have played a less important role than the philosophers of other schools during the first half of the third century, however true it may be that Longinus preferred Ammonius, Amelius and Plotinus. Hence it is more than a speculation that Plotinus should have read works of writers amongst them.

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[267] Armstrong's translation, I, p.41 is a little exaggerating in as far as he translates "His writings, however are *full* of concealed Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines" 'Full' is not in the Greek ἐμμέμικται, which means rather that they are embedded in his writings, so it is used in Plotinus himself (cf. 38[VI,7],21,14) where it is said of light that is mixed in body and is invisible.

[268] Even Theiler, *Plotin zwischen Plato und Stoa, Sources*, 88, 101 is forced to admit that direct reading of Posidonius by Plotinus is doubtful. However, he finds direct reading not necessary because Plotinus could have read doxographies, see also Graeser, *The Stoics*, 4, cf. below 227.

[269] See for all these Stoics, Brisson, *Vie*, 61 ff. (prosopography) *sub vocibus*. We know mostly nothing more about them, except for Phoebion, who wrote rather incoherently, from a philosophical point of view, but stylistically careful, and Medius, who defended the Stoic doctrine of the eight parts of the soul, cf. Brisson, *Vie*, 97.

[270] After those Stoics who appear in the text the Stoic school seems to have vanished, see Pohlenz, *die Stoa*, I, 290. They are not mentioned in Spanneut, *Permanence du Stoicisme*.

Porphyrius also mentions a certain Trypho[271], who was a Stoic and a Platonist at the same time (Porphyrius, *Vita*, 17,3,4)[272] and who earned a place in history by accusing Plotinus of plagariazing Numenius. It seems plausible that Plotinus had acquired some knowledge of the work of this man. So there seems to have been a mingling of these two schools, what enabled Stoic philosophy to become virulently and from a Neoplatonic viewpoint dangerously, present in the core of philosophy in those days. Perhaps it is precisely this amalgam of both Platonism and Stoicism that made it necessary to polemize with the Stoa. Especially in his first treatises[273], Plotinus repeatedly argued sharply and elaborately against the Stoic doctrines of the soul and the relation of body and soul, an issue which was also at the focus of Porphyrius' interest, who went on asking Plotinus on the very subject during three whole days (Porphyrius, *Vita*, 13,11 ff.) and on the Stoic side Medius (cf. note 269)! On the other hand Plotinus also incorporated *Stoica* as *e.g.* the *logos spermatikos*[274] smoothly into his own Neoplatonic thought, a *Stoicum* that was perhaps already platonized before Plotinus. And, as I said already, Porphyrius states the presence of several hidden *Stoica* to be embedded in Plotinian philosophy[275]. As a matter of fact, it is probably in this category that one should place Plotinus' use of the Stoic examples of degrees of unity. His reading of books of the Stoics just mentioned or otherwise knowledge of Stoic anthologies must have him made familiar with these examples.

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[271] We do not know any more about him apart from the fact that he accused Plotinus of plagarianism of Numenius, Brisson, *Vie*, 111.

[272] Theiler, *Plotin zwischen Plato und Stoa*, 65, speaks about: "einen stoisierten Plato" and a "platonisierte Stoa".

[273] Already in the *second* treatise (2[IV,7],1-8 there are many arguments against the Stoic material doctrine of the soul. All along one can find arguments against Stoic philosophy, in 5[V,9],4,4.; *ib*.,5,17,26.

[274] See Graeser, *The Stoics*, 41 ff. and cf. Theiler, *Plotin zwischen Plato und Stoa*, 74, see also 66 and 72 ff.

[275] The hidden doctrines presumably do not refer to Plotinus' elaborate polemics against the Stoics, see also Theiler, *Plotin zwischen Plato und Stoa*, 89.

Appendix II: Plotinus' employment of the examples of the categories A, B, C elsewhere in the Enneads

The agglomerate of examples demonstrating degrees and forms of unity recurs several times in Plotinus. It is obviously a standard set, borrowed from the Stoa as we saw above p. 73 ff. It is used in many contexts that deal with all kinds of philosophical issues. However, the contexts that have the examples all have one thing in common: to bring about the difference between forms of oneness. From our point of view we may employ these texts for elucidating the preamble, *viz.* the issue of συνεχής. Perhaps it did not escape the attention of attentive readers of 9[VI],1 that to take συνεχῆ μεγέθη not regressively with category B (ship, house), but progressively with C (the organisms), is not foolish at all. In this connection it is relevant to observe that in 9[VI],1,32 συνεχής can be taken to embrace either both category B and category C or category B or category C separately. In the last case one of them is left out when the other is chosen. Τοίνυν (9[VI,9],1,8) cannot be decisive, for it can be connected both with what is antecedent and with what is subsequent. I may bring in first of all 32[V,5],4,32 as evidence in favour of a regressive connection of συνεχής.

32[V,5],4,32

In his attempt to demonstrate the precedecence of the numerical one in regard of what depends on it, Plotinus discusses the problem whether the unity of the compounding monads of a dyad and the unity of the dyad as dyad are one and the same or of a different nature, even though they both participate in the first monad. At this critical moment Plotinus attempts to clarify his position by picking out two examples from his collection: *viz.* an army, exemplifying discrete unity and a house, as a model of a continuous structure, and sets out to ascertain their different types of unity. The house displays a form of unity κατὰ συνεχές, according to the combination of the bricks and their continuous structure. This unity is based on this continuous nature, not on the being of the house or on a quantative unity (κατὰ ποσόν). However unclear the example remains in other aspects, it is not liable to dispute that it is the continuous structure, the συνεχής, that accompanies the notion 'house'. The contribution of 32[V,5],4,32 undoubtedly furthers the regressive connection of συνεχῆ μεγέθη in line 8 of 9[VI,9],1 with the house and the ship of lines 6-8. Do not think that question is settled now, because there are texts which cast a different light on the issue.

43[VI,2],10,3,4

When discussing the problem of the unity of a particular thing, Plotinus asks in what way a thing (τι) is one. As a τι (particular) ἕν it is already plural. Notice that, although discussing τι, Plotinus is still at the level of being, as appears from what follows. Each of the εἴδη, species (or Ideas), are to be considered homonymously (ὁμωνύμως, 'equivocally applied', *LP*) one. They are already a plurality (apparently by containing their members). A species or Idea is one in the sense an army or a choir is one. Such unities are one inasmuch as they contain their members; they are a unity that consists in a series of particulars. As to the problem what to connect συνεχής with, we have no evidence here to rely on. Plotinus does, however, continue to say important things, that it is not the One on the level of intelligible being that we encounter in the examples. There is no common *one* to be met in being and in the particulars. Therefore, the One is not a class (γένος) as we will see in Appendix III. After having presented a variety of arguments to prove that the one is not a class, he points out in ch.11 that the one is not 'the same' with all (τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ πάντων ἓν οὐ ταὐτόν). It is not in the same way one either in the intelligible realm or in the sensible world. Even in the latter we encounter different types of unity. For the unity in a choir, in an army, a ship or a house is not the same, which again (αὖ announcing a new aspect) goes for entities such as these (referring to the just mentioned examples) and the continuous, the *συνεχές* (lines 8-10). Here we must admit that συνεχής is presumably intended to denote a group different from and higher (C organisms) than what we thought it denoted in 9[VI,9],1. Indeed, it is not applied to houses or ships, which may be used as evidence against my interpretation that also in 9[VI,9]1 συνεχής is connected with its antecedent. Sofar the scores are 1-1.

Plotinus goes on by making some remarks that seem to differ from the message conveyed in 9[VI] about the equality of the ratios of degrees of unity and of being in entities. This issue will be more aptly dealt with in Appendix III.

34[VI,6],13,18 ff.; 16, 36 ff.

Here Plotinus wishes to establish the preexistence of the one or unity in an entity before one says 'one' or even 'many' of it, in which case the one must be preexistent as well. Saying 'multitude' is saying 'more than one' and when somebody says 'army', he detects (νοεῖ) a lot of armed men arranged into one order (εἰς ἓν συντεταγμένους): into a whole. Looking sharply at the unity (τὸ ἕν) originating in the order, one unifies the nature of the multiple. This unity is not an optical illusion (... τὸ ἓν ψεύδεται) nor is in the case of a house the unity of lots of bricks an illusion, let alone the unity of the house. If this goes a fortiori for the continuous (συνεχής) and for that what has no parts (ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ μεριστοῦ)[276], he continues, it must be clear that this is the case because of the fact that the One has a form of nature and has existence. Although it is less plausible we cannot exclude the possibility that συνεχής does not indicate ἐπ' οἰκίας, but a higher category, *viz.* category C (organisms); in that case τὸ μὴ μεριστόν could reasonably be identified with the soul (cf. 9[VI],1,17 b)[277]. Here the question of the interpretation of συνεχής remains open and has no bearing on the interpretation of 9[VI],1.

Ch.16,36 ff. of treatise 34[VI,6] has little to add to the problem, although something is said about a choir and an army, and body and soul.

Conclusion:

To sum up our findings sofar, we can see that συνεχής in any case denotes the continuous in entities made up from parts (a house *etc.*) and that it is sometimes also applicable to the continuous in organisms. We must be aware of the fact that in 32[V,5],4,32 no mention is made of any category of organisms. So this place on its own cannot turn the scale. Ultimately I think that in 9[VI,9],1,8 συνεχής is firstly connected with category B, but that it also is meant to comprehend the organisms of category C. In support of this view we may quote a passage from 4[IV,2],1,60, where it is said of the soul that its unity is not like the unity of the body. Body owes its oneness to the συνεχές. So clearly in an early treatise, no. 4, we find body and continuity (and unity) connected; even διεστηκός is found in the vicinity.

From the viewpoint of the continuous, both categories B and C, are species, but that does not alter the fact that from the viewpoint of the intensity of unity A, B and C are apparently categories that express an increase in intensity of oneness, which reaches a climax in C (καὶ δὴ καί). The difference between A (διεστηκός) and B/C (συνεχής) as regards their *structure* of unity remains a sharp one and must not be argued away, something Graeser[278] makes himself guilty of by claiming "that Plotinus' *allusion* (sic! *my* italics) to this Stoic theory of different degrees of unity or oneness is not at all a draw of attention to the distinction to be employed between unified an non-unified bodies (cf. Sextus Empiricus, *adv. Math.*, 9,78[279]). In other words, Plotinus speaks of "bodies", "organisms", "ship", "army" and "choir" as ἕν, whereas Posidonius, we must suppose, probably held that only natural bodies must be considered to be unified, *i.e.*, ἡνωμένον." However, neither in Plotinus nor in Posidonius, the question whether or not natural objects may be called unified, ἡνωμένον, is at issue. It is degrees of unity that is at stake. In any case we have seen that ἡνωμένον in Plotinus has a new value (Appendix I). Graeser's way of handling the question under discussion is, especially because of his attempt to minimize Stoic influence, unclear, biased and disturbing[280].

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[276] See for these lines above 76.

[277] As we did earlier, see 76.

[278] Graeser, *the Stoics*, 74.

[279] For this text, see above 75.

Graeser holds that the examples are dealt with in passing (sic!) and 'in just the context where Plotinus relates his discussion of the unifying formal principle of *one-ness* to the Aristotelian treatise about *Being and One* (*Metaphysics* I)[281]. This being so, it is difficult to see any point in saying that Plotinus is 'stoicizing' ". According to Graeser it is all within the framework of a Platonic-Aristotelian problem that the examples figure: the *argumentum e gradibus entium*[282]. I do not think the *argumentum e gradibus entium* as such has any direct relevance to 9[VI,9], since it deals with a ladder of quality on which the beings with the least qualities (only physical) are the lowest and the Godhead the highest (see *SVF*, I,529 = Sext.Emp., *adv. Math.*, IX,88 and Cicero, de *Natura Deorum* II,12,13 and 33-36). The Stoic examples on unity show that it is not so much quality that matters, but unity, so if the Stoic ladder of unity has been influenced by the *argumentum e gradibus entium*, the influence on Plotinus seems to be indirect and has only a remote importance.

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[280] It also contains remarkably careless references, so VI,9 is called the eighth treatise (as in his entire book), whereas both V,5 and VI,2 are numbered 43.

[281] Confrontation with Aristotle on this point takes place in ch.2 see note 309.

[282] See Graeser, *The Stoics*, 29, 56 and above all 74, 75.

Appendix III: the One and unity.

I One or unity?

Harder (*I b*, 466) makes Plotinus affirm that "alle Dinge sind durch das Eine seiend" (line 1 of 9[VI,9]). In the first line of ch. 1 he renders τὸ ἕν by 'das Eine', probably thinking of the powers of the One. Bréhier translates: " C'est par l' *Un*, que tous les êtres ont l' existence", in a note making room for an other translation: "ont l' essence", " ils sont qu'il sont": 'having being' or 'are what they are'. Bréhier's first translation is probably right, for we have seen that it is existence that Plotinus has in mind in the preamble. The question that now comes up is: what is the cause of existence? Are Harder and Bréhier justified in assuming the Superone as the cause of existence or must we side with MacKenna, who translates: " it is in virtue of unity that being are beings" (*o.c.*, 614)? I am inclined to deny that Plotinus has the Superone in mind. For what is subsequently discussed is the consequences of loss of unity (τὸ ἕν) for the being (existence) of the examples of the three categories. Unity and existence are so closely interconnected that loss of unity leads to destruction of being. It is the unity of a single, individual thing that populates the sentences preceding line 20. It is only in line 20 that the One emerges, if it is not in line 1, when it is asked if the soul as the provider of unity should not ultimately be regarded as the One (καὶ αὕτη ἐστι τὸ ἕν;). It is τὸ ἕν in the sense of unity that dominates the preamble.

It is an interesting fact that, although Plotinus has the word ἐνότης, the meaning unity is but scantily expressed by the very ἐνότης in the *Enneads* (*LP* offers only 6 instances) and is entirely absent from 9[VI]. This remarkable absence in 9[VI,9] can easily be explained by pointing to the fact that Plotinus wished to involve reciprocally one and being by relating them and to stress the importance of 'one' for being, in perspective of his quest for the Superone. For it has all to end in the vicinity of the *One*, not of *Unity* (ἐνότης). Τὸ ἕν or ἕν without article is ambivalent inasmuch as it entails both connotations: the Superone and 'ordinary' unity. In line 3 ἕν is a predicate, denoting unity and so it remains till line 20, then, both meanings are mingled again, the significance 'One' only recurring in lines 28, 29, 30 (αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν) 33, and in lines 36, 37. Translators alternately translate 'One' and 'unity', and they are definitely right. However, they often fail to be consistent. *E.g.* Bréhier should rather have 'Un' (with a capital) in line 30, as it would be obligatory in lines 33, and in lines 36, 37. In the German translation of Harder, unfortunately, all is veiled by the German convention to write substantivated adjectives or cardinals with capitals, so there is no way to see the differences between ' das *E*ine' and ' das *e*ine'. Armstrong is over-consistent in that in ch.1 of 9[VI,9] he only uses 'one' with a small letter, where there are many cases, as we indicated above, which requires One with capital (*e.g.* 28,30,36,37).

There is a wide variety of forms of unity. In some cases there is more of a unity than in others. Linguistically this is manifest in a series of determinations of ἕν: μᾶλλον ἕν (line 28), οὕτως ἕν (line 26), τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἕν (line 25) and elsewhere the important 43[VI,2] provides interesting examples: 43[VI,2],11,15,16 ἧττον ἕν, *ib.*17 τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἕν and in 43[VI,2],9,22 we find τὸ μὲν πρώτως, τὰ δὲ ἄλλως (*sc.* ἕν). There is a scala of unities, ranging from the lowest forms to the highest. In 9[VI,9],1 the soul displays the highest form, as the bestower of unity to other entities, but for its own form of unity it is indebted to an other entity (πάσχει δὲ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπ' *ἄλλου*, 9[VI,9],1,44). This ἄλλου must be interpreted as the mind. Τὸ ἕν as unity descends from higher realms. In 9[VI],2,6 it is the mind that is said to convey oneness to (lower) entities, just as the soul does, commensurately with the proportion of being which it imparts to them. So unity is imparted downwards along the hierarchical ladder: mind gives it to soul, and soul bestows it on corporeal beings. Μεταδιδόναι is the Greek verb which expresses imparting, μετέχειν and μεταλαμβάνειν are technical terms for the reception of unity by lower entities. Thus it is said of the body in ch.1, 38, 39: ἀλλὰ τὸ σῶμα μετέχει τοῦ ἕν. Likewise of the soul in line 43 (πάσχει) and about being (= mind) we learn in ch. 2, 23, 24 that it has the One by participation: μεταλήψει καὶ μεθέξει. In line 23 - 25 of ch.1 we have already come across the soul as imparting unity according to the being a man of a particular man, a process described in terms of demiurgical activity: looking at the Idea of Man soul creates the particular man. Is that procedure also applicable to the imparting of the one to that man? Is the soul looking at the Idea of the One, while providing him with the appropriate oneness? Does such an Idea of the One really exist in the transcendent domain? These questions are entirely legitimate, for everywhere, at all levels, we encounter forms of unity. Indeed, such a One does exist in the realm of mind. What we have said so far may give the impression that participants share in the One according to the usual pattern of participation that functions with Ideas. A closer examination of participation in Plotinus will teach us otherwise.

II Plotinus on methexis

As to the relation of the participated to its participants, Plotinus knows that it is a difficult problem, for although he uses the notion of participation frequently, he realises that there is a general theory which has its difficulties: in 34[VI,6],14,40 ff., after having established that being big, or beautiful *etc.* of a particular is caused by its participation in and the presence of the Idea of big *etc*, he leaves the question how this participation takes place, to the general theory, which he only refers to in this connection. He can be no more precise on the essence of the problem either. In 23[VI,5],8,4 ff. he affirms that he will not yield to the temptation to dismiss the problem with some cheap arguments or comparisons. He affirms: "The Ideas are not placed separately on one side and matter a long way off on the other and then illumination comes to matter from somewhere up there. For what would "far off" and "separately" mean? I am afraid that this would be empty words. And again the business of participation would not be said to be hard to express and extremely perplexing (τὸ δύσφραστον καὶ τὸ ἀπορώτατον), but the explanation would be extremely accessible and well known from the examples" (23[VI,5],8,4 ff.). The theory of participation also concerns the One. There are lots of places as we shall see where participation is extended to the One. So Plotinus has and uses a doctrine of participation[283]. Participation (μέθεξις, μετάληψις) is sharing of the participants in a participatum (an Idea or a hypostasis). It is the presence (παρουσία) of the participatum to the participans and *vice versa* the presence of the participans to the participatum which may be regarded as the cause of, in any case the fact of, the being similar of the particular, whether a transcendent one or not[284].

Although the general setting of participation may not be unknown, Plotinus' more specific solutions have not been subjected to much examination. We shall here present a more detailed discussion of the issue involved. It appears that Plotinus handles several special techniques for explaining the presence of the Idea, the mind and soul, and the One in the participants (μετέχοντα cf. *e.g.* 43[VI,2],12,12).

Participation as we just heard from Plotinus himself is a complicated matter. I believe, we should start with the distinction of three fields of participation. 'Ordinary' participation functions within the relation between individual particulars and the Idea they participate in in the field of the sensible world. I shall call it participation I. Apart from this type of participation, Plotinus talks of participation in the *transcendent domain*, which is different from the participation in the realm of the sensible world[285]. This type of participation (participation II) concerns the relation between classes and species, and it also includes participation in the case of the (whole) mind and (particular) minds and the (whole) soul and (particular) souls. Next to these two types there is participation in the One (participation III). All three types have common characteristics, especially, of course, insofar as *relation in general* is concerned, but there are also remarkable distinctions, which set them apart from eachother.

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[283] Kremer, *Seinsphilosophie*, 122 ff., 138.

[284] There is - complementariwise, see Kremer, *Seinsphilosophie*, 138 - the archetype-image-theory. What is lower in ontological status has an image (εἰκών, ἴνδαλμα, ἴχνος, μίμημα) of the paradigm (ἀρχέτυπος), the lower entity is on the one hand like and similar to the paradigm, otherwise dissimilar and of a lower ontological status.

[285] According to 22[VI,4],11,20 there are differences in being present (παρεῖναι) of the sensibles in regard to the intelligibles, and of the intelligibles to themselves.

1) Participation in the realm of the sensible world

The notion of 'ordinary' participation is perhaps found perhaps most clearly explained in 23[VI,5],8,15 ff. Plotinus continues his exposition of what participation really is directly after his remark about not wishing to present any cheap solution to the problem of participation. An Idea is not spatially separate from matter, nor does it pass through and run over the whole of matter. The Idea is not reflected in matter as if in water. The Idea (of fire) does not donate (*i.c.* to matter) anything of itself, because it is not scattered into bits, nevertheless with its whole the Idea informs the parts and the whole of a particular piece of matter (23[VI,5],8,35-39). On the other hand, it is matter itself that attempts to gain as much as possible from the Idea by drawing near to it and by grasping (and not grasping the Idea, since nothing is in between, see 23[VI,5],8,15-22)! The participants are bearers of a likeness to the Idea, but these bearers, which have been previously produced by their producers, also have themselves other aspects, which make them fit for bearing. So matter is matter fit for being informed. Instructive in this respect is 15[III,4],1,8 ff., where Plotinus teaches us about the production of the bearer, which in the fresh status of being produced is not yet informed (ἀμόρφωτον), but expects to be completed by a form (εἰδοποιεῖτο) by turning to its producer (τῷ ἐπιστρέφεσθαι πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν). So we get an indefinite thing becoming a 'produced body', which receives a form appropriate to its potentiality, being a 'receiver' (ὑποδοχή, a mini-form of Plato's famous ὑποδοχή from the *Timaeus*) for the principle which produced it and brought it to maturity (*ib.*,14-16).

2) Participation in the transcendent world

As to participation in the transcendent domain, this type operates on a higher level than that of the sensible particulars and the Ideas. This type, however, has a pattern in common with the participation of particulars in an Idea: the participatum is and remains an unscattered whole, just like the Idea in relation to its sensible particulars. This can be demonstrated in the case of thinking and being. If we participate in thinking, we have part of one and the same thinking, which is with itself (23[VI,5],10,15-18). When having part in thinking I have neither parts nor the whole, whereas you have another whole, torn apart from each other (οὐ μοίρας αὐτοῦ λαβόντες, οὐδὲ ὅλον ἐγώ, ὅλον δὲ καὶ σύ, ἀποσπασθὲν ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου *ib.*,16-18). There are no scattered portions (μοίρας). The same goes for being. Plotinus, vigorously maintaining the integrity of being, affirms (23[VI,5],3) that, although being as one[286] is not divided in any way, this being is both nowhere and everywhere, and others participate in it, in so far as they are able to be with that being (παρεῖναι), making the transcendent participants responsible for what comes after being. Plotinus frees being strictly from parts (μοίρας), which would be either smaller beings and denaturate or being wholes as being itself. I may quote the most important phrase of ch.3 in this connection, (Armstrong's translation): "...with no need of any diffusion either by some portions coming from it, or, alternatively, by its remaining in itself but something coming to the others in many ways". So we may conclude that Plotinus does not like the idea of separate immanent forms[287] of being to be given to the participants.

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[286] According to Dodds, *Elements*, 211, Plotinus although on the verge of making distinctions as Proclus does by introducing the μετεχόμενα, in 23[VI,5],3 shrinks back from

We may regard the transcendent domain as occupied by the five famous classes, *viz.* Being, Identity, Difference, Motion, and Rest, which as classes embrace their specific species. The main distinctive feature of the classes is the interesting type of unity they have with their participants, the species. This type of unity resembles most, as Plotinus says, the unity of an army and a chorus (43[VI,2],10,4), examples that have been promoted here to feature as examples in the transcendent realm of the intelligible. Such a genus displays oneness and plurality at the same time, because of the fact that the genus in itself is one, but also embraces the species. An army consists in its members, which without the coherence of the army would only be individual entities: and the same goes for the genus which is the unity of the species, but with the proviso that the class does not vanish into the species but remains itself before them, even though it has its kinds. Plotinus (43[VI,2],19,10 ff.) even warns us not to make the genus disappear in the participant species and stresses that it (the genus) is both in the species and in itself as well. This indicates that both the species and the genus have the same form in common (*ib.*,17,12), which, being the same to such a large extent, could easily be thought to have disappeared in the participant species. Plotinus firmly maintains, however, that the class preexists and remains in itself, no matter how it is participated by the kinds.

As to mind the type of participation it involves is comparable to that of classes and species. On this point Plotinus is adamant (43[VI,2],20, 25 ff.). Just

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calling the transcendent term ἀμέθεκτον, although he does call it (*sc.* being PAM) ἀπαθές and ἀμέριστον. In fact Plotinus says that being is not in the particulars but that participation is the participants being present to it (being) as far as possible (τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐκείνου μεταλαμβάνειν, ὅσα δύνατα αὐτῷ παρεῖναι, *ib*,13 and 14). I can not make much of Dodds' argument for Plotinus' reluctance: "his mystical sense of the universe as the expression of a single divine force makes the sharper distinction impossible for him". If this were true, why would Plotinus have distinguished hypostases at all? Moreover, we must realize that the term παρεῖναι here concerns being (not the One).

[287] The best systematic exposition of the relationship between forms, immanent forms (instantiations), bearers of the forms (instances, particulars), and forms in their mental status *in Plato* is to be found in De Rijk, *Plato's Sophist*, 30-67. I have had his distinctions in mind when working on the present book.

as the class remains in itself before the dependent species, in the same way the universal mind remains in itself before the particular minds. So the mind, too, preexists and does not vanish into the part-minds. However, there is also a difference. Species can be said to have their class in common, but particular minds have a more special and more close relation with the whole mind than species have with the class. Plotinus uses a special notion, which one only can use with preservation in regard to the class-species-relationship. Plotinus presents the notion of potentiality to explain the relation of the whole mind and the particular minds 43[VI,2],20,3 ff. The whole mind is potentially the particular mind, and the particular mind is potentially the whole mind. However, of the species it cannot be said that it is potentially its class. 'Επιστήμη is adduced as an example how this system works. In the whole of knowledge there are potentially pieces of knowledge and a piece of knowledge is always embedded in the whole of knowledge. The relation between the minds with the minds is closer than that between classes and their species.

Because there are so many minds, there must by their productive force be an equal amount of souls which are one with the whole soul, as the minds are one with the whole mind (6[IV,8],2-4). However, - and here soul is further articulated than mind in the *proodos* - the soul can be divided by the bodies it dominates. The soul in a body is an image of the whole soul in as much as it is divided in the body but remains a whole. It is very important to conclude that, in fact, with mind-minds and soul-souls we do have a special case of participation (II), which is in fact a narrower kind of relationship than the other types of participation. Plotinus usually avoids this term and talks of being embraced (ἐμπεριεχέσθαι[288]). Indeed, the relation between the whole or universal soul and the individual souls is not only a relation of participation, but also a relation of whole/parts, whereas the whole-part doctrine does not hold for the relation between Ideas and particulars and that between classes and species. The universal soul is the individual souls and vice versa the individual soul is the universal soul. This universal soul should not be confused with the All-soul, which is responsible for the body of the world and governs the cosmos. Our individual souls and the All-soul must be regarded as species of one universal soul. We may even consider the particular souls and the All-soul to be sisters[289]. There is a very curious passage (27[IV,3],6,17 ff.) that reveals the closeness of the relationship and the equality of the other souls, where Plotinus tells that if it had not been the All-soul that had created the world, an 'ordinary' soul could have done so, which is significant for the relationship between the soul and the All-soul, which entails more equality than one would exspect them to have. However more potent the All-soul may be in actuality, together with the other souls it belongs to the the universal soul and is related to it according to the whole-parts-pattern involved in the relation between parts of science and the whole of science (27[IV,3],2,50 ff.)[290], as we already encountered in the case of the mind-minds-relationship. This whole-parts-relationship is closer than the one the participants have with the participatum in participation I and II. For a proper and neat relation of participation of types I and II, the entity participated in does not form an organic whole with the participating parts on an equal footing in the way in which the universal soul and the All-soul do together with the other souls. We may conclude that the ordinary form of participation does not hold for the soul/soulsrelation. This explains why Plotinus seems to reluctant in referring to soul as copies or images of the the universal soul[291]. Plotinus offers the new Neoplatonic relation as we described it and Proclus incorporated this relation in his trinity: ἀμέθεκτον, μετεχόμενον, and μετέχον. One may see in Proclus' doctrine of participation the well organized answer to Plotinus in regard to the relations between mind and minds and between soul and souls[292] and in regard to participation in general.

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[288] 43[VI,2],20,17,18.

[289] See Helleman-Elgersma, *Soul-sisters*, 57 ff. The origin of this form of explanation concerning All-soul/ other souls dates back from times long ago. The historical line of this relation is quite curious. It all started in Plato's *Timaeus* where the ordinary souls are made from the same mixture as the All-soul. This thought was incorporated in the Stoa; also according to Posidonius the human soul and the worldsoul have a common origin. In Albinus, *Didaskalikos*, 25,4, we find the same thought with reference to the κρᾶμα in the *Timaeus*. See Graeser, *The Stoics*, 30, and Theiler, *Source*, 66, referring to Iamblichus' observation on the equation of "Teil-und Weltseele".

3) Participation in the One

In 43[VI,2] Plotinus seems to have reached a final peak in thinking about the problem of participation in the One. Here Plotinus develops a very special theory about participation in the One (which I call participation III), which at the same time clarifies by contrast the theory of other forms of participation in Plotinus (all participation other than type III). Here we touch on a problem that in 43[VI,2],9 ff. is in the centre of Plotinus' interest. In 43[VI,2],9,9 ff. he examines the question whether the One can be regarded as a class (γένος) embracing kinds (εἴδη), as one might expect from a class. The Superone (τὸ πάντως ἕν), admits of no additions, and cannot be predicated of anything, so that it is not a γένος. It should be noticed that it is not only the Superone that is involved and denied to be a γένος, but the same goes for the One in being (a second One). It is this One in being that is examined in the following parts of ch.9-11 of 43[VI,2]. So indicating this (second) One in the next pericope we will use the term '*o*ne' with small letter[293].

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[290] See Helleman-Elgersma, *Souls-sisters*, 249, where she lists several places in the *Enneads*, where the science pattern of whole-parts is employed in Plotinus' arguments. We shall encounter this pattern again in 9[VI,9],5,5-20.

[291] See Helleman-Elgersma, *Souls-sisters*, 87.

[292] Meijer, *Participation*, 65 ff.

In 43[VI,2] Plotinus passionately rejects the application of the notion 'genus' to the one, because being a genus and entailing kinds, (εἴδη, ch.9, line14), would hand it over to plurality and make it different. How could a one be different? For by the slightest augmentation it would not be one any longer. Plotinus by his virtuosity of reasoning attempts to convince his readers by a series of very profound and complicated arguments that you cannot truthfully apply the term 'genus' to the one (in being). Now this has grave consequences for the way in which an entity has the property 'one', for, in that case, the entity would not have it the by the same type of participation as in an Idea (or genus). The usual type of participation would affect the oneness of the one. Plotinus does his utmost to reject the usual notion of participation, which, apparently, would be disastrous for the pureness of the one as one. A property can be in a thing (Plotinus uses the rather neutral ἐνυπάρχειν) without participating in a class: Ἢ πρῶτον οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἴ τι ἐνυπάρχει πολλοῖς, γένος εἶναι οὔτε αὐτῶν, οἷς ἐνυπάρχει, οὔτε ἄλλων, οὐδ' ὅλως, εἴ τι κοινόν, πάντως γένος (43[VI,2],10,33 ff.): "Firstly it is not necessarily so that when something (*i.c.* the one) is immanent in many things, it must be their class nor must it be of other things, nor is it necessarily so that if there is something common (we shall meet another use of 'common' short[294]), there is definitely a class". So *e.g.* as a number the one is in the other numbers (43[VI,2],10,16-17) but it is not present as a class[295]. In the same way the one is not present in beings as a class, which does not prevent things from having unity. Plotinus strengthens his case by adducing another example. Although the point, he says, is immanent in lines, it is not the genus of the lines nor of any other entity. Thus Plotinus tries to familiarize his readers with the idea that things may have certain properties without participating in an Idea or superidea (class). He says that we must not consider these types of unity in beings as 'common' (common *to a class* κοινόν 43[VI,2],9,22, *ib*.,10,5). Wherever the one is, it is different, whether in being as hypostasis or in particular beings. At the background of this reasoning we have the very subtle and for the whole doctrine of participation very interesting consideration that beings, when participating in an class, have the class in common, and are common as belonging to a class, but in the case of the one each and every entity has its *own* form of oneness, more or less unified. In chapter 11,5 he states that "the one in all things is not the same" (τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ πάντων ἓν οὐ ταὐτόν).

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[293] In his translation Armstrong consistently and aptly employs one alternately with a capital or with a small letter. Harder (Theiler), has only 'Eine' and does not seem sufficiently aware of the occurrence of the one. He is misleading when he says in his commentary: "Von ἔτι an (ch.9) ist wieder das "Ἑν allein wieder im Blickfeld" (*IV b*, 467).

[294] See note 296

[295] It is remarkable that earlier, in 34[VI,6],11,7-9 Plotinus seems to say precisely the reverse, namely that the one is a genus, see Slezák, *Nuslehre*, 93, n.288.

What he aims to do, is to convince his readers that the one is not participated in in the usual form such as we encounter in the relation between classes and species or between Ideas and particulars. When having compared the oneness and the plurality of a kind with an army or a choir (as we have seen already, p.91) Plotinus says (10,5,6): Οὐ τοίνυν τὸ ἐκεῖ ἓν ἐν τούτοις, ὥστε οὐ κοινὸν τὸ ἓν οὐδε θεωροῖτο ⟨ ἂν⟩ ἐν τῷ ὄντι καὶ τοῖς τι οὖσι τὸ *αὐτο*. ὥστε οὐ γένος τὸ ἕν "the one which is there (in the transcendent domain) is not in those entities and in the particulars, so that the one is not common and can not be viewed as being *the same* in being and the particular beings. Consequently, the one is not a genus". We have here the same argument. The one is not the same as the one found in being as a whole or in particular being. This would be the case if it were common, *viz.* belonging to its members. Hence in contrast to this utterance we are entitled to say that for Plotinus participation I-II amounts to sharing one and the same form, which is the same in its participants and belongs to them all (κοινός). This notion of participation II is found most clearly in 23[VI,5],8,35-39, as we have already explained. The Idea (of fire) does not donate (i.c. to matter) anything of itself, because it is not scattered, nevertheless with its whole it informs the parts and the whole of a particular quantity of matter. If we participate in thinking, we have part of one and the same thinking,.being with itself (see above p.100). In the case of the one there is no such thing as a common one that remains the same in all[296]. On the contrary, it is completely different for each possessor. Plotinus wants his readers to be aware of the fact that what we find in being and its kinds is not *the* one (τὸ ἕν), but only a *homonymous* one (ἀλλ' *ὁμωνύμως* ἓν ἕκαστων τῶν εἰδῶν 43[VI,2],10,2); one could call it 'unity', but he does not use such a word as ἑνότης[297]. We have now discussed how the problem of possessing unity comes up both in connection with the one and with the bearers of unity. Before being able to tackle the problem of the origin of unity in beings, we must follow Plotinus in his discussion of the problem of degrees of unity and existence.

4) Plotinus on degrees of unity and existence. The origin of unity in beings

Plotinus continues his account (43[VI,2],11,1ff.) with a few remarks that seem to differ from what he says in 9[VI] about the equality of the ratios of degrees of unity and of being in entities. In 9[VI],1,25 ff. he tells us that the ratio of unity is equivalent to the ratio of being: the amount of being equals the amount of unity *vice versa*. The same is said in 9[VI],2,7-9 about the activity of mind. This appears to contradict what he said later on. In 43[VI,2],11,8 ff. he illustrates the thesis that unity is *not* commensurate with being by the very examples he uses in 9[VI],1,25 ff. to demonstrate the reverse: unity is proportional to being in entities. In 43[VI,2],11,14 Plotinus affirms that the circumstance that unity and being are in proportional balance is incidental, but it may be otherwise. What has less unity, cannot generally be said to have less being. And now he returns to our examples to prove his case: an army and a choir *are* no less than a house, although they do not have the same degree of unity. However, the statements in 43[VI,2],11,14 and 9[VI],1,25 ff. are only seemingly contradictory. For the connotations of the verb 'to be' are different. In 43[VI,2],11,15 Plotinus reveals his real intentions by using the keyword *ὑπάρχον*. He says: "but it is possible to be of less unity while being no less *in existence*": 'αλλ' ἔστι (*sc*.. ἔξεστιν) μὴ ἧττον ὂν *ὑπάρχον*, ἧττον εἶναι ἕν. Apparently there are no degrees in existence. So being has different connotations in the two tracts. In 43[VI,2],11 Plotinus' attention is focused on the notion of existence (ὑπάρχον), which is present in the verb 'to be', whereas in 9[VI],1,25 ff. it is the contents or quantity of transcendental being (εἶναι) that is involved. Being (εἶναι) is seen from the viewpoint of the intelligible world, where being belongs. Of course the soul has more being (and unity) in 9[VI],1,25 ff. because of the fact that the soul is on a level closer to mind than ships or houses *etc*. are. Notwithstanding the fact that difference of connotation plays an important role for evaluating the contradiction, it has to be stressed that there ultimately remains a contradiction. For after all in 43[VI,2],11,15 ff. Plotinus maintains a point of view that differs considerably from his earlier doctrine: by exploiting the connotation of existence in this chapter he intends to prove that unity and being are incommensurate, whereas in 9[VI,9],1 he starts from the reverse.

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[296] When he said that there is something common about oneness in particulars he does not mean that the one is common and the same by participation, but that there is only a *uniform* phaenomenon: all the particulars have unity, without participation.

[297] See on ἑνότης above 94.

Sofar we learned in 43[VI,2],9-11 that the one (the second one, in being) is not a γένος, so that it is impossible for being to have the one (or unity) by participation I and II. Moreover, there is a difference *in regard to the mutual proportion of being and unity*. It is not so that together with being oneness is conveyed to entities. So Plotinus was, as it were, obliged to find a solution for the problem of varying degrees of unity in beings, since in this field there is no proper type of participation to refer to. This urge explains a curious passage (43[VI,2],11,16 ff.), in which Plotinus, fully aware of the fact that he could no longer make use of the notions of participation I and II or of being as conveyor of oneness, accommodates himself by finding a brand new method of explaining. It is not the unity descending from the One that gives unity to an entity, but it is the entity's pursuit of the Good. In as far as an entity wishes to be with the Good and obtains the Good, it becomes united. So the *teleological* pursuit of the Good is responsible for the bigger or smaller portion of oneness the entity has. For a moment in this text it seemed as if the Good were something different from the One, but in the end it is clear that this is not the case. For the pursuit of the Good is simultaneous with striving for the One. The second one, in so close a communion with the Good, has the same function as the former in being the origin and the object all beings strive for (ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος). So we have a double origin (the One[298] and the one) responsible for the birth of things and a double pursuit (towards the One and the one) responsible for the oneness of things. The oneness belonging to the second one does not make it a γένος as Plotinus feels urged to repeat, for it is not one way in which it is in the entities nor is it something common as in the case of the γένος, a thought we met before [299].

This extremely strange system of explaining unity in entities makes the impression of an *ad-hoc* solution[300], to guarantee that both the One and the one are not a genus (and so plural) and that the oneness of both the One and the one by participation (I-II) is not affected. Indeed, in 32[V,5],4,1 ff. Plotinus still believes that entities are one by participation (in the One or a one): we must ascend to what is truly one, but not one like all other things which, while being multiple, are one by participation in a one: εἰς ἓν καὶ ἀληθῶς ἕν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα ἕν, ἃ πολλὰ ὄντα μετοχῇ ἑνὸς ἕν ...)[301]. However, the *system* of the remarkable solution to the problem raised in 43[VI,2],11,16 ff. can already be found in 15[III,4],1,9 ff., where Plotinus teaches us that what was produced as formless by a producing entity *(i.c.* soul) receives form by turning towards its producer. Elsewhere (22[VI,4],11,5 ff.) we learn that the (in)capacity of their own structure prevent some entities from being similar to their superior entity more than others. They are less able to be present (παρεῖναι) to their forming principle. So there is a tendency in Plotinus' doctrine of participation to ascribe the activity to the lower entity and to make the form depend on this *epistrophè* of the lower entity towards its superior. In this way the higher entities can remain unaffected, they are imparticipable, ἀμέθεκτος as Proclus would say (but only in regard to the Superone, the other henads are participable). I do not know whether this new theory of Plotinus has to do with the birth of the notion of the One as imparticipable Henad in Proclus, but the problems concern the same structures in the transcendent domain[302]. In any case participation III turns out to be no type of participation at all. Plotinus himself speaks about παρεῖναι (23[VI,5],3,15), *i.e* being present to the One (or one) of the bearer of unity, and μιμεῖται 43[VI,2],11,10 when it comes to a characterization of the matter in question.

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[298] The One is expressely said to be at the beginning and at the end: ἀμφοτέρωθεν δὲ τὸ ἕν. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀφ' οὗ καὶ τὸ εἰς ὅ. καὶ γὰρ ἄρχεται ἀπὸ τοῦ ἓν καὶ σπεύδει εἰς τὸ ἕν (line 25).

[299] See note 296

[300] Is this, perhaps, the explanation of the strange difference between 34[VI,6],11-7-9 where it is implied that the one is a genus, whereas in 43[VI,2] Plotinus has the opposite view ? See my note 295.

[301] In 32[V,5],9,10 he still says that all entities participate in the SE (but do not have it: μετεχόντων ἁπάντων αὐτοῦ μηδενὸς ἔχοντος αὐτό)

[302] See Meijer, *Participation*, 65 ff

5) Back to 9[VI,9],1

We can find everywhere types of unity that do not affect the pureness of the unity of the one in being. We have unity of motion: τὸ ἐπὶ κινήσει ἕν (43[VI,2],9,18), *etc.*, the one of the soul and of beauty, the one of the corporeal (with its three categories). It is from the (Stoic) arsenal of examples (as in 9[VI,9],1) that Plotinus collects examples that display variety of degrees of unity. However, we cannot be sure that the systematic exposition expressed in 43[VI,2] with regard to the relation the One (and the second one) has with the unities of entities we just examined also plays a part in the younger treatise 9[VI] or whether Plotinus there was aware of the problems involved. I am inclined to believe that 43[VI,2] is a later development, Plotinus' wording and message in 9[VI,9],1 indicate a different attitude. The demiurgical activity of the soul is working hierarchically downwards just as the mind in ch.2, which similarly conveys oneness to is inferiors; moreover, the soul bestowing unity on corporeal entities is still thought of within the framework of the usual pattern of participation, for it is expressly said that the soul looks to the One in order to make each particular one, in the same way the soul when making a man looks to the Idea of Man. But rather enigmatically, even paradoxically, Plotinus adds that the soul takes the one in the immanent form of man, which seems to be different and even divers from the notion of giving the one by looking to the One. The last mentioned operation makes the first superfluous. What we know for certain is that in both treatises (43[VI,2] and 9[VI,9],1) the notion of the differentation of types of unity is fundamental and virulently present.

To return to my startingpoint, I may say that the one in line 1, as seen against the background of what we learned in this Appendix, is probably rightly interpreted as unity (fitting with an entity), apart from the contextual arguments I offered[303]. This squares nicely with the 'one's' in a later tract, 30[III,8],10,20 ff. In each and every thing there is some one, which is the abiding origin, the most valuable force of say a plant, an animal, a soul or the universe.

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[303] Proclus interpreted 9[VI,9],1 in a similar way (the One as unity) in the first proposition of the *Elements*, cf. Meijer, *Participation*, 85.

CHAPTER TWO

2, 1-8 Is the One to be identified with total being?

Translation

> Can it be that in regard to each thing of the particular ones its being and the one are not the same thing, whereas in regard to total being and total essence being and the one are the same? So that he who discovered being should have discovered the One as well and that being itself should be the One itself? and so that, for example, if the essence is mind, mind should also be the One, because mind is in the primary sense being and one giving to the others as much a share in the one as it gives being. For what could a person say it is except that?

Now that Plotinus believes he has proved that in the Plotinian transcendent architectonics the One should in no way be identified with the soul, the next candidate for identification with the One emerges: the seemingly harmonious couple of 'mind-being'. As early as in 5[V,9],8,16,17 μία μὲν οὖν φύσις τὸ τε ὂν ὅ τε νοῦς, cf. 24[V,6],6,21,22, mind and being are said to be indissolubly connected to the extent that what is mind is being and what is being is mind. However, this is not simpliciter so as will appear later on[304]. Although ultimately being is not a product of the activity of mind and has priority as an object to the thinking subject[305] the two are so closely connected, that by means of being the mind can be introduced in this chapter.

Plotinus asks the following question (making use of an interesting technique, *viz*. the pattern of the totality/part antithesis): granted that the being of the particular that is one (ἑκάστῳ τῶν κατὰ μέρος[306] ἕν[307]) may perhaps be not the same as the One (or one, see note 309), could it be imagined that the oneness of the *totality* of being (ὅλῳ τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ[308]) is apt to be identified with the One?[309] This would lead to the consequence that as soon as one finds being (of the totality of being), one has discovered the One as well. Being itself (αὐτήν, line 4) would be the same as the One *itself* (αὐτό, line 5), referring to ultimate being, *i.e.* being in the primary sense (perhaps the Idea of being) and to the Superone respectively[310]. Initially the answer is affirmative as is implied in the argument.

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[304] See note 330 and also p.178.

[305] see Kremer, *Seinsphilosophie*, 143

[306] τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἕν is translated by Armstrong as: "the things which are one as parts". This rendering is likely to come down to my own. Elsewhere the expression τὰ κατὰ μέρος means 'the particular in relation to a whole', *e.g*. the particular minds in relation to the whole mind (27[IV,3],1,13) and the particular sensibles in relation to the whole of the sensible (28[IV,4],8,5). So in 9[VI,9],2,1 it is the particular that is one in relation to the whole that is one.

[307] ἕν is often indeclinabile. Here it is not a gen.-form, perhaps because τὸ ἕν is involved in the context, cf. line 8, where we find ἑνός without the One being involved.

[308] οὐσία and ὄν (εἶναι) are used promiscuously according to Kremer, *Seinsphilosophie*, 89, n.61. I prefer to avoid translating οὐσία by 'substance', for 'substance' has too great an Aristotelian flavour in terms of the first category. It is simply the substantive of εἶναι and as such it is not much different from εἶναι. The word ὄν can be equivalent to οὐσία, whereas the latter, however, cannot be used for the *entity* which is. That is perhaps the reason why Plotinus adds οὐσία in line 2. In order to have a synonymous

The next clause (line 5 οἷον, εἰ νοῦς ἡ οὐσία *etc.*) is connected to the previous one by a rather vague οἷον, which is mostly rendered by 'for instance' (Harder, *etci.*). However, what comes after it, is not really an exact example of what preceded, not the fact that if you find A, you have found simultaneously B, but rather an elaboration: if (implied: A (One) is B (being) and) B is C (mind), then, A (One) is C (mind). Consequently I can understand why MacKenna's translates 'thus' (instead of 'for instance'). However, I think that by writing οἷον Plotinus believed he continued further along the same lines. It is the equation of the One with mind that is the aim of the argument. Well then, if being is mind, in this development the One would consequently be mind. Two attributes are given to this mind that makes the identification plausible: a) mind is both being and one in the primary sense (πρώτως ὄν; πρώτως ἕν); b) mind conveys as much oneness to other things as it imparts being to them.

Ad a): a) provides the reason why it is not at all odd to identify the One with mind. Mind is the highest being in the Plotinian transcendent architectonics, and consequently πρώτως ὄν points to this highest level of being, mind,

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word next to 'being' I would prefer to render οὐσία not by 'substance but by 'essence', which (deriving from *essentia*) has the same neutral ring as οὐσία has.

[309] As early as in Aristotle (*Met.* X 1054 a 9-19) being and unity are brought together (13 ὅτι δὲ ταὐτὸ σημαίνει πως τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν, δῆλον τῷ τε παρακολουθεῖν) ...and identified in the individual: τὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι τὸ ἑκάστῳ εἶναι. It is extremely likely that Plotinus had this Aristotelian passage in mind when writing ch.2. In 9,10 he quotes a similar passage almost *verbatim* from the *Metaphysics* (III, 1003 b 26,27). It is likely too, that the problem whether being includes unity, and v.v., or not, came to his mind not only from Aristotle, but also from Plato's *Parmenides*. In the second hypothesis, being and One are played off against each other (*Parmenides* 142 B ff.). Surprisingly in lines 1,2 Plotinus seems to deny what he approves of in lines 9,10. In lines 1,2, unlike Aristotle, he sets out from the assumption that the one does not coincide with the being of a particular, whereas in lines 9,10 he seems to accept this position. One should bear in mind, however, that in lines 1,2 it is the Superone that is not to be identified with the unity of a particular and that ultimately in the argument the position of the identification of particular being and particular oneness is rejected. Aristotle's objective was to identify being and unity, because to his mind being was first of all substance, *i.e.* the bearer of qualities, the subject of the other categories. Well then, as such this subject must be one and must display unity: being (substance) includes unity. This also goes for Plotinus inasmuch as the particular is one (*i.e.* has unity) and also universal being is one.

[310] πρώτως ἕν - Notice that in ἕν, understood as unity, there is a diversity as to its intensity, from the lowest part of the scale (as in the army *etc*, see ch.1) to the superunity of the Superone. Πρώτως ἕν is very high on the scale. Other expressions that denote degrees of unity and oneness are found in 1,30 μᾶλλον ἕν and οὕτως ἕν (see above Appendix III of ch.1, also for later developments concerning the relation between being and unity).

where plurality makes its first appearance in its most simple, *i.e.* one-like, manner (πρώτως ἕν)[311].

Ad b): μεταδιδόντα *etc*. adds another reason why the identification of the One with mind does not seem strange: mind gives being and oneness to the other things to an equal degree and in proportion. All this amounts to the realistic possibility of identitying the level which gives oneness to other beings to the One itself. A similar argument was already employed in the case of the soul, which by its creative activity could be assumed to give oneness (ch.1, 17 ff.). However, in the development of the argument this giving was not sufficient ground for identifying soul and unity.

2, 8-24 No, the One is not to be identified with total being

Translation

> For what could a person say it is except that? For if it is the same as being - for a man and one man is the same -, surely it is like a number of an individual thing, just as you should say two of some things, you should say of a single thing one. Now if number belongs to the beings, of course the one does too. And one has to find out what it is. But if counting is an activity of the soul, the one would absolutely not be in the things. But our reasoning said, that if an individual thing will lose its one, it will not even exist at all. We must therefore see if the particular one and the particular being are the same, and the total one and the total being. But if the being of a particular thing is a multitude, and it is impossible for the one to be a multitude, they would each be different. Man and living being and rational are many parts and these many parts are bound together by the one. Therefore man and one are different, since the first is particible and the second has no parts. Also indeed total being, which contains all beings in itself will be more many and different from the One and possess the One by sharing and participation.

For argument's sake it could be imagined that the One could be identical with something other than being, but this route has no prospects. Plotinus expresses this suggestion in the form of a question which at first glance seems a rhetorical one: for (γάρ a difficult γάρ[312]) what other thing could one call it (the One) besides being (Τί γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ[313] εἶναι αὐτὸ φῆσαι)? However, ultimately, this seems to be a real question if we consider the dilemma it leads to: for (again a difficult γάρ) either a) it is the same as being or b) it is the number (ἀριθμός) of each thing.

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[311] See 32[V,5],4,1-7 and 43[VI,2],9,39-43.

[312] γάρ: considering its connection with the foregoing, presumably a rather elliptical use: it must mean 'if mind gives the same degree of oneness and being', then another equation than one and being is unlikely, see my description of the development of the argument in the text; for the use of γάρ see note 699.

[313] The lecture of the mss παρ' αὐτά has been changed by the corrector in A into παρ' αὐτό. HS read the lecture of the mss: praeter ens et intellectum (Ficinus' translation). If the original reading of A is correct, there is a barrier to overcome. For Plotinus proceeds with a dilemma, the particular one is a) being or b) ἀριθμός (or with a hypothetical phrase, see my text about the original reading in line 9). So I presume that he had only two possibilities in mind: being or number. Mind is left out. So I prefer the reading of the corrector (A 3). Igal, *de Uno*, 276 takes the second αὐτό with εἶναι so as to make αὐτοεῖναι: "Quid enim praeter Unum dixerit quispiam ipsum per seipsum esse?" Αὐτοεῖναι does not occur in Plotinus, but

The above interpretation fits in with the popular alteration in the text (line 9) made by Ficinus, who changed εἰ into ἤ, taking into account the other ἤ of line 10: aut. However, this alteration has a disadvantage: the question Τί γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ εἶναι αὐτὸ φήσαι; seems to be a rhetorical one, but turns out not to be a rhetorical question at all, as we suggested. Therefore one might reconsider the reading of the mss: εἰ. The question Τί γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ εἶναι αὐτὸ φήσαι; , then, remains a rhetorical one, to be answered by: 'the one can be said to be no other thing than being'. The argument then continues very appropriately : 'For if the one and being are the same - for man and one man is the same- it is a fact (the other popular meaning in Plotinus of ἤ, see *LP*) that the one is a kind of number of an individual thing (ἑκάστου)'. Exploring these two possibilities, I tend to prefer the last one and to maintain the reading of the mss. εἰ.

Plotinus continues (without saying this directly) on the level of the particular, perhaps under the influence of the μεταδιδόντα-clause that concludes with the oneness of the particular thing as given by being. So note that αὐτό in the phrase Τί γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ εἶναι *αὐτὸ* φήσαι does not only concern the universal One and the universal being, but also the oneness of the particular: it is particular oneness that the mind conveys to beings.

To continue the study of the particular in the Plotinian train of thought: in the first part of line 9 (a) εἰ/ἦ γὰρ ταὐτὸν τῷ ὄντι Plotinus presents an Aristotelian phrase[314] as a ground, again an example of what is particular: "man and *one* man is the same". A similar approach appears again in the second part of the dilemma : b) ἢ οἷον ἀριθμός *τις ἑκάστου*. Later on at line 17 he returns to the level of totality (ὅλως). An outline might help:

αὐτοουσία does (39[VI,8],12,8), as Igal himself points out. As I see it the first αὐτό (παρ' αὐτό) can hardly refer to the One, as Igal believes to be convincing: "ut patet". According to Igal "Quid enim praeter Unum dixerit quispiam ipsum per seipsum esse?" means that in Plotinus' argument nothing but the One can be being itself (ipsum esse per se ipsum): therefore primarium Unum= primarium Ens. Unfortunately, in this explanation the connection between the question and the following is lost.

[314] Plotinus offers a passage of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (III, 1003 b 26,27) almost verbatim, see my note 309 (the sequence in Aristotle is inverse). Aristotle concludes that one man and man, that being man and man are the same: ταὐτὸ γὰρ εἷς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὢν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπος... The theorem that one man and man is the same is repeated in 34[VI,6],5,31, but there it is rejected, for the oneness of a man precedes his being a man (see Bertier e.a., *Nombre*, 159,160). In 9[VI,9],2 he rejects the theorem too, but on other grounds (6 ff.), for the being of a particular is multitude (πλῆθος). See further my analysis.

A particular	B universal
(lines 8-16; 17 b-21)	(lines17 a, 22)
1) τὸ ὂν ἕκαστον	1) τὸ ὅλον ὄν
2) τὸ ἓν ἕκαστον	2) ἕν

He now (line 10 ἢ οἷον ἀριθμός τις ἑκάστου) elaborates the notion of number. To make the passage understandable, we should consider what he says in his later discussions on number (32[V,5],4, and most important of all, 34[VI,6]), leading to the following survey:

Survey on number

1 Ἕν (preceding everything that hierarchically follows)

2 Ontical number (οὐσιώδης ἀριθμός I, Ideal Numbers)

3 Number as fundamental for the being of entities (οὐσιώδης ἀριθμός II a as intelligible, II b as sensible)

4 Number as pure quantity, counting number, which can be extended by adding monads (μοναδικὸς ἀριθμός, ἀριθμὸς ἀριθμῶν)

The Super-One precedes everything that hierarchically follows and therefore it is not countable (32[V,5],4,13). It is, of course, not a number at all[315]. Notice that in Plotinus οὐσιώδης ἀριθμός has two meanings, the second of which has not been given much attention to as yet. The first one concerns the pre-ontical level of being, referring to number as creative of being and dividing it, preceding even the five Greatest Genera (34[VI,6],9,1 ff.) and calling them into existence. These numbers are comparable with the Ideal Numbers of Plato[316] (occurring *e.g.* in 32[V,5],4,17 and 34[VI,6],9,34). Note that in this connection οὐσιώδης means : making being (οὐσία) in general possible, providing structure to being, but one should also recognize a second οὐσιώδης ἀριθμός which as such is in the thing and holds the nature of an intelligible *entity* together[317]. The same type of number functions in the things of our world, see 34[VI,6],16,36[318].

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[315] 32[V,5],4,14 οὐδ' ὅλως ἀριθμεῖσθαι.

[316] See the following note.

[317] οὐσιώδης ἀριθμός refers not only to what is called the Ideal Numbers as they are supposed to figure in Plato's 'On the Good' (cf. Armstrong, *Translation* V, p.166 n.1, Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 298, 302), but also to the number as present in the being of the intelligible things, *i.e.* the particular Ideas. Perhaps this is most clear in 34[VI,6],16,48,

What is meant by number so far, has to be clearly and sharply distinguished from the counting number, for this adds nothing to the things counted (for when one counts a man and a dog, you add nothing to their being). This is merely a question of adding monads. It is a purely psychical act of the *subject, which is of no relevance at all for the ontological status of the things concerned* (cf. 34[VI,6],16,30). It is the soul that goes through things when counting them (*ib.*, 29).

Return to the text

Now that we have learnt enough from the later discussions of number[319], we can grasp the meaning of Plotinus' utterances in 9[VI,9],2,10 ff.(b). If the

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where the trias in the soul (as intelligible entity) is carefully distinguished from the trias in general (Ideal Number) in being, which functions as *ἀρχή* of being. The οὐσιώδης ἀριθμός in the intelligible particular is said elsewhere, in 34[VI,6],16,25 ff. to be the one in being (τὸ ἓν ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ) and what holds the structure (φύσιν) of the thing together (τὸ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ συνέχον τὴν τοῦ πράγματος φύσιν). As Ideal Number οὐσιώδης ἀριθμός is found in ch.9,33 ff. of 34[VI,6]. It is what is to be observed in Ideas and it is their co-generator, in short the source, root and principle of intelligible beings (ὁ δὲ οὐσιώδης (*sc.* ἀριθμός) ὁ μὲν ἐπιθεωρούμενος τοῖς εἴδεσι καὶ συγγεννῶν αὐτά, πρώτως δὲ ὁ ἐν τῷ ὄντι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ πρὸ τῶν ὄντων, βάσιν δὲ ἔχει τὰ ὄντα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ πηγὴν καὶ ῥίζαν καὶ ἀρχήν), see also 32[V,5],4,19, where we learn that the οὐσιώδης ἀριθμός is that which continually provides being (οὐσιώδης (*sc.* ἀριθμός) μὲν ὁ τὸ εἶναι ἀεὶ παρέχων).

[318] Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 302 holds that when Plotinus affirms of man that he has in essence the 'two', this 'two' concerns the Idea of Man. However, the context makes clear that Plotinus does not exclude the essence of the particular, which has its impact on the meaning of οὐσιώδης ἀριθμός (see also the following note 321 about πρᾶγμα). Essential number operates on all levels of the 'Derivationsystem' (see Krämer, *ib.*, 297 and note 412, where IV,6,15,35 must be altered into VI,6,15,35). It has also functions on the lowest level: in 10[V,1],5,11 Plotinus declares that in sperma it is not the moist that is the most important thing, but *ἀριθμός* and λόγος. When one counts, the number one uses does not refer to the οὐσία, nor to the οὐσία as it presents itself in the sensibilia (ὁ ἀριθμὸς οὗτος οὐκ οὐσία *οὐδ' ὡς ἐν αἰσθητοῖς* 34[VI,6],16,16,17). Bertier *e.a.* has little or nothing to add about οὐσιώδης ἀριθμός, see *Nombre*, 21, 170, 171, 188, 189, but the information about the fact that οὐσιώδης enters history in Plutarch (*De comm. not.*, 1085 D, fire and air give the tension, the permanence and the character of οὐσιώδης, gives being to things) is interesting, although this has nothing to do with number as Bertier e.a., *Nombre*, 17, rightly points out. So in the Stoa it also functions on the level of the particular thing.

[319] Abundant material about Plotinus' thought on number can be found in Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 292 ff, under the heading 'Plotins Theorie der Intelligibilen Zahlen'. He also provides recent literature on the subject (298, n.413). Krämer makes clear that not only Plato and Aristotle contributed to Plotinus' thinking, but also Pythagoreanism in its Academic dress. Repeatedly Plotinus makes the *dekas* to the paradigm of number, which points to a Pythagorean background (cf. Krämer, *ib.*, 302). Krämer made a good point as to that. In my analysis we see that on all levels number is constitutive of being, which perhaps goes farther than Plato ever went. For in Plato's late period, Numbers are only said to be before the level of Ideas. It is the Platonic-Academic version of the Ideal Numbers that

(particular) one is a kind of number of a particular thing (ἢ οἷον ἀριθμός τις ἑκάστου), then this can be understood as follows. Just as you would say 'two' in regard of (two) things, so you would say 'one' in regard to one single thing. I must warn my readers that when Plotinus has the one in the sense of unity belonging to a particular or a universal in mind, I use 'one' instead of 'One'.

Two possibilities are brought in. The sentence that follows, suggests the possibility that number belongs to beings (line12 ὁ ἀριθμὸς τῶν ὄντων; Plotinus does not say that number *is* being). If so, the one, too, must belong to beings (or to a particular being). 'Belonging to' does not mean that number can be identified with being, as is often assumed in translations[320]. Rather, I think, we should bring in number 3 (οὐσιώδης ἀριθμός II a as intelligible, II b as sensible) of my outline: there is a kind of number that is fundamental to each particular being, determining its structure. If this is true, this holds too of the particular one. Plotinus adds: "and we must make inquiries as to the position of the one as number (ζητητέον τί ἐστιν, the subject of ἐστιν being the one as number of a being)". In contradistinction to this possibility Plotinus develops an alternative, the suggestion of the counting number: "But if counting is an activity of the soul, (which goes through the counted things), the one will not be (*as what he later calls* οὐσιώδης ἀριθμός) in things (οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι[321] τὸ ἕν)". In

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Plotinus sticks to, for it is characteristic of old Pythagoreanism to connect number with the things in our world. I doubt if Krämer's interpretation of οὐσιώδης ἀριθμός is broad enough. It seems to me that he confines this term to the Ideal Numbers. So on p.308 he distinguishes three types of number: 1) the οὐσιώδης ἀριθμός, 2) μοναδικὸς ἀριθμός and 3) sensible number (ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς), whereas, as we see in my analysis, οὐσιώδης ἀριθμός is also at work in the sensible world. As far as I can tell, I think that Krämer was right in involving the Academic-Pythagorean developments in the interpretation of Plotinus' doctrine of number and to detract from Plotinus' originality in this respect. However, I cannot follow his statement (*ib.*, 310) that this mathematical stamp on Plotinus' doctrine of mind faded away in Plotinus and that in the *Enneads* we merely have the remainders or fossiles of the Academic doctrine on number, rather than a still valid, systematically reworked influence. Against this view it may be argued that Plotinus not only offers many references to the doctrine of number, but even devotes elsewhere apart from a more limited discussion an entire treatise 34[VI,6]. It is hardly acceptable to state that a philosopher who should devoted an entire treatise to the doctrine of number would have but a rudimental interest in number.

[320] The translations of *e.g.* MacKenna "If number is among things", of Bréhier "Si le nombre est un être", are unacceptable, perhaps correct Armstrong, "if number belongs to the real beings" . For it is not the notion that number is among things, but that number is a constitutive part of things that is emphasized. Compare the parellel with ἀριθμός τις *ἑκάστου*, where the gen. does not allow for any such translation. We may draw the same conclusion from his words: οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη *ἐν* τοῖς πράγμασι τὸ ἕν (14), which is directly connected with his argument on the loss of being when unity has gone, in ch.1,4 ff. see 69 and later on.

[321] It is important to realize that πρᾶγμα (οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ἐν τοῖς *πράγμασι* τὸ ἕν) is employed both in regard to the things in our world and to intelligible entities. In line 14 πρᾶγμα refers to the examples of the preamble of ch.1, which will lose their being (in the sense of existence). But in line 19 ἄνθρωπος must be considered as a πρᾶγμα viewed upon also in the perspective of an intelligible entity, because of its being a compound of ζῷον and λογικόν, which are intelligible characteristics. The same two-level-employment of ἄνθρωπος and the same intelligible entities (ζῷον and λογικόν) are found in 34[VI,6],16,21 ff. as cha-

this case one can hardly fail to recognize number 4 of my outline: pure quantity, adding nothing to the ontological status of the thing concerned. This possibility is ruled out. The one must be constitutive of and essential to a thing, because, as is proven in ch.l, the loss of unity implies loss of existence[322] as well[323]. I may again point to the fact that also in 34[VI,6],16,27,28 we find a reference to number *in* being that holds the structure of the thing together (ἀλλὰ τὸ *ἐν* τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ συνέχον τὴν τοῦ πράγματος φύσιν).

So one has to return, Plotinus says, to the first possibility. Is the being of a thing the same as its oneness or its unity (cf. line 9 εἰ / ἢ γὰρ ταὐτόν τῷ ὄντι)? This problem must be considered both in the field of the particular (εἰ ταὐτόν τὸ ἓν ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ ὄν) and in the domain of the totality as well (καὶ τὸ ὅλως ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν). If a particular being displays plurality, whereas its oneness is not plurality, then the being of a particular and its oneness will be different. It is easy to see that the individual man is compound and plural. He partakes in (the Idea of) animal and in (the Idea of) rationality[324] and possesses many parts (μέρη)[325]. This plurality is connected by unity (ἑνί without article !). Therefore the individual man and (the particular) one must be different because his unity can be divided into parts, whereas the oneness of the one is without parts[326]. Especially[327] the totality of being (τὸ ὅλον ὄν), comprehending *all* things (πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχον τὰ ὄντα) is even more plural and must be more distinct from the

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racteristic of the twofoldness of man and his οὐσιώδης ἀριθμός. For πρᾶγμα as intelligible entity compare 7[V,4],2,46.

[322] How badly in need of correction the mss sometimes are may be gathered from the fact that they all (excepted J, which has μηδ' εἶναι) have the nonsensical form μὴ δέεσθαι, which is undeniably rightly corrected in ms A in μηδ' ἔσεσθαι. This is precisely what had been proven in the first chapter of 9[VI,9].

[323] The loss of existence concerns the things (πράγματα) mentioned in the preamble of ch.1 and consequently regards the things in the world, which confirms my suggestion of the, usually implicit, presence of the 'sensible' οὐσία in the argument.

[324] The same example is used in 34[VI,6],16,22, cf. note 321, where Man is called ζῷον *καὶ* λογικόν. This proves that Volkmann wrongly deleted καί in ch.2 line 19 before λογικόν and Harder has rightly defended καί, without, however, bringing in 34[VI,6],16,22. In both places the notion of man as ζῷον καὶ λογικόν is not simply a question of quantative counting, but of structure. See on man = ζῷον *καὶ* λογικόν as different from the Aristotelian use of man and the dyad, Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 308, n.437 and Bertier *e.a.*, *Nombre*, 188.

[325] Harder (*I b*, 470) complains about Plotinus' free style: "ein Musterfal der freien Redeweise Plotins, der keiner Grammatik genug tut. Der Mensch ist das und das, er (besteht aus, er ist) viele Teile". However, we must not forget that for Plotinus ζῷον and λογικόν are parts (μέρη) of the intelligible composite 'man'. I know of sentences that give far more reason to complain about. Plotinus needed those μέρη to establish that the One is without parts.

[326] This one (presumably still the particular one) is said to be without parts (ἀμερής), but not indivisible (ἀμέριστος), which implies the possibility of having parts.

[327] Καὶ δὴ καί can be better translated by 'especially' or 'a fortiori' than by 'moreover' as Armstrong does.

one, possessing the one only by participation[328]. This means that the one of total being cannot be identified with the pure One. This conclusion, however, is not drawn explicitly. Plotinus immediately moves on by insisting on the plurality of being.

2, 24-32 The plurality of being (Ideas)

Translation

> Being has also life and mind. For it is not a dead thing. Therefore being is multiple. But if it would be mind, in this manner too it must necessarily be many. And still more so, if it embraces the forms. For not even the Idea is one, but rather a number, both each individual and the total Idea, and it is in this way one as the cosmos would be one. Generally speaking the One is the first, whereas mind, the forms and being are not the first. For each form is composed of many parts, composite and posterior. For the things an individual thing is made up, those things are prior.

As we already know[329], πάντα regularly denotes all that is included in the mind. In this case πάντα are the Ideas, which emerge in the following. Moreover, being has also life and mind (line 24)[330]. This is to be regarded as an additional argument. Being is not νεκρόν, dead (or dead thing)[331], so life suits it, as Plotinus implies. Readers of his earlier tracts should remember that Plotinus uses the word νεκρός in connection with mind and being[332]. Its having life and mind makes being plural. If that being, full of life, is mind (lines 25,26) - Plotinus touches upon his startingpoint in line 5 - it is also by being mind that being is plural (life plus mind) and *a fortiori* if in this quality it - as it does - contains the Ideas[333]. An Idea as such is not one (line 27), and we now expect him to continue with: 'but plural'.

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[328] I am not able to discover any real difference between μετάληψις and μέθεξις. Already in Plato (*Parmenides* 131 A) μετάληψις is a technical term that denotes participation. One might wonder why in this instance Plotinus uses both terms in one sentence. Perhaps by doing so he wished to lay more stress on the notion of participation. Another explanation would be that he wished to express that *every* form of participation is implied where being embraces all things. On possessing the One by participation see the Appendix III of ch.1.

[329] See above 39.

[330] Line 20 καὶ νοῦν - Being is also in the possession (ἔχει) of life and according to all mss of mind (νοῦς). If we follow Harder, we have to expunge καὶ νοῦν, for being *is* νοῦς according to Plotinus' general teaching and cannot be said *to have* νοῦς. This argument is not entirely convincing for we just heard that being possesses (ἔχει) the One by participation (line 23). So in line with this remark one could expect Plotinus to say that being also possesses mind. HS accept Harder's second argument: line 25 reasons as if νοῦς was never mentioned in the proceeding. I think this is a better argument than the first one given by Harder. Perhaps even more convincing (but now for the maintaining of καὶ νοῦν) is Plotinus' reason: οὐ γὰρ δὴ νεκρόν *etc.*, a remark that has to do with life. Life is combined with being in the well-known passages of Plato's *Sophist* (249 A, cf. Slezák, *Nuslehre*, 63 and Bussanich, *The One*, 32), which, of course, is known by Plotinus (see 9[VI,9],11,15 and 38[VI,7],39,21,28-32). There we find twice the expression νοῦν ἔχειν and ζωὴν ἔχειν in connection with being ('Αλλὰ νοῦν μὲν ἔχειν, ζωὴν δὲ μὴ ἔχειν;). If Plotinus has this Platonic passage at the back of his mind, we do not have to wonder about καὶ νοῦν. There are more arguments to bring in. Plotinus' conclusion runs therefore: so it is πολλά. This makes more sense if it is preceded by καὶ νοῦν. Merely the fact that being has life is not sufficient for it to be called πολλά. It must be emphasized that elsewhere in Plotinus the triad being, life, mind recurs 7[V,4],2,43: τὸ γὰρ ὂν οὐ νεκρόν οὐδὲ οὐ ζωὴ οὐδὲ οὐ vooῦν, see also 49[V,3],5,31 ff. where life and thought are related to being. Furthermore, in 2[IV,7],9,23 νεκρόν and ζῷον appear, whereas mind is not present, since the subject of the discussion is soul. The passages quoted do not turn the scale, but show some sort of balance. Ultimately, I am inclined to take καὶ νοῦν for authentic because of πολλά in line 25 and because of the interesting and perhaps decisive fact that elsewhere, too, sometimes being has priority, cf. εἰ δὴ τὸ ὂν πρῶτον δεῖ λαβεῖν πρῶτον ὄν, εἶτα νοῦν, εἶτα τὸ ζῷον *etc.*, 34[VI,6],8,18, see Harder *III b*,

Rather surprisingly, at first glance, he continues (line 27), however, with the word ἀριθμός, meaning number as 'quantity', 'more than one', or perhaps rather 'comprehensive unity'. It is not the same 'number' as in line 12, where ἀριθμός is supposed to hypothetically include the One, and to be the *structuring* number, in line 27 the message is not that an Idea is number in a Pythagorizing way[334]. Both the individual Idea and the collective Idea[335] are said (line 28) to

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449 and Hadot, *Entretiens* V, 107 ff. The ternar often appears as οὐσία ζωή νοῦς. So I believe Harder was mistaken by deleting καὶ νοῦν. It always has to do with a certain view or a certain issue when Plotinus' terminology, or even thoughts, are less definite and more fluctuant than writers of handbooks would wish. Indeed, there are passages that express a general interpretation that being and mind are one and the same. Plotinus himself quotes Parmenides' famous saying of fr.3 τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν τε καὶ εἶναι (see 5[V,9],5,29-30 and see also 7[V,4],2,43 ff. and 38[VI,7],41,18, cf. Kremer, *Seinsphilosophie*, 123). The two partners have equal status. However, in 34[VI,6],8,18 their order of priority is reversed. Accordingly we may conclude that in 9[VI,9],2 the order is possibly reversed too, a conclusion that would suggest to stick to καὶ νοῦν.

[331] One has to render νεκρόν not by 'corpse', but by 'dead (thing)', see *LP s.v.*, 'thing without life', like stone or wood as appears from 2[IV,7],9,23,24 where Plotinus affirms that the First Being is not νεκρόν, as stone or wood (ὥσπερ λίθον ἢ ξύλον), stone in the same context recurring as example in 49[V,3],5,35, now very instructively clarified by *ἀψύχῳ τινί*. It is interesting to notice that Plotinus uses constantly νεκρόν as attribute of σῶμα (26[III,6],6,46; 28[IV,4],28,7 *etc.* see *LP*). In itself νεκρόν does not mean 'corpse', but 'dead'. I even doubt if the famous expression νεκρὸν κεκοσμημένον said of matter in12[II,4],5,18 has to be translated by 'decorated corpse', the rendering 'a decorated dead thing' would do better. Bussanich, *The One*, 32 believes that in the early treaties Plotinus was particularly fond of the image of 'corpse', but νεκρός must not be rendered by 'corpse', but by 'dead' (= lifeless) or 'dead thing'.

[332] See note 331.

[333] ἰδέα - Schwyzer, *RE*, 554 remarks that ἰδέα and εἶδος are interchangeable (except in those cases where they are used in contradistinction to the Aristotelian γένος). Here in ch.2 we immediately find him applying this rule to the extent, that in line 27 εἶδος is replaced by ἰδέα and εἴδη emerges again in line 30. It must be remembered that γένος means 'class'. The five famous classes of the *Sophist* are elaborately discussed in Plotinus, as we saw in Appendix III of ch.1. The five classes (Being, Motion, Rest, Identity, Difference) produce the εἴδη 43[VI,2],19,1 ff. Plotinus asks: "does each of them on its own produce the εἴδη (in this case of course not interchangeably used with ἰδέα) ?" The answer is: no. In 43[VI,2],18,17 we read: justice and wisdom are Ideas, not classes, they are ὕστερα γένους καὶ εἴδη, *i.e.* they are lower than a class and (therefore) they are species. The classes embrace and contain the species, see Appendix III of ch.1.

[334] Bertier e.a., *Nombre*, 43, 44 suggests this, when it is said "elles (the Ideas) sont plutôt des nombres ... (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἰδέα ἀλλ' ἀριθμὸς μᾶλλον ...)". However, he seems to have a better understanding of the text when he speaks of "la pluralité interne de l'idée", in this context.

display plurality, showing a specific type of oneness (οὕτως ἕν), *i.e.* like the comprehensiveness of the cosmos[336], of which the most conspicuous characteristic that it embraces all. Both the individual Idea and the total Idea are each in its own way participated by participants, whether by transcendent or immanent particulars. This would imply: they are plural and thus leave no room for identifying mind with the One.

Plotinus next (line 29) brings up a new point: the One is first, whereas mind, the Ideas (contained by mind), in short, being, are not the first. He goes on with the theme of the Ideas, not now considering what is under the domination of the Ideas (the participants), but what is prior to them. For every εἶδος is built up from many things, is a composite (σύνθετον) and is posterior (ὕστερον). He argues this point by bringing up the general rule that from whatever each thing is built up of, that has priority. So every εἶδος is built up of other transcendent entities. This remark is not easy to understand. Only lower Ideas are constructed from other ones, that ipso facto are prior to them. Plotinus' definition tells us that every Idea is compounded (σύνθετον). Perhaps we should rather consider a special characteristic of Plotinian Ideas: he has their interpenetrability in mind according to the adagium 'all in all' or rather 'all is all': καὶ γὰρ ἔχει πᾶς πάντα ἐν αὑτῷ, καὶ αὖ ὁρᾷ ἐν ἄλλῳ πάντα ... πᾶν πᾶν καὶ ἕκαστον πᾶν (31[V,8],4,7,8)[337]. This does not mean that a Plotinian Idea has no characteris-

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[335] ἡ σύμπασα sc. ἰδέα- It is said that νοῦς is "die Summe der Ideen" (Schwyzer, *RE*, 554, see also Harder, *I b*, 475). The passages adduced in favour of this opinion (1[I,6],9,34; 26[III,6],6,1 and 5[V,9],3,7) are not entirely convincing, for they are not explicit on this point. It is also said that the highest Idea (die oberste Idee) is "die des Geistes oder des Seins" (Kremer, *Seinsphilosophie*, 91) and that being is "die Gesammtheit der Ideen" (Kremer, *ibidem*, 88). With the exception of one passage, the passages quoted in favour of this conception of the highest Idea are rather vague. The clearest is 32[V,5],6,1-4: "Being is not the form of some one thing but of every thing (εἴδους οὐ τινός ἀλλὰ παντός)". Here it is Plotinus' aim to clarify the fact that the One is ἀνείδεος as negation of the characteristic of the first hypostasis that comes after it. So I can understand why this notion plays a role in this context and consequently why Plotinus uses it. The other quotations Kremer presents do not contribute to determine the notion of the highest Idea nor to found it (45[III,7],4,3 and 12). So we only rarely meet this Idea: we do not have much material to interpret ἡ σύμπασα ἰδέα. Yet, if this Idea has any meaning at all, it must denote something like the (comprehensive) Idea of being. As to the Idea of being as an all-embracing entity, there is a inextricable complication. In Plotinian philosophy there is room for being as a member of the society of the five highest classes (see 11[V,2],7). In that case the genus being is not all-embracing, but an equal member with the other members of the group. I think that here we have a problem that testifies to a fundamental schisma in the (neo)platonic philosophy, the irreconcilable conflict between being as genus and being as comprehensive of every thing what as an Idea is (think of the παντελῶς ὄν of Plato' s *Sophist 248 E*). Plotinus is fully aware of the double sense being must have: on the one hand we have mind as comprehensive being, on the other hand we have being as a genus (43[VI,2],18,11 ff.).

[336] ὥσπερ ἂν εἴη ὁ κόσμος ἕν (lines 28,29). Harder has introduced the splendid combination of εἰ ἦ (in A ^{ac}) = εἴη. We also meet the notion of comprehensive unity in the later tract 43[VI,2],10,3,4 τὸ γὰρ εἶδος πλῆθος, ὥστε ἓν ἐνταῦθα ὡς στρατὸς ἢ χορός, see Appendix III of ch.1.

[337] See Kremer, *Seinsphilosophie*, 57

tic of its own, but besides having this characteristic they are intermingled in a peculiar way, characteristic of the level of mind (see 9[VI,9],5,16 ff.). Thus Plotinus can say that each εἶδος is a compound by setting aside its own characteristic. All the Ideas that are intermingled in a particular Idea can be assumed to contribute to that Idea and to be responsible for its being a compound. So they have priority and the particular Idea may be called ὕστερον. "And what is 'later', secondary, cannot be called 'first'.

Perhaps this line of argument is unsatisfactory because there is another way to explain that the elements the Idea is compounded of, may be called prior. All Ideas are preceded by the five all-embracing classes[338]. In any case, one must assume a higher level prior to the Ideas. This makes the Ideas unfit to be the first things, which has its consequences for mind too.

However, the possibilities are not exhausted yet. We have to take into consideration a third possibility: it could be that *mind* as such is regarded as prior (in the μεταδιδόντα-sentence of line 6 mind seems to be superior to being = the Ideas), and the same holds true for *being*. Finally one has to be aware of yet another possibility: we have learned earlier in this Analysis that *number* is constitutive of being and of the Ideas themselves. Thus there are so many possibilities with equal right that I would not know which option should be favoured.

2, 32-47 Mind is not the first: its thinking ends up in *epistrophè*.

Translation

> And the fact that the mind cannot be the first, will also be clear from the following (considerations); it is necessary that mind is engaged in thinking and that the best mind, *i.e.* the mind that does not look to what is outside thinks what is prior to it. For when it withdraws into itself it turns to its origin. And if mind itself is the subject and the object of thinking, it will be double and not simple and not the One. But if it looks to some other thing, it will definitely look to what is better and before it. And if it looks both to itself and to its superior, in that way also it is secondary. And one must regard the mind as such that it is present to the Good and the First and that it is with itself and that it both thinks itself and thinks that it is itself all things. Thus it is far from being the One since the mind is multicoloured. Well then, the One will be neither all things, for so it would no longer be one, nor (will it be) mind, for also in this way it would be all things, since mind is all things, nor (will it be) being, for being is all things.

Plotinus goes on (line 32) by giving some additional proof (*καὶ* ἐκ τῶνδε) to confirm that mind cannot be regarded as the First (τὸ πρῶτον). Mind is necessarily engaged in thinking (ἐν τῷ νοεῖν εἶναι), even the best mind, *i.e.* (καί *explicativum*) the mind that does not look outwards, but thinks about what is prior to it. Plotinus gives the reason (γάρ). When mind does not look outwards and withdraws into itself, it focuses on its origin (ἀρχή) which is indicating the well-known *epistrophè*[339]. In this case one might imagine mind as looking at itself or inside itself: in that case, subject and object coincide. If the mind is both subject and its own object, it is, by being both, twofold and not single and therefore, not the One. If it looks to some other thing, the object does matter, for mind will definitely look to something better and superior (the ἀρχή) to it. Plotinus suggests another possibility by using a method, that essentialy goes back to the Sceptics or is at least popular with them[340]: he excludes *all* logically hypothetical possibilities, and combines the two possibilities just rejected as a third possibility: mind is *both* looking to *itself* and to the *superior*. In that case it will come second (Plotinus now employing the word δεύτερος), because if mind looks to itself and its superior, this superior will come first, and mind second. This remark presumably contains a reference to line 32, where he announces a proof for the mind not being πρῶτον. The mind appears to be δεύτερον. We must add that ultimately Plotinus is of the opinion, that mind looks both to itself and to its superior as well, as we we learn in ch.3[341].

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[338] See for the relation of classes and Ideas Appendix III of ch.1, 99 ff.

One should realize that Plotinus seems to argue by taking *particular* mind as his startingpoint. It is amazing to see how Plotinus when speaking of mind and soul often shifts from the particular entity to the universal[342]. What he has proven for the particular, equally applies for the universal. In this case it was sufficient to prove that the particular mind is plural in order to exclude the possibility that the One can be identified with mind.

This δεύτερον- character of the (now universal[343]) mind is further explained in the following sentence (line 40) which provides a curious and important portrait of the capacities of the mind. Firstly one must imagine the mind as present to the Good (= the First), note *παρεῖναι*, which underlines the difference between the Good and the mind; secondly the mind is with itself (note *συνεῖναι*[344] καὶ *ἑαυτῷ*) and knows that it both thinks itself and thinks that it is itself τὰ πάντα (all the Ideas). Later on[345] we have to go into this twofold description. In this context Plotinus continues with his proof that mind is not the

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[339] See for *epistrophè*, note 878.

[340] See *e.g.* Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, III, 259 ff.

[341] See ch.2,43 and ch.3,22 ff.

[342] See *e.g.* 33[II,9],9,51 ff., where Plotinus shifts from the universal mind to the particular, see Roloff, *Gross-schrift*, 186, cf. below 254.

[343] It is clear that it is the universal mind that now comes to the fore, for later on (see the text) Plotinus speaks of τὰ πάντα.

[344] Schroeder, *Sunousia*, 681 renders συνεῖναι by "coheres with itself", a translation that by 'the suggestion of cohesion', stresses in fact the unity of the mind, whereas it is Plotinus' (and Schroeder's !, see *ib.*, 685) aim to underline its multiplicity, for what 'is together with itself' is not simple, and is therefore manifold and hence can not be identified with the One. We may refer to a parallel συνεῖναι of the mind in 5[V,9],7,8,9. Here Schroeder (*ib.*, 681) interprets συνὼν αὐτῷ as 'self-sufficiency', whereas only 'being together with itself' is meant.

[345] See 166, 167.

First and not the One. The One is far from being the manifold or multicoloured (ποικίλος[346]) entity mind is.

Plotinus now presents a rather circular recapitulation (I do not agree with Harder's proposal to take lines 45-47 as the 'prologue' of ch.3). The One cannot be a) τὰ πάντα, for this would imply that it is no longer one[347], nor can it be b) mind, since it is not[348] τὰ πάντα, which mind is (see a), nor can it be c) being, as this is τὰ πάντα (see a).

Additionally one could remark the intriguing fact that in line 41 the Supreme Entity is denoted by the name of the *Good* (and also the First), which as such makes its first appearance in this treatise. It is very interesting to notice that in this context Plotinus uses the title 'Good' for the SE: apparently when withdrawing into oneself and making contact with the Highest are at stake as well as the presence of the mind to the SE, he seems to think it appropriate to introduce the Good to get the One on an equal footing with the Good. For directly afterwards the SE is again referred to as the One (line 43 πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ τὸ ἓν εἶναι ποικίλον ὄντα: "for it (mind) is far from being the One since it is so multicoloured"). Perhaps it is because it is the first time he discusses the seeing of the SE that he feels the need to make connection with previous discussions about the contact with the SE, in which it was not called 'One', but 'the First' or 'the Good'[349]. In any case no co-Platonist would or could deny the presence of the mind to the Good (παρεῖναι[350]). Nevertheless, many Mesoplatonists would not go so far as to make a gap between the mind and the One, but would consider mind to be the highest Entity[351].

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[346] See note 359 of ch.3.

[347] οὕτω γὰρ ⟨ἂν⟩ οὐκέτι ἓν εἴη. Kirchhoff added ἄν, I think rightly, for the comparable constructions of hypothetical sentences in ch.2 (lines 14,19) have the optativus with ἄν. On the same ground I would prefer a place right before εἴη, but see the place of the next ἄν. Kirchhoff's correction is not adopted by HS. Harder means that retroactivily the ἄν of the following sentence works in οὕτω γὰρ οὐκέτι ἓν εἴη. This argument seems disputable, for one would have rather expected the reverse.

[348] Notice that οὐδέ (line 44) should be taken with τὰ πάντα, for in the symmetry of the structure of the following sentences οὐδέ is repeated twice, and each time with the predicative nomen, οὐδὲ νοῦς (line 45), οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν (line 47).

[349] See above 61.

[350] Schroeder, *Synousia*, 678 shows that παρουσία is used not only (with Plato) for the presence of the Form to the particular and of the intelligible to the sensible, but also reversely for the presence of the sensible to the intelligible. We may add: of the mind to the God (One). As to line 41, Harder does not make the correct distinction between παρεῖναι and συνεῖναι. He is of the opinion that Plotinus is tacitly correcting himself. To think the One is better thought of as turning to the One: "es ist vielmehr ein Hinwenden, oder (14,2,41: Harder's manner of quoting for 2,41) ein Zusammensein". I would object that a) a correction is out of line here and b) that Plotinus' one and only objective here is to show that mind is near to the One and therefore δεύτερον. Harder's wording suggests that he is confusing παρεῖναι with συνεῖναι. In this context Plotinus uses συνεῖναι to denote mind's being with itself, *i.e.* on its own level, whereas παρεῖναι is used for the mind being present to a higher level: its being present to the One. We must come back to this later on, see below 139 ff.

[351] See above 11.

CHAPTER THREE

3, 1-14 What is the One? First stage on the way to it

Translation

> Well then, what could the One be and what nature could it have? Certainly, it is in no way amazing that it is not easy to say, since it not easy to say this even with regard to being or the form. But we do have knowledge that leans on forms. But insofar as the soul enters the formless, being unable to grasp this because of the fact that it is not determined and not, as it were, stamped by a multicoloured stamp, it slips away and fears that it has nothing to stand on. In circumstances like these the soul gets tired and gladly it often descends, falling away from all things till it comes into the sensible realm resting, as it were, on solid ground. Just as for instance the eyes when tired of small things gladly rest on great ones. But when the soul wants to look on itself, seeing only by being together and being one, it does not think that by just being one as yet it has what it seeks, because it is still not different from what is being thought. Nevertheless the person who is going to philosophise about the One, must act like that.

In the previous chapter mind as a candidate for being the One has been eliminated. Although we now know more - be it only negatively - than in the beginnings of ch.2, that is, we are now fully aware of mind's deficiencies and failure as a candidate because of its plural character, we might become desperate: if the candidate with the highest and most imposing qualities even fails to be the One, what in the world could the One be (line 1) ? What nature (φύσιν) can safely be attributed to it (Τί ἂν οὖν εἴη τὸ ἓν καὶ τίνα φύσιν ἔχον[352];)? These are the almost desperately exclaimed questions (line 1) with which ch.3 opens. That we are in doubt and uncertainty as to the nature (a remarkable word !, but in this connection it is frequently used by Plotinus[353]) of the One, who would wonder? For what is very close and near to it, the last post before the One so to speak, is already difficult to grasp, Being and the Ideas, so it can not be amazing that the One vanishes from our sight. Fortunately, concerning Being, there is help from knowledge (γνῶσις[354]), which can base on the Forms (εἴδη). But unfortunately, when the soul[355] enters[356] the realm of the ἀνείδεον[357], the level of non-being, *i.e.* in this case superbeing[358], there is no diversity[359] of patterns to stamp the soul and to determine its contents. Soul is not able[360] to grasp the One (περιλαβεῖν[361]). Consequently, soul is in danger of slipping (ἐξολισθάνει[362])

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[352] Line 1: ἔχον - perhaps ἔχοι?

[353] Line 1: φύσις - It is not the first time that Plotinus employs the expression ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς φύσις. In ch.1,15 we have met it already. In the latter, however, it is not the φύσις of the Superone, but the nature of unity that is meant. In ch.3,1 Plotinus is still in the position to speak about the nature of the One, exploratively (see also line 29, and line 40), because as yet it is not known that strictly speaking (see 183) the One displays no φύσις, no properties and no qualifications whatsoever. Nevertheless φύσις is frequently employed in Plotinus to be able to speak about the essence of an entity (of ὕλη, σῶμα, ψυχή, ὄν, ὄντα, οὐσία, νοῦς, νοητόν, αἰών, see *LP* 1090, we even find it repeatedly in connection with the SE in later treatises: of the Good *e.g.* 32[V,5],13,20, 33[II,9],1,1, see further *LP* 1095 for lots of places). In connection with the One it is not used as much, except in 33[II,9],1,3 where the nature of the One is put on the same footing as the nature of the Good. Incidentally, this usage seems further to be limited to 9[VI,9] as we may gather from *LP* 1095, see ch. 5,35. As we know already it also means 'hypostasis', see above note 77.

[354] Line 3: γνῶσις is a more general term. Bussanich, *The One*, 193 holds that here γνῶσις is a noetic term and as such a variant of νόησις. Nevertheless, γνῶσις remains more neutral than νόησις or ἐπιστήμη. In the athmosphere of searching the One, ἐπιστήμη would

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have been too definite, since in 9[VI,9],10,5,6 ἐπιστήμη has a well-defined meaning, linked with proof *etc.*, see ch.10, 5 ff. See in general on Plotinus' terminology concerning notions of knowledge below 165 ff. There is no gnostic element in γνῶσις here.

[355] Line 4: ψυχή - After what was said in the previous chapter about mind one might wonder why suddenly soul emerges. An explanation may be found in the background of the myth of the *Phaedrus*, which also has the soul at the centre. Moreover, the soul is the bearer of the 'person', cf. note 714. See on the importance of the myth in ch.3 note 356.

[356] Line 4 ἴῃ - At the background of the entire chapter is the myth of the *Phaedrus*. Literal or semiliteral borrowings, however, are not frequent. We may point to στερεῷ in μέχρις ἂν εἰς αἰσθητὸν ἥκῃ ἐν στερεῷ (8), compare *Phaedrus* 246 C 3 ἕως ἂν στερεοῦ τινος ἀντιλάβηται. With some courage one may call this a literal quotation. A semiliteral quotation is ἀποπίπτουσα (8 and 54) and ἐξαδυνατοῦσα reminds one of ἀδυνατοῦσαι of 248 A. About their meanings see below and note 360. There are a lot of shifts in the parallelism of ch.3 and the *Phaedrus*-myth. For instance, στερεῷ itself drifted away from στερεοῦ in Plato. In the *Phaedrus* it is matter in which the soul finds itself embodied after the 'fall'. In Plotinus it is the sensible world of the Doxa to which the soul falls back (ἀποπίπτουσα), which has nothing to do with being embodied, but only with perception. In Plotinus the whole journey is of a different type: it is only an epistemological journey, in which any notion of μετενσωμάτωσις is entirely absent. Moreover, what is even more important, it is not to the Ideas but the One that the travelling soul reaches out to. This causes a change in levels. Much in Plato's myth has been transposed in Plotinus to a higher level. Nevertheless, one should be aware of the Platonian background in ch.3, as may appear from my further remarks.

[357] Line 4: ἀνείδεον - This word is 'double-faced'. It can be said both of the One and of matter, see for the One 32[V,5],6,4,5, 38[VI,7],17,36,40 *etc*; for matter: 25[II,5],4,12. It means 'without form' and this applies both to matter, that has no powers nor properties in its own right and to the One, which is above all kind of Form. See, Blumenthal, *Psychology*, 114, Harder, *III b*, 408 and Schwyzer, *RE*, 560. It still remains questionable whether in both cases the same type of form is involved. The form that impregnates matter is the socalled εἶδος ἔνυλον, the immanent form. When discussing the formlessness of the One, it is the superior type of form, the Idea, that Plotinus has in mind. In 9[VI,9],3,4 ἀνείδεον has nothing to do with the theorem that the Formless is the Generator of Forms, as expressed in 38[VI,7],17,40 ff.; *ib.*,32,10 ff., cf. Hadot, *Traité* 38, 330.

[358] See for not-being note 813.

[359] Line 5: ποικίλου - It means multicoloured, manifold. It belongs to Plotinus' poetic stock. It is here said of the stamp, *i.e.* mind with its richness of Ideas, which can stamp the soul, providing a kind of transcendent ladder: ποικίλου τοῦ τυποῦντος see Harder, *I b*, 471 and Kremer, *Seinsphilosophie*, 38. Ποικίλου alludes to the fact that in mind *all* things (cf. 2, 44-46 πάντα) are present. In the region of mind there are many Ideas for the soul to rest on in mounting in contrast with the realm of the ἀνείδεον.

[360] Line 4: ἐξαδυνατοῦσα - 'To be quite unable', *LP*. Being on a higher level than in Plato soul is unable to a higher degree to pursue its aim.

[361] In this word I suspect a semiliteral notion of semi-concrete embracing. For the same type of περιλαβεῖν, e.g., 32[V,5],6,14,15. For περί in this context 124 and note 802.

[362] According to Bussanich, *The One*, 188 there are many references to the soul slipping away (from the union with the One). He quotes apart from places in 9[VI,9], 6[IV,8],1,8,9, not without reason, but we must not forget that there it is the visitor of the *divine*, not the One (Plotinus himself) who *after* the visit wonders why it is that he came down and why has ever descended into the body at all. In 9[VI,9], ch.3 we are at the stage that precedes the visit with all its anxiety and uncertainty, and here we have a case of failure. So before the union could be realised soul has slipped away. Schwyzer (*RE*, 565) curiously

away and afraid it will have no base to stand on (καὶ φοβεῖται μὴ οὐδὲν ἔχῃ[363]). Soul's efforts to get hold of itself wearies it out and it is not without pleasure[364] and relief that it descends often dropping back from the all (πάντα, in this context a misleading term[365]) until it arrives on firm ground as if resting on it (ὥσπερ[366] ἀναπαυομένη). Plotinus uses ὥσπερ because properly speaking there is only question of rest[367] when one is unified with the SE. Just as the eyes worn out by seeing small things[368], find relief in seeing big letters, soul will be glad to come on familiar ground. The reader will recall the famous scene in the *Phaedrus* (247 B) where the carriages of the souls mount to the Outerworld, to its back.

A most difficult phrase (line 10 καθ' ἑαυτήν κτλ.), which will be amply commented upon in an Appendix, suggests that soul has the capacity to make itself one, as a necessary but in the end insufficient step on the road towards the One. Soul contemplates itself with full energy. After this curious unification as a necessary step soul must go on mounting to the One ("Ὅμως δὲ χρὴ οὕτως ποιεῖν τόν μέλλοντα περὶ τὸ ἓν φιλοσοφήσειν, line 14,15).

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enough, believes that Plotinus here speaks of the descent of the soul from its origin, but it is all about the process of getting knowledge of the One.

[363] Line 6: φοβεῖται μὴ οὐδὲν ἔχῃ (line 6) -Translators interprete this sentence so as to assume that the soul fears 'to have nothing at all (Armstrong)'. Considering ἐξολισθάνει (to slide away), I think we should understand μὴ οὐδὲν ἔχῃ as: 'to have nothing *to stand on*', which is in harmony with the desire to come down to solid ground as it features in lines 9,10 ἐν στερεῷ.

[364] Line 7: ἀσμένη - This joy is absent in the myth of the *Phaedrus*, understandably considering Plato's different aim. The same idea is also expressed in ἀναπαυομένη (9).

[365] Line 8: ἀπὸ πάντων - I am unable to see any cogent reason for the use of the word πάντων. If it is sound, in this context it undeniably designates the whole region of the *ἀνείδεον*. However, (τὰ ?) πάντα can hardly be supposed to designate this region, see ch.2,45-47, where it is identified with mind and being. It is not from πάντα that soul is slipping away, but from the ἀνείδεον, where πάντα precisely are not welcome. Thus I believe Plotinus is somewhat confused about the levels and realms we are dealing with.

[366] Armstrong translates as if ὥσπερ should connected regressively with ἐν στερεῷ, which, however, with ὥσπερ is impossible, because it can only be connected progressively, with what comes after it.

[367] See about the ultimate rest 237.

[368] One is quickly reminded of the passage in Plato, *Rep.* II 368 D, about reading big letters (justice in the State), where small ones fail to be clear (private justice). Plotinus himself had diminished eyesight. That was the reason why he refused to correct himself what was written by his own hand, cf. Porphyrius, *Vita Plotini*, ch.8. which furnishes more details about his rather bad methods of writing. I must admit that in the text nothing is said about letters, but only about objects. Armstrong, *Transl.* VII, 310,311 compares Numenius fr.2, where Numenius in a striking poetical comparison compares seeing the Good with a person straining his eyes and at once seeing a little boat far away among the waves. This seems to me rather far-fetched, because in Numenius this person is assumed to be succesful in his attempts and there the fundamental point is not getting tired, but straining of the eyes. On fr.2 of Numenius see below 160.

3, 14-22 Being free from evil as a condition

Translation

Well then, since it is the One that we seek, and we are considering the origin of al things, the Good and the First, one must not go far away from what are the first things by falling away to the ultimate things of all, but one must strive for the first things and lift oneself up from the sensible things, which are the ultimate things, and be free from all sorts of evil since one is hastening to attain the Good, and one must be on his way upwards to the Origin in oneself and become one out of many, if one will become a beholder of the Origin and the One.

Now the phrase περὶ τὸ ἓν φιλοσοφήσειν is elaborated by Plotinus. First we shall say something about the term περί (line 14 περὶ τὸ ἕν), which is deliberately chosen and requires some further comment. What kind of approach is meant by this rather vague word? Where in the environment (περί) of the One are activities to be located? Since we try to reach[369] the One[370], *i.e.* the origin of all things[371], which is the Good and the First, we must necessarily keep around the first things (notice περί in περὶ τὰ πρῶτα, line 17) avoiding to relapse to the counterpart of the first things: the ultimate things (τὰ ἔσχατα), the outer rim of being. You have to strive upwards to the One by bringing yourself[372] up from the outer rim of being, the sensible things, which is what Plotinus meant by 'ultimate'. This effort cannot be completed unless one is free from evil, being introduced as the counterpart of the Good, which emerged in the foregoing[373]. The notion of evil seems also to be suggested by the implications of the sensibilia, the world that surrounds us, not very surprisingly in the Plotinian teaching about evil. One must be free from any shortcomings, imperfections, failures and evil, if one wishes to strive for the Good. This means the pursuit of civic virtue[374].

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[369] Line 20: γενέσθαι - "halte ich gegen Cilento für unerträglich", so Harder *I b*, 471. Müller deleted it, but HS accept it. Γίγνεσθαι + prep. (πρός) is not awkward, see *LS* and note 375.

[370] Line 15: ἕν - without the article, although the One is meant, cf. note 377. The absence of the article is best explained by taking ἕν as the predicate and ὃ ζητοῦμεν as the subject in the sentence.

[371] Line 15: τῶν πάντων - is used once more as a fixed term designating everything except the One and matter.

[372] Line 18: ἐπαναγαγεῖν - *LP*: 'bring back' is perhaps not correct, for it is not 'bringing back' that fits the context, but 'bringing upward'. Ἐπαναγαγεῖν ἑαυτὸν is a rather unusual expression which seems to be employed to portray with strong colours the *own* effort of the visitor of the One. How this must be done is expounded in the following part of the long sentence.

[373] Line 16: οὔτε - recipitur a τε 19 et 20 τε (HS). Admittedly, οὔτε .... τε meaning 'not ..... and' is normal Greek. Indeed, we may connect οὔτε with the following τε (line 19) and τε of line 20 as HS and the *LP*, 784 have it. So one should not accept Harder's conjecture οὐδέ. However, we encounter the combination οὔτε ... ἀλλ': 'not ... *but* '. Then the (adversative) complement is to be found in ἀλλ' not in τε (19). Τε (19 and 20) make the words dominated by them parallel to the ἀλλ'- phrase. For the combination οὔτε ... ἀλλ' we have a straight parallel in 46[I,4],16,3:*οὔτε* σπουδαῖον τηρήσει ...*ἀλλ'* ἐπιεικῆ ἄνθρωπον ...: "he is not keeping his mind on the good man, ...but assuming an ordinary man" (Armstrong). So τε (line 19 and 20) seems very likely not to be connected with οὔτε, but rather with ἀλλ'. Thus I reject the solution of HS and the *LP*.

Actually one is on his way[375] to the Good by ascending[376] to the Origin which manifests itself as the Origin in oneself. It is at this point that Plotinus returns to the unification of soul as described in lines 11,12 (καὶ ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν γενέσθαι, referring to τῷ συνεῖναι καὶ ἓν οὖσα τῷ ἓν εἶναι αὐτῷ), if one really wishes to acquire a vision of the Origin, the One[377] (ἀρχῆς καὶ ἑνὸς θεατὴν ἐσόμενον). Note the future tense in θεατὴν ἐσόμενον. This future tense may be assumed to be the echo of οὐκ οἴεταί πω ἔχειν ὃ ζητεῖ, cf. line 12 and τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ τὸ ἓν φιλοσοφήσειν. This form of unification is only a startingpoint. The vision is brought forward as yet to come. Being one of the soul as depicted in lines 11,12 is not enough, meaning only a stage *before* the One, be it a necessary preparation, if one is ever to become the visitor of the One.

3, 22-36 Necessity of soul's becoming mind

Translation

Well then, it is necessary to become mind and to entrust one's own soul to the mind and place it under it, in order to receive, being awake, what the mind sees and to contemplate by means of that mind the One, without adding any form of sense-perception and receiving something of perception into the mind, but one must with a pure mind *i.e.* with the first of the mind contemplate the Purest. When then a person who is embarked on the contemplation of such an entity (*sc.* the One) imagines size, shape or bulk in regard to this nature, then it is not mind that is his leader in contemplating this, for the mind does not have a nature to see such things, but (then) his activity has to do with sense-perception and opinion which accompanies sense-perception. But one has to receive from the mind its promise of what it is capable. Mind is capable of seeing what is before it or what belongs to it or what proceeds from it. And also the things in it are pure, still purer and simpler are the things before it, or rather that which is before it.

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[374] Line 19: κακίας τε πάσης κτλ.- It is the so-called civic virtue that is the first step to become virtuous. In order to cut the connection with all that belongs in the depressing atmoshpere of the body, virtue must be pursued as a means of purification so that man is liberated from ordinary life and made to ascend towards the level of mind, which as such does not possess virtue or virtues but has the *principles* of the virtues. Having these principles does not include having what is dependent on this principles like the Ideas do not what their participants do. The Idea of Fire does not burn: the participants do the burning. We read all this in 19[I,2],3. Purification is in the entire chapter the catchword. It has its role too in ch.3 of 9[VI,9]. After purification the soul has the intention to turn to the mind and be active as mind (19[I,2],6,25); this thought is recurrent in our chapter 3. On 19[I,2] see Harder's introduction (*I b*, 559 *etc.*). See also note 388.

[375] Ἄτε πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν σπεύδοντα γενέσθαι. I think Igal, *de Uno*, 277 is right in defending πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι contra Volkmann et alli and especially Harder ("γενέσθαι halte ich für unerträglich"), for *γενέσθαι πρός* (τινα) does not seem bad Greek at all (see *LP*, 213 γενέσθαι πρός), see also note 369.

[376] Line 21: ἀναβεβηκέναι - Notice the perf.tense: being on his way to the Origin in oneself, *i.e.* in the style of 19[I,2] to leave the level of soul with its civic virtues, cf. below 331.

[377] This belongs to the very few passages, where the union is said to be with the One, see above 62 and below 297. Notice the absence of the article.

Plotinus seems to become aware of the fact that soul on its own is unable to meet the One. Elsewhere (38[VI,7],35,4) we are informed about soul's need to become νοῦς before the last station is attained: νοῦς γενομένη αὕτη θεωρεῖ οἷον νοωθεῖσα, it has to become mind itself so to speak (see Part III 'the mystical Union', 300). This consideration in 38[VI,7] (rather late) seems Plotinian standard. We already find in the second treatise, 2[IV,7],10,35,36 a similar thought: the soul must become a κόσμος νοητός in order to come into contact with the Good by its illumination. Here in 9[VI,9],3 it is worded in the same manner: νοῦν γενόμενον (line 22) as in 38[VI,7],35,4. One has to become νοῦς oneself and to trust his soul to the νοῦς and to place it under the νοῦς, later called ἡγεμών[378] (line 29), reminiscent of the remarkable κυβερνήτης of *Phaedrus* 247 C[379].

Now in the condition of being awake[380], *i.e.* fully conscious of the higher level of mind, without being disturbed by any earthly sorrows or concerns, the soul is able to see what in function of mind it sees in regard to the One. To be sure, the mind is occupied with the act of seeing; however, it is doing so without any form of sense-perception. Later on we will discuss what seeing of the mind actually entails (see Part III: 'The mystical Union', 304), an analogon of sense-perception; for the moment it is enough to state that one is entitled to say that the mind sees. One is not entitled to transpose the eye's ways of seeing to the activity of the mind (lines 30-32). This points to the pureness of this kind of seeing, its being free from any sensible stain when it sees the Purest. Impureness is often the characteristic of the descended soul, that shows a tendency to be immersed in earthly sorrows and sins. The instrument of mind's seeing is τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ νοῦ[381], the part of the mind that is nearest to the One.

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[378] Line 29: ἡγεμών - HS refer to *Laws* 963 A 8 and Harder, *I b*, 471 (ad 3, 31) refers to the *Phaedrus* (obviously to *Phaedrus* 247 C ψυχῆς κυβερνήτῃ μόνῳ θεατὴ νῷ). Κυβερνήτης in the *Phaedrus* is strange as far as I can see. It never means 'driver' but always 'pilot', 'steersman' (see *LS*) except in Plato's (?) *Theages* 123 C. This seems not to have gone unnoticed by Plotinus, who substitutes ἡγεμών for κυβερνήτης, to whom you must trust your soul (see note 379). Harder's reference makes the impression to be more fruitful than the one of HS (*Laws* 963 A 8), for in spite of the use of ἡγεμών the passage lacks the ambiance of the *Phaedrus*, which is the background of ch.3.

[379] Line 23: τὴν ψυχὴν ... ὑφιδρύσαντα - One has to trust one's soul to mind as a leader; this notion of leader recurs at 29 (in ἡγεμών). Ὑφιδρύειν turns out to be a hapax in Greek literature, cf. *LS, s.v.*, in Plotinus ἱδρύω can mean to place on a level or in a realm, 2[IV,7],8/1,4. In this context it does not mean 'to subordinate' (*LP*) being too abstract, but more concretely conceived 'to place under'. Notice in line 24 ms A's felicitous correction ἵν' ἃ for mss ἵνα.

[380] Line 24: ἐγρηγορυῖα - The soul must be awake, for to be occupied with bodily concerns is being asleep 26[III,6],5,23. The notion of being awake is even said of the One: 39[VI,8],16,33 cf. Schwyzer, *RE*, 561, 562. See for 'being awake' note 156.

[381] O'Daly, *Self*, 86 thinks in 'the summit of the soul' we meet the Chaldean 'flower of the mind (ἄνθος τοῦ νοῦ)'. See about the layers of the mind *e.g.* 43[VI,2],11,45,46 ῎Επειτα καὶ ἐν τῷ ὄντι οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰ μὲν πρῶτα τὰ δ' ὕστερα εἶναι, cf. note 388).

Plotinus tells us what the characteristics of sensible things are: μέγεθος, σχῆμα and ὄγκος[382]. These attributes which are traditionally used to describe the sensible world, form a coherent unity in qualifying the sensible world. If anyone is stupid enough to try to make the mind see in terms of ascribing these characteristics to the One, he would have to concede that mind is not his leader in seeing the One, but its activity belongs to sense-perception, which only results in doxa, the companion of sense-perception. Here we are reminded of a passage, rather a thought, borrowed from the *Timaeus* (28 A), where sense-perception and doxa are related to each other[383]. No, we must trust mind and its promises and announcements (ἐπαγγελία[384]). Mind's capacities enable it to see what comes before it (τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ), what belongs to it, τὰ αὐτοῦ, taking the following sentence into account καθαρὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ. Consequently τὰ αὐτοῦ is likely to mean mind's capacity of seeing the contents of mind itself (as we learned earlier, see line 11 and ch.2, lines 42 and 43).

We are even told that it belongs to mind's abilities to see what originates in it: τὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ. HS go so far as to bracket these words on the at first glance acceptable ground: "intellectus enim non curat quae post eum". Igal ingeniously deletes ἢ τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ and corrects τὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ into τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ[385]. One may point to the circumstance that in the rhythm of the development τὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ has no echo in the following sentence, whereas the other two expressions have, in the same sequence as Igal's correction suggests. However, both arguments ("intellectus enim non curat quae post eum" and the fact that τὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ is ignored in the following), perhaps, do not provide sufficient ground to go as far as to bracket or delete τὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ, whether in the manner of HS or of Igal. In ch.2, 34,35 mind is supposed to be able to look ἔξω, implying mind's capacity to look outside itself to other things, perhaps to things originating in and from itself. So it could refer to the Forms as originating from the mind. Moreover, in a later work, 30[III,8],9,29-32 linked with the present problem by Dodds[386], Plotinus orders the mind to give itself up to what is behind it, because the mind has the capacity to face both directions (ἀμφίστομος), in order to see there what the One generates in it and what may be stamped as the voice of the One[387]. Finally, in ch.3, 33 Plotinus gives a *general* statement about mind's abilities: he appeals to minds own announcements (ἐπαγγελία). In this case, the enumeration of as many capacities as possible seems less strange, even if it concerns a capacity which is not relevant in the immediate context or overdone, when regarded within the framework of the system. Consequently, I am not convinced that the deletion of the words involved is necessary; deleting seems too dogmatic, although, admittedly, generally speaking mind is not supposed to regard things that come 'after it'. Additionally it must be emphasized that παρά with a genitive does not precisely mean 'after' ('post eum', HS) but 'originating in' (see *LP s.v.*)

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[382] Line 28: μέγεθος, σχῆμα and ὄγκος - These are all characteristics of sensible, physical matter (not of matter in the opposition matter/form, 12[II,4]). Μέγεθος is extension, σχῆμα is earthly form (never used of the Ideas, where μορφή is usual), ὄγκος is any contents whatsoever that fills space, from air to nothingness (in Epicure we find it as a particle, cf. *LS s.v.*). Μέγεθος and σχῆμα are connected in 12[II,4],8,21-24, μέγεθος + ὄγκος in 12[II,4],6,16.

[383] Line 31: δόξης - δόξα as accompanying αἴσθησις reminds us of *Timaeus* 28 A 2: (τὸ δὲ αὖ δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου δοξαστόν see also 28 C 1). Harder (*I b*, 471) also refers to *Theaetetus* 197 C 3. One wonders why Harder says: 'Platozitat ?', with interrogation-mark. Of course it is not a literal quotation, but rather an allusion to Platonic thought in Platonic words. I do not think that knowing this is of much help in interpreting. The 'quotation' is clear in itself.

[384] Line 32: ἐπαγγελίαν - An ἐπάγγελμα is the public announcement of the capabilities and faculties of a sophist: 'der Geist ist wie ein Sophist oder Goet, der seine Fähigkeiten anbietet' (Harder, *I b*, 471 referring also to 33[II,9],14,15). The same metaphorical use as in 9[VI,9],3,32 (mind's announcement) in 26[III,6],7,20 where Plotinus says: "what matter *announces*, is a lie" (Διὸ πὰν ὃ ἂν *ἐπαγγέληται* (*sc.* ὕλη), ψεύδεται).

[385] Accepted by HS^2.

[386] Dodds, *SP*, 21, *idem*, *Notes*, 112.

Plotinus goes on (line 34) with a phrase expressing degrees of pureness[388]. Pure are things in the mind, still more pure are things before mind, or rather that which (singular !) is before mind. A problem might arise. Is there really anything prior to the mind besides the One? Between mind and One nothing intervenes and that is the reason why Plotinus corrects his own words by means of an epidiorthotic μᾶλλον: it should be noticed, however, that from time to time it appears that the region in between *has* principles like Beauty or Arithmos[389]. However, in this context I do not think that Plotinus is alluding to any such entities. 'Απλούστερα, things prior to mind, are purer, while more simple (καί epexegetically).

After these words Harder opens a new paragraph, to my view misleadingly, by making the wrong connection. Lines 36,37 are the ground for the conclusion in line 38: οὐδὲ νοῦς τοίνυν ἀλλὰ πρὸ νοῦ. What is more pure, and more simple than the mind and its objects, or contents, is *ipso facto* more one and therefore more likely to be identifiable with the One. Hence the conclusion that the One is not mind is consistent, since there exists something that actually is more pure and simple: τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ.

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[387] The passage 30[III,8],9,29-32 is hotly debated, see Bussanich, *The One*, 99. If our interpretation as given in the Analysis should be wrong, nevertheless, the word ἀμφίστομος remains as support for our maintaining the reading of the mss; Bussanich, *The One*, 101 has another opinion.

[388] Line 26: καθαρά - This purity has to do with being awake (ἔγερσις), see 26[III,6],5,24. Soul has to strive for purity because it is immersed in impurity (1[I,6],5,29 ff.). Purification is needed as is pointed out in 19[I,2] passim. The purified soul is elevated to the level of mind. The purest part of mind is the instrument for seeing the purest, *viz.* the One, and it is the 'first' of the mind. In mind too we find levels (cf. note 381). The highest level is the first, which denotes the 'department' nearest to the First, *i.e.* the One. In mind there are also degrees of purity.

[389] See note 96 and for ἀριθμός 111.

3, 36-45 The One is neither mind, nor graspable by any 'category' whatsoever

Translation

> This then is not even mind, but before mind. For mind is something belonging to the beings. But it is not something, but before every entity, nor is it being. For being too has something like a form of being. But it is without form, even without an intelligible form. For qua generative of all things the nature of the One is nothing of them. So it is neither something nor qualified nor quantative nor mind nor soul. It is also not in motion nor again, at rest, it is not in a place, not in time, but it is self on itself unique in form, rather without form being before all form, before motion, before rest. These are about being, which make it multiple.

As an additional ground (γάρ) for not identifying the mind with the One, Plotinus declares that mind is something among beings (τὶ γὰρ τῶν ὄντων, line 37). Mind (of the beholder of the One) is seen during the argument of ch.3 as a particular, like it is here because of τι (τὶ γὰρ τῶν ὄντων) and later ἑκάστου (line 38). Τι is not applicable to the One: the One is prior to each thing (ἕκαστον = τι), nor is it being (οὐδὲ ὄν). In contradistinction to mind, being must here be supposed to function as *universal* being. It is seen apart from any other distinction, in its purest nature. But even then, as pure being, it has form. For being, Plotinus asserts, has as it were (οἷον) the form belonging to being, one might say the Form of Forms, that is when being is regarded in its purest form. The One, on the other hand, does not possess any form, not even a noetic form[390]. The ground for this statement is the Plotinian rule that whatever generates some thing does not possess any characteristic of the thing generated[391]. So the One as the generator of all form and being, is itself devoid of their characteristics.

It is not without importance to stress that Plotinus here does not say that the One generates being and Form, but the *physis*[392] of the One generates, and so on. This may be regarded, perhaps, as a justification for what is essentially an impossible statement: the One is not supposed to generate. Strictly speaking, one is not entitled to ascribe any activity to the One let alone an important activity like generating, *i.c.* the generation of being. For the moment, however, Plotinus allows himself to speak of the possibility of the generation of the nature of the One. We shall return to the problem of the possibility of ascribing attributes to the One lateron[393]. We must add that Plotinus often speaks about the nature of the One[394]; therefore it is possible that Plotinus' employment of the word is more innocent than I just suggested.

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[390] The One is said to be formless: ἄμορφον (ἄμορφον δὲ ἐκεῖνο καὶ μορφῆς νοητῆς). As to ἄμορφον, we observe it as μὴ μορφή in the next treatise 10[V,1],7,20, also its frequent use in 38[VI,7],17,18,40; *ib.* 32,38 and we must stress that it is almost a synonym for ἀνείδεος, cf. Hadot, *Traité 38*, 276, 335. The many uses in 38[VI,7] are caused by the formation of being by the Good as formless. Bussanich, *The One*, 53 says that "surprisingly perhaps, the distinction between the One and Intellect is rarely expressed in terms of shapelessness and shape", referring to our passage as an exception. This must be an optical error which emerges when one overlooks the synonymity of ἄμορφος with ἀνείδεος.

[391] See Schwyzer, *RE*, 569.

[392] See also note 353.

[393] See 183.

Harder[395] points to the Stoic category τι, when discussing Plotinus' introduction of the notion τι (line 37), but not rightly I presume. In connection with the recognition of this type of notion of τι, it is not unimportant to notice that in ch. 3 it is referred to by ἑκάστου (line 36), the individual, separate thing, both in the realm of the transcendency and in the material world as well. Harder should have referred to the τι of line 41. To understand his point we must go into the notion of τι in Stoic philosophy: the most general name of a thing is τι, be it or be it not in the Stoic corporeal sense of the word. The Stoa is forced to acknowledge a kind of overall category, because of the requirements of their corporeal notion of being (εἶναι). This supercategory must also embrace the important phenomena that have no corporeal aspect, *viz.* time, place, the λεκτόν, whatever it may be[396] and which by lacking a material aspect, run the the risk of falling outside the domain of *being*, which would destroy them, unless they are saved by being a τι. This implies that although they are removed from being, they are, nevertheless, entitled to exist (the Stoics created or exploited a specific term to denote 'existence' ὑφίστασθαι as we saw earlier[397]).

Plotinus was well acquainted with τι as a term from Stoic stock (see 43[VI,2],1,21,22). In 42,43,44[VI,1,VI,2,VI,3] he argues against such an overall category on the grounds that being and the sensible cannot be embraced by one and the same category (see already 43[VI,2],1,21,22), let alone being and the One. However, notwithstanding his knowledge of the Stoic concept of τι, we must become aware that *in our context* τι does not mean the Stoic all-embracing category including what *is* not. In Plotinus τι can be and in ch.3 is the most neutral category or denotation within being (the mind, too, is here a τι). In his philosophy it is a handy and useful notion to denote the most general and neutral what can and may be said of a particular thing, whether a sensible or an intelligible entity. In Plotinus it is employed - parallel to Stoic philosophy - even of immaterial things, the realm of being, but not as an all embracing category. Its significance amounts to substance[398], τι being an even more suitable term than οὐσία (as substance), while its contents is still more neutral. In 49[V,3],12,50 ff. and 13,1 ff. this type of τι emerges very clearly[399].

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[394] See *e.g.* 33[II,9],1,15 (see note 353) and 32[V,5],6,15 where we read about its 'boundless nature', cf. further *LP* 322, 323.

[395] Harder, *I b*, 471.

[396] See Long-Sedley, *Hellenistic Philosophers* I, 201, 202.

[397] See above note 233

[398] This form of substantial τι is extensively discussed in my Excursus on naming the One, see 181,182.

[399] Line 37: τι - In 32[V,5],6,22,23 we also read that the One is neither τι nor οἷον. For the One's most prominent characteristic is its ineffability (see below 183). On the whole subject of τι see Wurm, *Substanz*, 158 ff., 177-179, and *RE*, 542. On τι as a category from Stoic stock to supersede everything, including being and the sensible, and about the Stoic use of the four categories see Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, I, 69, 70 and Rieth, *Grundbegriffe*, 91, Rist,

After the distinction I made between the Stoic τι and the neutral denotation τι I can not see any reason why Harder[400] should be justified to claim that the employment of τι would be an ironical ('gleichsam ironisch') use of a Stoic term, although his attribute 'ironical' marks his susceptibility for the peculiar meaning of τι in this context. So I am not able to see a reference in τι, however ironical, to Stoic philosophy, nor can I see one in ὄν which Harder also regards as a use of a Stoical category. I do not agree with this way of interpreting the use of τι and ὄν. Rather I think Plotinus was motivated by the wish to employ the most general term in philosophy. Now that Plotinus felt justified in concluding that the One is not anything belonging to τὰ πάντα (line 40 οὐδέν ἐστιν αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν referring to τὰ πάντα) he appears to remember τι, and to see it ultimately as a category, for he excludes the One from this category and from other categories as well (41). He comes forward with a hotch-potch of categories borrowed from several philosophies. We may enlist them as follows:

1) τι	- more neutral than οὐσία, important in Stoic philosophy, but here it seems more Aristotelian.
2) ποιόν	- from Aristotelian origin, is also Stoic.
3) ποσόν	- from Aristotelian origin.The combination with ποιόν proves that Plotinus uses Aristotelian concepts in this case. The Stoa did not use ποσόν as a category.
4) νοῦς/ψυχή	- they are no categories as such, but in the context they play a similar role. Admittedly, in ch.1 and ch. 2 they were rejected as applicable to the One, but their appearance seems rather odd, for they are not in tune with the categories used before and after them being of an other rank and of difficult syntax[401].

Stoic Philosophy, 103 and Long-Sedley, *Hellenistic Philosophers* I, 163 who have a useful survey and comment, on which issue, however, see my note 233 on existence. I disagree with Goldschmidt, followed by Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus*, I, 174, 175. Goldschmidt, *Le système Stoicien*, 19 holds the Stoic τι to be ultimately nothing but an ἐννόημα, being only in the mind, without any reality that answers to this term as an object. If this were true, all things in Stoic philosophy that are called a τι as λεκτόν, τόπος *etc* would be in fact nothing and would lack existence. This would *e.g.* deprive things of their place to be in and consequently of their existence. I think that ultimately τι refers to existence, whether in the world or in the mind. Concluding this note I may point to the fact that in Plato's *Sophist*, too, we come across the strictest relation between τὸ ὄν and τι (237 C).

[400] Harder, *I b*, 471.

[401] Line 41: νοῦν οὔτε ψυχήν - note that the case of neither words is in tune with the case of the other categories, being in the nominative. This may support the view that his use

5) κινούμενον -from Platonic origin (*Parmenides* / *Sophistes*)

6) ἑστώς -idem (*Parmenides* / *Sophistes*)

7) τόπος -idem (*Parmenides*, Aristotle)

8) χρόνος -idem (*Parmenides*, Aristotle)

Numbers 5-6 are Platonic concepts borrowed from the *theologia negativa* as it appears in Plato' dialogue *Parmenides* (138 B 5-6), but they figure in the *Sophistes* also. The numbers 7 and 8 (τόπος and χρόνος) may be assumed to originate from the *Parmenides* (see 138 B 3, 141 A 5), but they are also standard Aristotelian categories (οὐσία, ποσόν, ποιόν, πρός τι, ποῦ, πότε, κεῖσθαι, ἔχειν, ποιεῖν, πάσχειν, *Categories*, 1 b 25 ff.). These categories are studied by Plotinus in 42[VI,1], 43[VI,2], and 44[VI,3], so rather late in his development, and they are rejected for the intelligible world and perhaps also partially for the sensible world[402]. In the intelligible world quality cannot be present as a genus among the primary classes, for Ideas have no qualities, only essential features (43[VI,2],14). Quantity as a primary genus is absent too, for it is posterior to the five primary classes (43[VI,2],13). In his treatise 43[VI,2],16 τόπος and χρόνος are rejected because they imply duality and the specific character of a category of the Intelligible (the five Genera) precisely is being one. Place or 'where' (που) implies one thing in another, so that there are two things. Time - as a measure of movement - is a composite thing therefore twofold and consequently it does not satisfy the standard of being a genus. In the intelligible world there is no place and no clock-time at all. The only intelligible 'categories' are the Five Genera of the *Sophistes* (Identity, Difference, Being, Motion and Rest). Especially Motion and Rest also play a part in the sensible world. One could suppose that when Plotinus in 9[VI,9],3 writes about οὔτε κινούμενον οὔτε ἑστώς in combination with τόπος and χρόνος, which are exclusively sensible, he has the sensible categories motion and rest in mind, but it is more likely that these later divisions into intelligible and sensible categories do

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of this words is inauthentic as categories considering the oddity of their being used as categories, as we found in the Analysis. HS believe that the accusatives depend on a suppressed λεκτέον. To change both νοῦν and ψυχήν into nominatives has been proposed by Kirchhoff, which is certainly an easy way to get rid of the syntactical anomaly, but in the end the most acceptable, for τι (line 41) *etc* can hardly be but a nominative of the predicate, being the elaboration of: .. οὐδέν ἐστιν αὐτῶν. Armstrong translates as if he reads two nominatives, although he has two accusatives in his text.

[402] See 44[VI,3],3 ad finem. See for a handy and useful short study of the genera of the realm of Being and the Aristotelian categories as they function in Plotinus, Evangeliou, *The ontological basis of Plotinus' criticism of Aristotle's theory of categories*, 73 ff., esp.77.

not (yet?) play any part here. In this rather early treatise all these subtle rejections of the sensible categories and utterances about intelligible 'categories' (genera) do not play any part in the story. It may be that his thought about categories was not as far developed as it was later on, even 43 [VI,2] seemed to be more mature than 42[VI,1]. In any case "it is on a considerably higher level" as Armstrong puts it[403].

The hotch potch of categories Plotinus mentions in ch.3 of 9[VI,9] apparently is meant to represent anything of a categorial character one might imagine. They imply a 'categorical' denial of the categories (whether Platonic, Stoic or Aristotelian ones), in regard to the One. I cannot find any reasonable sequence in them, although some categories are dependent on others. When speaking of a τι, the categories of ποιόν and ποσόν immediately emerge. It is *not in a place* (as being in some other thing) that could have been said of the One in view of its later qualification as αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μονοειδές (line 43); *not being in motion* and *not being in rest* of the One are the qualifications Plotinus pursues in the following, and οὔτε κινούμενον οὔτε ἑστώς may be regarded as preparing the introduction of his argument about Motion and Rest.

It is interesting to notice that a confrontation of the highest Principle with categories belongs to standard Mesoplatonic procedures. So we have in Albinus (*Didaskalikos* X, 4) a series of categories, mainly of Aristotelian stock, which are all denied to the highest God of Albinus: γένος, εἶδος, διαφορά, τι, κακόν, ἀγαθόν, ποιός, ἄποιος, μέρος, κινεῖ, κινεῖται. Τι is in this series perhaps not a category at all, but merely announces κακόν, ἀγαθόν, ποιόν, ἄποιον *etc.*, and together with συμβέβηκε it is the characteristic expression of Albinus' SE as not having any attribute (τι) by participation (οὐδὲ *συμβέβηκέ τι* αὐτῷ). Albinus himself applies the rule that having an attribute would solely come to the One by participation (κατὰ μετοχήν τινος) in something (prior). It is very curious to observe that in Albinus' list κινεῖ, κινεῖται emerge, which, as we shall see, play a very important part in Plotinus' further argument. The fact that they perhaps belong to a standard set of categories could have inspired Plotinus to go into Motion (and Rest)[404] in greater detail, or the circumstance that they occur abundantly in the *Sophistes* and the *Parmenides* could also have been an incentive for Plotinus to go into them. However, I believe that the standardprocedure in Mesoplatonism was, perhaps, his most important motive.

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[403] Armstrong, *Translation* VI, Introductory note, 6.

[404] Ever since Andronicus' edition of the *Categories* within the framework of the reemergence of the esoteric *corpus aristotelicum*, there has been a vivid preoccupation with Aristotelian categories. Andronicus himself, Nicostratus, and Atticus heavily attacked them (see note 30). It is said (Harder-Theiler *IV b*, 417) that there are also adherents of them in Mesoplatonism, *e.g.* Gaius and Albinus, who tells us that Plato showed the ten categories in the *Parmenides* and other works (*Didaskalikos* VI,10, the opening lines). Here we come across the acceptance and incorporation of the ten Aristotelian categories into Platonism. However, this does not mean that there is not more to say about the categories. For already in Albinus we find a confrontation of the One and a hotch-potch of categories, largely from Aristotelian stock (as I said in the text) but, strangely enough, not borrowed from the *Categories*, for γένος, εἶδος, διαφορά have nothing to do with the categories. There must have been a tradition of this confrontation, in which notions of the Aristotelian categories (ποιός, *etc.* but here with the remarkable partner ἄποιος) and classes of the *Sophist* are

To return to Plotinus' discussion itself, one has to say that to deny all these concepts or 'categories', whether or not authentic, in regard to the One is entirely legitimate, for the One is beyond any qualification whatsoever. Plotinus, however, also feels the urge to embellish the One with some positive qualification (line 43): he emphasizes the uniqueness of the One by means of a definition originating in the *Symposion* (211 B 1).

According to the mss the One is τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μονοειδές. Harder draws our attention to the lack of the article in connection with all other categories. So we may well adopt Heintz's clever restoration αὐτό, in stead of τό. Plotinus, with his etymologically sensitive ear, however, hears in μονοειδές a Platonic ring, but one that is not in complete harmony with Neoplatonic views about the status of the One. Hence an epidiorthotic μᾶλλον corrects the partial wrongness of μονοειδές. In Diotima's treatment of Eros μονοειδές may be sound as a description of the uniqueness of the Idea of Beauty, but in Neoplatonic environments it reminds the readers and Plotinus himself too much of the stem of εἶδος: μονοειδές does not exclude εἶδος. This exclusion is a requirement for the high position of the One. So Plotinus corrects the *Symposion*definition: μᾶλλον ἀνείδεον. The One is prior to any Form (εἶδος), a familiar thought.

3, 45-54 The One is not 'at rest'. The One conditionally typified as cause, although being in fact unsayable

Translation

> Why, then, if not in motion, is it not at rest? Because each or both of them have to do with being and what is at rest is at rest by rest and this is not the same as rest. Consequently it (at rest) will come to it as an attribute and it will be no longer simple. Incidentally, also to say that it is cause will not be predicating an attribute of it, but it comes to us, because we have something stemming from it, whereas that remains in itself. And we must not even say "that" or "is" , when we speak accurately, but going around it as it were we want to voice our experiences revolving sometimes near it, and sometimes falling away because of the difficulties about it.

Two Ideas are connected with this 'being prior': the One is prior to Motion and Rest (κίνησις and στάσις). Plotinus feels obliged (by whomever he may have been inspired[405]) to say a few more more words on these Ideas and

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found to coexist in an altogether friendly fashion. In any case, to accept the categories for the sensible does not mean that one accepts them for the SE.

[405] Aristotle's series or Albinus' κινεῖ, κινεῖται (in Albinus' κινεῖ, κινεῖται are perhaps but a circumscription of ποιεῖν-πάσχειν, of Aristotle's series) or generally Mesoplatonic

their relation to the One, rather, the (negative) relation of the One to these Ideas, their shortcomings in denoting the essence of the One. Both these Forms have to do with being, making it plural. At this point a (didactical) question remains to be answered. One could imagine that the One, not being in motion, remains at rest (lines 45,46). Why does this reasoning not apply? Well, *being* must necessarily be either in motion or at rest or both. Now what is at rest is at rest in virtue of (the Idea of) Rest, which instance of being at rest is not the same as 'Rest' (Idea). What seems to be implied is that there is the duality of the giving and the given entity. When an entity is at rest this rest will come to it from the part of another entity. There is an implicit idea in the text, suggested by ὥστε: "When this reasoning is applied to the One", resulting in the following line of thought: so that (When this reasoning is applied to the One), it (rest , see below) will belong to the One as an attribute: συμβήσεται αὐτῷ (for it should be given by Stasis) and therefore the One will no longer be simple (ἀπλοῦς). In that case it will be a bearer of a property.

'At rest' is the attribute given to the One in the sentence συμβήσεται αὐτῷ, (see on συμβήσεται, συμβεβηκός expressing attributes p.81). The original question was why the One may not be assumed to be 'at rest' when not in motion. Thus the attribute (*viz.* the subject of συμβήσεται αὐτῷ) must be 'at rest'. Well, being 'at rest' is due to another power, not to its own. The other power concerned is the Form Rest. The same applies to the One: it would be 'at rest' in virtue of Rest. So 'at rest' would originate in the Form Rest and would be imparted to the One from elsewhere. Plotinus' conclusion seems valid and sound: the One would not be simple. The implication is that the One cannot be 'at rest'.

Plotinus proceeds in a rather curious way. He now informs us that speaking about the One as cause (τὸ αἴτιον λέγειν) is not ascribing (κατηγορεῖν) something that comes to (συμβεβηκός) *the One* but to *us* (ἡμῖν). This does not mean that the One is not a cause, but it means that to say something about something, *i.c.* the One (λέγειν), is *not always* 'predicating something (κατηγορεῖν) of that something' (κατηγορεῖν συμβεβηκός usually means giving a predicate to describe an attribute that comes to an entity by its participating in some other (prior) entity). Well then, if we ascribe to the One being cause, we do not say that there is something that comes to the One by participation in another entity (for that is just as incorrect as to ascribing rest to the One), but it is to ascribe something that has come to *us*. The correctness of this interpretation and especially of the meaning of συμβεβηκός as something coming to something appears from Plotinus' following remark: "(For doing so) we have something from the One (*ἔχομεν τι παρ'* αὐτοῦ), whereas the giver (the One) remains in itself (ἐκείνου ὄντος ἐν αὐτῷ)". What is that 'something' ? Apparently it is the being cause of

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influence or was it simply the influence of the *Parmenides* / *Sophistes*? I think, as I said in the text, Mesoplatonism was most important.

the One. For τὸ αἴτιον λέγειν of the One is in no way saying that cause comes to the One by participation in a (prior) entity (which is the essence of predication), but this comes to us directly from the (essence of) the One itself.

It must not escape notice, that the meaning of συμβαίνειν is exploited by Plotinus in the lines concerned: συμβαίνειν has the meaning 'to happen to one', which may amount in this case to rather simply 'come to one' (a) and be specialised as (b) 'to come as an attribute to one' (in the perfect tense συμβεβηκός: 'having come to one and being now - as an attribute - with one'). Plotinus' utterance that to speak about cause is something that comes to us from the One (not as a *predicate concerning us)* is often, if not always, misunderstood by the translators who do not understand the game with συμβαίνειν. They translate as if something incidental or accidental comes to 'us', but Plotinus means only to say that we have something (a notion) imparted to us. Harder: "... so bedeutet das auch nicht ein *Akzidentielles* (my italics) von ihm aussagen, sondern von uns...". Armstrong: " .. is not to predicate something *incidental* (my italics) of it but of us...". Bréhier:" .. mais c'est là attribuer un *accident* (my italics) non pas à lui, mais à nous..". Krämer[406] uses the sentence to support his affirmation: "Es ist darum nur folgerichtig, dass auch der ἀρχή-Begriff selbst nicht an das reine Wesen des Absoluten heranreicht, weil es nur sekundär, gleichsam "fur uns", von seiner Weltgerichtetheit her fixiert". Our place ch.3, lines 59 ff. does not provide any support for the idea that cause is not in the essence of the One, but only that the causality of the One is *our* experience, not coming to the One from elsewhere.

Our ability to say such a thing about the One as being cause, is presumably achieved by the method of analogy (via analogiae), which has the advantage of not ascribing to the One a characteristic or property that stems from Being (and the Ideas), but assigns to the One something that transcends Being[407].

A question remains. How, after having rejected rest in regard to the One did it occur to Plotinus to proceed with lecturing on *cause* (αἴτιον)? The only reason I can think of is the following. Being 'at rest' was due to Stasis and was different from Stasis. He explicitly portrayed Stasis as a cause. Thus the notion of cause was on his mind. What was caused , 'at rest', was denied to the One as an attribute. So cause also came to Plotinus' mind to be denied to the One as an attribute (συμβεβηκός). This line of argument is aptly connected with the implicit message that there is no property coming to the One. This means that the whole passage about cause is, as it were, an appendix or afterthought to the rejection of rest. In turn this implies that the link with the foregoing argument about rest cannot be a *causal* one. Therefore, ἐπεὶ καί does not signify 'for', as every translator has it, but it must be assumed to be the special type of ἐπεί, which means 'incidentally'. This meaning is rather frequent in Plotinus, but seldom observed. It is does not occur in *LP* (Pape refers to Plato, *Parm. 128 E).* We shall have the opportunity to come back to this issue[408]. The meaning 'incidentally', or 'by the way', 'now we think about this point we may bring in a cognate subject to talk about', fits in elegantly with the appendix-character of the argument about cause. Even καί (ἐπεὶ *καί*) gets thus its due: now we have talked about the possibility of something coming as an attribute to the One, it is so that even (*καί*) calling the One a cause is not ascribing an attribute coming to it (ἐπεὶ καί τὸ αἴτιον λέγειν οὐ κατηγορεῖν συμβεβηκός τι αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ἡμῖν κτλ.).

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[406] Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 344, 345, see his note 559.

[407] For the relation of analogy and cause, see the Excursus in ch.5. The same holds for the via eminentiae, which similarly does not assign to the One any predicate of Being, but a characteristic which transcends Being (see the same Excursus).

Following this rather tolerant attitude when it comes to speaking about the One, Plotinus proceeds in a stricter fashion (ἀκριβῶς λέγοντα) by not only denying 'at rest' and Rest to the One, but even forbidding to ascribe any attribute or qualification whatsoever to the One, a) ἐκείνου[409], b) ὄντος[410] (echoing ἐκείνου ὄντος). Plotinus apparently elaborates the ἄρρητον of the One (see about ἄρρητον p.183), a traditional theme, in a very consistent manner, we may venture to say, right to the very end. He gradually allows less and less (at first we were permitted to speak about the One λέγειν, κατηγορεῖν, with restrictions, now even to say ἐκείνου and ὄντος is forbidden). The only thing we can do about this, is to revolve (περιθέοντες) around the One, so to speak, and to have the desire to explain (ἑρμηνεύειν ἐθέλειν[411]) our feelings, our own experiences (τὰ αὑτῶν πάθη[412]), sometimes encircling the One, sometimes very closely (ὁτὲ μὲν ἐγγύς *sc.* περιθέοντες), sometimes falling back because of the difficulties in connection (περὶ αὐτό) with the One. It is always on our part that we describe our experiences (ἑρμηνεύειν a very important word, for it replaces and corrects ἀκριβῶς λέγοντα), we cannot say that the One *is* (*i.e. ontical predicate*) according to what we feel and experience in its vicinity. Perhaps also our notion of the One as cause is the ἑρμηνεύειν of our experience. We shall deal with the problem of experiencing the meeting with the One in a separate enquiry (see Part III 'The mystical Union'). We shall meet later on an arsenal of terms to express the inexpressable. In other contexts Plotinus does not seem averse to ascribe a legion of positive terms to the One, but according to

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[408] W. Pape, *Griechisch-Deutsch Handwörterbuch* I, 909 'übrigens'. See below 211.

[409] Line 51: 'Εκείνου - Ever since the *Timaeus* (50 A) it is a *locus communis* to deny the possibility of naming in regard to certain substances. In the *Timaeus* Plato feels the urge to reject any pronominal reference to precosmic 'matter' (I use the quotation - marks because of the fact that 'matter' first appears in Aristotle and may therefore be regarded as an anachronism. However, it is a useful term for our purposes). Plato rejects any use of terms such as τοῦτο and τόδε in connection with the precosmic matter of the *hypodoche*. In the *Theaetetus* (157 B) we have the same type of rejection of pronominal indication. In Plotinus pronominal reference to the One is excluded (ἐκείνου), be it for other reasons than in Plato, although there is a common ground. It is a Greek way of thinking that what *is*, can be named and conversely that what can be named, *is*. We meet this notion as early as in Parmenides (fr.2,7,8 οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τὸ γὲ μὴ ἐὸν *οὔτε φράσαις*). Both the precosmic matter of the receptacle in the *Timaeus* and the One in Plotinus cannot claim to be. So the One is denied any name, except the name 'One', with the proviso that this name is a case of an emergency, it is only a startingpoint to be transcended and negated, as we may learn from 32[V,5],6,32 (ἀποφήσῃ). There is an undeniable need to indicate the One (σημαίνειν ἑαυτοῖς θέλοντες... ὡς δυνάμεθα *ib*, line 25). Notice the restriction: "if we name the One, we are actually unable to do this, if we do not, we are even less able to speak about it". The correlation between being and naming is brought forward in *e.g.* some passages of the *Sophist*, 237 B - 238 A, 244 B ff. Needless to say that the whole question of the One's being unspeakable is recurrent in the *Parmenides* and in Middle Platonism. We shall discuss this subject later in more detail, see 183 ff.

[410] 9[VI,9],3,49-54. 'Επεὶ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον λέγειν οὐ κατηγορεῖν ἐστι συμβεβηκός τι αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ἡμῖν, ὅτι ἔχομέν τι παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου ὄντος ἐν αὐτῷ. δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τὸ ἐκείνου μηδὲ *ὄντως* λέγειν ἀκριβῶς λέγοντα. The reading ὄντως λέγειν accepted by HS, has the disadvantage of turning the couple μηδὲ τό ἐκείνου μηδὲ ὄντως λέγειν ἀκριβῶς into a stylistically unbalanced piece of information, not very easy to render. This emerges from Harder's translation (*I a,* 181), which has an artificial ring to it: "Jazelbst 'jenes' dürften wir es in eigentlichen Sinne (ὄντως!) nicht nennen, wenn wir genau reden wollen". The employment of μηδὲ / μηδὲ implies two objects in the text to go with λέγειν. If this is so, ὄντως is unsuitable because it cannot possibly function as an object. Moreover, the repetition of the adverb (ὄντως just before ἀκριβῶς) raises doubts. Thus a repetition of the ὄντος from the previous line seems more likely. It is plausible to think that under the influence of ἀκριβῶς, ὄντος was changed into ὄντως (ὄντος being somewhat akward when read superficially as may have occurred in copying the text). Also from a philosophical point of view, much can be said for the reading ὄντος. The climax, as it were, of the whole paragraph is the conclusion that not even ὄντος is applicable to the One. Our view is completely in line with the one

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Puelma (*Vorschläge*, 91) defends. But questions remain. How *e.g.* did Ficinus tackle the problem?

Ficinus felt unable to make something of his reading ὄντως but he had to find some solution for his Latin translation. He failed to see the repetition of ὄντος in his reading. So he had the intuition that ὄντως could be adapted to the preceding τὸ ἐκείνου in order to get τὸ τοῦτο, which we actually find in the rasura of A 3, his own hand. He only (?) needed to leave out the ς of ὄντως, to change ον into ου, the ω into ο, to add a τ, and by doing so, he got an exact parallel of τὸ ἐκείνου. But now given the new situation, he had to adapt ἐκείνου, because there was no obvious reason for τοῦτο being in the genitive, nor for ἐκείνου. He therefore changed ἐκείνου into ἐκεῖνο, perhaps influenced by its article. Indeed, by his own hand A 3 we find that in the rasura ἐκείνου is changed into ἐκείνο. All this appears in his translation: neque illud neque hoc dicere fas est. Ficinus did not see that ὄντως was a mistake for ὄντος. Many readers *e.g.* Bréhier, MacKenna and others, were lead astray. So Puelma cannot be sufficiently applauded for his efforts in rescuing the ὄντος of Page, which was in fact already seen by Ritter, who read *τὸ* ὄντος (see App. HS; ὄντος is now accepted by them in the *editio minor*, P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer, *Plotini Opera Omnia*, III, Oxford 1982, 276. Igal, *de Uno*, pleaded as early as in 1971 in favour of ὄντος, eight years before Puelma). Presumably, the original text had *τὸ* ὄντος, just as *τὸ* ἐκείνου. This would more easily explain Ficinus' τοῦτο, although he had to double τό. In Plotinus we constantly find 'Selbstzitate' provided with the article, see Puelma, *o.c.*, 91, n.5. Puelma adduces 9[VI,9],6,52; 9[VI,9],10,12 may also be considered an instructive example (τὸ 'ὄφθεν'). 9[VI,9],5,41 is less apposite (οὐχ οὕτω 'ἓν' λέγοντες και 'ἀμερές' being an example without article). Relevant to the question of the article in *τὸ* ὄντος is 9[VI,9],6,52, where the article is given to each self-quotation: οὐδὲ δεῖ *τὸ* 'συνεῖναι' προσάπτειν... ἀλλὰ καὶ *τὸ* 'νοεῖν' καὶ *τὸ* 'συνεῖναι' ἀφαιρεῖν.

[411] Line 53 - ἐθέλειν seems to be an infinitive under the influence of δεῖ in line 51.

[412] Line 41 - πάθη: it may be that this word has an awful sound in the ears of the Stoics, but we may point to the fact that elsewhere it is often devoid of even the slightest negative overtone, see Plato, *Rep.*, 514 A 1 and 518 B 2. There the word refers to a positive event, the liberation of the prisoner in the Cave and his blessed life in the realm of the Ideas, cf. Meijer, *Nieuw Licht in Plato's Grot ?*, 66, n.13. In ch.3 it denotes our (ultimately positive) experiences when approaching the One.

Schwyzer[413] it is always in connection with things inferior to it. In his account of the terminological negativity in connection with the One, Schwyzer[414] curiously leaves out what we just heard about the One and cause, although to my view this is an eminent specimen of his remarkable methods in ascribing 'aspects' to the One and of his singular approach of description.

Appendix on 9[VI,9],3,10-14

> .. .. Καθ' ἑαυτὴν δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅταν ἰδεῖν ἐθέλῃ μόνην ὁρῶσα τῷ συνεῖναι καὶ ἓν οὖσα τῷ ἓν εἶναι αὐτῷ οὐκ οἴεταί πω ἔχειν ὃ ζητεῖ, ὅτι τοῦ νοουμένου μὴ ἕτερόν ἐστιν."Ὅμως δὴ χρὴ οὕτω ποιεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ τὸ ἓν φιλοσοφήσειν.

This passage marks a specific stage on the road of the soul to the One. Which stage this is depends on the question of what συνεῖναι, mentioned in line 11, means. The interpretation of this word will be our main task in this Appendix. Several problems arise forming a chain:

I. The meaning of συνεῖναι.
II. 1) What does καθ' ἑαυτὴν mean?
  2) Are we to read μόνον with Henry-Schwyzer (*o.c.*, 310) or rather μόνην with Harder and all mss. except Q? Should we connect the words we choose with ἰδεῖν (Harder) or with ὁρῶσα (Henry-Schwyzer, *o.c.*, 310, n.11)?
  3) What is the object of ἰδεῖν (τὸ ἓν with Henry-Schwyzer and Harder)?
  4) Is there any reasonable interpretation of τῷ ἓν εἶναι αὐτῷ?

First some translations. Harder renders the passage as follows (*o.c.*, 177):

"Entschliesst sich aber die Seele sich rein für sich allein (καθ' ἑαυτὴν...μόνην) auf die Schau des Einen zu richten, dann sieht sie es indem sie mit ihm zusammen und Eines ist, und eben weil sie dann mit ihm Eines ist, glaubt sie noch gar nicht zu haben was sie sucht, weil sie von dem Gegenstand ihres Denkens selber nicht unterschieden ist."

Bréhier (*o.c.*, 174):

"Mais lorsque l'âme veut voir par elle même, comme elle voit seulement en s'unissant à son objet, comme elle est une grâce à cette union avec lui, elle ne croit pas tenir encore ce qu'elle cherche parce qu'elle n'est pas différente de l'objet de sa pensée".

MacKenna (*o.c.*, 616):

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[413] Schwyzer, *RE*, 562.
[414] Schwyzer, *RE*, 560.

"Soul must see in its own way; this is by coalescence, unification, but in seeking thus to know the Unity it is prevented by that very unification from recognizing that it has found: it cannot distinguish itself from the object of the intuition".

Armstrong (*o.c.*, 311): "But when the soul wants to see by itself, seeing only by being with it and being one by being one with it, it does not think it yet has what it seeks, because it is not different from what is being thought".

It is not difficult to see that each of these translations has its own problems as to the meaning of συνεῖναι. According to Harder συνεῖναι means 'bei ihm sein' (Armstrong has the same). This 'ihm' must designate the One. Bréhier is less clear on the subject: 'en s'unissant à son objet.' He does not commit himself as far as an object is concerned, which seems wise, since Plotinus himself did not either. MacKenna's 'coalescence' gives συνεῖναι too strong a meaning, although it remains unclear. We may wonder why from Harder's viewpoint this being together with the One and being one (συνεῖναι καὶ ἓν οὖσα) does not satisfy the demands of the soul. When the soul is unified with the One, it is blessed with the greatest gift it can ever wish or hope for. How could it be dissatisfied with this most promising situation? Nevertheless, the soul does not think it has reached its ultimate goal, as appears from soul's own words.

I am unable to see why, according to the interpretation above, the soul is so pessimistic after being unified with the One: "it does not think it yet has what it seeks". The objections of the soul make no sense to me. That is why I wonder if there really is any mention of unification of the kind, and this amounts to wondering what συνεῖναι actually means.

Previously in the argument we read of the νοῦς that it is with itself, 2,42 συνεῖναι καὶ ἑαυτῷ. In the development of the argument the very same νοῦς gives way to ψυχή, presumably because of the ascent to the One, which is usually ascribed to ψυχή cf. 7,15, where mounting to the One is described in parallel terms and where the soul is the active, mounting entity. We shall be hearing more about this (cf. p. 220). So it would not be surprising if Plotinus had συνεῖναι of the νοῦς in mind, when using the word συνεῖναι in our passage. Looking more closely at συνεῖναι in 9[VI,9] I am struck by the fact that it is continually connected with (ἑ)αυτῷ, cf. 5,27 σύνεστιν ἑαυτῷ, and 6,49 συνὸν αὑτῷ (in this case it is the One that is with itself). Passages enough to suggest that συνεῖναι can be interpreted as *being with itself*. It is very important to observe the interesting occurrence of the same thought in as early a treatise as 5[V,9],7,9 where we learn about the *mind* that it is: συνὼν αὑτῷ ἀεί. We do not think that the fact that συνεῖναι is also applied to the being together of the sensible with the intelligible stands in the way of our interpretation here[415].

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[415] See Schroeder, *Sunousia*, 691. I would criticise his tendency to render συνεῖναι in the case of the soul's being together with mind by 'being dependent on', where an *orientation towards* the mind is concerned, which is different from and in fact, precisely the opposite of

Ἓν οὖσα, following in the text, can elegantly be understood as an effect of being with itself, the soul being totally one with itself. I even feel inclined to assume that the soul thinks of itself as what was said earlier of the νοῦς. And Plotinus may indeed have had something similar in mind where the soul was concerned. In order to ascertain this we must follow the argument starting from 3,1. Being is difficult to know, let alone the One, since it is neither being nor form. Where being is concerned, the soul can rest on forms (εἴδεσιν line 3), but as far the soul's mounting to the One is concerned, this is impossible. In this case it has to become ἀνείδεον and gets into serious trouble. Unable to find any point of support to rest on, it falls back, as it does in the *Phaedrus*, but in Plotinus it is relieved to find some repose. Then comes our passage. The soul wishes to see and look on its own, *i.e.* according to its own psychic structure.

I do not adhere to the opinion that the *direct* objective of the soul is to see the One. Nothing is said about this in the immediate vicinity of the text. It is the *manner* of seeing that is important. Plotinus promptly explains what that kind of seeing implies: ὁρῶσα τῷ συνεῖναι. It is a form of seeing by means of συνεῖναι. On the basis of what we have seen of συνεῖναι, we can say that this form operates by being together with itself. In this communion with itself the soul is one: ἓν οὖσα. It is pure and enclosed within itself to fathom its deepest nature.

This interpretation gives μόνην a new splendour. According to the current view it does not mean much, because 'alone' is of little to no significance where the seeing of the One is concerned. In my view it can be understood as a meaningful clarification of seeing, whether connected with ἰδεῖν or with ὁρῶσα. In any case it implies a manner of seeing of the soul, when it is completely with itself and completely occupied with itself. When μόνην is connected with ὁρῶσα it emphasizes seeing according to itself as much as it does when taken with ἰδεῖν. Since the usual interpretation did not provide any proper meaning, Henry and Schwyzer were tempted to prefer the reading of ms. Q ac. μόνον providing a limitation of seeing: only seeing by being together. That makes sense in the argument just as it does in our interpretation: seeing is being with itself, but my explanation also makes sense of μόνην. The advantage is that it stresses the isolation of the soul when plunging into itself. The problem of choosing between μόνην or μόνον is of minor importance in my argument. We now begin to

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being dependent. I would advance a similar objection to his translation and interpretation of the orientation of the mind towards the Good in 43[VI,2],11,36,37 (*ib*, 681), when he renders τὴν σφόδρα αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν συνουσίαν by 'the strong being in dependence which it has with and toward the Good". On p.690 he writes "that we have seen that συνουσία is a term which applies both to the continuity of the sensible with the intelligible and the intelligible with the sensible". I have not been able to detect the continuity of the intelligible with the sensible in his article. This orientation downwards might not have been of interest within the system. So I find only a 'continuity' from soul to mind and from mind to the SE.

see what this stage of the road to the One consists of: the being with itself of the soul and the being one by way of this activity (ἓν οὖσα). This cannot be considered the final stage on the road to the One, however, for ultimately the soul does not go beyond its own boundaries. It is therefore quite understandable that Plotinus should add that the soul does not mean to be where it wishes to be by the 'very' being with itself (τῷ ἓν εἶναι *αὐτῷ*).

Some observations should now be made with regard to τῷ ἓν εἶναι αὐτῷ. It is generally supposed that this means that the soul is one with the One (αὐτῷ = the One). Yet this seems highly implausible not only because of the significance we have just established for συνεῖναι, but also because of the circumstance that the One was mentioned too long ago and is too remote to be anaphorically referred to by αὐτῷ. Only two possible interpretations remain:

A) We should read: 'by being one with itself (compare ἓν οὖσα). The fact that αὐτῷ is not feminine does not need to be a serious objection - it occurs elsewhere, albeit in a somewhat looser connection, 7,20 *ἀγνοήσαντα*. However, a conjecture, αὐτῇ, will do as well.

B) It is possible to interpret αὐτῷ as a strengthening of τῷ ἓν εἶναι: by the *very* being one. I adopt this possibility with all due caution, because being one is thus emphasized again, which fits in with the text, although admittedly the alterations in the case of A) do not modify the argument.

I shall now return to the main course of my argument. By being purely one the soul cannot think it has reached its ultimate goal. Why not? Because it is still in itself, it is not yet different from the object of its thought, *i.e.* itself (not the One). The soul is on the right track (ὅμως δὴ χρὴ οὕτως ποιεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ τοῦ Ἓν φιλοσοφήσειν). To transcend any kind of form completely is a necessary step in going to the One, but the soul is still with itself. Plotinus expressly says that it is occupied with philosophising *about* the One (περὶ τοῦ Ἕν), which is undoubtedly to be viewed as an essential stage, but does not involve being in *communion* with the One. The road to the One is described more fully in 7,10 ff. (see below p.222). The soul must first be ἀνείδεος, next it must ἀγνοεῖν πάντα and finally it has to ἀγνοεῖν itself. Being with itself is not specifically mentioned here, but is certainly implied in being ἀνείδεος and ἀγνοεῖν τὰ πάντα. Abandoning itself is the ultimate stage before reaching the One (ἐν τῇ θεᾷ ἐκεινοῦ). The soul has attained the final stage (see what is said in the Analysis about the future tense of line 22, θεατὴν ἐσόμενον). After having been united with the One and been together with the One (κἀκείνῳ συγγενόμενον) and having communicated (ὁμιλήσαντα) sufficiently with the One, the soul returns to transmit the message to others. Indeed, ὁμιλήσαντα is the highest stage for the soul to reach. Once one is there, there is nothing higher to search for. My conclusion that συνεῖναι in our passage cannot possibly be this highest form of ὁμιλία, seems surely justified. As to συνεῖναι and ἓν εἶναι as it stands in 3,12 the soul realizes that it is not yet fully satisfied.

As a result of what has been said, we can answer the original questions as follows:

I. συνεῖναι is being with itself, being absorbed in itself.

II. 1) καθ' ἑαυτὴν means operating according to its own psychic nature, *i.e.* the *absolute* functioning of the soul, which can be compared to becoming ἀνείδεος to the utmost and to ἀγνοεῖν τὰ πάντα.

2) μόνην, irrespective of being connected with ἰδεῖν or ὁρῶσα, stresses the retirement of the soul into itself, no longer orientating itself to forms (εἴδη). The reading μόνον also allows an apposite meaning in the context: the confinement to being with itself of the soul.

3) The direct object of ἰδεῖν cannot possibly be regarded as the One and the question is if there is any object at all. It is the manner of seeing that matters: seeing through being itself.

4) Τῷ ἓν εἶναι αὐτῷ is liable to different explanations. The only one to reject is the interpretation of this expression as referring to the One. With great caution I adopt the explanation according to which τῷ ἓν εἶναι αὐτῷ is strengthened by αὐτῷ (very) although the possibility to interpret αὐτῷ as αὐτῷ (notice Plotinus' use of αὐτοῦ *etc.* in stead of ἑαυτοῦ/αὐτοῦ *etc.*, see *LP* 280) or to change it into αὐτῷ or even αὐτῇ remains: to be one with itself.

CHAPTER FOUR

4, 1-7 Ἐπιστήμη is insufficient for reaching the One

Translation

> And the difficulty arises mostly, because understanding of it does not go along with knowledge or thinking, as with the other intelligible things, but by way of a presence superior to knowledge. But the soul experiences its falling away from being one, and it is not entirely one, when it gets knowledge of something. For knowledge is reason and reason is many. So the soul transgresses its oneness, falling into number and multiplicity.

The ἀπορίαι mentioned at the end of ch.3 seem to concentrate on one major problem (Γίνεται *δὲ* ἡ ἀπορία *μάλιστα* κτλ.), which already was commented on, earlier, *viz.* the epistemological transcendence of the One. On the one hand we are obliged to speak and think about the One[416], on the other we have no means to do so[417]. Although we have forms of knowledge at our disposal, ἐπιστήμη and νόησις, the range of these terms is confined to the intelligible world. How do we manage to get the means that are suitable to understand or come into contact with the One, which is above all[418] intelligible forms or levels? It is already problematical how *to put* the question of knowledge of the One. What term can enable us to phrase the question as such? Plotinus employs the term σύνεσις. As a term it is more neutral than both ἐπιστήμη and νόησις. It covers a wide field. It is employed in connection with the level of our world, and with both the soul and the mind. It is also used in those cases where the knowledge or understanding as such is rather vague from a systematical point of view. So Plotinus applies the word σύνεσις when he assumes some understanding, like when people are angry when they observe improper behaviour (28[IV,4],28,25 ff.) or when they are overcome by fear on the basis of doxa (26[III,6],4,15). The intellectual moment in these emotional situations is called σύνεσις. Also when the object or the situation of the understanding is not exactly known σύνεσις emerges. Thus we find it in 38[VI,7],31,33 that the soul, coming near to the Beloved, feels that it has become really being and it has really gained understanding (about its situation) and it percieves that it is near to what is has so long been seeking. Σύνεσις is the word that Plotinus uses to denote the acquisition of a true understanding of its situation, which as such is not yet mapped out. The same type of understanding returns in 38[VI,7],33,27, when it is pictured that the lover becomes aware of the fact that he must change to that which is more formless. The realisation is captured in the words: εἰ δὲ σύνεσιν λάβοι. Σύνεσις is often accompanied by συναίσθησις[419], again because of its neutral, widely ranging and 'innocent' meaning. Αἴσθησις is limited to the sensible world, ἐπιστήμη and νόησις are confined to the realm of intelligible knowledge. We shall meet both terms again[420].

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[416] See on this question 181.

[417] In connection with lines 1 and 2 HS refer to *Parmenides* 142 A 2,3: Οὐδ᾽ ἄρα ὄνομα ἐστιν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ αἴσθησις οὐδὲ δόξα. Plato's point of view is only a startingpoint in Plotinus, who wishes to overcome the lack of modes of knowledge. Only ἐπιστήμη is mentioned in 9[V,9],4,1,2.

[418] Plotinus says: our understanding of the One is not by way of ἐπιστήμη and νόησις as with the *other* intelligible things: ὥσπερ τὰ *ἄλλα* νοητά. The word ἄλλα does not necessarily include the One (cf. my note 118 of Part I), which would have made it a νοητόν.

Soul's position intermediate between the intelligible world and the sensible domain results in its possession of two forms of knowledge, *viz.* τύποι (stamps) originating in the sensible and τύποι (patterns) stemming from the intelligible level, as it is said in 49[V,3],2,25: ἀλλὰ ὧν δέχεται τύπων ἐφ' ἑκάτερα τὴν *σύνεσιν* ἴσχει ("It has understanding of the impressions which it receives from both sides"). We are entitled to consider σύνεσις as the embracing term, embracing both: it is obviously not as fixed as ἐπιστήμη *etc.* Consequently σύνεσις is a suitable term to overcome any embarrassing lack of terms to pose questions, so we find it in 45[III,7],1,15 and perhaps still more appropriate in 45[III,7],7,3: Τίς γὰρ ἂν σύνεσις γένοιτο μὴ ἐφαπτομένοις; "For what understanding could there be (*sc.* of eternity) if we were not in contact with it ?"

So here in 9[VI,9],ch.4 σύνεσις is aptly applied when asking about the understanding of the inexpressible[421]. The only mode of 'knowing' the One turns out to be παρουσία - presence (line 3). This word, that may be known from Plato's doctrine of Ideas, to denote the immanence of the Ideas in particulars, is - as usual in Plotinus - elevated to a higher status: it is now connected with knowing the One, which is far above the status of an Idea in Plotinus. Plotinus points to the fact that ἐπιστήμη falls short and is of a lower level (παρουσίαν ἐπιστήμης κρείττονα line 3), but whose presence is it that Plotinus has in mind? Is it the presence of the One close to its admirer or the presence of the admirer close to the One[422]? I am inclined to think that it is the presence of the admirer close to the One that is concerned. Compare line 41 of ch.2, where παρεῖναι no doubt denotes the presence of the mind in the vicinity of the Good (παρεῖναι τῷ ἀγαθῷ). Plotinus carries on by presenting a phrase (lines 3-5) in which it is said that when in search for ἐπιστήμη, soul endures (πάσχει) a distance, a separation (ἀπόστασις) from being one. The fact that this sentence can only have soul as its subject, lends some weight to my surmise that the παρουσία concerns the presence of the soul in the vicinity of the One and not vice versa. This causes us to extend our previous observations concerning παρουσία. Here it has nothing to do with transposition from the Ideas to the One. For in this case the subject of being present must be the One as also happens in the case of the Ideas. However, it appears that here the subject of the presence is the soul at the end of its difficult passage to the One. Thus we have here an example of a characteristically Plotinian use of this word.

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[419] And of συνουσία, see Schroeder, *Synousia*, 682 ff. We also find σύνεσις αὐτοῦ: knowledge or understanding of itself said of mind and γνῶσις αὐτοῦ with a similar meaning (cf. 38[VI,7], 41,17-27) denied to the SE. In similar contexts it often has to do with the level of mind. However, in the framework of our account of the presence in ch.3, the combination with συναίσθησις (see above 45) is of minor importance. It is the wide use and neutrality of σύνεσις that interests us here.

[420] See below 165 ff.

[421] I do not think that Bussanich, *The One*, 116 is right to state that σύνεσις refers to hyper-intellection in 9[VI,9],3. Although this does not miss the mark it is the neutrality of the term that should be advanced. Again, it does not refer to soul's intimate proximity to the One in 38[VI,7],33,27-29. In the latter passage it means that the soul gains a better insight in its situation and what to do.

[422] See on παρουσία above 105.

Notice the peculiar phraseology of τοῦ ἓν εἶναι ἀπόστασιν. Soul loses its original unity, and it gets separated from its being one (alluding to the process of ch.3, line 11 ?), when it gets involved in gathering knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of something (ὅταν ἐπιστήμην του λαμβάνῃ[423]).

According to Plotinus ἐπιστήμη must be considered as λόγος and λόγος is plural (πολλά). Thus the soul will fall prey to number (ἀριθμός) and plurality (πλῆθος). Number and plurality could refer to the verbal side of logos (λόγος προφορικός[424]), uttered in speech. Logos, in the context, is difficult to interpret for the only thing we know for sure, is that here logos is plural. The argument is extremely brief, which makes clear that the contemporary or rather the supposed reader is assumed to consent immediately when hearing the argument. Later on (in ch.5) we will be informed about logos or Logos and then I shall provide a succinct description of Plotinian epistemology. In advance we may point out that two levels of knowledge, and thus of logos, are to be distinguished in a twopartite soul: the lower soul, the ψυχὴ λογικὴ and a part of the soul which may be called the νοῦς. The mind has the patterns of being in it, *e.g.* of righteousness and by λογισμός the reasoning soul seeks to find out if this or that is righteous (49[V,3],2,10 ff.). How could the soul reason if it were not in the possession of patterns or paradeigmata of the things it wishes to know? The soul also has the capacity to orientate towards the mind-part and by dialectics even to go even to the first classes[425]. I assume that it is also the case in ch.4.

I took it for granted that the supposed reader is to know more about logos. What *we* know in addition, is that logos not only denotes the spoken word or the word inasmuch it is thought in the mind, but that it can also mean reasoning (λογισμός) or even faculty of reasoning (λογιστικόν)[426]. Indeed, if it means reasoning it amounts to ἐπιστήμη as described in 9[VI,9],10,5, where we learn how ἐπιστήμη is attained. It is by ἀπόδειξις (argument), πίστις (proof) and διαλογισμός that ἐπιστήμη is produced. Argument and proof are the instruments by means of which reasoning works and proceeds. It is not unlikely that Plotinus had the same thing in mind in ch.4. For soul also has the capacity to orientate towards its mind-part, and by means of dialectics to even go to the first classes, which are previous to the One. When one seeks to have knowledge about something (τι), Plotinus in this context assumes that one intends to reach the One. Consequently it must be the superior type of ἐπιστήμη that is meant to figure in the text. Be it as it may, if ἐπιστήμη is λόγος and διαλογισμός there will be number and plurality (πολλά). On the basis of this consideration I reject Harder's translation for λόγος: 'Begriff', which is rather unfortunate because of its lack of plurality, and I am ready to accept the one of Cilento - processo logico -, Bréhier's 'discours', MacKenna's 'taking account of', which, however, is a little bit too vague, and Armstrong's 'rational process'.

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[423] Λαμβάνειν is often connected with terms of knowledge, *cp.* εἰ δὲ σύνεσιν λάβοι above145.

[424] On λόγος προφορικός and λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, Graeser, *The Stoics*, 35, cf. my n.485.

[425] See below 167.

[426] Cf. Blumenthal, *Psychology*, 102, 105.

Being occupied in gathering, the soul passes beyond τὸ ἕν, παρέρχεται τὸ ἕν, *i.e.* it exceeds its own unity (line 6). I do not think that τὸ ἕν is meant to denote the Superone[427]. For these words obviously refer to τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόστασιν (line 4 and see line 8). The fact that we are told that soul falls back to number and plurality cannot succesfully be brought in harmony with the possibility that soul should miss the One (παρέρχεται). No, the soul passes beyond its own being one, its unity (παρέρχεται τὸ ἕν *sc.* εἶναι as Harder saw) when mastering ἐπιστήμη. This unification of the soul is known to us from ch.3[428].

4, 7-16 One has to go beyond ἐπιστήμη. Beauty a stage on the road to the One

Translation

> Well then, one must run up above knowledge and in no way depart from being one, but one must depart from knowledge and the things which are known and from every other thing, even from the vision of beauty. For every beautiful thing is posterior to it and originates in it, as all the light of day comes from the sun. Therefore, he (Plato) says, it cannot be spoken or written, but we speak about it and write sending out to it and wakening from reasonings to vision, as if we were showing the way to someone who wishes to see something. For teaching goes as far as the road and the journey, but the vision is the task at last of he who has the firm wish to see.

According to Plotinus' further teaching, you have to run (δραμεῖν line 8) beyond and above the intellectual forms of knowledge and in no way may you exceed soul's being one, its unity (again Plotinus speaks of τὸ ἓν εἶναι which may support our interpretation of παρέρχεται τὸ ἕν). Ἀπόστασιν (*i.e.* separation) from unity is bad, but - in contrast - there is a legitimate reversed form of ἀπόστασις, separation from intellectual knowledge, from the objects of this type of knowledge, from every other thing, even (καὶ) from the sight of beauty (καὶ καλοῦ θεάματος). The Greek admits of another translation: "ja von jedem andern Gegenstand der Schau wenn er auch schön sein mag "(Harder / Cilento /

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[427] Armstrong translates τὸ ἓν by the One.

[428] See above 139 ff.

Armstrong "and from every other, even beautiful, object of vision"; Bréhier is correct, and MacKenna wrong) which I would not prefer. Harder's interpretation is probably based on the notion that the beautiful is part of all other rejectable knowledge and has no specific status. This may be doubted. When you leave all forms of knowledge behind, you will meet beauty (cf. line 18 ἀγλαία), the radiance and the glory of the One, which is like a cloud around the One, or rather, like the rays of daylight surrounding the sun[429]. Plotinus provides proof by indicating that every form or kind of beauty (πᾶν καλόν) is posterior to the One and originating in the One. The neutrum sing. πᾶν καλόν refers to καλοῦ θεάματος (line10) and provides support for my surmise that καλοῦ must be viewed upon as a substantive and not as an adjective, as Harder *c.s.* has it. Thus after all efforts to go beyond intellectual knowledge before reaching the One, there is Beauty, which from time to time is supposed to have a special status[430].

At this point (line 11 ff.) Plotinus quotes Plato (φησιν[431]): therefore (because it goes beyond the usual ways of knowing) one cannot speak or write about the communication with the One (οὐδὲ ῥητὸν οὐδὲ γραπτόν). Obviously, Plotinus is referring his readers to Plato. The quotation comes from the famous *Seventh Letter*, that is a source of trouble as regards its authenticity. If we may accept its originality, which Plotinus obviously did without question, we are referred by Plotinus to an exclamation of Plato about people who adhere to the opinion that writing about and systematical treatment of the theory of Ideas is feasible. Plato vehemently denies that the Ideas may be object of speech. It is only συνουσία that may teach you something about them; in 341 C D he confirms that the Ideas are not fit to be written or spoken about. It is peculiar that he ranges writing before speaking: γραφέντα ἢ λεχθέντα, γραπτέα.... ῥητά. However, this can be explained by the fact that it is writing about the Ideas that is the issue of his argument. The whole tenor of Plato's thought is quietly reduced to a single formula by Plotinus, with a 'rational' order: speaking before writing (οὐδὲ ῥητὸν οὐδὲ γραπτόν). Consequently, in spite of φησιν, we are not dealing with a literal and direct quotation (rightly observed by Harder *I b*, 472, HS print only οὐδὲ ῥητόν as a direct quotation), but rather with a Neoplatonic formula that has a characteristic Neoplatonic transposition[432]. What Plato said about the Ideas is transmitted to the One, a continuously recurrent feature of Neoplatonic industry.

Well then, if there is nothing to say and nothing to write about the ultimate contact with the One, why speak and write at all? Plotinus is very open about this matter. We speak and write to bring our pupils on the right track and we send them off to the One. We may recall[433] his early attitude towards pupils or students: he only wished to speak, but now he writes too, with the same objective. Plotinus, being aware of a teacher's limitations, confines teaching to merely sending off the curious reader or pupil and showing the way to go. One has to awaken the pupil from the λόγοι (reasonings) about being and to send him on the way which leads to the vision of the One[434] as you may show a tourist the way to his destination: you cannot do more for him, it is up to him to do the walking (= the seeing[435]). Perhaps you can make him confident that walking is not beyond his possibilities and capacities. We have here a problem of communication quite common in Platonism. Dialectics, originally an activity taking place between two (or more) partners of conversation, has to become '*mono*lectics'. Ultimately there is no help for us, nor can we experience the unification with the One together. In the end we are on our own: μόνος in the presence of a μόνος, as Plotinus himself stresses repeatedly and very impressingly in the final words of 9[VI,9)[436]. Already Plato himself or the writer of the *Seventh Letter* (in any case a Platonist) was fully aware of the problem of monolectics. In *Seventh Letter* (341 C) it is a purely individual experience of being illuminated that is illustrated by the sudden appearance of the light in one' s mind as the end of dialectics (evoked in him by a longterm συνουσία).

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[429] For the sun as paradigma Ferwerda, *Images*, 46 ff.

[430] See note 96.

[431] See about φησιν 227.

[432] This place is one of the very few quotations of the *Seventh Letter* Schwyzer in *RE*, 551 is willing to recognise, but not without doubt. He rejects 38[VI,7],36,4 and is in doubt about 17[II,6],1,43,44. In his *edition*, however, III, 449 we find the places just mentioned without any criticism. Also we find there 49[V,3],17,29.

4, 16 - 35 Failure to go to the One is one's own fault

Translation

> But if someone did not come to the vision - and the soul did not get an understanding of the splendour there and it has not experienced or does not have in itself as it were the erotic feeling of a lover who came to rest in whom he loves, on the basis of seeing, since he had received the true light that has gone round his whole soul - through having become nearer, but having ascended while still burdened from behind, what was an impediment for the vision, and not yet having ascended alone, but having something that keeps him from it, or not yet being unified into one - for it is not absent from anyone and absent from all, so that in its presence it is not present except for those who are able to receive it, so that they adjust to it and as it were touch it and contact it by the likeness and the potency akin to that what comes from it; when he was just as he was when he

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[433] See above 17.

[434] HS refer to Plato *Republic* 532 E 3. There we are told about dialectics as a road to the goal, the place where we find rest and the ultimate goal of our voyage. However, there is a great difference: in Plotinus the road is the last stage before the goal, then, it is the ultimate vision and unification with the SE that is waiting for you to be realised.

[435] Ἡ δὲ θεὰ αὐτοῦ ἔργον ἤδη τοῦ ἰδεῖν βεβουλημένου: "but the vision is the task of someone who has already resolved to see (Armstrong's translation)". I do think that ἤδη must be connected with the foregoing, meaning 'in the end': 'in the end it is the task of someone *etc.*'; βεβουλημένου as a part. *perf.* I would prefer to render by: 'who has the firm wish to' referring to the βουλομένῳ of line 14.

[436] See below 290.

came from it, he is at last able to see it as its nature is to be seen- if he is not yet there, but if he is outside because of these impediments or through lack of reasoning which educates him as a teacher, and gives him proof about it, (then) because of those impediments he must blame himself and he must try to be alone by renouncing all things, but in regard to what he disbelieves because he is deficient in reasoning, he should consider the following.

Now we come across a phrase of almost gigantic proportions lines 16-32), built up the following pattern: "If one is not able to see the spectacle of the One (line 16)...............one must consider *oneself* to be the cause of one's failure (32)". A large *parenthesis* or digression concerning the presence of the One is splitting up the sentence (16 -32) into pieces.

I There are several possible factors that may prevent the soul from reaching the goal of the journey, the vision of the One:

a) soul has not acquired any knowledge (τις σύνεσις) of the splendour (ἀγλαία[437]) in the surroundings of the One. Incidentally we should realize that the observations made earlier[438]regarding the denotation of σύνεσις turn out to be correct: here it is even used in connection with splendour, which demonstrates best the neutrality of the term[439].

b) such a person has not experienced nor possesses as it were the erotic feeling of a lover who, by seeing his beloved, has come to rest in his beloved one or One (ἀναπαυσαμένου). In my view the erotic comparison is made to show that soul has not reached his goal, *i.e.* the postorgastic feeling of satisfaction (ἀναπαυσαμένου is an aorist and not a present tense, see below more details about erotics and the One[440]) of the lover[441], who had received (reading δεξάμενος or δεξαμένου see HS, for other constructions Harder, Armstrong, Igal) the light that is true and has illuminated (περιφωτίσαν[442]) his soul.

c) Such a person has not received the light from the truth of the One , but he was in a motion going upwards while still burdened by a load as it were behind (ὀπισθοβαρής: passions ?[443]) which as such hampers[444] his efforts to see

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[437] Line 18: ἀγλαία - A poetic word, already appearing in Numenius, fr.2 (ed. des Places), see on μόνος Appendix ad line 22, below 157 ff.

[438] See above 144 ff.

[439] So I disagree with Bussanich, *The One*, 126 who interprets σύνεσις as 'intimate awareness'.

[440] See below 261, 262.

[441] Already in 1[I,6],7,12 ff. Plotinus dwells in strongly erotic terms on the feelings of the one who has seen the Good.

[442] The mss have περιφωτίσας, but the very word seems normally to be used of the source of light, so Harder suggested to alter it in περιφωτίσαν with φῶς without having gone so far as actually changing it in his text. HS 2 and Armstrong accepted, however, Harder's proposal. Armstrong curiously enough takes over the change but translates as if he had περιφωτίσας in the Greek.

[443] I consider the phrase δεξάμενος - περιφωτίσαν as concerning the lover. After this phrase Plotinus continues to speak about the failing soul (διά. *etc.*); ἀναβεβηκέναι must be parallel to γεγονέναι and dependent on διά. I do not see how HS can mean that ἀναβεβηκέναι can be dependent on ὀπισθοβαρής: "ἀναβεβηκέναι regitur ab

(his head being not in the right position burdened by that load as it were). He is not alone (μόνος), *i.e.* not without any hampering lower influences but he has something in between that embarrasses him and separates (διεῖργον) him from the One. Alternatively, Plotinus advances the possibility that soul has not unified itself (εἰς ἓν συναχθείς[445]), alluding perhaps to the process of line 11 of ch.3. It may be that this is not really an alternative but only the other side of the same coin.

II The *parenthesis* (line 24 οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄπεστιν ------- line 30 θεατὸς εἶναι). The One is supposed to be not absent from anything (everything participates in the One[446]) as well as absent from everything (the One transcends everything), a Neoplatonic paradox, repeated in the following words expressing that he is present and absent at once. I would put a comma after παρεῖναι, implying: but present only for those who possess the capacity and who are prepared to receive the One. This passage sheds new light on the vexed question of whose presence is involved. It makes undoubtedly clear that not only the soul must be present to the One, but also the One to the soul. And now all we said about transposition and translation from the Ideas to the One turns out to be valuable. Presence is presence both of the One and the soul as well. I do not think that my interpretation of line 4 of ch.4 is incorrect. Presence there means presence of the soul, near to the One. We shall see later on that the problem of presence is the ultimate problem of how the One and the soul are in communication (see p.310). Here I must indicate the fact that Plotinus does not use literally the word 'soul', he speaks constantly about a person, the τις of line 17 who,

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ὀπισθοβαρής". The same construction already in Igal, *de Uno*, 281, who says: "est enim infinitivus consecutionis", which leads him to the following rendering: "etiam tum nimium deorsum gravatus quam ut possit sursum stare" (cf. later on, line 22,23 οὐ μόνος ἀναβεβηκώς). Moreover I know of no such awkward construction of an infinitivus consecutionis in Plotinus, who, admittedly, does not eschew strange constructions. Besides there is no such tone of 'nimium .. ut' in ὀπισθοβαρής that would enable us to translate 'too burdened behind to be in ascent'. Igal's idea is to take ὀπισθοβαρής ὑπάρχων parallel with πεφωτίσας. In that case the verb ἀναβεβηκέναι must inevitably depend on ὀπισθοβαρής. Igal's interpretation makes the visitor incapable of 'sursum stare". But ἀναβεβηκέναι does not mean 'sursum stare' (see 9[VI,9],3,21) and this has nothing to do with the context. Harder suggests the word to come from the *Oracula Chaldaica*, ed. J.Kroll, 60, see now Majercik, *The Chaldean Oracles*, 198, who favours - against scholars who declared the fragment (Majercik, *o.c.*, 155) in which ὀπισθοβαρής appears, inauthentic precisely because of its occurrence here in Plotinus -, its possible authenticity. She translates (*o.c.*, 107) "weighted from behind". In the oracle it is said of passion. This might give us a clue to its meaning in Plotinus, 9[VI,9],4.

[444] Plotinus writes: ἃ ἐμπόδια ἦν τῇ θέᾳ (which *was* a hampering for the vision). The imperfect tense refers to the fact that Plotinus starts from the failure as already expressed in the imperfecta of the beginning of the sentence: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἦλθε, ... ἔσχεν .

[445] I disagree with Bussanich, *The One*, 136 that εἰς ἓν συναχθείς denotes the goal of the mystical ascent. It is a preliminary stage, be it a very important one.

[446] For participation and the One, see Appendix III of ch.1 Or must we think of the ἐπιστροφή ?

however, during the evolution of the text immersed into a well prepared person (properly translating: person*s*). Nevertheless, it is, of course, the soul that is the vehicle of being a person. Consequently (ὥστε), such a well prepared person (after ὥστε we solely find the simplex) is able to accommodate himself (to the One) and, so to speak, to touch the One and to make contact with the One by means of his similarity *i.e.* (καί explicativum) the potency in himself, a potency akin to 'what (comes) from it (the One)'. It is necessary to quote the Greek part of the sentence: ὥστε παρὼν μὴ παρεῖναι ἀλλ' ἢ τοῖς δέχεσθαι δυναμένοις καὶ παρεσκευασμένοις, ὥστε ἐναρμόσαι καὶ οἷον ἐφάψασθαι καὶ θίγειν (, ?) ὁμοιότητι (· Harder, O'Daly) καὶ τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμει συγγενεῖ τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ (· HS, Bussanich) ὅταν οὕτως ἔχῃ, ὡς εἶχεν, ὅτε ἦλθεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἤδη δύναται ἰδεῖν ὡς πέφυκεν ἐκεῖνος θεατὸς εἶναι - κτλ. Harder, O'Daly [447] , and Armstrong, *Translation* have a high point after ὁμοιότητι and take τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμει συγγενεῖ τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ within the ὅταν-clause. I do not agree with this punctuation: there is no plausible reason why we should disconnect the two dative-constructions ὁμοιότητι and τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμει συγγενεῖ τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. If we let the sentence remain a whole, without disrupting it by punctuation, we could connect ὁμοιότητι καὶ τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμει συγγενεῖ τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ with παρεσκευασμένοις, but I would favour a connection with ἐναρμόσαι[448] καὶ οἷον ἐφάψασθαι καὶ θίγειν[449], in which case the sentence expresses in what manner we can touch the One: it is our likeness with the One, our being unified as far as possible, that enables us to touch the One. We have a power δύναμις in us, which is akin to what comes from Him (τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ *δυνάμει* συγγενεῖ τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ).

Igal[450] interpretes this δύναμις as virtue: the soul can make contact by its similarity with the One and its virtue. Now 'virtue' is an incorrect rendering of δύναμις, which can only signify 'power' or 'potency'. Well then, this virtue (or rather, potency) is not akin to the One as Igal holds (..virtutem, cognatam *sc.* Ei) but it is akin to what comes from the One or rather to the potency of what recently came from the One as descendant (συγγενεῖ τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ). This potency must be the capacity of the person who was still near enough to the One to be able to see the One. So Plotinus declares that a person has a likeness and a potency in himself enabling him to return to his original situation of his birth from the One, an issue that will be paid attention to several times later on[451].

Another expression highly problematical is συγγενεῖ τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ in the phrase τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμει συγγενεῖ *τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ*. Some interpreters believe that ἐν αὐτῷ in τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμει refers to the One and explain συγγενεῖ τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ as

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[447] O'Daly, *Presence*,166, see also his note 32.
[448] According to Schwyzer, *Rhein. Mus. 90*, 235 note 28, is ἐναρμόσαι intransitive.
[449] On ἐφάψασθαι καὶ θίγειν as term of contact with the One see 304 ff.
[450] Igal, *De Uno*, 282
[451] See below 154, 155.

'akin to its subsequent' (O'Daly[452]). In this case it is the power of the One that enables us to touch the One. Within its context, however, this interpretation is not very likely, for in the entire previous section it is the efforts and the use of soul's capacities (*e.g.* to unify itself) that dominate the scene, not the activity of the One itself. Igal comes up with the suggestion to take τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ (*sc*. εἶναι, for which addition see Schwyzer, *RE*, 520) causal: "quia ab Eo procedit" (consent of HS). We have to include the subsequent ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, which is extremely likely to be parallel with τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. So τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμει συγγενεῖ τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ must signify that we are able to make contact with the One by the power in us that is akin to what originates from Him (τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμει *συγγενεῖ τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ*). This interpretation offers the advantage of giving the dative with συγγενής that usually accompanies expressions of similarity or congeniality its due, so that we do not, like Igal (and HS), have to assume a dativus causae we would not expect[453].

In my view, considerably different from other's (especially of Igal), all this means that the person's soul can restore itself to its former status and potency when it descended from the One. Indeed, this must be Plotinus' train of thought; elsewhere a direct descent from the One does seem to belong to Plotinus' usual teaching (we have already met with the *genesis* of the mind in 7[V,4]), although this concerns the *genesis* of the universal mind, not the particular mind as seems to be the issue here, see Part III 'The mystical Union[454]). Proof that something of the kind was in Plotinus' mind here, too, is provided by the following sentence. When the person is in the state he had[455] when he came from the One (ὅταν οὕτως ἔχῃ, ὡς εἶχεν, ὅτε ἦλθεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ)- in my summary, when he is 'as much one and unified as possible' - then it is, at last (ἤδη[456]), that he is able to see how the nature of the One can be fit to be seen (ὡς πέφυκεν ἐκεῖνος θεατὸς εἶναι), a very important phrase, to which we shall return later on, see p.155).

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[452] O'Daly, *Presence*,166, see also his note 32. The difficult expression in line 27 τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμει provoked a wide range of solutions. Along with Igal we reject Harder's / Cilento's assumption of ἐν αὐτῷ referring to the One. In this case we must accept a very odd inversion: we would suddenly see Plotinus turning to the power of the One to be connected with its offspring, whereas it is only reasonable that both ὁμοιότητι and δυνάμει be ascribed to the 'well prepared souls' from line 25, 26, being in fact a well prepared singular soul, as appears from what follows. I can understand those (Müller) who want to alter ἐν αὐτῷ into the plural ἐν αὐτοῖς because of the fact that in lines 25,26 the well prepared are put in a general plural, but as I just said, the whole line of thought goes on in the singular (*cf*. line 29 ἔχῃ, δύναται), see also Igal, 285. So there is no need of a plural ἐν αὐτοῖς. The fact that Plotinus uses ἐν αὐτῷ instead of a simple αὐτοῦ may be due to his wish to stress that this power remains hidden in the soul as long as soul does not return to its former state.

[453] I do not think that to bring in ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλο τῷ μετ' αὐτὸ νοητόν 7[V,4], 2,11,12 can provide any help, for this passage, where, indeed, τῷ μετ' αὐτό - parallel to τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ - by most interpreters is causally explained 'as by being posterior to the One', admits of quite a different interpretation as in my view is rightly suggested by Bussanich, *The One*, 17: "and it is also an intelligible object to something else, that which comes after it", see above note 174.

[454] See below 315.

[455] Line 27: ἔχῃ - Igal holds that the subject of ἔχῃ must be δύναμις, not the soul nor the τις (as Harder will have it, pace HS). As I have a different interpretation, I would prefer as a subject: τις, not the one from line 17 as HS assume, but the person who remains after the plural of the well prepared persons from lines 25,26, must be meant. I hold it that two 'persons' are involved in the gigantic phrase. The τις which is the subject of the whole sentence (except the parenthesis) and who has failed to see the One (*cf*. also line 30), and the well prepared one of the parenthesis who is at last able to see the One as it in its nature is

The correct interpretation of the complex ὅταν οὕτως ἔχῃ, ὡς εἶχεν, ὅτε ἦλθεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ is highly important because it is a key-phrase in the debate Bussanich[457] opened with Trouillard, O'Daly *et alii*, who hold that the prenoetic intellect and the hypernoetic intellect can be put in one box or are identical as O'Daly affirms[458]. Indeed, in 49[V,3],10,42 ff. Plotinus describes the stage of the mind is in immediately after leaving the One and before the stage of thinking. At that stage the mind does not yet pluralise by thinking, "it still has touching (θίξις) and contact (ἐπαφή, *sc.* with the One), without speaking and thinking, prethinking, since the mind has not yet come into existence, and that which touches (the One) does not think" (ἢ οὐκ ἔσται νόησις αὐτοῦ· ἀλλὰ θίξις καὶ οἷον ἐπαφὴ μόνον ἄρρητος καὶ ἀνόητος *προνοοῦσα οὔπω* νοῦ γεγονότος καὶ τοῦ θιγγάνοντος οὐ νοοῦντος). From Plotinus' point of view in 49[V,3],10,42 ff. it is not his aim to picture this status as ideal, his only purpose is to sketch the process that leads to thinking. Nevertheless, we get a very good insight in what he supposed the prenoetic stage to be. So the *prenoetic* or inchoate intellect is mind when just originated in the One and not yet thinking. The *hypernoetic* intellect is the returning mind, going back in mystical ascent to the One. Bussanich is an ardent opponent of this identification or conflation of the two statusses, for in his opinion the soul totally submerges into the One in the mystical vision. According to Bussanich, the prenoetic status and the hypernoetic status cannot coincide, because the hypernoetic mind is not the same as the mind that has only just left the One, but it is totally absorbed in the One.

A phrase as our sentence ὅταν οὕτως ἔχῃ, ὡς εἶχεν, ὅτε ἦλθεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, especially ὡς εἶχεν "as he *was* " troubles Bussanich, for it suggests temporal stages of the mind and implies indeed a prenoetic stage rather than a hypernoetic stage. Although I agree with his notion of a total submergence of the soul into

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(lines 26-29). I wonder why Igal, *de Uno*, 285 and HS (ad line 28: ἔχῃ subjectum τις cf. line 17; Harder's position is not quite clear) assume that Plotinus should have returned already *after* line 27 to the τις of line 17. In Igal's case, it might be the view of the shortness of the digression that makes him hold this position. I think that the range of the parenthesis is well circumscribed by HS (contra Igal, who confines it to lines 24-26, making in an artifical and unnatural way the infinitivi ἐναρμόσαι καὶ οἷον ἐφάψασθαι καὶ θίγειν dependent on the rather distant and for dependency of these words inappropriate μήπω εἰς ἓν συναχθείς).

[456] I cannot understand why anyone could translate this word by 'already' (Armstrong, better Harder, "dann erst", Igal, *de Uno*, 283 quite correctly: "iam, sed non ante, *tunc demum*), for it is at last, after all these preparations, which are described and prescribed in the long sentence that the soul is able to touch the One.

[457] See for this debate Bussanich, *The One*, 231 ff.

[458] O'Daly, *Presence*, 166.

the One (see Part III, 'The mystical Union"[459]), I cannot go along with Bussanich's interpretation[460] of ἔχῃ, although his translation of the sentence: ὅταν οὕτως ἔχῃ, ὡς εἶχεν, ὅτε ἦλθεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ into: "when someone is when he was when he came from him", is correct. As to the phrase, ὡς εἶχεν ("as he was") Bussanich takes it as conveying "the intimate *ontological proximity* to the One". In Greek, however, ὡς εἶχεν as an adverb with ἔχειν would rather indicate a situation than an ontological status (εἶναι). So we must maintain that with the phrase ὅταν οὕτως ἔχῃ, ὡς εἶχεν, ὅτε ἦλθεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ Plotinus refers to the pre-noetic stage of the mind, which is not the same as the last stage, the stage of the soul's total union with the One, *but only shows how far the soul must unify itself*, in order to be ever prepared for the ultimate coinciding with the One. One must never forget that for Plotinus' readers and probably for Plotinus himself all this was hot news, for it was the first time in the *Enneads* that he so elaborately went into the problems of the mystical ascent. The last stage of identification (which identification is rightly defended by Bussanich) is not yet portrayed. Hence the remarkable phrase: ὡς πέφυκεν ἐκεῖνος θεατὸς εἶναι. Returning to the status one once had when going out of the One, one is capable of seeing the One as it in its nature is to be seen. The great adventure is yet to come (this we find in later chapters of 9[VI,9]). Most of the texts concerning the inchoate mind form part of later treatises[461], as we saw in 49[V,3],10,42 ff. where Plotinus describes the stage of the mind immediately after leaving the One, but does not aim to idealize this situation. So readers of 9[VI, 9] can hardly be assumed to have been aware of what readers of later treatises may be acquainted with. But even from a later point of view identification of the inchoate stage and the last stage of unification with the One should be a mystification.

III After the digression we return from the person whose soul was prepared to receive the One to the τις of line 17 whose soul was not yet there (εἰ οὖν μήπω ἐστιν ἐκεῖ: ἐκεῖ meaning in the vicinity of the One, cf. ἐκεῖ in τῆς ἐκεῖ ἀγλαίας). There may be several reasons for his deficiency and his absence from the One:

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[459] See below 307 ff.

[460] Bussanich, *The One*, 235.

[461] In connection with the issue of the inchoate mind there is a formidable list of places to quote (see Bussanich' survey and discussion, *The One*, 231 ff.). Favourite and primary places are 38[VI,7],16,13ff. and 30[III,8],8,32-35, where this process of inchoation of the mind is described in rather sad terms. Mind had better not wished to enroll itself ('Αλλὰ ἀρξάμενος ὡς ἓν οὐχ ὡς ἤρξατο ἔμεινεν, ἀλλ' ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν πολὺς γενόμενος, οἷον βεβαρημένος καὶ ἐξείλιξεν αὕτον πάντα ἔχειν θέλων - *ὡς βέλτιον ἦν αὐτῷ μὴ ἐθελῆσαι τοῦτο*, δεύτερον γὰρ ἐγένετο). However, Plotinus is fully aware that this process concerns the universal mind and not the individual (*ib.*, 41 Καὶ ἄλλως δὲ ὁ νοῦς οὐχ *ἑνὸς τινος* νοῦς, ἀλλὰ καὶ *πᾶς* on contextual grounds καὶ here seems to mean 'just', not 'also'). So this is a less appropriate passage to present as evidence concerning the ascent as dealt with in ch.4 of 9[VI,9]. This does not alter the fact that also the particular mind must have experienced such a status when coming from the One, whether during its birth or during the mystical vision, see Part III, 'The mystical Union", 319.

a) a reason in the visitor himself: διὰ ταῦτα which means that he is hampered by his burden or his not being μόνος.

b) or his lack of a λόγος (reasoning[462]) that can lead him like a teacher (τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦντος λόγου) providing him with a convincing argument (πίστις ![463]).

It is for reasons a) or b) that, according to Plotinus, the visitor has himself to blame. One should notice that b) seems rather inconsequent, for it cannot be taken as one's own fault that one has no teaching λόγος unless Plotinus means that one now has if one reads 9[VI,9]. Be this as it may, his task is now to separate himself from everything else and to return to splendid isolation to the degree of being μόνος. If even then he has no confidence for being deficient in his reasonings (ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐλλείπων[464]), his considerations must adopt the following line, *i.e.* what is offered in ch.5. This seems a rather peculiar transition to the following chapter and a rather loose one as well.

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[462] We may base this meaning of λόγος on ch.4, line 13, where we are encouraged to awaken the soul from reasonings to vision (ἀνεγείροντες ἐκ τῶν *λόγων* ἐπὶ τὴν θέαν).

[463] Πίστις in Plotinus, sometimes means 'proof' (see 9[VI,9],10,6); it goes far beyond Plato's πίστις in the Line of the *Republic*.

[464] This combination of the Greek words has been introduced by MacKenna.

Appendix on μόνος (see line 22)

In *Entretiens V*, in the paper 'Numenius and Ammonius' by Dodds a very useful treatment of μόνος is provided (16-18) in which a comparison is made with Numenius' use of this word in combination with itself (μόνος μόνῳ) which turns out to be a formula, as in Numenius' fr.2 (ed. des Places, Leeman fr. 11): ὁμιλῆσαι τῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνον μόνῳ (where it is said that in this way we must meet the Good) with several places in the *Enneads*,1[I,6,]7,8; 38[VI,7],34,7 and 9[VI,9],11,50. Before Dodds, Peterson dedicated an article to what he calles the μόνος πρὸς μόνον-formula: 'Μόνος πρὸς μόνον-Formel bei Plotin', Philologus 88 (1933), 30 ff. See also Atkinson, *Ennead V 1*, 131 and 132.

In normal Greek, ever since Homer μόνος μόνῳ denotes a private conversation (already in *Symposion* 217 B). *Peterson*: 'persönlich', 'privat', 'vertraulich', 'intime' (Peterson, 35). It always means the exclusion of other persons. There are lots of examples, collected by Peterson (34, 35, see also Dodds, 17). In Thessalus the formula comes closer to what the formula meant in Plotinus. Thessalus of Tralles, in a letter to Claudius, mentions his wish to speak with a Godhead (see Peterson, 36). In Egypt, he finally succeeded in persuading a priest to organize a private meeting with a God (Asclepius = Imhotep). Even the priest is asked to withdraw, something he reluctantly did. So Thessalus' wish to meet and to speak to the Godhead in private has been fulfilled (εἰ μόνῳ πρὸς μόνον ὁμιλεῖν ἐπιτρέψειεν). It is not vision as much as the conversation that is aimed at (against Dodds). This is the first time we come across the formula in a religious context. Numenius is the second case which we shall return to later on. In Plotinus, too, we find a religious atmosphere, in which the words μόνος μόνῳ emerge, 1[I,6],7,9 (notice: chronologically his first treatise). Here Plotinus adduces a comparison with people attending sacred rituals in the nude. They stripp off all clothes, which is, spiritually, also the obligation of those who wish to see Beauty as such (or the Supreme Entity, which is called in this chapter the Good (line 1): the notion One is lacking in Plotinus 1[I,6], see p.27). We have to stripp off all we have put on during our descent into this world. It is only then that we, with our pure self (μόνῳ αὐτῷ), are able to see the pure God (αὐτὸ[465] μόνον). So not only we, but also the Divinity itself is μόνος, which is explained as εἰλικρινές, ἁπλοῦν and καθαρόν (εἰλικρινές and καθαρόν originating in the *Symposion* 211 E 1). The notion of a private meeting is conspicuously present. Peterson (32) claims to see here the dominancy of a metaphysical aspect: "Absonderung und Verbundenheit". The predicate 'metaphysical' as distinct from 'mystical' is not a very happy one, at least in the sense Peterson attaches to it. For the passage is as much mystical as the other passages are in Plotinus. Dodds, too, speaks of 'metaphysical' and in the case of 9[VI,9],11,50, even of magic "by the inspired addition of φυγή (μόνον πρὸς μόνον)"; but what precisely this new metaphysical (or magic) meaning happens to be, he does not say (see Dodds, 17). Anyhow, in 1[I,6],7 it is the mystical meeting of the soul with the SE itself that is portrayed. The combination μόνος μόνῳ here has a special feature, the word μόνος strengthens the notion αὐτός which in Plotinus is the focus of human (and in this case also: divine) being[466].

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[465] The God (masculine) is continued with the neuter (αὐτὸ μόνον) because of the quotation from the *Symposion* which is in the neuter: εἰλικρινές, ἁπλοῦν and καθαρόν.

We find a fundamental breakthrough in that the contents of μόνος in the formula is completely modified. Instead of the exclusion of people μόνος indicates the absence of burden or hampering factors on the side of the soul, and the pureness on the side of the Godhead. The αὐτός of the ascendent is 'naked', stripped off of all spiritual clothes which could hamper the meeting and the vision. Elsewhere this is elaborated in other ways, it is a running motive. The God is found after the ascendent has passed all that is alien to the God (παρελθὼν ἐν τῇ ἀναβάσει πᾶν ὅσον ἀλλότριον τοῦ θεοῦ 1[I,6],7,9), so that he sees the God as such: εἰλικρινές, ἁπλοῦν and καθαρόν. The notion of (private) conversation vanishes, whereas the notion of vision, elsewhere unification, becomes more and more predominant. In 38[VI,7],34,7 the soul is in such a condition of nudity (the running motive I referred to: ἀλλὰ δεῖ μήτε κακὸν μήτε αὖ ἀγαθὸν (!) (a kind of polair expression) μηδὲν ἄλλο πρόχειρον ἔχειν), having stripped off even its form (ἀποτίθεται πᾶσαν ἣν ἔχει μορφήν), that soul is able to receive the One (ἵνα δέξηται μόνη μόνον). The notion of private meeting is not absent, but it entirely has been modified in comparison to the 'normal Greek usage'. It is now complete and absolute unification that is produced, in which both partners melt into eachother, when suddenly the One appears in the receiving soul. "They are no longer two but both are one. You could not distinguish between them, as long as the One is present in the soul": μεταξὺ γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἔτι δύο, ἀλλ' ἓν ἄμφω. οὐ γὰρ ἂν διακρίναις ἔτι ἕως πάρεστι (see Part III, 'The mystical Union', 308). The soul does not even notice its presence in the body, nor does it call itself with an other name: man, animal, being, all: ...οὔτε σώματος ἔτι αἰσθάνεται, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῷ. οὔτε ἑαυτὴν ἄλλο τι λέγει, οὐκ ἄνθρωπον, οὐκ ζῷον, οὐκ ὄν, οὐδὲ πᾶν. Οὐδὲ πᾶν is rather curious but explicable if we regard it as a comprehensive, all embracing term[467]. It may be obvious that we gain a lot by considering separately both the μόνος-character of the soul and the μόνος-character of the SE. In 38[VI,7],34,7 the character of the God is not elaborated, unlike that of the soul that is broadly characterized by a multitude of prescriptions for its behaviour in order to reach the stage of being. In 9[VI,9],11,50 it is the being alone of both the SE and the soul that is understood in the phrase: φυγὴ μόνου πρὸς μόνον. After everything said in 9[VI,9] it is easily seen what the μόνος-character of both must be. I fail to see what magic (Dodds) can be found here. I do realise that it is again a private meeting involving a complete unification that is meant (see later on p. 290). To be more specific, it is the idea of going to, the ascending to (πρός) such a meeting of the pure soul with the pure SE that is concerned. Peterson (34), in his account of 9[VI,9],11,50 puts it rather melodramatically (and wrongly, for 9[VI,9] is not the end of the *Enneads*, as was intended by Plotinus himself; it was in fact only the ninth treatise, but was elevated to a higher status by making it the final treatise giving by the editor Porphyrius): "Dass die Enneaden mit der μόνος πρὸς μόνον-Formel schliessen hat etwas wie einen symbolischen Sinn. Die Formel fasst die Mystik und die Metaphysik Plotins zusammen. Übersetzbar is der Ausdruck aber eigentlich nicht, denn was besagt letzthin eine Übertragung wie die von Kiefer: "eine Flucht des einzig Einen zum einzig Einen?" One should treat this sentence more soberly. It refers to the ascent of the 'naked' soul-visitor to the pure SE. It is the preposition πρός that colours the 'Formel'. In 1[I,6],7,8 and 38[VI,7],34,7 we meet the expression in a direct combination without preposition. Then, it concerns the private meeting. In 9[VI,9],11,50 (with the preposition) it indicates the ascent to such a private meeting. In 10[V,1],6 it emerges again with the preposition, where it refers to praying to the God, invoking him when confronted with a difficult philosophical problem (following the example of the *Timaeus* 27 C and 48 D[468], but with Stoic influence[469]). We have to reach out by stretching our souls towards the God enabling us to pray alone to him alone (εὔχεσθαι .... δυναμένους μόνους πρὸς μόνον). The preposition does not mean much here. It is not the mystical meeting with the SE that is meant (see Part III, 'the mystical Union, p.323). According to Peterson, the formula "kann sich präpositional intentionaliseren" (33): in this case we have to do with a more metaphysical "Betrachtungsweise" (10[V,1],6), whereas elsewhere it should be regarded in a more mystical way. However, in all the occurrences of the formula, with or without the preposition (with the exception of 10[V,1],6), Plotinus' main concern is to give expression to a mystical private encounter. Only in 9[VI,9],11,50 the notion of ascent is more dominant, perhaps because he used the word φυγή. To separate a more metaphysical aspect from a mystical one is of no use: there is only mystical union and coalescence.

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[466] See below 160.
[467] See below 317.

The circumstance that scholars unsufficiently realise that in Plotinus the new way of using the formula has to do with the conditions of both the visiting soul and the visited God or One, makes that texts such as 9[VI,9],4 tend to escape notice in the context of the 'monology' in Plotinus. In 9[VI,9,],4 the μόνος-character of the visiting soul is underlined (lines 22 and 33), whereas the μόνος-character of the God or even the word in regard to the God is absent.

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[468] See Dodds, *Numenius*, 18, who quotes from Plotinus also 8[IV,9],4,6 and 31[V,8],9,13.

[469] Peterson (31) points to the Stoic interpretation of the stretching out of the hands as stretching out of the soul.

Nevertheless it reveals the same character in regard to the visitor as we have found in 1[I,6],7 and 38[VI,7],34,7 (stripping off any hampering factor). So we have the half of the formula, which is more than the single word μόνος would indicate, since within the framework of the visit the 'aloneness' of the God is implied. It is no wonder that this aloneness is not brought forward, for in 9[VI,9] the identification of the One is under discussion. Elsewhere we come across passages where the μόνος-character of the One is brought forward, without mentioning the μόνος-character of the visitor; it may even be that in those contexts the idea of a visiting soul is absent[470]. Nevertheless, one should always be on the alert when encountering the word μόνος in Plotinus: there is always the possibility that it means more than simply 'only'.

We noticed a tendency of the formula to lose its character of conversation. Up till Thessalus' letter, it is speaking that is dominant in the meeting. In Numenius, too (fr.2 des Places, fr.11 Leeman) a religious athmoshere is found, but the notion of speaking has disappeared in ὁμιλῆσαι μόνῳ μόνον. The meaning is no longer 'speaking with a person in private', but rather 'meeting' or 'vision' (δεδορκώς, κατεῖδε). In Numenius, for the first time in history, as far as I can see, the focus on the purity, the alone-ness of both (μόνος) the visiting soul and the visited God as well, comes to the fore. Μόνος is already used in the metaphorical scene of the lonely ship that is waited for: μόνην. It is a ship of the ἐπακτρίδες, pirate ships or fishing boats. In the metaphor this is a prelude to the character of the God's surroundings. As far as the God is concerned the μόνος-character, is described as follows. There is no man, no animal, no body, big nor small, but an unspeakable, unexplainable, divine solitude, where the abode and the splendour (ἀγλαία !) of the God are to be found. The loneliness of the God is made a predicate of the God himself, although it is mainly elaborated in the description of the surroundings but μόνος is echoed in ἔρημος. It is the first time in history that the meeting consists not in a conversation but in a vision, and we may add that not only the God's loneliness is brought forward, but also the μόνος-character of the visitor: ἀπελθόντα πόρρω ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν (ὁμιλῆσαι τῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνῳ *μόνον*). The visiting soul has to turn away from the sensible world. This feature must be assumed to have influenced Plotinus. This μόνος -character of the visiting soul is repeatedly expressed precisely by its turning away from the sensibilia. This motive is found in 9[VI,9],3,16-19:... οὔτε *πόρρω* δεῖ γενέσθαι τῶν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα εἰς τὰ ἔσχατα τῶν πάντων πεσόντα, ἀλλ' ἱέμενον εἰς τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαναγαγεῖν ἑαυτὸν *ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν* ἐσχάτων, *etc*. According to Numenius, this has to be brought into effect by letting go of the sensibilia and by exercising the mathemata, *i.e.* by studying numbers (fr.2,20 ff.). Plotinus has methods of his own analogous to those of Numenius, but lacking the mathematical texture. We already met the casting off of all form in 38[VI,7],34,3: ἀποτίθεται πᾶσαν ἣν ἔχει μορφήν, culminating in the unification of the soul. I may refer, too, to 9[VI,9],4,23 ἢ μήπω εἰς ἓν συναχθείς and to 9[VI,9],3,11 in my interpretation (see note 445 and p. 139 ff.). It is highly probable that the deliberate intention of Numenius to portray in the beautiful fr. 2 the philosophical meeting of the spiritually lonely soul and the lonely Good, with the new, accommodated use of μόνος in regard to both, must have had its impact in the sensitive soul of Plotinus. We are told by Porphyrius that Plotinus was a thorough reader of Numenius, whom he read in college (as we know already[471]). Plotinus was even accused of plagiarising Numenius. Dodds (17) on the one hand tries to defend him against this charge, but on the other hand he concedes that indeed Plotinus has borrowed many expressions and thoughts. He indicates several possible references to Numenius in Plotinus. Dodds perceives an echo (perhaps an unconscious one) of the description of the loneliness of the Good (ἔνθα μήτε τις ἄνθρωπος μήτε τι ζῷον ἕτερον μηδὲ σῶμα μέγα μηδὲ σμικρόν) in Plotinus, 38[VI,34],7,17 where we already have met the same series of words: σῶμα, ἄνθρωπος, ζῷον, although this could easily be a coincidence. If a reminiscence at all, we must be aware of the fact that in Numenius the series is said of the μόνος - character of the surroundings of the *God*, whereas in Plotinus it is said of the *soul* in the private meeting. Consequently, the possibility of an *unconscious* echo is greater than even Dodds is ready to assume. Dodds points not only to verbal parallels but also to parallel thoughts, which in his opinion, are far more important than trivial verbal parallels. As to fr. 2 of Numenius Dodds calls attention to ἐποχεῖσθαι 53[I,1],8,9 (in my opinion 'floating of the God on being' in the metaphor of the pirate vessel, not riding) an expression Plotinus uses several times. In Plotinus it is not clear on what the rider moves 1[I,6],3,12; 28[IV,4],27,15; 29[IV,5],6,17; 38[VI,7],5,24 (perhaps not a ship); 27[IV,3],7,17 in view of the athmosphere of the *Phaedrus*-myth, it might be a carriage. We have in 1[I,6],8,10 οἷα εἰδώλου καλοῦ ἐφ' ὕδατος ὀχεομένου ("like a beautiful reflection playing on the water" (Armstrong's translation), but in fact it is floating as if it were a ship). The rider/ the 'navigator' is always higher in rank in the transcendent world. Dodds quotes too the use of the word ἀγλαία in Numenius, fr.2, which in Plotinus appears in the context of the superb splendour in the noetic world (see 30[III,8],11,30; 31[V,8],12,7; of the sensible world only once 27[IV,3],17,21, cf. Dodds, 18) or of the radiance of Beauty in the immediate surroundings of the Good *cp.* Numenius fr.2,15 and Plotinus, 9[VI,9],4,18. Other verbal parallels are adduced by Dodds. Collectively they have some weight for him, perhaps they have more than Dodds is ready to accept. For as to the thought Numenius fr. 2 and Plotinus' monology have more in common than Dodds (or Peterson[472]) would consider acceptable. I indicated the fact that the two types μόνος, both of the soul and the Good, are already present in Numenius fr.2. In Numenius fr.2 ὁμιλῆσαι μόνῳ μόνον we find for the first time the philosophical use of μόνος in connection with the meeting of the soul and the Good; in Numenius it denotes for the first time the private meeting, (not conversation) of the soul and the Good. So the structure of the Plotinian monology is already entirely foreshadowed in Numenius fr.2. Considering all this I must disagree with Dodds, who takes the Numenian phrase ὁμιλῆσαι μόνῳ μόνον as rather "colourless and commonplace"[473]. It was not Plotinus who gave it its new significance as Dodds thinks, but Numenius already did.

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[470] See *e.g.* 38[VI,7],1,39; 38[VI,7],25,15 and 49[V,3],10,17 both with ἔρημος. Armstrong, *Translation* V, 104 points out that the quotation of *Philebus* 63 B 7,8 we find here in 49[V,3],10,17, is inappropriate. The *Philebus* speaks about the class of pleasures to be kept alone and isolated from the class of knowledge. Armstrong rightly adds: "Plotinus did not always remember or advert to the context of the Platonic phrases which come to his mind". However, in connection with the 'aloneness' and isolation of the SE we may assume that Numenius in his fr.2,16 echoes the Platonic word ἔρημος in the phrase τὸ μόνον καὶ ἔρημον (*Philebus* 63 B) and gave it another turn.

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[471] See above 6.

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[472] The differences with Plotinus are exaggerated by Peterson. He affirms (39) that "an eine wesentliche Abhängigkeit Plotins von Numenius in dieser Formulierung nicht zu denken ist". Doubt also in Atkinson, *Ennead V. 1*, 132.

[473] Atkinson, *Ennead V. 1*, 132 ("tolerably common") agrees with Dodds on this point.

CHAPTER FIVE

5,1-5 Plotinus addressing the philosophers who recognize what is beyond the corporeal

Translation

> Whoever thinks that reality is governed by chance and spontaneity and held together by bodily causes, is far removed from God and the notion of One. And our argument is not directed to these people but to those who posit another nature besides the bodies and ascend to soul.

Here we have a fresh start for all those who have failed - as the τις - in ch.4,17 and 30 to make contact with the One. It is from the properties of the soul that Plotinus now makes a new approach. Whereas in ch.4 Plotinus pointed out the shortcomings of ἐπιστήμη and νόησις as ways to reach the One, he now invites the failing visitor to go another way. To go this way, it is absolutely necessary that one acquires a right insight into what the soul really is. Those who consider the soul as something corporeal will never reach the superb goal. Plotinus starts by reproaching all those who - obviously followers of Epicurus[474] - hold that being is governed by chance and spontaneity and that it is held together by corporeal causes (factors).

As I feel it, the expression that all beings are governed by chance and spontaneity[475] (τὰ ὄντα τύχῃ καὶ τῷ αὐτομάτῳ διοικεῖσθαι) is entailing a slight oxymoron. Chance and governing mutually exclude each other. Administration by chance is no administration at all. Consequently, thinkers of that type are very far from God and the notion of the One (καὶ θεοῦ καὶ ἐννοίας ἑνός). One may wonder why the notion God is introduced at all, although we know Plotinus' fondness of the notion of God to name the Supreme Entity[476]. It seems provoked by the notion of governing the world, of administration (διοικεῖσθαι) which calls for an administrator, which in the case of the world can only be God. This is rather common Greek stock. This introduction of God fits the new, open, general approach of ch 5. As a matter of fact in Epicurus the Gods do not govern the world, they stand aside in their intercosmic lodgings. Indeed, Epicureans are far away from God and a fortiori from the notion of the One (οὗτος πόρρω ἀπελήλαται καὶ θεοῦ καὶ ἐννοίας ἑνός[477]). It must not escape notice that it is a rather broad notion of a governing God that Plotinus has in mind. It is not only the direction of what happens in the world, its scenario, but also the force that is responsible for its structure. So we find διοῖκειν employed in 28[IV,4],10,18. This power, the Soul, arranges all (*ib.*, 26 κοσμεῖ). In 9[VI,9],4,1,2 it is this form of government which is probably meant, for Plotinus speaks about corporeal causes that *hold things together* (τὰ ὄντα ...) καὶ *σωματικαῖς συνέχεσθαι αἰτίαις*, which seem to concern the structure of the world rather than events, although when as early as in treatise 3[III,1],3 Epicureans are involved, Plotinus immediately thinks and talks not only of structure but also of events and the responsibility for actions, which do not depend on a swerve of atoms but on the action of the willing soul. As to the One it can only be indirectly responsible for the structure of the world. To Plotinus himself it is not as much the highest God as the soul that governs the world (τόδε τὸ πάν), see 33[II,9],17,14,15 and 47[III,2],2,41 where διοικεῖν is used. One may say that it is the Logos that directs what happens in the world (48[III,3],5,31), which is of course also indicated by the verb διοικεῖν.

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[474] It must be the Epicureans that are attacked with the same formula in 47[III,2],1,1.

[475] line 1: τύχῃ καὶ τῷ αὐτομάτῳ - see for treatment of these notions Arist., *Phys.* 195 b 31, for a resumé 197 b 18, see also *Met.* 984 b 14 (cf. Boot, *Voorzienigheid*, 17).

[476] See above 63.

[477] Line 3: καὶ θεοῦ καὶ ἐννοίας ἑνός - Harder (*I b*, 473): "Ich glaube dass θεοῦ schon von ἐννοίας abhängt (anders die Übersetzungen von Müller, Bréhier und Cilento)". The reason why I do not accept Harder's construction which as such is absolutely possible, is that it is not so much the difficulty of knowing the Godhead, as the problem of bringing the One to mind to get a notion (ἔννοια) of it, that Plotinus intended to stress in this chapter. Compare line 40 εἰς *ἔννοιαν* ἄγοντες with commentary ad hoc.

Those Epicurean nitwits who adhere to the theory of the explanation of things by chance are not addressed by the argument Plotinus is about to develop (καὶ ὁ λόγος οὐ πρὸς τούτους, line 4), but all those who are inclined to assume next to matter or corporeality a transcendent (cf. ἀνιόντας[478]) level, who accept a psychical level with its own nature. Harder (*I b*, 472) is right in stating that Plotinus does not set the Stoics against those Epicureans; however, he does not provide an argument for this assumption. In my view there is a reason why he speaks to all those who as (Meso)Platonists are ready to accept a transcendent psychical level in its own right or who as Peripatetics can adhere to an abstract, non-material form as soul. For it is not so much a scenario ("Weltplan", Harder) that matters, but the powers behind the structure of the things in this world.

5, 5- 24 Above soul mind emerges. The status of the knowledge of the soul and that of mind

Translation

And these people must have insight into the nature of soul in other respects and especially that it comes from mind and that it is by sharing in reasoning, coming from it, that it has its virtue. Then they must grasp that mind is different from reasonings and the so-called reasoning part and that reasonings are as it were already in distance and in motion and that the forms of knowledge are principles in the soul and as such already manifest, because of the fact that mind has become and is the cause of the forms of knowledge in the soul. And seeing that mind, being as it were an object of perception, in order to be apprehendable has mounted on the soul and that its father is the noetic world, one must say that mind has a quiet and unwavering motion, having all things in it and being all things, an indiscriminated and again discriminated multitude. For it is not discriminated as the principles, which are already thought as single, nor is what is in it confused. For every principle proceeds separately, as also in the branches of knowledge although all items are in a partless whole and yet every item is separate from them. This multitude being together, the intelligible world, is what is near the First and our argument says that it necessarily is, if at least one says that also the soul is (near the One), and this ranks above the soul. However it is not the first, because it is not one and not simple, but the One, the origin of all things, is simple.

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[478] 'Ανιέναι as going up to a higher level in 3[III,1],2,4: people, who turn out later in the chapter to be partly Epicureans are accused of not being willing to ascend to the first things (not the One !, for he says τὰ πρῶτα) and to transcendent causes (τὰ ἐπέκεινα αἴτια); the same in 5[V,9],4,1. Line 5 ἀνιόντας - It is not the future tense of ἀνέρχεσθαι, but a part. praes. of ἀνιέναι cf. *LP s.v.* Harder translates: "auf die Seele zurückgreifen". But it is the notion of going upward that is most important in the context, see line 13 ἐπαναβεβηκότα where literally going upward is meant. In Homer this significance is frequent.

Those 'psychics' [479] must realise the following:

1) a) the soul stems from mind (παρὰ νοῦ), which is said in support of:

b) soul has its excellence inasmuch it has a communion (κοινωνήσασα[480]) with the λόγος which originates in mind. By λόγος Plotinus means the full contents of Ideas as they are in mind. The expression λόγος displays a similar content in 10[V,1],3,6 ff. There is also the λόγος of the soul as we shall see later in our discussion (cf. 10[V,1],3,8) as the whole of separate Ideas in the soul, which can be called λόγοι[481].

An excursus on the relations between mind and soul as regards knowledge may be a useful background for understanding lines 7-20. For it is precisely insight into this relation that enables a new approach to the problem of reaching the Superone.

Excursus on the relations of mind and soul; forms of knowledge

Soul's manner of gaining knowledge shows that a higher method of knowing must be assumed to exist on a level which in turn must be supposed to be higher than the realm of the soul. It may be well to provide the following scheme (helpful is undoubtedly Blumenthal, *Psychology*, 100 ff.):

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[479] Line 5: τούτους - The plural makes clear how much in a paradigmatical sense of οὗτος line 2 has to be understood, see also Harder, *I b*, 474.

[480] Line 7: κοινωνήσασα - a similar thought in 26[III,6],2,29-32. The virtue concerned is the excellence of soul's functioning, see Blumenthal, *Psychology*, 104, who also quotes 26[III,6],2,29-32 where Plotinus says that τὸ λογιζόμενον is virtuous when it acts in conformity with mind, we also find in 26[III,6],2,29-32 virtues as the excellent functioning of the other parts of the soul. The virtue of the entire soul would be the harmony of the excellent functioning parts, cf. 9[VI,9],1,6. Here, in 9[VI,9],5,7 it is said that the soul gets its excellence by sharing in the λόγος that comes from the mind. This 'excellent functioning of the soul' is reduced to the functioning of the soul as participating in the λόγος of the mind and this type of virtue is only found here. The *LP* does not mention the excellent functioning of the soul as such. In connection with ἀρετή and soul the *LP* (g) *e.g.* gives 19[I,2],3,21 (misprint for 31!), but there it is not soul's excellence that is involved. The other places mentioned in *LP* do not concern the excellent functioning of the soul.

[481] See Atkinson, *Ennead V. 1*, 50 who has a very good and helpful survey on λόγος.


νοῦς (εἴδη [482]) ἐπιστήμη I
λογισμός(I)
(διαλεκτική)
ψυχή (λογική[483])
εἴδη [484], τύποι, κανόνες (ἐπιστήμη II)
λογισμός (II)
τύποι⟨ ἐπιστήμη III (rather δόξα)
αἰσθητόν

This scheme not only concerns the understanding of the relations between mind and soul, but also the relation between soul and the *sensibilia*. In the mind all forms of knowledge are simultaneously present to the mind. Whatever one holds by reasoning (λογισμός) to be in the world (43[VI,2],21,32,33) or by reasoning holds to be the best in this world (43[VI,2],21,36,37), one will also find it in the mind. However, the mind has everything before reasoning (πρὸ λογισμοῦ), so that the mind may be called νοῦς λελογισμένος (43[VI,2],21,34). For the mind there is no need to go through itself ἐπεξιέναι (43[VI,2],21,31) to find knowledge, for mind has already gone through its knowledge, so that this activity is superfluous. In the mind all its knowledge is present in a unified, simultaneous manner (see 43[VI,2],21,28 ff., 5[V,9],6,1-4 and numerous other descriptions of this position). According to 43[VI,2],21,28 ff. we may consider the mind as the great, all-embracing λόγος μέγας, τέλειος, πάντας περιέχων. We have already seen that there is a λόγος of the soul, which embraces all forms in the soul. Next to this λόγος we have a λόγος within the soul which is the inner formulation of knowledge. It is the (Stoic) λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, which is expressed by the λόγος προφορικός[485]. The intellectual part of the soul (which may be called ψυχὴ λογική 5[V,9],7,1-7; λογιστικόν 9[VI,9],5,8; διανοητικόν 49[V,3],2,23; διάνοια 49[V,3],3,2; νοῦς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς 49[V,3],2,14 and 17 νοῦν γὰρ αὐτὸν φήσομεν; τὸ καθαρὸν τῆς ψυχῆς 49[V,3],3,11; and finally τὸ λογιζόμενον[486]) has methods of thinking of its own, different from the simultaneity of mind's way of thinking. The characteristic manner of the soul seems to be its reasoning, product of its δύναμις λογιζομένη, λογισμοί (λογισμός II of the scheme): soul is ἐν λογισμοῖς (49[V,3],3,14). Soul's activity is rational, discursive, conclusive thinking, the λογισμὸς λογίζεται (43[VI,2],21,36 λογισμός λογίσαιτο). These λογισμοί (II) make use of what can be brought in by the senses (τύποι of the scheme 49[V,3],3,1-4) and they try to connect these with the patterns (τύποι of the scheme) that have descended from the mind (49[V,3],2,10-15), in order to form δόξα. Λογισμός II is already found in 10[V,1],11,11-18. Whereever λογισμός is at work, it is in the realm of soul, not on the level of mind. The highest activity of the soul (λογισμός I of the scheme) is ascending to the mind (49[V,3],8,45), which is essentially dialectics, that may reach the πρῶτα γένη (20[I,3],4,14), but dialectics do not enable us to go beyond the border of mind and soul. Soul is only able to find knowledge because of the patterns of knowledge which have descended from the mind to the soul (49[V,3],3,13), the soul receives the νοῦ ἐπικείμενα ἴχνη; see also 10[V,1],11,1-9, and 49[V,3],4,16 where we are told that the soul operates by means of κανόνες, standards, which it gets from the νοῦς[487]. So it has the Ideas in a separated, unfolded and unrolled form (53[I,1],8,7) whereas in the mind the εἴδη are ὁμοῦ τὰ πάντα (53[I,1],8,8 and 5[V,9],6,1-5), not separate nor unrolled. So the soul has a double task, occupying itself with the *sensibilia* in order to get a grip on them, and ascending to mind in order to mount ultimately to the One.

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[482] (εἴδη) ὁμοῦ τὰ πάντα.

[483] Also named νοῦς τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ καθαρόν τῆς ψυχῆς, λογιστικόν, διάνοια, διανοητικόν see later on in the text.

[484] εἴδη κεχωρισμένα, ἀνειλιγμένα see 53[I,1],8,7.

[485] Plotinus is supposed to know these Stoic notions, cf. Blumenthal, *Psychology*, 107.

The forms of knowledge, too, of mind and soul are different. Real ἐπιστήμη (ἐπιστήμη I, cf. 'wisdom', see note 824) is found in the mind (5[V,9],7,4-8, cf. 31[V,8],6,8), secondary ἐπιστήμη (ἐπιστήμη II still labelled with that name 9[VI,9],5,10) has its place in the soul. Knowledge about the sensibilia ἐπιστήμη III, however, should preferably be called δόξα (5[V,9],7,3). Ἐπιστήμη at the level of the mind is precisely as the contents of the mind (πάντα) a simultaneous whole. Whenever a part of this simultaneous knowledge comes to the foreground in isolation (προχειρισθέν 8[IV,9],5,13), it is, admittedly, put in front (προτέτακται 8[IV,9],5,14), but the other parts follow (albeit unnoticed 8[IV,9],5,15). You cannot have pieces of knowledge without their connections. The whole of the knowledge entails all theorems. No part is spatially distinct (see also 5[V,9],8,5-8). Every part has its potency in the whole. In the case of the geometrist we can see everything connected with his instantaneous theorem; both what is prior and what follows by a kind of sequence is implied, without being made explicit. Plotinus frequently uses the wholeness of ἐπιστήμη to illustrate the wholeness and simultaneity of the contents of the mind, not only in 9[VI,9],5,16 but also elsewhere in the *Enneads*[488].

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[486] See 9[VI,9],5,8.
[487] See also Atkinson, *Ennead V. 1*, 229 ff.

From a chronological point of view it is striking that we find the whole doctrine not only in later treatises, but already rather elaborately in a treatise like 5. But also in 10[V,1] the complex returns[489]. The special method of mind's thinking, the simultaneous presence of its knowledge, the descent of norms and Ideas towards the logical part of the soul, soul's characteristic methods of acquiring knowledge, both about what is in the mind and what can be known by means of the patterns from the mind in the sensible world seems to be developed in a rather early stage of Plotinian thinking, in any case present as an elaborate complex before 9[VI,9]. Precisely what I brought forward on the theme of ἐπιστήμη (I,II,III=δόξα) and the wholeness of ἐπιστήμη stems from the early treatises I mentioned (5 and 8, see also 31[V,8],6,9). This is what we shall also find in ch.5 of 9[VI,9].

Back to the text

Now we are sufficiently prepared to understand our passage in ch.5. The whole tendency of the passage can be summarized as follows: There is something besides the soul, mind, which is responsible for the excellence of the soul. The activities of this rational part of the soul are already in separation and in motion (implicitly in contrast with the 'quiet motion' of mind). The Ideas in the soul have become manifest (motion) as caused by the mind. The mind must be considered as the superior of the soul and has a quiet motion of its own as a simultaneous multitude. This simultaneous multitude must be near to the First (SE). It is motion that is the pivot on which the argument that brings about the existence of the mind, hinges. We may now be prepared to follow Plotinus' argument more in detail.

Plotinus proceeds with the following sequence of thought:

a) One has to possess[490] insight in the soul and one must especially take the mind as different from the λογιστικόν[491], the reasoning part of the soul. Blumenthal[492] precisely quotes this passage as evidence for his thesis that undescended mind and λογιστικόν can in no way be identified.

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[488] See above 100.

[489] Important places are 5[V,9], ch.6, ch.7, ch.8 and 10[V,1], ch.3, ch.10 and ch.11.

[490] Line 6: κατανενοηκέναι. The perfect tense is neglected by all translators, as far as I can see. The perfect tense (resultative) means: to have acquired the understanding (of the nature of the soul) and to possess it now as a basis for the development and extension of knowledge: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λαβεῖν (aorist.).

[491] Line 8: λογιζόμενον - This word may be taken as noun rather than as a pure participle, see 26[III,6],2,31: καὶ τὸ λογιζόμενον παρὰ νοῦ.

[492] Blumenthal, *Psychology*,105.

b) Soul's methods reveal themselves in the λογισμοί, which are, as it were, already in a state of separation and motion (τοὺς λογισμοὺς ἤδη οἷον ἐν διαστάσει και κινήσει). Διάστασις means precisely the counterpart of 'spatially not distinct' from the content of the mind [493]. The term λογισμοί is rather vague for it is not easy to decide whether we have to deal with λογισμός I (towards the Ideas in the mind) or with λογισμός II, directed towards the τύποι originating in the sensible world. Those reasonings could have to do with the contents of the mind as objects or results, but they can hardly be the cause of the forms of knowledge (ἐπιστήμαι) in the soul as λόγοι for the cause of these ἐπιστήμαι is told to be the mind itself. It is said that the λογισμοί, reasonings are already as it were in distance and motion (τοὺς λογισμοὺς ἤδη οἷον ἐν διαστάσει και κινήσει). If this does not refer to the descent and emerging of the separate Ideas, which is not plausible, it must refer to the motion of thinking or reasoning itself, related to separation, whereas the motion in the mind is of a completely different quality: it is the quiet motion of line 14[494]. It is because the demonstration of the existence of an entity which has another form of thinking, quiet and unwavering, is the tenor of the whole passage, that it seems most likely that Plotinus wished only to underline the *manner* of thinking (distance and motion in contrast with the way of thinking of the mind) *not the object and aim* of this thinking of the reasoning part of the soul.

c) The person who assumes there exists a level of the soul must realize that the ἐπιστήμαι, pieces of knowledge[495], are λόγοι (the in the soul emerging Ideas[496]). These pieces of knowledge are as such (τοιαύτας) *i.e.* as λόγοι[497] (in the mind they form still a unity) already manifest (ἐν φανερῷ), because the *mind* is the cause of the (pieces of) knowledge in the soul (τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ....γεγονέναι *τὸν νοῦν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἴτιον).*[498] So he realizes that there is motion (just as there already was in the λογισμοί διάστασις and κίνησις) in that the pieces of knowledge have come to the soul as λόγοι (ἐν φανερῷ ἤδη (![499]) γεγονυίας), which are thought as separated unities (as will appear later on) and that there is such a thing that as a cause of the soul's knowledge must exist before the soul: mind.

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[493] Διάστασις means 'separation' according to *LP*. An excellent parallel in 29[IV,5],2,47, where it means separation of and in the air.

[494] See note 503.

[495] Although it would be rather plausible to connect these ἐπιστήμαι with the reasonings, and consider them as their products, after all this can scarcely be so, because we are told that the mind is the cause of the ἐπιστήμαι, which are λόγοι, Ideas in the soul. In connection with this point one should notice that also in 5[V,9],6,5 we hear about pieces of knowledge that are in the soul (ἐπεὶ καὶ ψυχὴ ὁμοῦ ἔχουσα πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐν ἑαυτῇ ...κτλ).

[496] Given what is said in the Excurs I do not believe that Bréhier is right in translating: "les sciences sont des *discours intérieurs* à l'âme". 'Discours' is imprecise, 'inner formulation' would be better, but it is neither the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, nor the λόγος προφορικός that is meant. It is expressly said that the forms of knowledge are caused by the mind. So we must think of Ideas. Armstrong translates λόγος by 'rational principle'. In as far this could denote the Ideas as κανόνες in the soul this would be acceptable.

[497] or as pieces of knowledge, plural, not as a whole like in the mind. Armstrong's translation: "of a kind which have already become manifest" treats τοιαύτας as if it were construed with οἵας or ὥστε with inf.

[498] Most translaters render this sentence as if the mind has become present in the soul. However, in the next line we are told that mind is above the soul, in a most literal way. Consequently, in accordance with what I have previously brought forward in the excurs about the mind as responsible for the Ideas in the soul (see scheme), I do think that ἐν τῇ

When one[500] sees - like in the sensible world - the mind as having literally climbed on top of the soul and as the father of the soul (as the κόσμος νοητός, the intelligible world), or perhaps better: when you have seen that soul's father[501] is the κόσμος νοητός (502), you have to state that the mind has a quiet

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ψυχῇ γεγονέναι τὸν νοῦν does not mean that the mind is present in the soul (as Harder, Armstrong, Bréhier hold) but that mind *has become* the cause of the ἐπιστῆμαι: γεγονέναι (ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ *γεγονέναι* τὸν νοῦν) must be connected with (τῶν ἐπιστημῶν) *αἴτιον*.

[499] Plotinus uses the same ἤδη thrice (lines 9, 11, 17) from the point of view of the quiet motion of the mind.

[500] Plotinus reduces a whole group τουτούς line 5 now to a single person ἰδόντα (line 12).

[501] Πατήρ is not only used metaphorically of the SE (or God) but also of the mind (33[II,9],16,9).

[502] Lines12-16. It is rather difficult to see how the two parts of this sentence are linked with each other (part a καὶ νοῦν - νοητόν; part b νοῦν - διακεκριμένον) and whether or not there is a causal connection or a connection of a different type. Concentrating firstly on part a, I would observe that mostly, if not always, τῷ ἀντιληπτὸν εἶναι is taken by translators as a dativus causae. Perhaps I might suggest that a simple dativus (finalis) is more satisfactory. This dativus with an infinitive is not uncommon cf. this very chapter line 39: τῷ σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις αὐτήν. Plotinus wishes his readers to visualise (οἷον αἰσθητόν) the relation of mind and soul. So he says: "I imagine the mind - as it were an object of perception in order to be apprehendable (τῷ ἀντιληπτὸν εἶναι) - as riding or having mounted the soul (ἐπαναβεβηκότα)". We must spend some attention to ἐπαναβεβηκότα (line 13): ἐπαναβαίνειν is mounting upward to what is higher in the scale of being, see *e.g.* Arist., *Met.*, 990 a 6. According to *LP* 400 *s.v.* it means as a perfect tense: 'be higher', 'transcend'. There could be a reminiscence here of the carriage-image of the *Phaedrus*, the remark about the father does not exclude any connection with the carriage-image. However, it can also mean, like ἐποχεῖσθαι (see 161), riding on an animal or a vehicle. Simply translating 'being transcendent' (*LP*) will not do, because Plotinus stresses that we must imagine a picture from the sensible world (οἷον αἰσθητόν). Transcendency is precisely not to be seen! Harder translates: "wie er über die Seele thront als ihr Vater". This translation has the advantage of providing a concrete picture. But it may be asked whether or not a hendiadys may represent Plotinus' intention. Perhaps he had two pictures in mind, both concrete and picturesque. For a moment I was under the impression that sexual intercourse was intended: ἐπαναβαίνειν frequently denotes the covering of animals, see *e.g.* Arist., *Hist. An.*, 540 a 22. However, mentioning the father would introduce the notion of incestuous relations which as such, however, are not to be excluded. We shall return to this subject later on (259). Given an incestuous situation mind may be held responsible for what is conceived in the soul, knowledge, which is undoubtedly implied in lines 12 and 13, but mind seems first of all to be the father of the soul (πατέρα *αὐτῆς)*. This implies that from the point of view of generations mind is one generation prior and accordingly of a higher, more venerable status than soul. However, it is not absolutely necessary to assume an accusative construction as being a direct object of ἰδόντα as is supposed in my remarks hitherto. There is also the possibility of Plotinus wishing us to understand: 'that her father is the κοσμὸς νοητός', which would make a good transition to part b. The κοσμὸς νοητός is the world that embraces all the Ideas, with a special form of motion as we learned in the Excursus in the text (see 166). The mentioning of this form of motion in part b may be well prepared in this way. Before turning to part b I must stress the fact that in line 14 κοσμὸς νοητός is more limited than in Plato, where it denotes

and unwavering[503] motion, because it *has* everything and it *is* everything, a multitude, on the one hand indiscriminated, on the other hand discriminated (πλῆθος ἀδιάκριτον καὶ αὖ διακεκριμένον, line 16). Readers of 5[V,9],6,3 are already familiar with the paradox in mind of things being together and being discriminate (πάντα ὁμοῦ ἐκεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον διακεκριμένα). We may recall now what has been said in our Excurs about the peculiar way of simultaneous thinking of the mind, already a favourite subject in the early treatises[504]. Plotinus wishes to support his statement by a comparison with the λόγοι which are already thought as unities (οἱ λόγοι οἱ ἤδη νοούμενοι καθ' ἕν), which does not at all apply to the indiscriminated mind (cf. what has been said about the mind as μέγας λόγος in the Excurs). To avoid any misunderstanding Plotinus is quick to add that it is equally true that the content of the mind is not in confusion (οὔτε

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the entire transcendent world. In Plotinus, however, it is now confined to the level of mind with the exclusion of the domain of soul. As to κοσμὸν νοητόν perhaps Müller was not right in deleting these words, for according to my interpretation they do not seem to interrupt the train of thought. HS take them together with ὄντα as an attribute with πατέρα. I prefer to take ὄντα as a predicate, as I have indicated before.

Part b offers a major difficulty. For it seems unlikely that we should connect φατέον with the participles (πάντα) ἔχοντα and (πάντα) ὄντα. In that case we are confronted with the redundancy of the accusative ἥσυχον καὶ ἀτρεμῆ κίνησιν. This problem cannot be eliminated as Bréhier (178) wants us to do by taking it attributively: "dans le calme et l' immobilité (by the way, not translating κίνησιν)". A possibility of connecting ἔχοντα and ὄντα with φατέον is accepting Vitringa's clever conjecture κινοῦντα in stead of the somewhat superfluous νοῦν of the mss (cf. 10[V,1],2,23). Another possibility is the assumption that a form of ἔχειν is lacking. So I hold it, that after κίνησιν by a kind of haplography the participle ἔχοντα is lacking.

Φημι is usually linked with an infinitive (see *LP*). But it can go with a participle, cf. *Gorgias* 481 C Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερόν σε φῶμεν νυνὶ σπουδάζοντα ἢ παίζοντα; cf. Kühner - Gerth, II, 72. I do not think it very reasonable to accept Harder's translation (184): "so muss man ihn fassen als stillstehende, unerschütterte Bewegung *etc.*". For in this case a verb εἶναι is tacitly understood to be connected with φατέον. But nowhere in Plotinus do we read that mind *is* motion: mind *has* motion. I stick to taking φατέον with ἔχοντα and ὄντα, assuming an extra ἔχοντα after κίνησιν. Nevertheless, the fact that mind has everything and is everything dominates in part b, for Plotinus adds that mind has all Ideas and being them, it is an undiscriminated and yet discriminated multitude. This point is further elaborated in the following. The quiet motion of mind does not emerge again. In any case, Plotinus' mention of motion is prepared by his remark about soul's motion in line 9: καὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς ἤδη οἷον ἐν διαστάσει καὶ *κινήσει* and fundamental for his argument. It may be that, granted the rightness of my solution, mind's having and being everything may provide a reason for its quiet motion. When mind is everything it has no need to go through its wholeness in search for a particular Idea. Mind knows them all simultaneously as we explained in the text (see 166). Finally I may point in regard to ἥσυχον καὶ ἀτρεμῆ κίνησιν (line 15) that there are two forms of κίνησις with the mind. This quiet, non kinetic kinesis and a motion drifting upward to the Good (24[V,6],5,8, see Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 318). Needless to say that this type of motion is absent in the context.

[503] Atkinson, *Ennead V. 1*, 29 has a long dissertation on ἥσυχος. He believes it to mean 'still', not merely 'quiet'. "Ἡσυχον (femininum according to HS) καὶ ἀτρεμῆ κίνησιν is something of an oxymoron. How can motion be still without motion and without wavering? The answer to that is to be found in the peculiarity of the mind which is expressed in the fact that it does not need to go through itself, because it has already gone through itself and has everything in it (see Excursus, 166) 'ready at hand'.

[504] See Excursus, 168.

συνκέχυται, lines 16,17[505]). For everything present in this peculiar indiscriminated way in the mind may proceed from the mind in its individuality (ἕκαστον) and so emerge in the soul. The usual comparison with ἐπιστήμη as science is again introduced. Although in the sciences or branches of knowledge everything is indivisible, without parts, everything that proceeds apart from the others remains in the totality[506].

The whole drift of the argument is to ascend to higher levels. The soul has its particular method of thinking (λογισμοί), which appears to be dependent on a level prior and therefore higher to it (with a way of thinking of its own). This 'all in one', this 'altogether' multitude, the intelligible world, must be near[507] to the One, necessarily of course, if one says that soul exists (as those who are adressed in the opening of this chapter do) and mind must be considered as superior to soul[508]. But one never can maintain that this intelligible world *is* the One, for it is not one[509] and not simple (as we have seen).

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[505] Συνκέχυται has its parallel in συνκεχυμένον 5[V,9],6,5, but there it is said of soul's knowledge. It is interesting to notice that in 5[V,9],6,5 ff. Plotinus underlines, more than he usually does, the individuality of the piece of knowledge that comes forward. He even says that such a piece of knowledge does not drag in the others along with it. This utterance does not seem to be meant to contradict what he elsewhere teaches about the fact that the other parts follow (8[IV,9],5,15, cf. above 167) unnoticed.

[506] Line 20: αὐτῶν refers to πάντων in the phrase *πάντων* ἐν ἀμερεῖ ὄντων ὅμως ἐστιν ἕκαστον χωρὶς *αὐτῶν*. It is interesting to realize that the comparison with the wholeness of the ἐπιστήμη was a popular theme in his early works (see 167). Needless to say that ἐπιστήμη here is not the same ἐπιστήμη we met before as the knowledge of the Ideas in the soul.

[507] Line 2l: ἔστι μὲν ὁ πρὸς τῷ πρώτῳ - Although ὁ is placed in the position of the predicate, in which situation the article is usually left out, we need not delete it with Kirchhoff-Harder, because it may be intended to express what is near to the First, *i.e.* the intelligible cosmos. Many mss have ὅ, a relative: "is what is near the One". I see no reason why this should be impossible. What I may note here, is that μέν is only a pseudo μέν solitarium, because it is taken up, apparently, not by δέ, but in this case by οὐ μέντοι (line 23). Indeed, it is *near* the One but it *is* not the One.

[508] It is the meaning of (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) εἶναι that I wish to discuss. Usually these words are interpreted in an existential sense: εἶναι signifies 'to exist' referring to the necessary (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) existence of the simultaneously present multitude in the shape of the κόσμος ὁ νοητός, see Harder ("dass sie notwendig sein muss"), and Bréhier ("qu'il existe nécessairement"), Harder, *o.c.*, 185, Bréhier, *o.c.*, 178. There can be no reasonable doubt that this multitude has to exist, but it seems rather superfluous to make Plotinus prove this in the parenthesis: "and the argument says that this (*i.e.* the κόσμος ὁ νοητός) is necessary, if one is to say that soul is (necessary) and that this κόσμος ὁ νοητός is higher in rank than soul". This chain of arguments can undoubtedly serve as proof for the existence of the multitude of this kosmos (if the soul exists what is superior in rank has to exist a fortiori). When reading the text, it seems to me that such a proof is not necessary and perhaps superfluous, since the existence of that multitude needs no proving inasmuch it is already established in the foregoing arguments. A different interpretation gives much more force to εἶναι (line 22) which seems almost certainly to refer to the immediately preceding ἔστι (πρός). Εἶναι (πρός) designates presence with the First (One). When saying that this πλῆθος/κόσμος is necessarily in the presence of the One, this is relevant to the context, for we are stating that although this πλῆθος/κόσμος is close to the First, it is not to be *identified* with the First (οὐ μέντοι πρῶτον line 23). From a theoretical point of view the candidature of this πλῆθος/κόσμος, which is higher in rank than soul, could be regarded as more justifiable, but it cannot *be* the First, since it is not simple (ἁπλοῦν). Where this candidature is concerned, it is well worth proving that πλῆθος/ κόσμος is right in the presence of the One, for it could not otherwise

The One is simple and the origin of everything (ἡ πάντων ἀρχή). This last expression is meant to make the transition to the following discussion on the One and its name. The fact that the SE is ἡ πάντων ἀρχή will make it possible to understand something about it.

Lines 5 - 20 contain some important information, which elsewhere in Plotinus is absent or less clear:

1) Notice what is said about the functioning of the soul as its virtue.

2) In line 8 taking the λογιστικόν with the soul is put beyond any doubt.

3) The λόγοι in the soul are called ἐπιστῆμαι. This implies that what we have met as patterns in the soul, descending from the mind down to the soul, is legitimately regarded as ἐπιστήμη (ἐπιστήμη II of the scheme). In a fundamental sense Plotinus provides a clue to a problem that has figured since Plato. When the soul brings together τύποι originating in the *sensibilia* with the τύποι descending from mind, and in this way produces knowledge about this world, we are allowed to regard those patterns as ἐπιστήμη (knowledge). The product is δόξα. Plato has never made clear whether or not those patterns in the soul (Ideas in the mental status) were entitled to be named ἐπιστήμη, a term he devoted to permanent knowledge of the Ideas in their transcendent status. What he did allow is to use the name ἐπιστήμη for the knowledge of Ideas.

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be considered a candidate. So the argument runs as follows: "And the logos (argument?) says that this (πλῆθος/κόσμος) is necessarily with the First, if at least somebody says that the soul too is with the First (cf. 4,19 ff.) and this πλῆθος/κόσμος ranks above the soul". We now have precisely what the argument requires: the location of πλῆθος/ κόσμος. Therefore εἶναι must not be assumed to mean 'exist', but has to be interpreted as 'be with', 'be present with'. One could also reasonably suppose that the εἶναι of εἴπερ τις καὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι could mean 'exist' for it is precisely this what the ἀνιόντας of line 5 are prepared to admit. I would not follow Harder in suppressing ὁ after μὲν, see my note 507.

Now that the main problem has been given its due we come to two minor points:

a) Should we add to τις (εἴπερ τις καὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι) the word ἀνάγκη from the previous sentence as Harder does?

b) Is λόγος to be preferred as an addition? cf. καὶ φησιν αὐτὸ ὁ λόγος ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι.

It seems to me that λόγος borrowed from the preceding words, is preferable as an addition to τις to ἀνάγκη from the *genitive* ἀνάγκης. But would it not show a certain disdain when combined with λόγος ? And if one accepts λόγος, what does λόγος mean in the context? Do we find in the immediately preceding passage a logos which proves the soul to exist? In 5,3 we find ὁ λόγος, which is translated by Harder as 'Darlegung'. Plotinus' argument here is aimed at those who, unlike people such as the Epicureans, do not deny that there is a domain of the soul next to the purely corporeal realm, but this λόγος does not argue that the soul exists, it argues that all those who accept the soul as a domain in its own right must be convinced that the soul derives its worth from a higher level. Λόγος there has the meaning 'reasoning'. However, this does not fit in our sentence, since such a reasoning is not to be found. So we should reject the solution of adding λόγος to τις and seek an alternative. There is reason enough to derive a φησι from φησιν in line 34 (with HS) 'if at least someone says that the soul too...*etc.*'. The τις in this case designates everyone who accepts the existence of the soul or its being present with the One, be it of course not so near to the One as its superior, πλῆθος /κόσμος.

[509] Line 23: ὅτι μὴ ἓν μηδὲ ἁπλοῦν- It is most disturbing that in HS's text μὴ is *not* printed.

It is perhaps interesting to point out that in this context Plotinus does not mention the possibility he refers to elsewhere to go upwards to the mind-level by means of λογισμοί. However, in 9[VI,9],5 his one and only concern is to make a sharp distinction between the forms of knowledge of the soul and those of the mind and to underline soul's dependence on the mind in order to ascertain mind's superiority and its higher status in regard to the position of the soul. This all happens within the framework of persuading other philosophers to accept this transcendental hierarchy as a startingpoint to seek the One.

5, 24-38 Although the One is almost unknowable and inexpressible, it is knowable via its offspring

Translation

> Now what is prior to what is the most honourable among the beings, if there really must be something prior to the mind, which wishes to be One, but is not One, but is uniform, because in itself the mind is not dispersed, but really together with itself, without dismembering itself through being near after the One, and having somehow dared to stand away from the One - thus that which is prior to it is the the marvel of the One, which is not being, for in that case the One would be said of some other thing, for which in truth there is no appropriate name, but since one must give it a name, one generally said would be appropriate, not as if it were some other thing and next one, being therefore difficult to be known, but better knowable by means of its offspring, being, - and mind leads to being and the nature of it (the One), which is such as to be the source of the best things and a power that create beings, while it abides in itself and is not diminished nor being in what has come to be through it, because it is even before them.

Not being!

We now (line 24) encounter again the notion that there is something prior to the mind with its peculiarities. Plotinus returns to the difficult problem how we must formulate and name this unknown and unexpressible One. We may put a stop here before attacking the gigantic phrase in which these problems are treated. We now have learned the other way in which those who believe that there is something higher than body, *viz.* soul, may reach the One. The disappointed man, who failed to meet the One at the end of ch.4, by lacking a teaching Logos or by mistrusting reasoning, is able to see along this trail that you can reach the One. This is the message of this pericope, but instead of going into details about meeting the One Plotinus proceeds in the next pericope by treating the problem how to speak about the One in an adequate manner. After proving that the intelligible world to a great extent is near to the One, higher than the soul, Plotinus is returning to the question of the unexpressability of the One.

After a broad treatment of this problem, which penetrates into ch.6 (needless to point to the fact that as to the division of chapters Plotinus is innocent), Plotinus develops a choir of positive and negative characteristics which all eventually fail to determine the One. It is no longer, as in ch.4, a journey of sightseeing, of theoria in the specific Platonic manner, that may realize the encounter with the One, it is now a different approach that may lead to the One.

(articulation)

To introduce this new way, firstly the question of naming deserves attention. After reaching the mind as the last possible station before the Unknown, Plotinus proceeds by pointing to the superior qualities of the mind which, however, appear to be insufficiently superior to make mind identifiable with the Unknown. Although mind may be freely called the most precious thing in being (τιμιωτάτου line 25), it fails to be the One, since[510] there must be something prior to the mind, because the mind longs to be the One, because it *is* not the One, but only entitled to be called 'onelike' (ἑνοειδής). This attribute is legitimately ascribed to the mind, because of the fact that the mind is not split up into pieces[511]. It is really with itself - a much repeated motive elsewhere in the *Enneads* and in 9[VI,9], designating a superior form of unity[512]. It has not articulated itself, because it is so near to the One, it only displayed the courage to stay apart from the One. Here we meet (for the first time in the *Enneads*[513]) the famous τόλμα, the audacity of the mind to remove itself from the One, the active role in the process of emanation, which has as the other side of the coin the abundant and even redundant richness of the One which causes the overflow of what becomes mind. Plausibly it is because of this paradox that Plotinus uses πως[514]. Plotinus treated the problem of the birth of the mind for the first time in

separation

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[510] Εἴπερ must signify here 'since as a matter of fact'. I would not translate here 'if indeed' (suggested by *LP*)

[511] Line 27 : αὐτῷ - Cilento and Harder (474) defend αὐτῷ, strange as it may be. For it has to mean that for it (the mind, see HS) the mind is not scattered, but the mind is really with itself *etc*. In the mind there is no question at all of dispersion. Sleeman, *Notes on Plotinus III*, 24, 82 suggested the elegant conjecture ἓν ("Intelligence, though not absolute unity, is yet one with itself") which, however, does not make the phrase ὅτι ἓν αὐτῷ μηδὲ ἐσκέδασται ὁ νοῦς fit in very well with what follows: ἀλλὰ σύνεστιν ἑαυτῷ, because it does not provide a good opposition. Be this as it may, *Harder*'s explanation of μηδέ is ruled out by Wolters, *Eros*, 24 ad 2,18. Μηδέ is the negative form of the idiomatic expression ὅτι καί in which καί is pleonastic (Harder's 'gar nicht' is wrong, Wolters, *ibidem*). So Wolters has the merit to have solved the problem of μηδέ, if one should not read μηδέν. My suggestion would be to have ἐν before αὐτῷ: the mind is onelike, because *in* itself the mind is not scattered, but it is *with* itself *(σύνεστιν* ἑαυτῷ). Μηδέν would very well fit in. I would like to add that Harder's observation in support of his explanation of μηδέ in itself has no significance at all: "gar nicht (denn dem Zerstreutwerden unterliegt vor allem die Materie)". Now no one may be expected here to think of matter, this being far from Plotinus' mind. In the same note Harder suggests that it is 'erwägenswert' to replace ἑαυτῷ by αὐτῷ obviously referring to the One. His misunderstanding of what συνεῖναι (ἑαυτῷ) really means (mind's being with itself, one of its most characteristic marks, see above 140), is responsible for this rejectable suggestion. Armstrong has αὐτῷ, but translates *ἐν* αὐτῷ.

[512] See *e.g*.. 211.

[513] 6[IV,8],8,1 has the word (τολμῆσαι), but not the special notion, for it means only 'to dare'.

[514] The word τόλμα is commented upon by Atkinson, *Ennead V. 1*, 4, who conveniently summarizes results of others (Baladi, Rist). See also Armstrong's note ad 10[V,1],1 (*Transl*. V, p.10) and Bussanich, *The One*, 82 ff. It has Pythagorean roots and has to be connected with the Dyad, but as Atkinson affirms, Plotinus does not actually call it the Dyad, the commencement of plurality. In 9[VI,9],5,29 Plotinus needs the idea of τόλμα

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7[V,4], in 10[V,1],7 he will return to this issue, in 9[VI,9],5,29 he touches it only in passing.

All the qualifications so far are meant to describe an eminent form of being one, but not the ultimate form of being one. What precedes the mind with its splendid qualifications, is the amazing spectacle of the One (τὸ πρὸ τούτου θαῦμα). I prefer to make θαῦμα predicate (like HS in the Oxford edition, missing the article as a predicate is normal Greek) and not to consider it as an object of ὀνομάζομεν (line 38) as Harder (*I b*, 474) does. Ms A, before correction, like most mss had θαῦμα τοῦ ἕν. A 3 (Ficinus) erased ου and added ο after the τ: attaining τό, with the obvious aim of separating το(υ) ἕν from θαῦμα: 'the miracle of what is prior, the One'; in order to get a complete sentence: "quod inquam super hoc mirabiliter extat, velut miraculum est ipsum unum". Harder (*I b*, 474) complicated the matter considerably by creating a figure ("das Wunder also, das vor diesem Geist liegt, das Eine *etc.*") to be provided with two preliminary predicates, χαλεπόν and γιγνωσκόμενον, functioning later on in the sentence ultimately as an object with ὀνομάζομεν (line 38). As I see it, Harder's solution is not very convenient, for his construction seems to fade away in the development of the phrase. This attempt to reconstruct the sentence encounters a decisive objection. Τὸ πρὸ τούτου must undoubtedly be regarded as a continuation (note δὴ) of τὸ πρὸ ....τιμιωτάτου, without any substantive or notion of amazing. We may best read τὸ πρὸ τούτου θαῦμα τοῦ ἕν (ἕν indeclinatum HS, a gen. explicativus) as a complete sentence in which τὸ πρὸ τούτου functions as a subject and θαῦμα τοῦ ἕν as a predicate, whereas a series of attributes or determinations are added. I understand, that also HS wish to take the sentence in this way. Ficinus also created a complete sentence, but organized the words differently by disconnecting θαῦμα and τοῦ ἕν, and taking θαῦμα in an adverbial manner "velut miraculum". He failed to consider θαῦμα τοῦ ἕν as the predicate.

(here τολμήσας) to make plausible that what had the audacity to stand away from the One, cannot, of course, be the One itself. In 10[V,1],1,4 its meaning is more negative, for there τόλμα is the root of all evil for the soul. In 9[VI,9],5,29 it concerns the *mind* and does not display this negative attitude. The mind is just called the most precious thing in Being. Plotinus' readers, following the chronological order, know nothing sofar about the audacity of the mind or the soul. With Bussanich (*The One*, 82) I disagree that the statement in 9[VI,9],5,29 should represent a bolder remark than Plotinus' utterance "that it would have been better for Intellect not to have desired all things (30[III,8],8,35-36)". We must warn against overinterpretation. To ascribe to 9[VI,9],5,29 pessimistic tones is overinterpretation. In 11[V,2],2,5-7 τολμηρότατον is the characteristic of the soul which dares to move from the One as far away as possible, which makes it most stupid. I can leave aside here the confrontation with Gnostic τόλμα. I think that Rist (*Monism*, 241) knows too much when writing that the passage 5,29 "does not mean that it recklessly broke away, but that it has 'faced up' to living apart after its generation - indeed it had no option". Armstrong, *Gnosis*, 117, denies the presence of a paradox: "that the ultimate responsibility for τόλμα lies with the One or the Good itself. And if it originates in the Good, it cannot be bad". This method of explaining away is doing the work for Plotinus, who never suggested anything of the kind. Moreover, even then the paradox remains or is even worse, for in that case the Good is responsible for what in fact is said to be wrong (10[V,1],1,4).

It is the expression θαῦμα τοῦ ἕν that introduces an athmosphere of uncertainty as regards determinating the One. Plotinus' first additional remark entails the not-being of the One[515], which as such is at the basis of the difficulties involved in naming this miracle. If the One really should be looked upon as being, then the term 'One' would be said of, and would even then or even there (καὶ ἐνταῦθα[516]) be predicate of some other thing[517]. But 'One' may not be regarded as a predicate, for this supposes the presence of another subject or suppositum, and given what line 26 says about being as ἑνοειδές rather than ἕν, the title τὸ ἕν would be a predicate of some other thing, namely the SE which, on this hypothesis, would be being. So τὸ ἕν were second and the hypothetical being of the SE would be the first. Apparently this situation would not do justice to the One, because indeed it is prior to being.

Now we are sufficiently prepared to realise that there is no proper (κατ' ἀλήθειαν) name for the One. If it is forbidden to ascribe being to the One, to Plotinus' Platonic view naming is equally impossible. But since (εἴπερ) the need exists to designate the One, otherwise we would be unable even to speak about the One, we may name it at best (προσηκόντως) by means of a generally (κοινῶς[518]) said 'one', without any implication, commitment or substantivation, in a non attributive way (οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο, εἶτα ἕν[519]). Because of the vagueness of this general one[520], there is not much hope that this name 'one' has much to tell and to teach about the nature of the One. Line 35 ff. elaborates on the difficulties and shortcomings of the semantical force of saying 'one'. One has better chances to know the One by looking at its offspring, being. For the name 'one' in fact designates what we do not know as ἄλλο.

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[515] It must not escape notice that not being *something* is entirely different from not-being. See about non-being of the One, note 813.

[516] Line 30: ἐνταῦθα. According to Harder (474) this indicates not metaphysical 'hienieden' but simply 'in diesem Falle'. This I doubt. Admittedly, ἐνταῦθα mostly means 'in this world (genesis)', but it could refer to the level of ὄν in the same line 30. Igal, *Helmantica* 22 (1971), 288 finds it necessary to replace ὄν by ἕν. Rightly HS did not accept his proposal. For then one can not see the meaning of the words that follow ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα κατ' ἄλλου τὸ ἕν.

[517] It is interesting to realise that in the hypothetical case of the One being, Plotinus assumes the One to be the predicate and some other thing to be the suppositum, whereas elsewhere we have the reverse, the One as object of predication, see ch.3,48 ad συμβήσεται. Notice κατ'αὐτοῦ as an expression designating the suppositum of a predicate (see 181).

[518] Line32: κοινῶς ἂν λεχθὲν προσηκόντως ἕν - From a syntactical point of view a rather obstruse phrase. Vitringa's λεχθείη produces too many adverbs, and does not help to make the construction of the phrase any more accessible. As I see it, κοινῶς and ἄν have to be connected with λεχθέν: 'if it were said generally one would name it in the right way ἕν (*sc*. ὀνομαζοίτο)'. Line 32 κοινῶς- Harder (474) "im üblichem, ungenauen Sprachgebrauch". Better 'general', *i.e.* in a non fixed way (ungenau). Armstrong's translation: " 'one' would be an appropriate *ordinary* way of speaking of it", is liable to the same criticism. Moreover, he takes προσηκόντως with the distant κοινῶς, which considering even the Greek rather loose way of connecting words is not acceptable. See also Igal, *de Uno*, 289.

[519] According to Harder the phrase is almost tautological with line 30: ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα κατ' ἄλλου τὸ ἕν, which as such is not untrue. However, οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο, εἶτα ἕν is a more general formula, which he already used in 7[V,4],1,8, later in 33[II,9],1,4 (see about this formule 181), whereas ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα κατ' ἄλλου τὸ ἕν has to do with the particular case of the SE as a supposed *being*.

[520] Line 33: διὰ τοῦτο refers to κοινῶς and οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο, εἶτα ἕν.

Plotinus feels he should spend some more words on being as γέννημα (echoed by γεννῶσαν, line 36). He makes his readers realise that not only mind brings about being, but also the *nature* of the One (καὶ αὐτοῦ *ἡ φύσις)* has in its peculiar manner to do with the forthcoming of being. I propose to take αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις as a co-subject of ἄγει: "both the mind and the nature of the One leads to being". The traditional interpretation considers καὶ ἄγει εἰς οὐσίαν νοῦς an isolated remark, a parenthesis of great obscurity to the extent that it is assumed to damage the development of the argument, which even caused Harder to adorn these words with daggers and earlier Vitringa to alter νοῦς into νοῦν[521]. HS did not follow, but nevertheless in their text the parenthesis may be regarded as rather odd. Harder argues that mind does not bring about being but *is* being. Now Plotinus is rather flexible in his thinking. Although sometimes he asserts that being is prior to thinking, he equally affirms that thinking makes being exist. In the same (early) treatise (5[V,9]) he claims priority of being over mind[522], whereas some chapters earlier in this treatise he points out that mind establishes *beings in existence*: ἣ δῆλον ὅτι νοῦς ὢν ὄντως νοεῖ *τὰ ὄντα καὶ ὑφίστησιν*[523]. In 10[V,1],4,26,27, so in the treatise next to 9[VI,9], he maintains that the mind makes being exist[524], whereas being gives being to the mind (ὁ μὲν νοῦς κατὰ τὸ νοεῖν ὑφιστὰς τὸ ὄν, τὸ δὲ ὂν τῷ νοεῖσθαι τῷ νῷ διδὸν τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ εἶναι). Consequently, I cannot understand why Plotinus could not have said in 9[VI,9],5,35 that "mind leads to being": καὶ ἄγει εἰς οὐσίαν νοῦς, if this conveniently supports his argument, as it does. Harder's next objection is that he does not see, as he points out, what contextual coherence this thought would pretend to have, but in my opinion it certainly has. As I see it, Plotinus wishes to dwell on the connection of being as γέννημα of the One. To be sure, mind is being, containing all things, but there is a process of generating, emanation, eradiation or whatever name may be given to this remarkable process, the power of the One[525]. Although he is aware of the fact that one can say that mind brings being about, Plotinus nevertheless now wishes to go into the role of the One as a generating power (δύναμιν γεννῶσαν) and to speak about the connection of this power and the generated product. Admittedly, by returning to the One the mind 'creates' being, but in this process the One is responsible both for the origin of the mind and of being. Plotinus calls the One 'source' (πηγὴ τῶν ἀρίστων[526]), although he immediately emphasizes the golden rule that a generating power does not diminish and that the One remains in its own place so that it does not become part of the generated things (γινόμενα) under its power. So the coherence of the argument is solid, and Harder's *aporia* unnecessary. In his translation Armstrong comments upon the difficulty of Plotinus saying that the mind leads to being[527]. Armstrong explains this difficulty by assuming that it is the intellect in *us* that Plotinus is talking about and that this intellect in us leads us to being, and that the supra-intellectual way to the One can only begin when the intellect has reached his goal (I suppose Armstrong means being). This solution to the problem seems highly unlikely, because a parenthesis of that kind is fully beside the line of the argument, for it is the universal mind that is at issue, the context having a universal tone, whereas my solution fits satisfactorily in in the sequence of the universality of the argument. It should not escape notice that Plotinus ascribes all this to the φύσις of the One (see his use of feminine words of reference, *etc.*). Perhaps, this is his way of alluding to the problem of keeping the One a pure thing that has no properties[528].

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[521] The same in Bréhier, support from Igal, *de Uno*, 293.

[522] See 5[V,9],7, 12 ff. and *ib.*,8,8 ff. .

[523] See 5[V,9],5,14.

[524] The same thought in as late a treatise as 36[VI,7],40,10-12: ἡ δὲ νόησις ... καὶ ὑποστήσασα τὴν οὐσίαν κτλ.

[525] See Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 321 ff.and below 199 ff.

The (power of the) One is not in τὰ γινόμενα because it is prior to τὰ γινόμενα (ὅτι καὶ πρὸ τούτων). This makes good sense. A clever proposal of HS makes the phrase ὅ τι καὶ πρὸ τούτων the opening words of the next sentence: "whatever may be prior to the generated things, we name 'one' *etc.*" Admittedly, καὶ fits in with a general statement. There is an objection, however: why would Plotinus use the vague and general 'whatever' (ὅ τι) when both before this and - more importantly - after this expression, Plotinus uses such a defininite form (line 39 αὐτήν). Αὐτήν in line 39 proves that Plotinus still has the φύσις of the One (or - with Harder,475 - the δύναμις , I might even suggest πηγή, although I prefer with HS φύσις) in mind and not the indefinite and vague conception as HS assume him to have had in mind (one has to notice that in lines 24 and 29 τὸ πρὸ τούτου he is anything but vague). If my interpretation holds, we miss an object for ὀνομάζομεν. Thus I can understand Kirchhoff's proposal to open the sentence with ἥν. Perhaps Plotinus' use of the Greek is such that such an object can be omitted (cf. 32[V,5],6,25, where ὀνομάζομεν is used without an object). I do not favour Harder's interpretation, who makes θαῦμα τοῦ ἕν the object of ὀνομάζομεν. In my opinion Plotinus proceeds by saying that we use the name 'One' because we are obliged to do so, since we point it out to each other.

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[526] Line 35: τοιαύτη - I do not regard τοιαύτη as a predicate, as it is taken in the usual interpretation, but as an attribute in postposition; ὡς is followed by an acc. cum infinitivo, ± ὥστε, nothing unusual cf. *LP s.v.* C.

[527] Armstrong renders οὐσία by substance, which has its difficulties, because it is being in general that is meant by Plotinus, see above note 308.

[528] On φύσις see above 77.

Changing in line 39 τῷ into τοῦ (Heintz and Harder, see 31[V,8],12,25,26) has its charms because the text is made somewhat smoother ('from the need to point it out to each other'), but this manoeuvre is not necessary. Thus HS may be right in keeping τῷ and taking ἐξ ἀνάγκης as an adverb[529].

5, 38-46 Naming the One

Translation

Quantitative one depends on being

> We necessarily call it One in order to indicate its nature while we bring it individed to our thinking and wish that the soul 'ones' it, not saying one and partless in the way we do of a point of a unit. For what is one in this way is the origins of quantity, which would never have come to existence, if there were not being and what is before being. So that is not where one should direct his thought, but one should always compare these things with those in analogies in their being simple and avoiding multitude and division.

Before dealing with the following I must put in an Excursus on the problem of naming the One and of the methods Plotinus uses to denote the ineffable. We will see that the three famous ways, the via negationis, the via analogiae and the via eminentiae are involved in solving the problem of naming.

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[529] 38-39 ὀνομάζομεν ἓν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῷ σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις αὐτήν *etc.* - In 31[V,8,]12,26 Heintz and Harder have found a parallel to ἐξ ἀνάγκης: χρηστέον γὰρ τούτοις τοῖς ὀνόμασι τῇ τοῦ σημαίνειν ἐθέλειν ἀνάγκῃ which lead them to change ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῷ in line 39 into ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῦ. They understand: 'we name (it) 'one' because of the necessity of indicating its nature to each other *etc.*', whereas HS do not accept this conjectural change and obviously adhere to the opinion that we name it 'one' - necessarily (ἐξ ἀνάγκης as an adverb) for indicating its nature to each other (τῷ not being a dativus causae, but a dativus commodi or finalis). As such this makes very good sense for, indeed, it is necessary to name it *one* if one wishes to make it clear to someone in such a way that one brings it to his mind without *parts* (ἀμέριστον) by the name (τῷ ὀνόματι *sc.* 'one') as line 40 wishes us to do. Mentioning this necessity is lacking in the other places where the same thought is expressed (32[V,5],6,25 and 49[V,3],13,5,6). Igal, *de Uno,* 292 favours the reading of the mss.

Excursus about the problem of naming the One (including some observations on the via negationis, the via remotionis, the via analogiae (the "via per inferiora"), the via eminentiae).

It is necessary to present a more detailed account of the problem of naming the One and of having a name available for the One. Already in 7[V,4],1 we find the (essentially Parmenidean, *Parmenides* 142 A) verdict that even the word τὸ ἕν is incorrect, because there is no concept or knowledge of the (not yet Super) One (καθ' οὗ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἓν εἶναι, οὗ μὴ λόγος μηδὲ ἐπιστήμη, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐπέκεινα λέγεται οὐσίας line 9,10). Two more (chronologically later) *Enneads* may provide some further help, *viz.* 49[V,3],13,5,6 (and ch. 14) and 32[V,5],6,25. There we find some cognate phrases (both concerning the naming of the One): καὶ ὀνομάζομεν σημαίνειν ἑαυτοῖς θέλοντες ὡς δυνάμεθα (32[V,5],6,25) and ἀλλ' ὡς ἐνδέχεται, ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς σημαίνειν ἐπιχειροῦμεν περὶ αὐτοῦ 49[V,3],13,5,6). In fact, there is no appropriate name for denoting the One. We must not forget that in regard to the One 'One' is not a predicate saying something of a substance nor a name indicating the nature of the One. It is no question of ἄλλο and εἶτα ..., a current formula used by Plotinus to indicate a situation of a predicate given to a substance[530]. This ἄλλο would possess the status of a substance, a τι to which a predicate is given or can be given. *Ennead* 49[V,3],12,50-52 passionately rejects any possibility of connecting the notion τι to the One. Knowing is a τι that is one (ἕν... τι), but the One is without τι. Otherwise it would not be the absolute One (αὐτοέν). The absolute (αὐτό) comes before the τὶ ἕν, something displaying unity. Plotinus now openly points to the ineffability of the One, in Platonism a recurrent theme of great interest (ἄρρητον 49[V,3],13,1). Whatever you say, you will say τι, so Plotinus affirms. In line 1 of 49[V,3],13 τι undoubtedly denotes a substance/particular. What to say? When Plotinus now turns to the implications of saying (and to the ultimate rescue): ἐπέκεινα πάντων καὶ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ σεμνοτάτου νοῦ, then we must recognize that this utterance is the only one to be true, but it is not a name (ὄνομα) of the One, for by saying that the SE is beyond being nothing is predicated of the One (ὅτι μηδὲν κατ' αὐτοῦ): it only expresses that the One is neither τι τῶν πάντων nor ὄνομα αὐτοῦ (predicate); an ὄνομα (predicate) may denote being a particular/substance of an entity or one of its properties, indicating any category you like. Nevertheless, Plotinus continues, in sofar as it is possible, we try to give ourselves indications in regard to it. So whatever is beyond mind and being cannot be named, implying that what is 'among' all things can bear a name because of the important fact that for entities on this level and from this level downwards, there are predicates that can be used.

[illegible]

[illegible]

No "whatness

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[530] See 7[V,4],1,8: ὂν ὄντως ἕν, οὐχ ἕτερον, εἶτα ἕν, and 9[VI,9],5,33: οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο, εἶτα ἕν.

The earlier *Ennead* 32[V,5],6 joins in; here, again, we are told that ἐπέκεινα ὄντος (line 11) does not imply saying τόδε, a particular thing, in regard to the One. For it does not 'posit' (οὐ γὰρ τίθησιν line 12); 'positing' in this case means assuming the existence of a thing (not of a quality), nor does it express a name (predicate, notice that 49[V,3],13, too, denies both the particularity of being a τι and the naming of a thing in regard to the SE). To use this formula is merely to say that it is 'not this' (οὐ τοῦτο). If you wish to see what is beyond the intelligible, you have to let go all the intelligible things. One has to draw a comparison with the analogy of the *sensibilia* and the *intelligibilia*, which provides knowledge about the intelligible (by analogy, this is a specifically Meso- and Neo-platonic method of searching for knowledge of the One as we will see later on p.186). Likewise you will learn by using the analogy of the intelligible and the One *that* the One *is* (in the narrow and limited sense of: being there, without any further assumptions in view of its nature). But *how* (οἷον) it is, will you learn by letting go the intelligible. Plotinus is careful to add a correction. In the case of the One 'how' essentially means '*not* how'. For where there is no τι (as Plotinus has amply discussed), there is no οἷον either (line 23, a very fundamental utterance). According to the beginning of this very chapter to be a τι is to be a τόδε τι and to be a τόδε τι (a transcendent particular in contradistinction to the Aristotelian τόδε τι, which always refers to the world in which we live; the whole chapter 32[V,5],6 is on the level of the transcendency of being) is to have a (characteristic) form, and to have a form is being. You can say τόδε (this specific form) of something that has a form (lines 5 and 6). Predicates are only to be given to substances: the One is no substance (οὐσία, ὄν) nor does it have any substantiality (τόδε τι lines 6 and 7). In the end we do not know what and how to say something about the One. Ultimately we speak about what is not effable (οὐ ῥητόν line 25, cf. ἄρρητον). And we give it a name, because we wish to indicate it to our selves, in as far and as best as we can (ὀνομάζομεν σημαίνειν ἑαυτοῖς θέλοντες ὡς δυνάμεθα lines 25,26). So what could naming in this case imply or contain? Plotinus now offers a suggestion. Perhaps to say 'one' is nothing but an ἄρσις (line 27, a denial in regard to what displays multiplicity, just as the Pythagoreans say Apollo, as a symbol of his 'not being multiple' (*α* (ποφάσει)-τῶν *πόλλων*). This is the only way not to say anything positive about one's subject. Next Plotinus reckons with the opposite suggestion: the 'one' could be held a θέσις, *i.e.* a positing of a name including what is referred to (εἰ δὲ θέσις τις τὸ ἕν, τό τε ὄνομα τό τε δηλούμενον line 29); then all will be worse and even more unclear than when one had not said anything about the One. Well then, why the impossible name 'One', one would ask? This (implicit) question is answered in line 31 ff.: the seeker may have started with an indication of complete simplicity (ἁπλότητος ... σημαντικόν), but in the end he would negate (ἀποφήσῃ) this as a clarification of the nature of the One. This nature is the ἄλλο of which εἶτα (the formula) something is said. This ἄλλο will be thought of by Plotinus first of all as a substance/particular, but ultimately even this substance/particular-character fades away, for there is no category one can connect with the One, that is neither a substance nor a property. Thus it is all negation that haunts the texts. It is all a variation on what is called the famous *via negationis* .

There is a lot of discussion nowadays about the via negationis[531], and about the entire complex of roads to the One (the via remotionis (ἀφαίρεσις), the via analogiae (ἀναλογία) and the via eminentiae (ὑπεροχή). What I have learned not without effort is to recognize that in Plotinus there is no way of negation *as a road to the One*. The via negationis essentially is a painstaking denial of any categorial predicate to the One. It is no τι nor οἷον, no movement no rest *etc*. We have heard the complete song earlier[532]. In short it is nothing that is on the level of being and of mind. I am under the impression that many scholars semi-consciously or even unconsciously hold that the via negationis has something to say about the One, lead by the slogan "omnis affirmatio est determinatio". However, in Plotinus the via negationis is meant precisely to say nothing about the One. Categorial determination ends in a blind alley. Name (ὄνομα) and category are inseparable companions. Consequently wherever there is no category, there is no name. We find the same connection between being ἄρρητος, name and attribute as 'experienced' by things in Celsus' words: "God is neither attainable by reason nor namable. For he does not experience anything which is graspable by a name. God is remote from any experience" (οὐδὲ λόγῳ ἐφικτὸς οὐδ' ὀνομαστὸς ὁ θεός. οὐδὲν γὰρ *πέπονθεν* ὀνόματι καταληπτόν. ἔξω πάντος *πάθους* ὁ θεός[533]). Πάσχειν happens to denote the same thing in this case as συμβαίνειν: having an attribute originating in an entity which is superior to the receiver[534].

Categorial semantics will let you down. What one needs is a form of non-categorial semantics. From the need to indicate (σημαίνειν 49[V,5],6,25) the seeker resorts to use the name 'One' as an indication of simplicity, but ultimately the seeker negates even the name One as an indication of some kind. Only seeing, not hearing opens the way to the One. However also seeing fails you in the end (see Part III, The mystical union, 304). The One is ἄρρητον. As far as I can see, this means that there are no names, which express the nature of the SE according to Neoplatonic philosophy. Plotinus himself is well aware of the limitations of categorial speech, which does not transcend being, nevertheless he is not so desperate not to phrase what our *experiences* are with the One and not to tell us about other means of gaining insight about the One, as appears from 49[V,3],14,1-8. With faultless insight in his epistemological and semantical situation he sensitively says that we can speak *about* the One (λέγομεν τι *περὶ* αὐτοῦ) but we cannot (categorially) *speak the One* (οὐ μὴν *αὐτὸ λέγομεν)* for we have no knowledge (at the level of mind or Being) about the One (οὐ γὰρ γνῶσιν οὐδε νόησιν ἔχομεν αὐτοῦ). The expression 'we cannot speak it' is Plotinus' interpretation of ἄρρητον, *i.e.* we can not speak and mean something categorial. 'To speak about it (*περὶ* αὐτοῦ)' is not to speak categorially about the nature of the One but rather about its relations with what follows to reversely leading to conclusions about the One. And that is precisely what he goes on to do in this extremely important passage on Plotinian semantics.

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[531] See note 539.

[532] See above 131.

[533] Celsus, 'Αληθὴς Λόγος, ed. O. Glöckner, 52, 29 ff. Cf. Festugière, *Révélation* IV, 115, 116.

[534] See my treatment of this issue, above 81.

If we cannot say anything categorial about the One, other ways of gaining knowledge about the One must be opened. There are three Mesoplatonic ways which may lead to the One: the via remotionis (ἀφαίρεσις), the via analogiae (ἀναλογία) and the via eminentiae (ὑπεροχή). I have learned to scrupulously separate the via negationis (ἀπόφασις), which is only a preliminary, and only leads to the trivium, from the via remotionis (ἀφαίρεσις). It is hotly debated whether or not ἀπόφασις may be identified with ἀφαίρεσις. Perhaps in later Platonism this may be done, but as far as Plotinus (and Albinus) is concerned, we may not. After all that I just brought forward about negation in Plotinus, obviously negation must be held to be different from 'abstraction'. It is very interesting to notice that also in Albinus, *Didaskalikos* X, 4 God is said to be ἄρρητος (but graspable by mind καὶ *νῷ μόνῳ* ληπτός) because He is not a genus, diaphora *etc.* (we met this list earlier[535]), in short He is denied any category one can imagine. This way of denial does not provide any knowledge in regard to the God. The only way to reach Him is by the mind. It is only then that Albinus elaborates the theme of ἀφαίρεσις, followed by the ways of analogy and eminence (X, 5, 6). The method of ἀφαίρεσις in Albinus consists in taking away ontologically from the God what we earlier denied by negation (ἀφαίρεσις *τούτων*)[536]. God is ἄρρητος because of his escaping the categories, but there is thinking about him by 'peeling off' (ἀφαίρεσις) any ontological property that belongs to being (αὐτοῦ νόησις τὴν κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν τούτων), which is illuminated by the example of the isolation of the mathematical point, we shall turn to shortly.

As to the supreme God's being ἄρρητος, Albinus is often charged with inconsistency. How could saying that God is ἄρρητος and the enumeration of a long list of divine attributes be brought into harmony? God is called αὐτοτελής, ἀειτελής, τέλειος, παντελής, attributes that may be excused because they indicate a type of perfectness, not found elsewhere (some sort of ὑπεροχή). There is more: θειότης, οὐσιότης, ἀλήθεια, συμμετρία, ἀγαθόν. It seems in Albinus as if ἄρρητος is but a harmless part of an enumeration (ἀίδιος, ἄρρητος, αὐτοτελής) and as if there were no destructive conflict between ἄρρητος and the other attributes. However, after all we have said about ἄρρητος as being the consequence of the fact that *on the level of* (in Albinus) *lower being there are no predicates to give to the SE*, we may state that being ἄρρητος is not inconsistently followed by qualifications and utterances as long as they do not compromise the SE with predicates from the level of being, which can not adorn the SE. I may again indicate the fact that Albinus himself (X, 4) correctly and exactly explains what he means by ἄρρητος, that is, in terms of pure negation, "for it is no class *etc.* (ἐπεὶ οὔτε γένος ἐστὶν οὔτε εἶδος οὔτε διαφορά. κτλ.).

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[535] See 133.

[536] So I think Whittaker, *Negative Theology*, 123 goes too far by separating the negation too much from ἀφαίρεσις when he affirms: "There is thus no good reason to suppose that in Albinus the phrase κατά ἀφαίρεσιν has anything to do with negation as such. In the passage in question Albinus is concerned purely with the problem of forming a conception of God. The matter of negative statements lies outside the scope of his exposition". This presentation does not reckon with the fact that paragraph 5 of ch. X immediately follows on that what is denied in par. 4. Ultimately Whittaker neglects τούτων in the phrase αὐτοῦ νόησις τὴν κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν *τούτων*. For τούτων refers to all that has previously been denied to the God.

After having examined all this and tackling the issue of ἀφαίρεσις as such, in advance I may point out that whereas the via negationis has to do with semantics, the way of abstraction concerns the ontological side of the matter. Abstraction (ἀφαίρεσις) has to do with the mental abstraction of ontological aspects of a thing. It is a procedure mainly used in the field of mathematics[537]. Also in Plotinus 9[VI,9],5 it is a mathematical procedure. It is the reverse of the Pythagorean (and Platonic) movement from point to solid. So we abstract from the corporeal the surface, from the surface the line, from the line the point. This seems to be an Euclidean method. In Albinus, *Didaskalikos* X, 5 we find the same method applied to the point. Already in Aristotle ἀφαίρεσις emerges[538]. In ch.6 of 9[VI,9] Plotinus applies the same method, and compares the abstraction that leads to the point with the abstraction that leads to the One. We shall revert to this issue. It should be obvious that abstraction, 'ontological peeling off' (ἀφαίρεσις; in connection with 'peeling off' perhaps the word περιαιρεῖν is still more striking) is not the same as negation, which figures on the plane of categorial predication, although the two methods have something in common: whatever one can negate, one can ontologically remove by abstraction, and vice versa.

The three ways of gaining knowledge about what is essentially ineffable (ἄρρητον), the via remotionis, the via analogiae and the via eminentiae (ὑπεροχή) are to be met rather extensively and paradigmatically in Albinus, *Didaskalikos*, ch.X (quoted earlier) which is a very famous chapter[539]. This chapter plays a dominant role in the history of the modern description of the ways and perhaps in the usage of these methods in Antiquity after Albinus. I cannot go closely into the contents of this chapter here, suffice it to say that directly or indirectly[540], this chapter or the methodical complex it reflects has exercised a great impact on Plotinus' methods of thinking about the One. The ineffability (ἄρρητον) and the ingraspability (ἀκατάληπτον, this word figures neither in Plotinus nor in Albinus[541]) of the One have to be overcome. Names and notions do not reach beyond the intelligible, but names as indications of negativity (ἐπέκεινα, ἕν = not πολλά) can help, just as analogy may do. For the moment we have said enough about ἀφαίρεσις.

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[537] Whittaker, *Neopythagoreanism*, 122.

[538] Whittaker, *Neopythagoreanism*, 122, cf. Aristotle, *Met.*, 1061 a 28 ff. Apparently it came to Aristotle already from mathematics.

[539] For literature up to 1975 see Mortley, *Negative theology and abstraction in Plotinus*, 363 n.1. For important discussions of the three ways I would refer to Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 115-119, 343-351 and Festugière, *Révélation* IV, 79 ff. More recently Whittaker, *Neopythogoreanism and negative theology*, has made a major contribution in re-

Analogy of which we have already given an example[542], operates by means of an (analogical) scheme that may be formulated as follows A : B = B : C, C being unknown (scheme I, see the scheme below). We may introduce here the term 'analogical *ladder*', for by using these analogical relations you may go upwards to C, the unknown (in this case of Albinus it is the SE, in Plotinus' case the supertranscendent One). Often there is a more simple form, which is also called analogy. One sees a property in B analogous to a property in C. This I call 'simple analogy'. I use the terms B and C because mostly the relation with the SE is concerned, but in principle this form of analogy can also emerge in the relation A : B.

You may also go upwards along the downward influence of the top: scheme II, C : B. When you find something in B you may conclude to the influence of C. This last form tends to be of a different type than scheme I as I have described it, in that basically sometimes it is not an analogy at all in the first sense. In Plotinus we find this form of attaining the One labelled ἐκ τῶν ὕστερον[543]. It is especially the function of the One as a cause that is characteristic for this scheme. In Middle Platonism it is also possible to conclude from C to properties of B (III). This scheme is not present or ought not to be present in Plotinus, for Plotinus does not start from the SE, whereas Middle Platonism

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gard to the distinction of negation and abstraction. See further for Albinus, *Didaskalikos* X, Mansfeld, *Compatible Alternatives*, 108 ff. and Donini, *Connaissance de Dieu*, 118 ff.

[540] We are not certain that Plotinus has ever read Albinus, see Armstrong, *Background*, 422, but, as Armstrong suggests, it is likely. In the Life by Porphyrius (14) Albinus' name does not figure, although Gaius is mentioned.

[541] However, in Philo, the first to speak about the via negationis, we find ἀκατάληπτον, see Runia, *Naming and knowing*, 82. See for literature about the history of the viae, Mansfeld, *Alternatives*, 97 n.18.

[542] See above 182.

[543] This is the formula of 49[V,3],14,7; in 38[VI,7],36,7 we also find γνώσεις τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ and in 9[VI,9],5,34 γιγνωσκόμενον δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γεννήματι. I disagree with Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 350, note 579 that γνώσεις τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ would refer to the method κατὰ σύνθεσιν (see for this method Festugière, *Revelation* IV, 122). This would be the reverse of diairesis. I see nothing of such a procedure in the passages quoted from Plotinus about knowledge by inferiors.

can, because some properties are agreed by all Middle Platonists to belong to the SE.

Scheme I Scheme II Scheme III

$$\begin{tikzcd}
C \arrow[d, phantom, ":"] & C & C \arrow[d] \\
B \arrow[d, phantom, "="] & B \arrow[u] & B \\
B \arrow[d, phantom, ":"] & B & B \arrow[d] \\
A & A \arrow[u] & A
\end{tikzcd}$$

In Albinus, in ch. X we find an example of both scheme I and scheme III. He uses and elaborates the sunsimile of the *Republic*. Just as the sun provides seeing by its light, without seeing, but providing it, so has the mind an analogous relation to the soul. Mind is not the soul nor what soul thinks, but mind provides to soul thinking and the objects of thought to be thought. It is not at all clear what in the context this analogy may have meant to produce. Considering our scheme I, it should be aimed at concluding to the existence of or knowledge about the God (the One does not emerge in Albinus, see note 29). This suggestion is confirmed if we may refer to a previous paragraph of ch.X (1). Here a more elaborated analogy between the *sensibilia* and the *intelligibilia* makes clear that just as in the *sensibilia* there is some highest level of simplicity, we find a similar one in the domain of mind. This highest form of mind is the cause of thinking in the lower mind and is also the cause of motion of the mind of the Ouranos. All this - and it is more elaborately told than I can reflect it here (even an allusion to the sunsimile is included) - is intended to say something about the highest mind, Albinus' highest God, who was said to be almost ineffable. There is a movement upwards (scheme I): as the sun provides light and seeing, so the mind (which is of a higher, noetic, level than the *sensibilia* with the sun) causes the soul to think and the objects of soul's knowledge to be thought. There is movement downwards (scheme III): the highest mind, the Albinian God, causes the mind of the Ouranos to move. Both movements have something to tell. Upwards your analogy furnishes you with a glance of the ineffable God (the fact of his existence), downwards you may conclude to God's influence in a lower entity. In Plotinus of both schemes (I and III) we shall encounter only the first. We do find, however, scheme II in Plotinus as an important provider of knowledge

A special case of using downwards influence (scheme II) which opens possibilities of concluding to C is given in 49[V,3],14. If we have no knowledge (γνῶσις, νόησις) of the One, we may nevertheless speak about it not saying what it is, but what it is not, a theme we are already familiar with. We speak about it from what comes after it (ὥστε ἐκ τῶν ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγομεν). Thus we are not prevented from having it (ἔχειν), even if we do not speak it[544]. This is a very special way of having the One, by means of deduction from its influence. Just like people who are in the grip of a divine power (it is highly probable that artistic inspiration is meant) know that something divine is within them, even if they do not know what they are moved to and by what they are inspired, speak and move, so we are disposed towards the One, when our mind is pure and we are aware that he is the power in our mind who gives and provides being, without being itself being, but transcending logos, mind and perception. In this way we *have* the One and are aware of it by means of its power. This is not different from concluding to the presence of the One and its nature from what comes next, as described in 9[VI,9],5,34 γιγνωσκόμενον δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γεννήματι, τῇ οὐσίᾳ, which comes down to scheme II. We shall see that in 9[VI,9],5, and 6 Plotinus thinks in an upward way, remembering however that we are allowed to apply the word 'analogy' here too.

There is a third method of thinking mentioned by Albinus in his ch.X. This is the via eminentiae (ὑπεροχή), relying on the method of Diotima in Plato's *Symposion*. When you become aware of the beauty in a body, the soul, the institutions, going thence to the sea of beauty, *etc*., and when you think with these the God by the eminence of his superiority, you have gained knowledge about him, in this case his superior beauty. In this way many attributes are ascribed by Albinus to God[545]. We shall find Plotinus going this way as well (*e.g.* 9[VI,9],6) but in addition we must immediately stress the fact that often he combines these ways to a methodical amalgam. On principle this way is a refinement of the way of analogy, for by analogy you establish some property in C and then you superiorise it.

Plotinus uses the word analogy and ἀφαίρεσις, in one form or another regularly (*e.g.* ἀφελοῦσα 9[VI,9],6,3). And in 38[VI,7],36,7 ff. we hear about a preliminary road to the One in terms of ἀναλογίαι τε και ἀφαιρέσεις καὶ γνώσεις τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀναβασμοί τινες: analogies, abstractions, knowledge by its inferiors and steps upward. The ἀναβασμοί τινες are rather difficult to determine in their functioning. We already met the steps in the hierarchical ladder of Diotima's speech in Plato's *Symposion* and the superiority of what transcends the ladder: the via eminentiae. According to Bussanich in this context the ἀναβασμοί τινες are "objects of study". I prefer to speak about 'methods of ascent'. I believe that we must take them as complements of the knowledge by its inferiors (γνώσεις τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ). When you find in the γεννήματα of the One traces of the One (oneness *e.g.*) you may use them as step up to conclude to the absoluteness of the 'oneness' of the One[546].

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[544] See about αὐτὸ λέγειν above 184.
[545] Mansfeld, *Alternatives*, 109

It might be of use to devote some words to the idea of theologia negativa in general. It will not come as a surprise that I would prefer to replace the title of ***theologia negativa*** by ***theologia aphaeretica***, and the title of ***theologia aphaeretica*** by ***henology aphaeretica***, because we should not so much deal with theology primarily as with a doctrine about the SE[547]. I must admit that saying what the SE is not by negation, has privative value, but its ends up in the blind alley of the ἄρρητον. Even the message of the via aphaeretica has nothing positive to bring, but it has its preparatory contribution to make in establishing what the One is and it can be part of the preparation of the soul to empty it[548] in order to wait for the arrival of the One. It is only the via per analogiam, the via per inferiora and the via per eminentiam who can bring us nearer to knowledge of the SE, but in the end neither they nor the via aphaeretica can provide the ultimate contact. Plotinus is very clear on this subject. The ἀναλογίαι τε και ἀφαιρέσεις καὶ γνώσεις τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀναβασμοί τινες may furnish us with some knowledge about the One, they teach (38[VI,7],36,5,6 μάθημα, μαθεῖν, διδάσκουσι) but the ascent to the One goes along other lines: purification, exercise of virtue (*ib.*, 8), and in the end it will be mental vision that will bring us into closest vicinity of the One. But also mental vision leaves a gap which has to be bridged: the complete unification is required, which he promises to be possible.

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[546] Hadot's commentary (*Traité 38*, 348, see also 49) is rather disappointing. He only says that these theological methods were found in Plato by the Platonists and claim them to belong to a tradition, which is a truism, and adds that it is interesting to see that Plotinus alludes to them as things perfectly known, which is again a truism. It is far more interesting to notice that these methods may be known to his readers by the frequent use he makes in his works, as we demonstrated in our text.

[547] Ultimately I would discard the term ***theologia*** (even ***henologia***) ***negativa*** as we find it illustrated in the works of Armstrong. Negation has, at least in Plotinus, nothing to do with the positive route to the SE. As we shall describe in the text, it is not negation but the via aphaeretica that will bring us to a limited extent on the way to the SE, but only in a preliminary sense. Moreover, we do not find in Plotinus the negation of negation which is held to be so characteristic for the ***theologia negativa***, Armstrong, ***Negative Theology***, 180 and especially 188: "We must not be content to say that God is not anything. We must not only say, but experience and be aware, that he is not not anything". This "not not anything" does not occur in Plotinus. A further point: I do not understand why in Plotinus the ***theologia negativa*** would be in any respect 'painful' as Armstrong contends (***Theologia Negativa***, 184), supported by Bussanich, *The One*, 195: "a fairly agonizing business". Negation does not hurt; although the via aphaeretica is not so easy, removal of attributes from our conceptions is more of a personal activity, but ultimately rather harmless.

[548] See 222. Bussanich has some remarks about 'cutting away everything' as "the most apt phrase to define Plotinus' practice of the negative theology", saying "that it is both intellectual and existential" (which I consider not to be appropriate terms). I would not call this negative theology, but Bussanich is right in as far 'cutting away everything' is not purely a matter of rationality as Hadot (*Spirituality*, 247) asserts. It certainly has to do with discarding all forms (see my treatment of emptying the mind, see 222), but to call this "existential" is not very illuminating.

Finally I may call attention to the difference in function of the several ways. The method of negation and the way of abstraction prepare the way for knowledge of the SE, but the way of analogy, the way of getting knowledge by inferiors and the way of eminence have the privilege of providing us with some learning about the SE, whereas it is only the way of abstraction that can play a certain role during the *actual* ascent of the soul, the others cannot, as we have learned to see.

Mansfeld[549] has another view in regard to the relations between the via negationis (not sufficiently distinguished by him from the via aphaeretica), the via analogiae and the via eminentiae in Albinus and constructs an order of importance. The via negationis as the most abstract is the first and the most important (Mansfeld: "πρώτη (*sc.* of par.5) should be understood as the most important"[550]), the via eminentiae the third and the most 'concrete', whereas the via analogiae is the second best. Apart from the question how many ways and methods one has to distinguish, *in Plotinus* this theory of Mansfeld does not hold. Plotinus attaches equal importance to all of them and uses them indiscriminately. The relations between them are as I sketched them in my text above. They function in a different way. Only the via negationis has to do directly with the SE being ἄρρητος. Also in Albinus this must assumed to be so. For he expressly links up the SE being ἄρρητος with negation. It was most easy to connect this enumeration of negations with the via aphaeretica, for what is taken away from the SE is all what has been negated (ἡ κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν *τούτων)*. Hence the fact that he dealt with this way first has nothing to do with its importance, but is entirely contextually explainable (we will later add some more remarks about this contextuality). If one does not distinguish negation from abstraction one is at liberty to say that the via negationis is dealt with last (which happens in par.4) as Mansfeld does. His thesis is that in par.3 themes of the second and third way are dealt with before the ἄρρητος-theme, ἄρρητος indicating the first way (κάλλιστος), and that the first way is explained last after Albinus has dealt with the predicates belonging to the second and third way, because of the difficulty and the level of abstraction of the via negationis. This order, as Mansfeld would have it, is disturbed by ἀίδιος, which incidentally does not fit in easily in any order: it is not explicitly dealt with and has little or nothing to do with any of the three ways. Mansfeld means "that the little chaos (*sc.* of attributes) scholars have believed his (*sc.* Albinus') theology to be is merely apparent". Albinus' enumeration is not done 'at random'. This is where Mansfeld comes up with his solution by suggesting the order of importance of the three ways[551]. However, I think that the order in Albinus is of a somewhat different structure, which is compatible with my thesis that the via analogiae and the via eminentiae are positive in providing knowledge about the One, and that negation explains the being ἄρρητος of the God. This is precisely what we are told by Albinus. Plato, Albinus affirms, considers the God (as *arche*) to be almost inexpressable, but we can gain some knowledge about him in the following manner (*μικροῦ δεῖν* καὶ ἄρρητον. ἐπαχθείημεν δ' ἂν περὶ αὐτῆς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον): via analogical procedures (without explicitly mentioning the word 'analogy') he comes to ascent to the God as mind, and best mind (ch.X, par.2,3). In par.3 he opens with a qualification (κάλλιστος) which could have been reached by the via eminentiae, but this is rather vague and in this case not even plausible, since κάλλιστος was required by his argument to make the God thinking himself as being the most beautiful. Albinus introduces a list of attributes starting with ἀίδιος, then ἄρρητος, αὐτοτελής, ἀειτελής, τέλειος, παντελής,/ θειότης, οὐσιότης, ἀλήθεια, συμμετρία, ἀγαθόν. Many of the attributes express stages of superiority (eminence αὐτοτελής, ἀειτελής, τέλειος, παντελής), but others do not or less (θειότης, οὐσιότης, ἀλήθεια, συμμετρία, ἀγαθόν) and some of them are explained as springing from the *arche*-and-*aitios*-character of the God (notice the ὅτι-s: ἀλήθεια, συμμετρία, ἀγαθόν), not from Gods superiority (as the via eminentiae would have it). So as I see it Albinus' account is as yet rather vague in regard to the ways of analogy and eminence. The sequence of his thought, however, is quite clear. For one first has to establish the fact that there is a Supreme Entity, God, with some properties, in this case his thinking, and it is only after that one is able to speak about the eminence of this God (his *marvellous* thinking). Well then, there is an order, which is completely understandable when Albinus' epistemologically aporetical situation is taken into account: God is almost ineffable. All this is completely in tune with the functioning of both ways as we in our text described it, although one should bear in mind that perhaps the way of eminence is hardly present. This has nothing to do with a sequence of importance, it is a sequence of functioning.

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[549] Mansfeld, *Alternatives*, 109.

[550] Also Dörrie, *Vom Transzendentem im Mittelplatonismus*, 213 regards the via negationis to be the most important: "unter ihnen hat der am meisten rationalen (*sc.* the via negationis) zweifellos den Vorzug". It will appear from my treatment of this issue that Dörrie's utterance is unfounded.

Having globally pointed out the order, one may proceed by establishing that within the general order there is some loose connection when it comes to the enumeration of attributes. With the four opening lines of par.3 Albinus has arrived at the conclusion he was searching for: there is a God who thinks best (namely himself as the most beautiful). Then he proceeds by giving some more information (from another source I presume) by the list of attributes: ἀίδιος, ἄρρητος, αὐτοτελής, ἀειτελής, τέλειος, παντελής,/ θειότης, οὐσιότης, ἀλήθεια, συμμετρία, ἀγαθόν, a list we have already repeteadly quoted. Because of the αἴτιος-character of the Godhead he adds God's being 'Father' (πατὴρ δέ ἐστι τῷ αἴτιος εἶναι κτλ.). This qualification comes as an appendix and is not announced in the list. It is interesting to notice that ἀίδιος, ἄρρητος, αὐτοτελής, ἀειτελής, τέλειος, παντελής seem to need no explanation apart from a description of the terms, and it is also interesting that θειότης, οὐσιότης are apparently obvious qualifications that do not require an explanation at all. However, ἀλήθεια, συμμετρία (καλόν), ἀγαθόν are discussed in reversed order, for Albinus worked in *a retrograde manner*. Ἄρρητος was the only attribute left of which he wished to give a complete explanation. This had to be done after having mentioned the appendix 'father'. So within the order the attributes are dealt with the comment on ἄρρητος comes at an entirely natural moment. The timing of this comment therefore has nothing to do with importance (Mansfeld). In that case ἀίδιος would have been of more importance. It is curious to notice that in spite of Dörrie's[552] and Mansfeld's contention of the via negationis to be the most important, Albinus himself in the first three paragraphs of ch.X of the *Didaskalikos* does not operate by means of the via negationis at all; what he himself in this part of the chapter uses are the via analogia and in a covert form the via eminentia.

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[551] Mansfeld, *Alternatives*, 109.

I must confess that, nevertheless, as an attribute, ἄρρητος seems rather odd in the enumeration. As standing in between ἀίδιος and αὐτοτελής, it could be assumed to express the uniqueness of the God, but this escape is doubtful and its contents and its place remain strange, not so much because of its supposed conflict with the other qualifications, but because of its contents as such. However, given its place in the text *the place of its comment* is a natural one.

We may now recognize that understandably Albinus opens his account of God with Plato's affirmation considering the God as *almost* ineffable: *μικροῦ δεῖν* καὶ ἄρρητον. The word ἄρρητον still seems to be taken in a not too dogmatical sense. Without this qualification μικροῦ δεῖν one is condemned to silence. But immediately he adds that this ineffability can be overcome: ἐπαχθείημεν δ' ἂν περὶ αὐτῆς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. So a single dogmatic ἄρρητον would have been too strict. As I see it the second ἄρρητος as a qualification of God in the enumeration has a more dogmatic ring and should be interpreted as *predicateless* (on the level of Being lower than the SE) as we depicted it above. In this case the clause *μικροῦ δεῖν* was not required and could easily be left out, which Albinus did. For when ἄρρητος means predicateless *in the sense we attached to it*, μικροῦ δεῖν would have been nonsense. One cannot say that there are *nearly* no predicates, if it is proven that no predicate whatsoever is applicable to the God.

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[552] Dörrie (*Vom Transzendentem im Mittelplatonismus*, 213) affirms that in comparison with the via negationis the via analogiae and the via eminentiae have in Middle Platonism only "eine mehr hilfsweise Bedeutung". We have seen in the text that in the case of Albinus' chapter X rather the reverse is true.

Return to the text of 9[VI,9],5,38,39

Now being aware of the methods of negation, abstraction, analogy ("per inferiora"), and eminence we may turn again to 9[VI,9],5 where we left off (lines 38,39) and see Plotinus at work on the base of τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γέννημα. Plotinus makes some observations about the right manner to introduce the One to the mind by naming the One 'one': ὀνομάζομεν ἓν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῷ σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις αὐτὴν τῷ ὀνόματι εἰς ἔννοιαν *ἀμέριστον* ἄγοντες καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἑνοῦν θέλοντες. Harder translates: "Wir wollen mit diesen Namen auf die Vorstellung des Ungeteilten hinleiten und die Seele zur Einheit führen" (*o.c.*, 187). MacKenna (*o.c.*, 619) renders the same phrase as follows: "indicating it to each other by a designation that points to the concept of its partlessness, while we are in reality striving to bring our minds to unity". Bréhier (*o.c.*, 178) : "et il faut l'appeler l'Un pour nous désigner l'un l'autre pourque ce nom nous conduise a une notion indivisible et unifie notre ame". Armstrong: "bringing ourselves by the name to an indivisible Idea". Igal: "Sed in ancipiti est utrum referendum sit ad ἔννοιαν (dum conamur Eam indivisam adducere) an ad αὐτὴν (dum conamur Eam indivisam ad notionem adducere)[553]". He does not know how the choice has to be made. I believe that the second option is to be preferred. In the following passage Plotinus' message is all about the purification of the One: in no way one is allowed to combine the One with being of any kind, for being implies multitude. If we wish to speak about the One we must do so on the purest level. We are then dealing with ἁπλοῦν and the φυγὴ τοῦ πλήθους. For πλῆθος means μερισμός (line 46). We must represent the nature of the One (the term 'nature' is significant) in an undivided state to our notion. The interpretation 'to an individed notion' seems to make little sense, if it makes any sense at all; Harder[554] feels obliged to translate 'the notion of the individed': "wir wollen mit diesen Namen auf die Vorstellung des Ungeteilten hinleiten". The objective θέλοντες of this procedure is: τὴν ψυχὴν ἑνοῦν. Ψυχὴν in this expression is usually understood as an object (Harder: "und die Seele zur Einheit führen", Armstrong: "and wanting to unify our souls", see also MacKenna and Bréhier). According to this interpretation we are supposed to wish to make the soul one. Now this does not fit in at this particular point of the argument. It is not so much that we want to bring our soul to oneness as it is to present the One, especially its structure in its partlessness, to our imagination.

In what immediately follows in the text (the opening of ch.6 included), what ἓν λέγειν actually means, is explained. We must not call this nature 'one' in the way we do when speaking about a point or a monas. For if we bring the *physis* of the One to our mind in this manner we actually introduce multitude Quantitative one and μερισμός. This kind of oneness is the source of multiplicity, quantity (ποσόν[555]) and therefore of division (μερισμός). Almost in desperation Plotinus exclaims: "How then should we say ἕν and how are we to adapt this One to our νόησις (cf. ἔννοιαν)?" At all events this must take place on a fuller level than when the monad or the point is 'oned' (ἑνίζεται). For if we truly realise the oneness of a monad or a point (by abstraction ἀφελοῦσα, ἀφαίρεσις !), we only have left the smallest possible remnant, which admittedly is ἀμερές, but was part of the many and which must therefore be regarded as ἐν ἄλλῳ. Even whenever we bring the One to mind (νοήσῃς) as νοῦς or as θεός, it will transcend these too (πλέον ἐστιν). And whenever we make it one with the διάνοια (ἐνίσῃς) it is still more one. It even surpasses thinking. All this shows that what must happen when we say ἕν, is:

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[553] Igal, *de Uno*, 292.

[554] Harder 187 (cf. *I b*, 475).

not unit 1) we should not make the One a monad or a point. For that is insufficient.
not unity 2) we should not make it one as we do νοῦς or θεός, since that is insufficient too.
not unifying? 3) even ἐνίζειν with the διάνοια is inadequate.

At any rate, it will be clear from the above that ἓν λέγειν is to be regarded as an activity of the soul: 6,3 ἀφελοῦσα; line,12 νοήσῃς; line,13 ἐνίσῃς τῇ διανοίᾳ, compare 6,1 τῇ νοήσει ἐφαρμοστέον; and 5,44 βάλλειν τὴν διάνοιαν; and 6,50 τηρεῖν τὸ ἓν in a context of semantical action. We can only conclude that when Plotinus speaks about τὴν ψυχὴν ἑνοῦν, it is the activity of the soul that is implied. It is therefore necessary for ψυχὴν to be taken as an accusative of the subject with ἑνοῦν, and not as an object, as is generally supposed. In what follows Plotinus demonstrates what kind of activity ἑνοῦν is. Here the connection with εἰς ἔννοιαν ἀμέριστον ἄγοντες appears. We have to bring to mind the nature of the One in an individed way (see 6,1 τῇ νοήσει ἐφαρμοστέον) *i.e.* without μερή.

The translations by Harder, MacKenna and Bréhier show how artificially they became in order to preserve *some* meaning. The word ἄγοντες is taken with θέλοντες in an impossible way by Harder ("wir wollen .... hinleiten" *etc.*) and MacKenna. Bréhier, often translating rather carelessly and paraphrasingly, leaves θέλοντες out. In my opinion we have to take θέλοντες *epexegetically* with ἄγοντες: it shows the intention with which we have to bring the structure of the One to mind. What we want is to 'one' that φύσις by our soul.

We may now return to lines 41, 42, where Plotinus warns us not to say 'one' and 'partless' in the sense we talk about the oneness and partlessness of the point (σημεῖον) or the arithmetical one (μονάς). They are both the origins of plurality (ἀρχαὶ ποσοῦ, but cf. note 555 on line 41). Plotinus is not thinking about the level of prenoetic number (see 111), for he emphasizes the postnoetic character of these forms of oneness: they would not be in existence, if being and what is prior to being (the One, but see note 558) had not preceded. We must not cast our thought thither (towards point and monas), ἐνταῦθα βάλλειν τὴν διάνοιαν, one of those remarkable concrete expressions, which Plotinus freqently uses to designate the process of thinking (see note 622; διάνοια is used because of the domain beneath the transcendent world , see p.167).

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[555] Line 42: ἀρχαί - HS: "Enn. recte, nam σημεῖον et μονάς duo principia". They are right in that those principles are two, but one has to add that μονάς may be regarded as a principle of plurality, rather the origin of numerality or plurality. Σημεῖον is the origin of extension. What Plotinus pursued by introducing σημεῖον , *i.e.* extension, we shall see later on, 197 ff..

So we are warned not to start from the point and the monas[556] and to end there. We must consider them as always entailing a similarity to what is prior to them in analogy[557]. The points of analogy to what is being and what is prior to being (ἐκείνοις line 45) are their simplicity and their avoiding plurality (which holds both for σημεῖον and μονάς as well) and avoiding having parts (which holds for σημεῖον). Here we find the via analogiae in its simple form (the simplicity of μονάς/ σημεῖον: the simplicity of οὐσία and τὸ πρὸ τῆς οὐσίας, the One); this last part of the analogy is not recognized by Harder, who, lacking insight into the matter of analogy, seems reluctant to involve the One in the analogy. This must certainly be wrong, for it is reaching the One, which is precisely the ultimate objective of employing the analogy as a method[558], a method however that falls short in the end, for the analogy is no more than a startingpoint to go upwards, and to form a starting notion about the One. However, this basis is not sufficient; the via eminentiae in the following chapter as it appears from the repeated πλέον ἤ in ch.6 (lines 2,12,13) will be operating as a complement to the via analogiae to complete what is brought in by the via analogiae. Although Plotinus continues his discussion of naming the One and bringing it to mind in the following chapter (of which we encountered already something), I suspend here to maintain the order of chapters and to have the chapter five finished.

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[556] Line 42: σημεῖον ἢ μονάδα - Harder (*I b*, 475) quotes Albinus' usage of "Punkt und Zahl" adding these words: "diese (point and number) wurden vom traditionellen Platonismus als Erkenntnis-Analogie herangezogen" (then he points to Albinus, *Ep.10*, par. 5 Louis). We have to rectify this utterance in two respects. Firstly Albinus (ch.X) does not mention number (so monas (Zahl) is no point of comparison). Secondly, - in the framework of what was said in the Excursus this is more important - Albinus quotes the point (σημεῖον) not as exemplifying an 'Erkenntnis-Analogy' but offers this example to elucidate the notion of abstraction (ἀφαίρεσις the via aphaeretica) in regard to the *sensibilia*: the point is the end of a series of increasing abstraction: αἰσθητὸν, ἐπιφάνειαν, εἶτα γραμμὴν καὶ τελευταῖον τὸ σημεῖον. Albinus' Middle Platonism, however, remains important in order to discover how, in his own manner, Plotinus works on the methods and thoughts Middle Platonism had put at his disposal. The same holds for Numenius' contribution to Middle Platonism (see *e.g.* 51). Unfortunately, Harder's observation ad line 42 is not of much help to connect Albinus and Plotinus in view of σημεῖον.

[557] Line 45: ὁμοίως - Harder (475) rejects Kirchhoff's clever suggestion to extend the influence of δεῖ in the previous sentence to the rather unexpected *adverb*, the difficult construable ὁμοίως, changing it into the inf. aor. and making it dependent on δεῖ. Harder offers a reason for this rejection: "mit 44 setzt ein neuer Denkimpuls ein". This may be reasonably doubted. For the content of the sentence admirably fits in with the previous argument, completing the idea of analogy by pointing to its limitations. Harder suggests (mindestens) the perfect tense ὁμοίωται. Needless to say that this should be rejected on the grounds just mentioned. I, myself, would prefer to read with Kirchhoff ὁμοιῶσαι, but not as a combination with the following αἰεί, but as a haplography: I would maintain αἰεί, which solution has an advantage above Kirchhoff's solution in that it must eliminate ει whereas ει can be saved if we assume that a haplography is the cause of the trouble.

[558] Harder believes that ἐκείνοις (line 45) only refers to the higher principles of the "Wieviel", but although Plotinus speaks in a general plural, he nevertheless certainly includes the One; ἐκείνοις (line 45) refers to οὐσίας and *τὸ πρὸ οὐσίας*.

CHAPTER SIX

6, 1-7 Methods to accomodate the notion of the One to one's thought.'Oning'

Translation

How, then, do we say one? and how must we accommodate it to our thinking? To be sure, by taking it as more one than the way in which the unit and the point are 'oned'. For in their case the soul takes away size and numerical multitude and attains in the end the smallest and leans upon something that is partless, but what was in a divisible whole and in something else. But that is neither in something else nor in something divisible nor in something partless in a way the smallest is.

After the initial question at the beginning of this chapter: "how, then, do we say one" and "how must we adjust[559] it to our mind", Plotinus starts again from μονάς and σημεῖον. Since ultimately when going to the One, the analogies they can provide are but a prelude, as the last sentence of ch.5 assures, we must posit[560] the One as 'one' in a fuller sense (Plotinus is using the via eminentiae) than μονάς and σημεῖον ever may be 'oned' (ἑνίζεται 'unified'). Their intrinsical value of oneness can be discovered by the soul (!)[561] via complete abstraction (ἀφελοῦσα, aphaeresis) by removing plurality and extension, a process, that may result in reaching the absolute minimum (σμικρότατον) and rests upon something partless, with this (dis) qualification, however, that this ultimate thing belonged to a divisible whole and is still in some other thing. You may abstract as far and as strongly as you can, yet the μονάς and the σημεῖον continue to be part of a continuous whole, which in the end condemns them despite of their maximalized oneness never to reach the degree of oneness the One deserves. Plato's *Parmenides* (138 A 2,3) forbids the One to be in another being: οὔτε ἐν ἄλλῳ. Plato adds: οὔτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ. Thus the literal quotation in Plotinus from the Parmenides is confined to ἐν ἄλλῳ. Plotinus' next words (line 5) display some inspiration from the same place in the Parmenides: οὔτε ἐν μεριστῷ does not feature in the *Parmenides* but οὔτε οὕτως ἀμερές undoubtedly does (138 A 4 τοῦ δὲ ἑνός τε καὶ *ἀμεροῦς*). Using Plato is again highly characteristic of Neoplatonic methods: they adjust him to their own needs. Plotinus further affirms that the One is not partless in the sense the minimum is[562].

eminence

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[559] Ἐφαρμοστέον- ἐφαρμόζειν in the field of mathematics can be used of the points radii have in common with their centre in a circle (see Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Anima*, 63, 8-13, about which see my page 245 below). Thus this word indicates a very tight connection.

[560] Line 2: τιθέμενον - Masculinum to be taken with ἐφαρμοστέον according to HS, who compare Kühner-Gerth, *Griechische Grammatik* I, 448, n.2.

[561] Line 3: ἡ ψυχή - Discursive thinking is the task of the soul, see above 167.

[562] Line 4: σμικρότατον - One could wonder why Plotinus so insistently rejects the idea of the One having smallness. It is possible about the One to imagine a particular form of oneness being partless to such a degree that it has the smallest possible extension οὕτως ἀμερές, ὡς τὸ σμικρότατον. The μονάς and the σημεῖον, in any event, may be considered

6, 7- 12 The One the greatest. Its power

Translation

For it is the greatest not in size, but in power, so that also its indivisibility is indivisibility in power. For also what is after it is are things indivisible in their powers and partless, not in their bulks. And one also has to take him as unlimited not by the untraversiness of his seize or number, but by the embracelessness of his power.

The use of σμικρότατον inspires Plotinus to add some remarks about its counterpart, the maximum (μέγιστον). Strange as it may seem in the case of the One, its oneness also implies its being the greatest, but not in connection with extension or size[563]. It is its power (δύναμις) that is greatest (HS vi, non potentia). The background, of course, is Plotinus' notion of the priority of the One

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to belong to this type of smallness. Well then, according to Plotinus' teaching the One must be considered to be of an entirely different order, not smaller than the smallest, but not small in any sense. For, Plotinus argues, the One is the greatest (which seems to be the counterargument), but its greatness does not contain any extension, it is only the greatest extension in *power* that is ascribed to the One. According to Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus*, I, 114 Plotinus would have *implicitly* acknowledged that the One is a minimum "dans l' ordre de la grandeur corporelle, lorsqu' il écrit qu' il est "la chose la plus grande de toutes, non par la dimension mais par la puissance"". This supposition seems to me to be disapointingly off the mark. For smallness, however small, implies extension, and any extension is rejected, since even greatness of extension, however great, is denied to the One. Any extension in respect of the One is denied elsewhere in Plotinus and I do not see any reason why an exception should be made in this case, in 9[VI,9],6. Plotinus' emphasis on the issue of the smallest minimum (smaller than μονάς and point to such a degree that smallness is even out of the question) as a candidate for being characteristic of the One might have a polemical background, which might have originated in Speusippus' contention that the One is the smallest ἐλάχιστον, see Tarán, *Speusippus*, fr.49 a, thought of as counterpart in the configuration small-great. In Neoplatonic circles *after* Plotinus' times it was held that it belonged to Speusippus' teaching that the One is the smallest indivisible minimum. The *Anonymus Taurinensis* rejects this theorem (see Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus*, II, 65, line 21) as specifically Speusippean, heading it under his name. The *Anonymus Taurinensis* (*ibidem*, 68, line 3,4) assumes (a) that the One transcends everything (smallness included), providing (b) an alternative, the smallness of the One escapes the limits of our human understanding, which for *Plotinus* is, ultimately, unacceptable, I think, because Plotinus' view cannot be grasped in extensional terms at all (micro-extensionality included). We see the doctrine of the One as minimal quantity repeatedly quoted and attacked among the Neoplatonists: apart from the *Anonymus*, who suggested the possibility, we encounter Iamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus and Damascius (see Westerink- Combès, *Traité*, 3, and 132). If Tarán, *Speusippus*, 356, 357 (see also 32, 33) is right, any Neoplatonic criticism of the doctrine is inappropriate since the Neoplatonic One is not equivalent to the Speusippean One, which is not the smallest quantity, but the smallest *number*. For Plotinus 9[VI,9],6 all this is irrelevant. The only point is whether Plotinus gave a reaction to such a Speusippean of pseudo-Speusippean doctrine, which narrowed the One down to minimal quantity. As such this does not seem impossible, but the whole tenor of his treatment, employing the ways of analogy and eminence, required a comparison with the smallest possible number or quantity to transcend even the oneness of these entities.

[563] Line 10: HS refer to two places, *Parm.* 137 D 7 (ἄπειρον) and Aristotle, *Phys.*, 207 b 28-29. These references do not seem very helpful.

over all forms of extension, from the largest to the smallest (the minimum). Its partlessness, too, concerns power, not extension, be it the minimal extension. Plotinus offers a proof for this position (ἐπεὶ καί line 8) derived from what we may learn from the γέννημα of the One (see above 178), in this connection τὰ μετ' αὐτὸ ὄντα (beings). They are indivisible and partless as regards their powers, but not regarding their ὄγκοι (*LP*: magnitude, perhaps 'dimension'[564]). As I feel it, the expression τὸ ἀμέγεθες in line 8 is inacceptable in the development of thought. For (lack of) magnitude is not the *q.e.d.* of the argument, which, incidentally, is perfectly provided by Vitringa's conjecture τὸ ἀμερές, which is accepted by Harder, rejected by HS. From the point of view of the argument τὸ ἀμέγεθες is but a poor parenthetical observation and even rather unclear, because one cannot see what sizelessness has to do with *power*, whereas a strong *q.e.d.* is needed in the sense of indivisibility of the One. How the indivisibility should be conceived, is further explained by another case (καί line 10), namely of the limitlessness (ἄπειρον) of the One (which is now called 'he' !, till line 17).

The One must be regarded as having no limits (ἄπειρον), not because when going through the One one would never encounter its limits qua extension or the limits qua its series of numbers, but because its power is incomprehensible. It is the first time in the *Enneads* that Plotinus connects the SE as the One with ἄπειρον. Later in the *Enneads* this theme emerges again[565]. Because of the One's lack of extension it is directly linked up with its having no extensional magnitude; in this athmosphere extensional *smallness* is rejected only in 9[VI,9],6 on contextual grounds. In 12[II,4],15,17 ff. Plotinus denies the One to have ἀπειρία *at all*, the One produces only unlimitedness in its posteriors. This is by no means paradoxical but completely in tune with the One being ἄπειρον in 9[VI,9],6, for although in 12[II,4],15,17 ff. the One is said not to have ἀπειρία, this form of ἀπειρία concerns extensional unlimitedness only, unlimitedness qua power is not at issue. The One's being ἄπειρον regards neither extension nor number. These forms of infiniteness are alien to the One. The One is only ἄπειρον because you cannot embrace or comprehend its *power*.

Power is the ultimate way to describe the One's nature, and it may be ascribed to the One, because it is rather harmless as it involves no other property or attribute, being but the *cause* of what emanates. In the late treatise 49[V,3],15,30 Plotinus gives way to this notion: the One possesses everything as not yet distinct (ὡς μὴ διακεκριμένα line 31), for everything comes forward in distinction in the second hypostasis, this is already actuality (ἐνέργεια). The

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[564] Line 9: ὄγκος - This word has a turbulent history and a wide range of meanings, from mass to point (Epicurus, see note 382). Here it is employed on a transcendent level, which is rare, but in connection with the problem such a use is understandable, for ὄγκος seems flexible enough (see note 382). In our treatise it is mostly a prominent characteristic of the sensible. In line 32 ὄγκος has descended again to the normal earthly level.

[565] 32[V,5],10,19-23, where also magnitude is involved, as in 38[VI,7],32,15; see also 32[V,5],11,1.

One, however, is δύναμις τῶν πάντων and makes what he has not (ἃ μὴ ἔχει line 35,36). It is clear that here the δύναμις of the One is the potency to create what indiscriminately and latently is in the One. However, there is not only the potency but one must also say at once that the power of the One has another side: it is the productive and creating force. *In* the One power is its potency to create everything inferior, and in regard to its inferiors it is this potency in its actuality (ἐνέργεια) as the actual productive force that creates its products. As I see it, one must discern between these two aspects of δύναμις. One might say that in these two sides of δύναμις we have the Plotinian problem of emanation in a most concentrated form. Therefore I disagree with Bussanich[566] that saying ὡς μὴ διακεκριμένα in line 31 is a rhetorical slip in view of what is said in 30[III,8],9,45 ff., where Plotinus posits the One's position as before τὰ πάντα. In 9[VI,9],5,36 we have come across already this double aspect of the One's δύναμις: there is the creating δύναμις, which produces τὰ ὄντα (δύναμιν *γεννῶσαν* [567]τὰ ὄντα) and there is the potency to create, which remains in it (μένουσαν ἐν ἑαυτῇ), does not diminish and is not present in what is created by it (καὶ οὐκ ἐλαττουμένην οὐδε ἐν τοῖς γινομένοις ὑπ' αὐτῆς οὖσαν). As far as I can see the latter has been rather neglected in the secondary literature. The first type has been broadly expounded by Plotinus himself, in 30[III,8],10 with the proviso that the second features also in this chapter, for he repeatedly says in his metaphors of the river and the plant of this famous chapter that the origin remains in itself[568].

In regard to the One, the Aristotelian significance of δύναμις as pure potentiality[569] having the capacity to be informed by form and to become something, has been widely considered among scholars to have nothing to do with the One. Small wonder, for Plotinus says it himself: the δύναμις of the One has nothing to do with passive (οὐ γὰρ πάσχει) potentiality like matter has passive potentiality (49[V,3],15,34)[570].

The same form of limitlessness of power emerges in the intelligible world[571], and in soul[572], but they are finite in number, which in regard to the

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[566] Bussanich, *The One*, 105.

[567] Compare the δύναμις εἰς γεννᾶν of 49[V,3],16,5 which is ascribed to all entities and therefore by analogy transmitted to the One.

[568] 30[III,8],10,7,11,19. Notice that in the vicinity of δύναμις (*ib.*,1) Plotinus likes to speak about origin (ἀρχή, *ib.*,10,5) and source (πηγή, *ibidem*, and 49[V,3],15,27; 9[VI,9],5,36). These metaphors express the continuity of the conjunction of the One with its posteriors, whereas the term δύναμις does not, or less.

[569] Notice that Aristotle, *Met.*1046 a 26-27 does know the other meaning, see Bussanich, *The One*, 106.

[570] Bussanich, *The One*, 105-107 presents a very useful survey of the meaning of δύναμις and possible historical backgrounds. I agree with him (*ib.*, 107) in his opposition against Krämer's idea that Plotinus' δύναμις indicates "reine Potenzialität" and "reine Negativität" (*Geistmetaphysik*, 351). After what is said about having everything indiscriminately and latently (which is as such no having at all) in 49[V,3],15,30 nobody will wonder that I must admit that δύναμις has some "Potenzialität". It is, however, not "*pure* potentiality". Perhaps we should rather speak of 'latency' in this case.

[571] 31[V,8],9,25; 23[VI,5],9,16.

[572] 33[II,9],17,10.

One does not play any role. The One is the cause of number. It seems unwise to bring in the notion of ἀνείδεον, as Rist[573] does when examining the infinity of the One. For the limits do not concern form, but extension or number (these limits are called πέρας). So Rist comes to the (unPlotinian) thesis that Being is finite (by form) and the One might be called 'infinite Being'. However, this infinity of the One is of a quite different order than the infiniteness in power, for this kind of infiniteness has nothing to do with form. Incidentally, I can not understand why one should wish to speak about "the infinite *Being*" of the One as Rist[574], and also Armstrong[575], does. Being has to be kept far from the One[576]. And the adjective "infinite" does not justify any such designation of the One.

6, 12-16 Imagining the oneness of the One as God is insufficient

Translation

> For when you imagine him as one as a God or mind, he is more. And again when you 'one' him by your thought, also then he is more than you would have imagined him as a God in order to make him more one than your thinking. For he is on his own, while no attribute has come to him.

In spite of the following γάρ (in line 12) which suggests that an argument or proof will follow, I assume that Plotinus returns to his previous point: the 'one-ing' of the One. The mss present after ὅταν a redundant ἄν. The conjecture of ἕν in stead of ἄν would satisfy the requirements of the argument more appropriately, giving an entirely different but far more suitable picture. "When you imagine the One as one (ἓν αὐτόν νοήσῃς) in the sense the mind or a God[577] is one, the One will be even more (πλέον)". Unclear remains what 'more' could mean. Harder translates: "so ist er mehr". Does that mean that the One has even more power? This is implied when the sentence provides proof for what directly precedes it concerning the power of the One's offspring. As I feel it, however, the question of power is no longer Plotinus' concern. In the following phrase, again, the point is 'one-ing' (καὶ αὖ ὅταν αὐτὸν *ἑνίσῃς)*. I suggest to compare line 2: πλεόνως τιθέμενον ἕν. Whenever you imagine the One as unified as mind or a God is, then the One will surpass this process of unifying. This is completely in line with all we have previously been told. You have to find the appropriate mode of 'one-ing'. When you take another chance, by making it one by means of your thinking (καὶ αὖ ὅταν αὐτὸν ἑνίσῃς τῇ διανοίᾳ), even then it is more (one, again suppleted).

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[573] Rist, *Road*, 25 ff.

[574] Rist, *Road*, 25,30.

[575] Armstrong, *Infinite*, 53.

[576] Basically it is right to keep being remote from the One, Plotinus himself, however, sometimes departs from this important rule. When serious contextual reasons force him to speak about the nature of the One, he cannot avoid to introduce 'being' as a term to sketch this nature (39[VI,8],13,38). In this case, however, it is not the being that belongs to the level of mind, but it is merely a mode of speech to be able to say at least something about the SE's nature. See *e.g.* 39[VI,8],13,9 (.... ἡ βούλησις αὐτοῦ (*sc.* the One) καὶ ἡ *οὐσία* ταὐτὸν ἔσται. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἄρα ἐβούλετο, οὕτω καὶ *ἔστιν*). Plotinus is fully aware, however, of his trespassing against the rules of correct speech, as he shows in the opening of ch.13 and 39[VI,8],13,50, where he says that one should always have a firm addition of 'as if' (οῖον) in mind. Bales (*Plotinus' theory of the One*, 43 ff.) collected a series of texts, that ascribe being to the One, calling them 'ontological'. Mostly these texts stem from 39[VI,8]. Bales does not seem to be aware of the 'as if' proviso (οῖον metaphoricum) in this treatise.

[577] Line 12: θεόν- I assume that here Plotinus means *a* God. The One is not comparable with mind, nor with a God. Very often we find God or Gods in Plotinus. He tries to surpass even the notion of mind. The highest of mind is God or Gods, but this does not amount to saying that the One is not God or could not be God (the all surpassing Supergod) as Arnou claims, *Désir*,130, ch.I, see Part I "The History of the One", 64.

In connection with the following a lot of conjectures has been made, all starting from the assumption that the transmitted text is unacceptable: the mss have ἢ θεὸν ἂν (see the apparatus of HS) which after the comparative 'more' (πλέον) will do. The problem seems to be the construction of the sentence ἢ θεὸν ἂν, which explains Ficinus' guess in the margine *εἰ* θεὸν ἂν. Literally rendered the sentence says: "even in that case he is more than (or with Ficinus 'if') you would have him imagined as a God in order to make him be more one than your thinking (ἢ θεὸν αὐτὸν ἐφαντάσθης εἰς τὸ ἑνικώτερον τῆς σῆς νοήσεως εἶναι)". Some scholars proposed to change ἢ θεόν ἂν in ἢ θεός, ἂν φαντασθῇς (Volkmann), or ἢ θεόν, ἐὰν φαντασθῇς (Vitringa). We have then, the following stages: 1) imagining him as mind or a God, 2) (αὖ ! making a second stage) one-ing him with the διάνοια. 1) and 2) are in retrospection combined in the reading of the mss: "he is more than you would have him imagined as a God to make him surpass the one-ing capacity of your mind". What presumably bothered Gollwitzer (and HS), is the position of the sentence ἢ θεὸν αὐτόν ἐφαντάσθης εἰς τὸ ἑνικώτερον τῆς σῆς νοήσεως εἶναι in the development of the thought; it would be unlikely that θεόν was put here by Plotinus. For in the development of the argument comparing the One with a God belongs to a stage before this one, namely 1). One would have Plotinus expected to say - as a second stage (αὖ)- that if you 'one' him with your mind, he also surpasses this process (πλέον). In line12 Plotinus also uses πλέον absolutely. This perhaps inspired Gollwitzer to read ὅσον ἄν, which HS accepted. In this case we can maintain the development of the thought, without Plotinus falling back to stage 1) by contaminating stages 1 and 2. However, the sequence of the thought, as I see it, especially the combining of 1) and 2) to draw more attention to the mental action, enables us to maintain the lecture of the mss without compromising the thought. On the other hand, if there should be a change, then I propose to accept εἰ and to alter θεόν into μὴ ἓν which offers the following sentence: εἰ μὴ ἓν ἂν αὐτὸν ἐφαντάσθης *etc.*: "if you would not have it imagined one to the extent that is more one than your thinking (εἰς τὸ ἑνικώτερον τῆς σῆς νοήσεως εἶναι)". So every attempt to bring the One to your mind will fail whenever you do not surpass the oneness of your own thought[578]. For the One is on its own, without anything that may be considered as an attribute: ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ γάρ ἐστιν οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ συμβεβηκότος. The One has no attributes, and consequently no predicates. Therefore you must apply a different form of thinking, one that transcends the manner of thinking of the mind-level.

It seems wise to, again[579], go into the value of the word συμβαίνειν here in order to explain line 15, which has a pivotal function in the chapter: ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ γάρ ἐστιν οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ συμβεβηκότος. The perfect tense συμβεβηκός denotes 'having come to an entity as an attribute'. Thus in line 16 οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ συμβεβηκότος means that the One, being on its own and in its own right, has no properties descending on it from higher levels (which, as a matter of fact, do not exist), *i.e.* the One has nothing by participating in higher levels. Therefore νοεῖν in terms of predicates indicating properties, even the property 'one', is completely impossible.

So far we have had to do with two characteristics of the One that may be inferred by analogy from its γέννημα: its oneness and its power, although it must be stressed that it is only by means of the via eminentiae that we may grasp what oneness and power signify in regard to the One. There is a third characteristic that promises to be successful and helpful to express the oneness of the One. If there is no attributive characteristic (συμβεβηκός) that can safely be ascribed to the One, its being on its own results into its autarky.

6, 16-35 A new approach

This is the attempt to [illegible] the One: autarky (no predicates)

Translation

Through its autarky one could also imagine its oneness. For it is the most self-sufficient of all and the most autark and the most without need. Everything that is multiple and not one is in need, not one since it is one composed from many. Thus its essence requires being one, but that (the One) does not need itself, for it is itself already. However, what is many, needs as many things as it is, and the fact that every contributive factor, since it is with the others and not on its own, is in need of the others, make such a thing needy both in respect of its oneness and its whole. Since then there must exist something that is the most autark, only the One can be such a thing, because it is not needy in respect to itself nor in respect to any other thing. For it does not seek some thing in order to be nor anything to be well nor something in order to be established there. For since it is the cause of the others, it does not have from the others what it is, and what could the well-being be for it outside itself? Consequently, its well-being is not an attribute, for it is itself. And it has no place. For it does not need establishment, as if it were unable to bear itself. And what will be established is soulless and a falling mass, if it is not yet established. And the other things are established by him, by whom they at once came into existence and acquired a place to be located in as well. And needy is also that what is looking for a place. But an origin is not in need of the things which are after it.

origin

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[578] See for this familiar theme 139 ff.
[579] See above 81 and 136.

It is on this new possibility to approach the One that Plotinus concentrates now. He declares: "by means of the autarky you can imagine the specific one-character of the One" (Τῷ αὐτάρκει δ' ἄν τις καὶ τὸ ἓν αὐτοῦ ἐνθυμηθείη[580] line 17). From the autarky of the One arises a chorus of consequences in terms of attributes to be denied. The absolute self-sufficiency of the One implies that it does not possess any need whatsoever: it is ἀνενδεές and thus has no participation in higher levels, which implies the absence of predicates to give. Consequently the combination of the One having no properties and its self-sufficiency does not emerge haphazardly. Moreover, the factual if not the intrinsical connection is also part of the tradition. We find a similar feature already in Albinus, *Didaskalikos*, ch.X, par.3. Immediately after stating God's ineffability Albinus affirms that the God is αὐτοτελὴς τούτεστιν *ἀπροσδεής*. Already in 7[V,4],1,13 Plotinus himself has pointed to the One's autarky. It is a recurrent theme in the entire *Enneads*. We may reject the following list of needs in regard to the One:

1) need of itself or of another
2) being
3) εὖ
4) a) τόπος
    b) ἵδρυσις
5) βούλησις
6) νόησις

Before making a tour along these points, I should recall the fact that in previous chapters other lists of 'categories' (Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic) were used to liberate the One from predication and attribution. Here I suspect an other traditional background, a different cluster of denials, concentrated around the notion of autarky. In any case autarky is the traditional counterpart of having no attributes, as appears from Albinus.

1) **No need of itself or of another.** What is most self-sufficient, is most autark and is without any need[581]. Now everything that is plural and not one[582],

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[580] Line 17: ἐνθυμηθείη - A brilliant restoration of Gollwitzer for mss ἓν οὐ μὴ θείη, see Harder, *I b*, 476: "... bringt den Satz in Ordnung durch Änderung eines einzigen Strichs: Θ statt O". Here it must be on a par with 5,40 εἰς ἔννοιαν ἄγειν and 6,1 τῇ νοήσει ἐφαρμοστέον. Kirchhoff's ἐννοηθείη is brilliant, and Gollwitzer's trouvaille all the more. Ἐνθυμεῖσθαι is frequently used in Plotinus, see *LP*.

[581] Line 17: ἱκανός - This word if not synonymous with αὐτάρκης must have a somewhat different meaning from αὐτάρκης. It seems to lay more stress on capacity, competence and power than αὐτάρκης does. In line 17 ὄν is added by Harder (*I b*, 476): Δεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἱκανώτατον ⟨ὂν⟩ ἁπάντων καὶ αὐταρκέστατον καὶ ἀνενδέεστατον εἶναι- This addition of Harder, if not necessary, is in any way plausible because of the assumption of haplography.

[582] Line 19: μὴ ἕν - Vitringa proposed to bracket these words, followed by Harder (*I b*, 477), who feels that they are far more isolated than linguistically seems acceptable. Harder

has needs. For it is not one since it grows from many contributive factors. Its substance would stand in the need of getting unity (ἓν εἶναι). As to the One (τὸ δέ) it has no need of itself (unity), because it is the One itself (line 20). Now we encounter a phrase (line 21 ff.) of which the syntactical structure is at first glance not very evident. The opening of the sentence does not present much difficulty: what is plural (πολλὰ ὄν), has as many needs as it has aspects. In proceeding to analyse the long sentence it is best to start from the assumption that ἕκαστον is the subject of a transitive παρέχεται ("in einen Zustand bringen", Harder[583]) and that τὸ τοιοῦτον may be considered as its object. Further, it is a real possibility to regard ὑπάρχον as being attributively connected with ἕκαστον whereas ὄν may be taken causally with ὑπάρχον, as Armstrong does. However, it would be preferable to make ἕκαστον ....ὑπάρχον the subject of παρέχεται: the fact that *etc.* Every contributive factor of the agglomerate (ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ) needs its co-factors ἐνδεὲς τῶν ἄλλων, because it is in the company of the other factors (μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὄν) and not isolated (καὶ οὐ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ). This being together of the component parts and the fact that each of the components needs the other components make the plural compound (τὸ τοιοῦτον, referring to πολλὰ ὄν (line 21) and ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ (line 22)) needy because its totality needs the component parts and the component parts need the other co-factors and the unity of the totality to be a compound (τὸ τοιοῦτον). Since there must be something that is the most self-sufficient, the one and only candididate for being so in the sense that it has no need whatsoever both in regard to itself (like the compound he talked about) or in regard to some other thing, in short, the counterpart of the needy compound described in the previous phrase, must be the One.

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opposes Cilento (243) who defends the mss. HS, too, accept this reading: "recepit subiectum 18". I would correct them by saying that it 'recepit' *the attribute* (μὴ ἕν) of the subiectum (πᾶν). Plotinus speaks of 'everything that is plural and not one'. Why is it not one? Plotinus wishes to explain this curious form of being not one (μὴ ἕν). It is not one (μὴ ἕν), because it arises from many things. What is badly needed to make a substance out of the many co-factors is 'being one'. So for Plotinus 'not one (μὴ ἕν)' seems to mean that the parts of the thing involved are in the position of not yet being unified and deserving a bond of unity, for in the following sentence (lines19,20) he speaks about the need of the substance of a thing to be one. Indeed, μὴ ἕν is a form of 'Selbstglossierung', explanation, which does not seem to me to be discordant with Plotinus' manner of speech. If one must accept that the mss reading μὴ ἕν is due to diplography, then I do not feel that the *interpretation* of the passage would seriously change. This does not hold for the ingenous bracketing of the first μὴ ἕν (line 18), proposed by Puelma, accepted by HS 2 and Armstrong in his translation: πᾶν δὲ πολὺ καὶ [μὴ ἓν] ἐνδεὲς μὴ ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν γενόμενον· "but everything which is many is also in need unless it becomes one from many". Nevertheless, this move is not required in the argument. For this 'everything' still remains in need even if it has become many as is argued in what follows. Also καί seems rather meaningless in the Puelma/Armstrong interpretation.

[583] Line24: παρέχεται - Harder (*I b*, 477) is right by taking the verb as transitive, see 27[IV,3],3,11; 42[VI,1],10,3. Subject is ἕκαστον (line 21) with ἐνδεές and object τὸ τοιοῦτον. HS completely agree with Harder.

2) **Being.** The One does not need anything, for not needing anything in relation to other things it does not seek anything (τι) in order to be (ἵνα ᾖ). One might ask what Plotinus is thinking about when he says τι. Given the context it is the τι in the sense of the substitute for substance as a category[584]. The only provider of being is being itself. It goes without saying, that the One being prior to being and being the origin of the procession of being, does not need being. Plotinus adds as proof (γάρ) that the One being the cause[585] for all others does not get from the others what it *is itself*, the golden rule of Neoplatonism (τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοις αἴτιον ὄν οὐ παρ' ἄλλων ἔχει ὅ ἐστι).

3) **Tὸ εὖ.** The One does not need something to be or to be *well*. What would the Good be for the One when placed outside the One? The answer to this rhetorical question apparently must be: nothing. The reader is supposed to understand immediately why he is assumed to give this negative answer. The elliptical thought must be completed by something like the notion that apart from itself nothing can be put on a par with the One and that nothing is in its vicinity. If there is nothing besides the One, the good cannot come to the One as a property from that absent something else by means of participation. Since there is nothing that provides the good to the One, therefore (ὥστε) the One does not possess the Good κατὰ συμβεβηκός[586] . This conclusion is supposed to rely on the following ground: for (γάρ) itself is the Good. This is rather odd. For the conclusion was reached on the basis of the statement that there is nothing next to the One that could be held responsible for furnishing the One with the good, and not on the ground that the One itself is the good. So γάρ must be elliptical: (and this conclusion that the good cannot attributively be ascribed to the One must be correct) for it is itself the good.

4 a) **Tόπος.** In Plotinus hardly the denial of place (τόπος, but see 9[VI,9],3,42) in regard to the One features. In his view place comes even later

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[584] See above 130.

[585] Line 27: αἴτιον - Plotinus had earlier informed us about the remarkable fact that if we speak about cause in regard to the One, we only say something what comes to us (see above 135). This does not mean that the SE is not a cause. Earlier already he told us of the One's γέννημα (5, line 34). In the above context Plotinus was not able to leave out the cause-side of the One. He successfully made an argument of this cause-side of the One. How can something that is the cause for the being of others, borrow some feature of its products? This would be comparable to a carpenter who would bear some likeness to a chair he made. We are now familiar with the implication of the golden rule of Neoplatonism: what is produced is not *actually* in the maker. I think that the notion of the process of producing artefacts is at the basis of all this. It seems to me one of the least convincing points in Neoplatonic thought. For with equal right one could maintain that in the process of generation, the 'father' displays some similarity to his child, if only the fact that they are both human beings. Plotinus can be supposed to answer to my objection that something like form is brought about after the One. Nevertheless, the golden rule seems rather a postulate of his preoccupation to liberate the One from what comes after it than a convincing thought for anybody who is not likewise preoccupied.

[586] Compare above 81.

than matter 12[II,4,]12,12 ὁ δὲ τόπος ὕστερος τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῶν σωμάτων, ὥστε προτέρον ἂν δέοιτο τὰ σώματα ὕλης and 39[VI,3],11,27 τὸν δὲ τόπον ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα ὕστερον καὶ *ὕστερον* τῶν πάντων, it seems to be the last and the lowest at the ontological scale, but prior to them we have extension and void[587]. It would be an absurd idea to saddle the One with such a low entity. It is not only denied in respect of the One (a most important place is 39[VI,8],11,21 ff.), but also in regard to the All (22[VI,4],2,1 ff.[588]) and to the Ideas[589], the soul[590] and mind[591]. This Neoplatonic theorem about place[592] as almost the lowest ontical entity is not much discussed in Plotinus, as I said, but it is a very curious doctrine indeed. For usually matter seems to be the last efflux from being, the last border of being beyond which nothing can exist for even matter is nothing. The doctrine, however, about the atopical character of what is above the sensible domain, is well described and thoroughly elaborated. That does not mean, however, that Plotinus is prevented from using expressions like τόπος νοητός[593] (quite in line with Plato himself, *Rep.* 508 C and 517 B) or from using the word τόπος in connection with the domain of being (see lots of places in *LP* 1031, *e.g.* 1[I,6],9,41 τὸν τῶν εἰδῶν ... τόπον). This usage may be considered as almost incorrect, but to avoid the term to describe the κόσμος νοητός[594] is hardly feasible. Κόσμος νοητός itself also has a suggestion of place, beit less than *τόπος* νοητός.

In ch.6 line 30 Plotinus' reason for denying the One any place is not the consideration that place is the lowest entity but the fact that the SE does not need any standing point (ἵδρυσις). What does not need any standing point a fortiori does not need any place. Ἵδρυσις and τόπος appear often together. Ἵδρυσις is the establishment of something or settling something in a place, also in the intelligible domain[595].

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[587] We have as lowest entities successively διάστημα (extension), void (see for both following note), place, then matter, then body.

[588] Here we find definitions of τόπος (with Aristotelian background, cf. Armstrong, *Translation* ad locum), especially interesting is his definition of τόπος as διάστημα, which he supposes to be prior even to the void. Διάστασις, dimension, basis of magnitude, is produced by the souls (33[II,9],17,7), who transform in this way the power of the intelligible into magnitude in the sensible world. It is said by Harder, *II b*, 482 (cf. also Atkinson's interesting note on 10[V,1],10,18,19, *Ennead V. 1*, 220-221) that in 27[IV,3],9,20 ff. Plotinus teaches that soul produces place as such. In the context, however, one should seriously reckon with the possibility of the soul producing not place as such but only a place for itself to be: namely body.

[589] Inlocalitas of the Ideas, ἐν ἀτόπῳ 23[VI,5],8,32, see Harder's note *II b*, 417 (see also 22[VI,4],11).

[590] 27[IV,3],20, 1 ff.

[591] 4[IV,2],1,19,20; 5[V,9],5,45 ff.;11[V,2],2,19-20.

[592] I find Sambursky, *The concept of place in late Neoplatonism*, 13, 14 rather meagre in providing information and insight into Plotinus' doctrine of place, even when realising that he essentially speaks about *late* Neoplatonism. In his book even 39[VI,8],11,20 ff. is absent.

[593] See in *LP* 1031 24[V,6],6,14 ; 38[VI,7],35,5 *etc.*

[594] Lots of places in *LP sub voce* κόσμος ad c.

[595] See Bussanich, *The One*, 196.

4b) **῞Ιδρυσις**. Plotinus not only denied being and the Good to the One, but also something to stand on (ἵνα ἐκεῖ ἱδρυθῇ). It has no place, for it does not need a standing point (ἵδρυσις) as if it were unable to bear itself. What is to be settled in a place (ἱδρυθησόμενον) has no soul (ἄψυχον) and is a burden, falling away, when not yet settled[596]. Plotinus gives the impression that the verb ἱδρύειν is only used for things that have no soul (ἄψυχον) and only have ὄγκος. However, he himself takes the liberty to depart from this rule by saying *e.g.*: "having settled myself above the region of the intelligible", ὑπὲρ πᾶν τὸ ἄλλο νοητὸν ἐμαυτὸν ἱδρύσας. However, this was said in the early treatise 6[IV,8],1,6,7[597]. The One is in fact responsible for the settlement of other things: it is through the One that the other things find a basis to stand on (ὑπέστη, ὑφίστασθαι reminds of hypostasis, here a notion of standing of having a place to stand on) and a place to be put. And now the refrain returns: whatever is in search for a place is in need, and this excludes the One (cf. 38[VI,7],17,35: Ὁ δὲ ἐπικάθηται αὐτοῖς, οὐχ ἵνα ἱδρυθῇ, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἱδρύσῃ εἶδος εἰδῶν τῶν πρώτων ἀνείδεον αὐτό: "But the Good is enthroned upon them (*sc.* mind as all things), not that it may have a basis, but that it may be a basis for the form of the first forms, being itself formless"). For as an *arche*, it has no need for what is posterior to it (its γέννημα). It may be worth while to notice that the refrain now returns in a somehow different setting. It is not so much the autarky of the One as its being the origin of things that matters now. So we do not need to charge Plotinus with burdensome repetion. That which is the origin of all things, is, according to Neoplatonic thought, without any need whatsoever.

5) βούλησις

6, 35-46 If the One would need anything, it would need not being (absurd). Rejection of want, and thinking

Translation

> And the origin of all things needs none of them. For whatever is in need, is in need because it strives towards its origin. An if the One is in need of a thing, it obviously looks for being not one. Thus it will be in need of what it destroys. And everything that is said to be in need, is needy of the good and what it preserves. So that for the One there is nothing good; and it has also no wish for any thing. But it transcends good and it is not itself for itself good, but for the others, if anything can participate in it. And it has no thinking, otherwise there would be difference, nor does it have motion, for it is before motion and before thinking. For what will he think? Himself? Well then, before his thinking he will be igno-

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[596] Line 32 μήπω - Harder comments that Heintz made a correct reference for his correction μὴ που to ἐκεῖ ἱδρυθῇ in line 27, which, incidentally, to my view is unnecessary.

[597] See also 10[V,1],11,15 where the composite ἐνιδρύμεθα is another example of personal use.

> rant and in need of thinking, in order to get knowledge of himself, he who suffices for himself!

A rather curious sentence (lines 35, 36) is added as a proof of the foregoing: for what is in need, needs, because it strives for its origin ("Ο τι γὰρ ἐνδεές, ἐφιέμενον ἀρχῆς ἐνδεές). I do not find it easy to grasp the precise connection, for it can hardly be regarded as a universal adagium. However, in Plotinus' Neoplatonism, like in Platonism every person or everything is assumed to strive for its Good, as we shall see below[598]. In Neoplatonic thought what is the *origin* of something is better. In this way the rule makes sense.

Plotinus proceeds by rather sophistically observing that if the One had any need, it obviously (δηλονότι) is to be *not* one, which would imply its destruction (ὥστε ἐνδεὲς ἔσται τοῦ φθεροῦντος). Why is this so obvious? Well, on this level of the One the only thing that prevails is oneness, but oneness is what the One already has. The only need left could be to be *not* one. So its only possible need leads to the (unacceptable) consequence of the destruction of the One. This is selfrefuting.

A new thesis (line 38) is brought forward: "everything that can be said to be in need, needs the good and not what it destroys, but precisely what it preserves". Rather abruptedly a most cryptical, but certainly elliptical conclusion is presented containing the notion that for the One there is nothing good (ἀγαθόν). We have the following pattern as an implementation of the ellips: 'everything that needs something, needs the good and what preserves it [the One cannot have any need in this respect for it can not be destroyed. Destruction has nothing to do with the One], so the preserving good is far away from the One[599]. If there is no good in respect to the One, there will also be no wanting (βούλησις) of that need nor anything else.

It must be emphasized that this word βούλησις not only expresses the will of a subject, but also its striving for something which is supposed to be good for it. Notice that Plotinus says : βούλησις οὐδενός, this rules out the βούλησις as the will to do something. We may refer to Aristotle, *NE*, 1113 a 15 ff., where we are told that βούλησις means wishing for the end, that is, what is the good for everyone. Each person strives for what he believes to be good, that is, what he perceives as good, although by an objective standard he may be actually striving for what is bad (see also Plato, *Philebus* 20 D). Nevertheless, βούλησις is connected with an end, the good, to strive for. This background may suffice to elucidate why Plotinus so suddenly introduces βούλησις. Where there is no Good to strive for (and for the One the Good as an end has been ruled out), there is no need of βούλησις. The One is the supergood and the bestower of the good on others, not on itself. It should be noticed here that βούλησις not always presupposes such a teleological implication. It may be used *e.g.* for the free will, see *LP*, cf. *e.g.* 40[II,1],1,7,34-37 and especially 39[VI,8] where the topic of the free will of the One (in fact 39 speaks about the Supreme Entity or the Good, see Part I on the History of the One[600]) is tentativily discussed. Plotinus hesitantly warning us to be cautious ascribes a will to the One. He warns his readers that basically nothing can be said of the One or about the One (39[VI,8,],8,5 ff.). However, since the question of the One's free will cannot be left out (it had become a very popular theme in philosophy after the appearance of the Stoics) he cannot avoid to say as best as he can what ultimately cannot be said. He is even prepared to depart from strict reason (39[VI,8],13,4,5; Harder: "sogar ein wenig unlogisch vorgehen"). Will is in fact found at the post-One levels, the One only being the cause of all this. However, this does not prevent Plotinus from concluding in the end that the will of the One coincides with its being (39[VI,8],21,12,13), although, strictly speaking, we transgress our limited capacity of thinking when ascribing these features to the One (see also *RE*, 461[601]).

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[598] See this page.

[599] Line 39: "Ὥστε τῷ ἑνὶ οὐδὲν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν *etc* - Because Harder does not seem to understand the coherence of the argument, he unrightly opens a new paragraph. See my analysis. For another place of the comma in line 38 (after τοῦ εὖ) see Harder, *I b*, 478.

We have learned enough to know that thinking implies difference in the sense of plurality (οὐδὲ νόησις ἵνα μὴ ἑτερότης line 42), but on the highest level after the One we encounter a plurality of a special type in which subject and object overlap eachother[602]. However, I doubt whether Plotinus has this type in mind. He proceeds as if thinking implies an object. He asks which object the One's thinking might have. The rather concise answer is a question: "itself?"[603]. This in turn presupposes that the One would not have knowledge before its thinking, and would need thinking in order to know itself, and that in the case of the One that is completely self-sufficient! Note the ironical position *at the end* of the phrase: ὁ αὐτάρκης ἑαυτῷ (a rather difficult dative[604]).

6) **νόησις**

6, 46- 55 The One having no ignorance about itself

Translation

There will not be, then, ignorance in so far as it concerns himself, because he does not get knowledge or think about himself. For ignorance arises if there is

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[600] See above 61.

[601] See above this chapter (ch.6), note 576.

[602] See above 166.

[603] Line 44: Τί γὰρ καὶ νοήσει ; ἑαυτόν ; - This interpunction is not found in the mss, but it is highly attractive to do so, for raising questions and answering them himself is a didactical habit of Plotinus. Otherwise we must translate: why should he know even himself (as propose HS the alternative Τί γὰρ καὶ νοήσει ἑαυτόν; : "cur enim intelleget quoque seipsum?").

[604] It must be a kind of sociative.

> an other, when the one does not know the other. But it (the One) alone does not know nor have anything that it does not know, but being one and being together with itself, it does not need knowledge about itself. Incidentally, one should not even connect (with it) 'being together', in order to preserve the One, but one should take away both thinking and being together and thought of itself and of the others. For one should not put it on a level of the thinker, but rather of thought. Thought does not think, but is the cause of thinking to an other. And the cause is not the same as what is caused. And what is the cause of all things is none of them.

Suppose the One has ignorance, because it does not know or think itself. You would be charged with being ridiculous. For ignorance presupposes the being of another thing in the event that one thing does not know the other. Now the One has no need of thinking itself, because it is with itself (συνεῖναι[605]). Consequently, there is no knowing or thinking in the One. Plotinus adds that the One is the one and only entity that does not think or know nor does it have what it does not know (οὔτε τι ἔχει ὃ ἀγνοεῖ line 49). It should not escape notice that συνεῖναι is now said of the One, where previously we encountered this verb in connection with the being of the soul with itself[606]. In both cases 'being together with itself' makes thinking or knowing superfluous, but as regards the soul it was meant as the cleansing of the soul in order to be open for the next stage. As to the One συνεῖναι refers to its being with itself, which makes thinking itself superfluous.

Plotinus, realising that it is impossible to ascribe attributes to the One, immediately corrects himself and warns his readers, opening his phrase with the corrective ἐπεί we came across earlier (Harder "eigentlich")[607]. "By the way: it is not permitted to connect even 'being together with itself[608]' to the One if you wish to preserve the One's integrity. But it is our task to free the One not only from thinking and being together[609] but also from knowing itself and others". It is very interesting to observe that what Plotinus had accepted in 7[V,4] as completely applicable to the One: *viz.* συνεῖναι, he now (line 50) rejects as inappropriate in connection with the One, in order to maintain its unity (ἵνα τηρῇς τὸ ἕν). This τηρεῖν τὸ ἕν by denial of συνεῖναι is obviously a self-correction, since in 7[V,4],2,16 he did not hesitate to say that everything of him *is* in him and *with* him (ἀλλ' *ἔστιν* αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ *σὺν* αὐτῷ)[610].

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[605] See above 39 and see note 609.

[606] See above 140.

[607] See above 137.

[608] Line 50: συνεῖναι - Plotinus forbids to connect συνεῖναι with the One, likewise he forbade in 3,51 to say ἐκείνου and in 3,52 to say ὄντος in regard to the One.

[609] Line 51: συνεῖναι - I would prefer with Preller, HS 2 to read συνεῖναι instead of (the mss) συνιέναι, because so far in the text nothing has been said about συνιέναι, whereas in 49 and 50 συνεῖναι plays an important part. I would reject the suggestion of HS: "an scribendum est: συνιέναι καὶ τὸ συνεῖναι" on the same ground. For the self-correction in regard to 7[V,4] (see in the text) this issue has no decisive importance for the rejection of συνεῖναι in regard to the One is warranted by line 50: οὐδὲ τὸ συνεῖναι δεῖ προσάπτειν.

[610] See above 39.

Now a seemingly paradoxical passage follows. After his having categorically denied the possibility to ascribe νόησις to the One, Plotinus suprisingly writes down, apparently without any qualms: οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν νοοῦντα δεῖ τάττειν αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὴν *νόησιν* (lines 51,52). There is something paradoxical in Plotinus' message. First he has made every effort to deny that the One thinks or that νόησις may be ascribed to it. Therefore the first part of the utterance just quoted does not entail anything alarming. One should not place the One in the category of the thinking subject (νοοῦντα). What is alarming - at least at first glance - is what follows: "but rather in the category of νόησις", which is previously unequivocally rejected with regard to the One. Harder has the merit of seeing this difficulty and tried to solve it by translating νόησις by 'Denkinhalt' which was accepted by Cilento: "contenuto del pensiero" (*o.c.*, III, 1, 429). Harder translated the whole sentence as follows (*I a*, 191, see also his note, *I b*, 478): "Man darf es nicht in eine Reihe stellen mit dem denkenden Subjekt (νοοῦντα), sondern eher mit dem Denkinhalt (νόησις); dieser aber denkt nicht, sondern is einem andern Ursache dass es denkt. Die Ursache ist aber nicht identisch mit dem Verursachten". Bréhier (*o.c.*, 181): "il faut le placer non dans la catégorie des êtres pensants, mais plutôt dans celle de la pensée". MacKenna (*o.c.*, 620): "It is not to be thought of as having but being Intellection, *etc*". Armstrong (*o.c.*, 326):"we must not put him on the level of the thinker, but rather of that of the thought", which is rather ambiguous, for 'thought' can be taken either actively, 'thinking', or passively, 'Denkinhalt'. According to Harder's solution Plotinus' argument runs as follows. The contents of thinking are the cause of thinking. 'Denkinhalt' is a kind of causa finalis, to give it an Aristotelian flavour. However, I object, in the context it is evident that νόησις has more of a causa efficiens (αἴτιον). It is hard to tell whether Bréhier observed any difficulty for 'la pensée' is equivocal in French, meaning both thinking and thought. MacKenna rightly translates: 'Intellection'.

Νόησις can hardly mean 'Denk*inhalt* in Greek ('concept' or 'Idea' is possible, but less appropriate here, see *LP* 689 *sub f*). How dangerous Harder's solution is appears from his commentary (ad 48, 6, 53, *I b*, 487): "νόησις mit kühnem wechsel der Bedeutung, 52 hiess es noch 'Denken', hier soviel wie νοούμενον, νοητόν". Harder's merit is to have stated the problem, but his solution does not seem acceptable. I believe that there is a better way of tackling the question with support from 9[VI,9],3,46 ff.[611]. As we remember, it is here that Plotinus tries - as in our passage - to protect the One from the following consequence: if the One does not move, it should be in rest (ἑστώς). A broad but sometimes elliptical argument follows. For this is true of *being:* either it must be in rest or in motion (ὅτι περὶ μὲν τὸ ὂν τούτων θάτερον ἢ ἀμφότερα ἀνάγκη). This is quite understandable, as is the following; τό τε ἑστὼς στάσει ἑστὼς καὶ οὐ ταὐτὸν τῇ στάσει. The whole of the argument is rather difficult (I may refer to my treatment of the passage, see p.134). The rester rests through rest (στάσις) and the rester is not the same as rest. Platonically conceived rest is the cause of the resting of the resting thing, it is not resting itself. Likewise the Idea of fire does not burn, but is the cause of burning of a thing; nor does motion move[612], as Plotinus said elsewhere, where he uses the same example. This pattern might be applied to the notion of νόησις in 9[VI,9],5,53,54. Νόησις as an Idea does not think itself, but must be considered as the cause of thinking. The difference with regard to the couple ἑστώς/στάσις is that Plotinus employs the term στάσις for the Idea and ἑστώς for the activity (if 'activity' is applicable to 'rest' (ἑστώς), resulting in the paradox of the activity 'rest', which is not a paradox at all for Neoplatonic thought). However, in 9[VI,9],6 *both* aspects are denoted by the same word νόησις. So Plotinus can say in one breath that the One has no νόησις (active thinking) and that it can be placed in the category of the νόησις (as an Idea), rather than in the category of the νοοῦντα, in order to make clear that the One does not think[613]. The subsequent argument is completely in line with this, and perfectly logical. Νόησις (the Idea) does not think, but it is the cause of thinking amongst other entities. As a general formulation of the (reverse) parallel τὸ τε ἑστὼς ... οὐ ταὐτὸν τῇ στάσει, ch. 3,47,48 we find in ch. 6,5,55: the cause is not the same as the caused (τὸ δὲ αἴτιον οὐ ταὐτὸν τῷ αἰτιατῷ).

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[611] See above 134 ff.

6, 55-57 The One is not even Good. It is the Good

Translation

> Thus we should not even call good that which gives the good, but we should call it good in another way, the Good above the other goods.

This cause of all things, whether transcendent or not, is not anyone of these things[614], it may not even (οὐδέ) be named 'good' which is rejected in line with the rejection of the other attributes just denied to the One. One is forbidden to call the SE 'good', *i.e.*, the good it provides (to other things). This good is below the level of the really Good. The phrase οὐδὲ ἀγαθὸν λεκτέον τοῦτο ὃ παρέχει is generally misunderstood. Literally Plotinus says: 'do not call it that good which it provides (ὃ παρέχει)'. Not as is commonly believed: since (ὅ: puisque, Bréhier; da, Harder, rightly Armstrong) it provides the good, which as such is not wrong, but not affirmed here. One should not call it or categorize by ἀγαθόν, but otherwise (ἀλλὰ (*sc.* λεκτέον ἀγαθόν) *ἄλλως*): "the Good" transcending all other good things (τἀγαθὸν ὑπὲρ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθά)". Compare for the construction of ἄλλως and the whole line of thought 39[VI,8],9,1-8, where Plotinus denies that the First is anything (τὸ τυχόν) that has an derivative property (συνέβη), not even with regard to itself (in line with what he just affirmed at the end of 9[VI,9],6), not because[615] it is inferior in that case, but because it is not even Good, but good in another sense (ἄλλως), in a lesser way (μὴ ὅτι χεῖρον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἀγαθὸν μέν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ *ἄλλως*, οἷον ἐνδεέστερον lines 7,8).

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[612] See for the Idea of fire, 38[VI,7],11,45 ff. and for motion 38[VI,7],37,15 ὥσπερ οὐδὲ κίνησις κινοῖτο ἄν .. .

[613] I can see a convincing element in Hadot's suggestion (*Porphyre et Victorinus*, I, 123) that all this is directed against Aristotle's νόησις νοήσεως, but only as a second aim.

[614] The construction of τὸ δὲ αἴτιον *πάντων* οὐδὲν ἐστιν *ἐκείνων* is comparable with ch.5,18-20 οἷον καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις *πάντων* ἐν ἀμερεῖ ὄντων ὅμως ἐστὶν ἕκαστον χωρὶς *αὐτῶν*.

Plotinus has a special terminology for the Supergood: τἀγαθόν with article and krasis. In 38[VI,7],38,1-9 he explains the specific character of the terminology, the employment of the article and the krasis, and he is eager to show that we call the Good τἀγαθόν, because we wish to avoid the copula, as in the expression 'he *is* good' (assigning being to it), and also to avoid the *complete* article (τό). However, we cannot mention it without using any form of article, so using the article with krasis is of excellent help to overcome the problems of the copula and the complete article. One might reasonably ask why Plotinus is so keen to keep the complete article away from the Good. He does not provide any reason. Presumably he wishes to prevent *two* words in denoting the Good or it would be that the use of τὸ ἀγαθόν with the article would not exclude the possibility of referring to a concrete good thing. Plotinus says: "We do not wish to say 'it *is* good' nor do we wish to put the article before it, but if one should take it (the article τό) away completely, we could not designate it, (therefore) we call it τἀγαθόν "in order that we do not make the word *ἀγαθόν*, but *τό* other (τό into τ')" (ἵνα μὴ ἄλλο (add: ἀγαθόν), *τὸ* δὲ ἄλλο ποιῶμεν). He adds: "so that we do not need the 'is' any more.[616]. Harder, Bréhier, Armstrong and Hadot do not correctly translate nor, I am afraid, correctly interpret this essentially quite simple phrase[617] (Harder: "denn dadurch werden wir das Ausgesagte von dem Subjekt verschieden machen", Bréhier: "mais afin de ne pas faire de l'article et du nom deux chose distinctes", which as such would provide an excellent sense. Armstrong: "that we may not make one thing and then another". Hadot: "pour éviter que nous fassions de lui (*sc.* le Bien), tantôt une chose, tantôt une autre"). I think that in line 7 αὐτό does not signify 'good' see Harder *IV b*, 514, but that it refers to "τό", the article. Whatever one chooses[618], unfortunately nothing in this part of the text does provide any clue to Plotinus' averseness of providing ἀγαθόν with a complete article.

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[615] I follow the interpretation implied in Bréhier's translation.

[616] Plotinus says: in order that we may need no more ἐστιν (ὡς μὴ δεῖσθαι τοῦ ἐστιν ἔτι, οὕτω λέγομεν τἀγαθόν). This makes good sense after what the phrase ἵνα μὴ ἄλλο (add: ἀγαθόν), *τὸ* δ' ἄλλο ποιῶμεν taught. I do not think that this sentence is well understood by the translators. They often translate by 'because' or 'for', puisque (Hadot) comme (Bréhier), but ὡς μὴ + inf. can only signify 'so as to' (cf. Armstrong's translation). For, so Plotinus thinks, if we make use of the krasisform we no longer have to express ourselves in a sentence like ἐστιν ἀγαθόν, which inappropriately uses ἐστιν in regard to the Good and was therefore rejected in line 1 ff. The krasisform, τἀγαθόν, meant a sort of phrase, or rather a denotation to Plotinus, which can make ἐστιν superfluous (ἐστιν ἀγαθόν which would have made the impression that good is an attribute) so that denoting the fact that the Good *is* the Good, is maintained: Λέγομεν δὲ τἀγαθὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ ... οὐδὲ κατηγοροῦντες, ὅτι αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ὅτι αὐτό.

[617] See Hadot's survey of actual solutions, *Traité 38*, 181.

[illegible] goal'

Proclus too has some words on the krasisform of τἀγαθόν (*Theologia Platonica*, ed. Saffrey-Westerink, II, 7, p. 46,18 (συνενίζοντες τοὔνομα τἀγαθὸν εἰώθαμεν ἀποκαλεῖν[619]). It is curious to see that Proclus should sin against his own rules for the interpretation of τἀγαθόν, and does not stick to the krasisform in denoting the Good[620]. Plotinus, too, is inconsistent in using the krasisform. He often forgets his own explanation and uses τὸ ἀγαθόν to denote the Good as if he had not thought or said anything about it (see *LP* 3).

After the end of ch.6 of 9[VI,9] Plotinus does not use the name 'One' any longer, as we already stated earlier. It is the names He, It, God and Father that are in use, and even the name' Good' is mentioned no longer (see Part I, Plotinus and the History of the Concept of the One[621]).

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[618] See Hadot, *Traité 38*, 181, note 338 pour different views on αὐτό of line 8. Bréhier and HS prefer to see in αὐτό the article, as I do myself; Ficinus, Cilento, Theiler and Hadot prefer it to make αὐτό refer to the Good, which as such would not alter my interpretation, but certainly modifies the opinions of the others.

[619] Meijer, *Some Problems in Theol. Pl., II, 7*, 192 ff.

[620] Meijer, *Some Problems in Theol. Pl., II, 7*, 192 ff..

[621] See above 58 ff.

CHAPTER SEVEN

7, 1-5 Despite all troubles, it is possible to touch the One

Translation

> And if because it is none of those things, you waver in your opinion, take a stand towards them and look from these things. And look without casting your thought outwards. For it does not lie somewhere having emptied itself from the other things, but it is possible for who is able to touch it, because it is there, but for who is unable, it is not there.

In his circular argument Plotinus turns to the old and vexed question: how do we reach our ultimate goal in our journey to the One? If the identification of the One with anything brought forward in the foregoing has let us in the lurch (culminating in thinking (νόησις) and goodness (ἀγαθόν)), Plotinus' advice is to try to proceed along a special track: "found yourself and your opinion (στῆσον) on these things (εἰς ταῦτα) and look from them (ἀπὸ τούτων θεῶ)". It is difficult to fathom this remarkable advice. Indeed, ταῦτα from line 1 and the same word from line 2 are to be correctly linked with the failing entities from the previous chapters and are perhaps best connectable with the phrase that the One qua the cause of all things *is nothing of them* (*sc.* τὰ πάντα, see the phrase in line 55 of ch.6: Τὸ δὲ πάντων αἴτιον *οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐκείνων*): all things that turned out not identifiable with or attributable to the One, even the attribute 'good'.

Exploiting this connection and understanding the sequence of thought so far, we must come to the conclusion that ταῦτα refers to everything below the One. Plotinus' advice is now: "you must turn yourself in their direction (εἰς ταῦτα), and look away from them" (ἀπό; making use of them as a startingpoint or base is common translation). What this precisely entails will be clarified much later in the chapter (lines 16,17). Plotinus says: "But do not look, in search of the One, outwards from the things (μὴ ἔξω ῥίπτων[622] τὴν διάνοιαν). For the One does not lie somewhere, in a place of its own (κεῖταί *που)*, for it has not deprived the other things (vagely τὰ ἄλλα, everything next to the One) from itself". Plotinus seems to imply that the One is to be found somewhere in the "other things". From his discussion it appears, that Van Winden[623] assumes these ὄντα to be identifiable in a general way with the things outside the One or the things of our world. He puts ταῦτα and τὰ ἄλλα (object of ἐρημῶσαν) in one box and speaks of "mit den Dingen anfangen", "in den Dingen bleiben", "nicht aus ihnen heraustreten". Indeed, one need not go to a place beyond the world: the One is present to be touched by him who can touch it, because it is *there* (ἐκεῖ). We shall see that ultimately we must leave also 'die Dinge'.

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[622] ῥίπτων τὴν διάνοιαν. Plotinus does not shrink from drastic terminology, so we met earlier 9[VI,9],5,44 βάλλειν τὴν διάνοιαν. According to Harder (*I b*, 479) : "gewählte Ausdruck der hohen Sprache ".

[623] Van Winden, *das ἐκεῖ*, 62.

The word ἐκεῖ is hotly debated by Harder, Puelma, and Van Winden (Waszink). Harder's argument against ἐκεῖ runs as follows: "ἐκεῖ kan nicht richtig sein, gerade hier is eine örtliche Festlegung störend. Kirchhoff's ἐκεῖνο befriedigt nicht (I agree), die erneute Unterstreichung des Subjektes ist gegen den Satzrhythmus" (I understand that, cf. Puelma, *Vorschläge*, 96, n. 22). I do not regard ἀεί, tentatively suggested by Harder, *I b*, 479 and elaborated by Puelma, *Vorschläge*, 95 (accepted by HS 2, Armstrong, *Translation*, p.326) as a very happy solution to the problem. Why should the One's continuous presence be emphasized in this context (see for an other opinion, Puelma, *o.c.*, 96, who refers to 9[VI,9],8,33,37 and 41)? It is far more satisfactory to learn *where* the One is to be encountered; Van Winden, *das ἐκεῖ*, 62: "Bleibe dort wo du (mit dem Denken) bist, nämlich in den Dingen, dort ist das Eine gegenwärtig, dort wirst du das Eine schauen falls du die Fähigkeit hast". We shall see that this only happens in the mind. 'Εκεῖ makes the opposition of ἔξω ῥίπτων τὴν διάνοιαν, "do not throw your thinking outwards, away from the things, for the One has not abandoned them". Consequently I agree with Van Winden that ἀεί is an unnecessary correction of ἐκεῖ. Why should a *lectio multo difficilior*, ἐκεῖ, have come in the text replacing the so common ἀεί as Van Winden rightly observes. In the end ἐκεῖ will turn out to point to the mind. Plotinus very significantly continues his treatment in chapter 7 with a discussion on the mind and how to find in the mental room of the mind the ultimate One. in the mind In Plotinus it is always on the level of the mind, *viz.* its purest part, where the meeting with the One takes place. What procedure exactly Plotinus has in mind, will sufficiently be clarified in the remainder of the chapter.

'Εστι .... παρόν (line 4) is usually considered as a periphrastic construction, which, although such a construction appears in Plotinus (*LP* 303), is not very plausible, if there is another possibility. Consequently, its being a participium coniunctum is more likely. The construction runs as follows: 'the One is present (ἐστι) for he who can touch it, being present (παρόν) there (ἐκεῖ), but for he who cannot, it is not present (*sc.* there)'. Other ways of construing the sentence may be possible[624], but they will not affect the procedure.

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[624] θίγειν ἐκεῖ - Igal, *de Uno*, 297 and HS propose to connect ἐκεῖ with θίγειν instead of with πάρον. Linguistical arguments are against this proposal, see Puelma, *Vorschläge*, 95, θίγειν connected with an adverb does not occur, although this need not be decisive. In my view, to connect ἔστι with the rather distant παρόν in a periphrastical construction seems rather clumsy, particularly because in the last part of the phrase he uses the normal πάρεστιν. It might be that θίγειν should not be connected with δυναμένῳ, but that it depends on ἔστι (in de the sense of ἔξεστι, cf. line 6): "it is possible for who is capable, to touch it, being there present". One must bear in mind that, apparently, ἀδυνατοῦντι is without inf. too.

7, 5-16 The soul must be blank

Translation

> And just as it is impossible with other things to think about something, when one thinks about another and is with that other, but one should connect nothing to what is thought, in order that it be the object of thought in pure form, so one ought to think there, that it is impossible to think the One, while one has the imprint of another thing in his soul, as long as this imprint is in action, and that again the soul being occupied with other things and possessed cannot be imprinted by the imprint of the opposite, but just as it is said of matter, that of course it must be free from all qualities, if it is to receive the imprints of all things, in the same way the soul must become far more formless, if there is going to be no obstacle settled in it in view of its fulfilment and illumination by the first nature.

After this introduction, Plotinus presents a broad elaboration of the procedure (lines 5-23), which reminds us of a description we met earlier[625]. Here (lines 5-23) we are lead to a procedure of becoming acquainted with the One, a procedure that amounts to emptying one's soul. In the process of thinking an object one cannot cling to something else or connect something else with that object in the same time keeping one's thought on the latter: one cannot have one's thoughts on Paris and on London at the same time. One must think the object purely (αὐτὸ τὸ νοούμενον[626]) without connecting other things[627]. Likewise, thinking the One (ἐνταῦθα) is a matter of thinking the One exclusively. It is impossible to think the One, whereas one has the impress[628] of something else at work in his mind. While the mind is preoccupied and tied by other things, it cannot be imprinted by the contrary (ἐναντίου).

The last remark, which rather unexpectedly brings the notion of the contrary to the stage, seems to be meant to strengthen the case. Why would Plotinus speak about this contrary at all? It is the contrary of an impression or a series of impressions of the soul. How could one's soul, being occupied with an impression, receive the impression of the contrary? How could you having other things in your soul receive *e.g.* the contrary of all things: the One, if your soul cannot be emptied completely? Perhaps something like this is Plotinus' mind. We must not forget that he is about to quote the *Timaeus* (be it seen through Mesoplatonian eyes[629]), particularly its description of the receptacle (or *pandeches*). In the context of ch.7 the notion of the contrary already forms part of what has been borrowed from the *Timaeus*: it is said that the receptacle should be entirely exempt from any form whatsoever, if it is to be well prepared for receiving impresses. For if it displayed a special character or nature, it would surely be inapt to receive what is *contrary* to the nature it would have adopted as its own nor would it be able to receive any other quality. The receptacle would not be well prepared πλὴν ἄμορφον ὂν ἐκείνων ἁπασῶν τῶν ἰδεῶν ὅσας μέλλοι δέχεσθαί ποθεν. Ὅμοιον γὰρ ὂν τῶν ἐπεισιόντων τινὶ τὰ τῆς *ἐναντίας* τὰ τε τῆς τὸ παράπαν ἄλλης φύσεως ὁποτ' ἔλθοι δεχόμενον κακῶς ἂν ἀφομοιοῖ, τὴν αὑτοῦ παρεμφαῖνον ὄψιν, *Tim.* 50 D E. It is the lack of quality the receptacle displays that is emphasized again and again in the *Timaeus*.

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[625] See above 125.

[626] Line 7: ἵν' ᾖ αὐτὸ τὸ νοούμενον - αὐτὸ means ' pure': ' in order that it may be the object of thinking as such (without any addition). This αὐτό can be compared with the αὐτό designating Ideas: αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, the beautiful on its own. Harder renders the sentence: "damit er auch *wirklich* und *alleine* das Gedachte werde". Armstrong translates: " that it may *really* be which is being thought about". "Wirklich" and " really" are not to the point as rendering of αὐτό. "Alleine" is precisely the meaning of αὐτό.

[627] Ἀλλὰ δεῖ μηδὲν προσάπτειν τῷ νοουμένῳ does not mean so much 'thinking about one thing and dwelling one's thinking on another' as suggested by the previous line: ἄλλο νοοῦντα καὶ πρὸς ἄλλῳ ὄντα, but it means 'connecting some other thing to the object of thought' or 'attaching an attribute to it', for Plotinus says that one should think the object *purely* (*αὐτὸ* τὸ νοούμενον).

[628] Τύπος imprint or stamp, is in fact in this context (lines 9-12) the immanent form in its mental aspect. In line 13 it is the form immanent in matter. Bussanich (*The One*, 162) has a very good discussion on τύπος' role in sense-perception, where Plotinus hastens to denounce the material character the Stoics lend to the word τύπος. Often Plotinus mitigates its material character by using οἷον, "which is a signpost for the incorporeality of the process" (Bussanich, *The One*,162).

Soul must be like matter, *i.e.* fully passive, just there to receive and to be moulded (this is the classical description of matter, see *e.g.* 12[II,4],8,14 ff.). *Hyle* has no quality whatsoever, is completely without quality[630]. A fortiori the soul must become ἄποιος which as a term is transposed to the level of soul in terms of being ἀνείδεος, εἴδη being the essence of the knowing of the soul (but as we shall see, there is more in the soul, *viz.* a διάθεσις of things[631]). We previously came across the word ἀνείδεος[632]and it is of importance here. Only as such is the soul, in no way hampered, prepared to become full (πλήρωσις) and to be illuminated by the First Nature, the One[633].

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[629] Line12: ὥσπερ περὶ τῆς ὕλης λέγεται - λέγεται by whom? - Plotinus introduces the term '*hyle*', intending to refer to the receptacle. This term here is rather anachronistic for it was Aristotle who invented it (although perhaps being influenced by Plato, see Düring, *Aristoteles*, 240, n.132). Harder (I *b*, 479) is right in saying that the terminology is younger (in part, I would add) than Plato. His reference to Albinus, *Didaskalikos*, VIII, 2 is to the point, whereas the reference to *Stoicorum Vetera Fragmenta* I 85 (Diog. L., VII, 134) by HS is rather pointless, although we do come accross the words τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν (οὐσία Stoic for matter) in it. Albinus speaks about matter, *hyle*, of course, for in his time it was a regular term and refers to Plato's receptacle. Albinus uses many Platonical terms and expressions. He also affirms: αὐτὴν δὲ καθ' αὑτὴν ἄμορφον ὑπάρχει καὶ ἄποιον καὶ ἀνείδεον. Both ἄποιον and ἀνείδεον are younger terms than Plato's terminology (ἄμορφον is thoroughly Platonic cf. the quotation in the analysis, *Tim.* 50 D E). Ἄποιος is found in the Stoa (cf. *LS* and compare we just said about *SVF* I 85). It is not in Aristotle (cf. Bonitz), but it is quite appropriate to describe - certainly from the point of view of a later Platonist, say a Mesoplatonist - the receptacle. Ἀνείδεος is missing both in Plato and Aristotle. The fact of its occurrence in Albinus, *Didaskalikos*, VIII,2 and VIII,3 together with ἄποιος makes likely that Plotinus was acquainted with Albinus or his source. Harder (*I b*, 479) mistakenly thinks that Albinus uses ἄποιος instead of ἄμορφον and πάντων ἐκτος ...... τῶν εἰδῶν, but Albinus employs the word ἄμορφος himself (see my quotation of VIII,2). It is interesting to find out in how far Albinus makes any distinction between ἀνείδεος and ἄμορφος. Perhaps ἄμορφος more concretely refers to the receptacle displaying material particular forms (cf. VIII,2 τοὺς τὰς μορφὰς δημιουργεῖν βουλομένους ἐκ κηροῦ ἢ πηλοῦ) whereas in ἀνείδεος he hears the word εἶδος, cf. VIII,3 ἀν*είδ*εον πρὸς ὑποδοχὴν τῶν *εἰδῶν* meaning the immanent or participated forms originating in Ideas. This may cast some light on the question what the words ὥσπερ περὶ τῆς ὕλης *λέγεται* in Plotinus 9[VI,9],7,12 refer to. It is almost certain that Plotinus with λέγεται (line 12) not only refers to the *Timaeus*, but also to an Albinian(like) description of the receptacle (see VIII,2,3).

[630] Solmsen, *Plotinus VI,9,7*, 245 suggested to add εἰδῶν with ἄποιον, wrongly I think, because Plotinus continues by pointing to the implied condition: "if matter has to recieve the τύπους (imprints) of all things". Surely, these imprints are to be seen as immanent forms (εἴδη), but it is not right to bring in the text explanation in stead of maintaining the text as it stands, provided that it makes good sense, which in this case it does without any addition.

7,16-23 The soul must turn inwards

Translation

> But if this is so, the soul must let go all outward things and turn entirely towards what is in it, and not be inclined towards something of the outside things, but ignoring all things, both before in their condition, then also in their forms, and even ignoring oneself one must come to be in the contemplation of that (SE), and having been with it and having had as it were sufficient communion with it, come back with a message, if one could do it, about that communion.

Plotinus continues: withdrawing from everything external (πάντων τῶν ἔξω ἀφεμένην) the soul has to go completely into itself, the famous *epistrophè* (δεῖ ἐπιστραφῆναι πρὸς τὸ εἴσω πάντη), not leaning towards the external things (μὴ πρός τι τῶν ἔξω κεκλίσθαι, (here is the transition of the soul to the person: ἀφεμένην (*sc.* ψυχήν, but see Harder, *I b*, 479, who reads with Kirchhoff ἀφέμενον) - ἀγνοήσαντα , I translate 'one'). Here we are clearly told that one should not stay and remain in the things thought about in the mind. To return to the introduction of this chapter, if we compare the phrases of the introduction with what we find now, we might come to the conclusion that, indeed, what we were told in the introduction is now explained. You must turn towards the things the One is not (line 1), you must use them as a basis, but you must look from there on (καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων θεῶ (line 2)). Now (line 17) we learn that your soul must *also* turn away from them (πάντων τῶν ἔξω ἀφεμένην), and via interiorisation (δεῖ ἐπιστραφῆναι πρὸς τὸ εἴσω πάντη) proceed to the One. What this means is immediately explained: do not cling to anything of the external things (μὴ πρός τι τῶν ἔξω κεκλίσθαι), but turn to the remarkable procedure of 'ignoring'

The term 'ἄποιος'(with genetivus) points to quality, which, certainly, as such is dependent on form as well in Platonism, but as I said there is no need of making Plotinus explicit on this.

[631] See below note 635.

[632] See above note 357.

[633] To be sure, the first nature (τῆς φύσεως τῆς πρώτης) is the One, but from now onwards down to the end of the treatise 9[VI,9] the name 'One' is dismissed. In ch.7, line 9 we have ἐκεῖνο,which as a neuter must refer to the One. Ch.6,line 51 is the last place to have τὸ ἕν explicitly.

(ἀγνοεῖν)[634]. Interiorisation is the key to the procedure. Ultimately that in which the One can be found, (line 4 ἐκεῖ), turns out to be the mind.

After the warning of interiorisation the most important phase of the whole procedure emerges, the elimination of the entire knowledge in the mind, in Greek ἀγνοεῖν, 'not knowing'.

This process of elimination contains two stages, 1) the elimination of the internal knowledge of the soul, 2) the elimination of the soul's knowing itself, leading to the vacancy of the soul. The first stage itself embraces a twofold procedure. Firstly (πρὸ τοῦ) one has to ban everything in its functioning and its condition (διάθεσις, commonly misunderstood[635]), secondly (τότε) one has to eliminate even the forms of all things (εἴδη)[636]. Ultimately, the soul must eliminate the knowledge of itself in order to be fully open for the vision[637].

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[634] It seems natural, then, to also compare θεῷ δὲ μὴ ἔξω ῥίπτων τὴν διάνοιαν (line 3,4) with δεῖ ἐπιστραφῆναι πρὸς τὸ εἴσω πάντη. However, we have different directions in these utterances. Lines 3,4 are meant to warn us against not to go outwards to a special place, beyond reality, but δεῖ ἐπιστραφῆναι πρὸς τὸ εἴσω πάντη refers to the withdrawal from what is external: do not lean towards anything external (μὴ πρός τι τῶν ἔξω κεκλίσθαι) and to interiorisation.

[635] Line 19: διαθέσει - First of all (πρὸ τοῦ) within the framework of 'not knowing (ἀγνοεῖν)' the soul must 'not know' all things διαθέσει, after that the soul has to abandon the forms (εἴδεσιν) of τὰ πάντα. According to Harder (*I a*, 193) the soul has to abandon this knowledge "vorher in seiner eigenen Haltung (διαθέσει)". MacKenna (621): "first in their relation to us". Bréhier (182): "qu' on ignore tout, d' abord en y disposant son âme". Armstrong, accepting Page's conjecture αἰσθήσει: "but ignoring all things (as it did formerly in sense-perception, but then in the realm of Forms)". I cannot understand either Harder's and MacKenna's interpretations or the one by Bréhier. For how can διάθεσις signify 'relation' or 'en y disposant son âme'? In the *LP* the meaning 'relation' does not appear. It has to mean (*LP* 238) condition, situation (less stable than ἕξις), and sometimes it comes close to ποιότης, *e.g.* ὥστε εἶναι τὴν *ποιότητα* διάθεσίν τινα ἐπὶ ταῖς οὐσίαις (17[II,6],2,30, see also *ib.*,1,24 ff.; this treatise entails a rather early examination of quality): so διάθεσις is *a condition* of (the qualities of) substances. The meaning of the text will remain obscure as long as διάθεσις is connected with the subject of ἀγνοήσαντα. What does "in seiner Haltung" mean? Is not the soul engaged in a continuous effort to approach the One ? The key to the text is to be found in what διάθεσις refers to. It seems to me that it should not be connected with the soul; rather the text becomes clear when διάθεσις is connected with τὰ πάντα.

There are two stages in abandoning knowledge:

a) first (πρὸ τοῦ) one has to abandon the condition of the qualities of things.

b) secondly (τότε), after removing the qualities, one even has to abandon the formal aspect of τὰ πάντα (cf. also 2,14). The ψυχή has to become ἀνείδεος.

All this amounts to a progressive and conscious abandoning of the objects with their two coordinates, διάθεσις and εἶδος. This is the right way to withdraw into oneself. Not only must one abandon τὰ πάντα in all respects, but one must also deny oneself on the road to the One, as we explained in the text. In this explanation we have done justice both to πρὸ τοῦ and to τότε, while not only εἴδεσιν but also διαθέσει appear as datives to say something of τὰ πάντα. They no longer have different functions as in the interpretation of others. Διάθεσις is the situation of τὰ πάντα, the condition of their qualities, whereas εἴδεσιν refers to the principle of form. It goes without saying that if I am right, there is - of course - no need to go along with Page (see the editio minor van HS, 282 and Armstrong) and replace αἰσθήσει for διαθέσει. Thus I would translate: "not knowing all things (getting rid of knowledge) in regard to their condition first and then in relation to their forms" ...

[636] Εἴδη are the immanent forms of τὰ πάντα, but worked on in soul.

[637] Line 21 ἐκείνου - According to HS, who compare with it 9[VI,9],10,16 (κἀκείνου γενόμενος), ἐκείνου is genetivus possessoris with γένεσθαι, which would suggest the fol-

Then it comes to the encounter with the One, and after having been in its company (so to speak, notice οἶον, the formula of metaphor) for long enough it is one's task and duty to go back and, if one were able to do it (said in anticipation of the difficulties concerning the memory of the union with the One, see 320), to report to others about the being together with the One, the audience (συνουσία, again this important word[638]). We may classify the whole procedure (A) into the following stages:

A:

1) emptying the soul of all knowledge, making the soul ἀνείδεος, which amounts to

a) 'not knowing': 1) all things in their functioning and accidental being (διάθεσις).

2) all things in there forms (εἴδεσιν).

2) 'not knowing' oneself.

3) συνουσία, ὁμιλεῖν /with the One.

The description of this process does remind us of a previous passage (chapter 3), which we call B (B' being a variant of B 1, see classification), where we were told about the being with itself of the soul, its unification. We might classify this passage into the following levels:

B :

1) a) mounting and ascending to the ἀνείδεον.
  b) the souls' being together with itself, its being one.
2) the soul's not being satisfied, because of its being not free from its object.

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lowing translation 'and not knowing himself he would belong to Him during the vision'. This seems rather unlikely, since immediately after these words it is said that the visitor comes in touch with the One, which would cause an hysteron proteron. Ἐκείνου seems to me genetivus objectivus with θέα (cf. Armstrong's translation: "come to be in contemplation of that One"). 9[VI,9],10,16(κἀκείνου γενόμενος) has a different message to bring: complete loss of the self and becoming the possession of the One, see below 272.

[638] See above 140.

B' :

1) leading oneself to the first things (εἰς τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαναγαγεῖν ἑαυτόν).
  a) freeing oneself from the sensibilia.
  b) being on his way to the Origin inside oneself.
  c) union of the soul (ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν γενέσθαι).
2) seeing the Origin (the One).

One is struck by the fact that chapter 3 has two versions of the way to the One are portrayed, which hardly have anything to do with each other. Only B1 b seems to refer to B' 1 c. Nevertheless, it is the same process that is described. It is Plotinus' richness of vision and ways of thinking that may be considered responsible for what seems almost to be an abundance or even a reduncy or a contradiction. Although ch.3 already presents *two* versions, we amazingly encounter yet in ch.7 a third version of the same story with a different description of the process. It is typical of Plotinus' mode of thinking that (sometimes even within the same treatise) he continuously reverts to themes he already dealt with, using different patterns of thinking or speech, I would propose to speak of 'contextual differences' in this connection. In the three versions, A, B, B', only A, a l and a 2, B l, b and B' l c seem to refer to the same, whereas in all the three of them we find mutatis mutandis some ultimate stage, A 3, B 2 (covered), B' 2. The version of ch. 7 is most important in that it clarifies the process of making the soul empty, A l, a l and 2 (and by doing so it casts new light on the soul's remarkable seeing itself in oneness (B l, b)).

What being with the One means, is illustrated by an allusion to what Minos experienced when visiting his father Zeus[639]. In this context Zeus is the symbol of the One, whereas in other treatises he is the symbol of the soul (28[IV,4],10,2-4; 10[V,1],7,35-37), or of the mind (31[V,8],4,40-42; 50[III,5],8,11-20)[640].

7, 23 -34 The Minosscene

Translation

It is, perhaps, because of the fact that he has had had such a communion that also Minos is called in the story the companion of Zeus, and it was in remembering this that he laid down the laws as images of this communion, being fulfilled

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[639] It is very interesting to notice ἴσως (line 23), perhaps. This word is not an indication of the fact that Plotinus is interpreting a myth, but a signal of a possible alternative (see καί in line 23 and καί in line 26) of explaining the name ὀαριστής. May be it is due to Minos' being together with Zeus as 'a lawgiving reporter' of what he experienced, may be the name is the consequence of his inclination to stay always with Zeus, rejecting any *political* activity, see my text.

[640] See Pépin, *Porphyre, Exégète d' Homère*, 249 on the diverse functions of Gods in allegorical functions.

> by the contact with the God to lay down those laws. Or having held political matters unworthy of him, he wanted to remain always above, what even could happen to one who has seen much. It is outside nothing - he (Plato) says - but he is with all while they do not know him. For they run away outside him, rather outside themselves. They cannot catch whom they have fled from, nor seek for another having lost themselves. Also a child having come outside itself in madness will not recognize his father, but he who has learned to know himself will also know from whence he comes.

When writing the word συνουσία[641] Plotinus, probably recalled the adventures of Zeus' son, Minos. In mythology Minos had similar meetings with the Highest God, Zeus. It is therefore, Plotinus suggests, that in mythology he is called[642] the ὀαριστής of Zeus (Homer, *Od.* 19,178, 179). Recalling what he had learned from Zeus, he presented laws as images of their conversations, because he was fullfilled by the divine touch, enabling him to make laws.

Law as
image

In (Plato's ?) *Minos* (319 E 1, cf. *Laws* 624 B 1) we are told that once in every 9 years he met Zeus in his cave, after which period he would publish what he learned from Zeus in the form of laws. As an explanation of the (etymologically unknown) word ὀαριστής the dialogue *Minos* called Minos συνουσιαστής. Harder (*I b*, 479, 480) points to the fact that in the dialogue he was called συνουσιαστὴς ἐν *λόγοις*, whereas in Plotinus the notion of συνουσία in the sense of being together is predominant: συνουσία has a special erotic flavour, as may appear from the union (ἐπαφή, körperliche Berührung) and (πληρούμενος (erfüllt, ersättigt, even 'befrüchtet' according to Harder). Harder seems right in pointing to this (spiritual) eroticism. Also in the *Symposion* we repeatedly hear of 'being' or 'making ἐγκύμων'(209 B). In the *Symposion* (209 C 2) we also find ὁμιλία with the same connotation of fertilisation (cf. line 21 οἷον ὁμιλήσαντα). We will meet this erotic aspect again[643]. This aspect seems to have been contributed by Plotinus himself to the long history of interpretating the figure of Minos (see Harder, *I b*, 479).

A rather difficult sentence follows (line 26 Ἢ καὶ τὰ πολιτικὰ οὐκ ἄξια αὑτοῦ νομίσας ἀεὶ ἐθέλει μένειν ἄνω, ὅπερ καὶ τὸ πολὺ ἰδόντι γένοιτο ἂν πάθημα). Van Winden[644] has eminently clarified the problems concerning the part. νομίσασα (which had led Harder to put the crux interpretum). He proposed to take the last α of νομίσασα with the subsequent ει - ἀεί. The result is a phrase with an impeccable meaning: νομίσας ἀεί *etc*. "or believing that politics are not worthy of him, he wishes to always (ἀεί) remain in these higher regions". However, there is still a problem. Who is the 'he' ? With Van Winden we can posit two possibilities. The political activity may refer to the activity of Minos (1) or in a larger sense it may be considered "as the activities of a citizen" (2). It is curious to see that Harder on the basis of rather unconvincing arguments decides to choose for option 1). He sees in τῷ πολὺ ἰδόντι an allusion to *Phaedrus* 248 D, Plato's social careerladder (HS agree): "the soul that had seen the most (τὴν μὲν πλεῖστα ἰδοῦσαν)". This reference would prove that in Plotinus τῷ πολὺ ἰδόντι is said in view of the politician. Notice πολύ for it is not πλεῖστα. In the *Phaedrus* the soul that had seen *most* (πλεῖστα) will make a career as a philosopher or an erotician, the soul that had seen *much*, will become a politician, the third position in the socio-hierarchical order of the *Phaedrus*. Therefore Harder supposes that τῷ πολὺ ἰδόντι in line 28 must contain a reference to the politician Minos, not to any ἀγγέλλοντα. I do not think Harder's reasons are cogent for the suggestion of such an interpretation: the so-called allusion to the social ladder is not convincing. In any case, I do not see a possible allusion as a ground for Harder's identification of τῷ πολὺ ἰδόντι with a politician, as will appear in my discussion. On the contrary, τῷ πολὺ ἰδόντι will turn out to be a person who has no political aspiration at all and in fact wishes to keep away from politics[645], by being close to the high levels of the transcendent world (ἄνω μένειν line 27).

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[641] Line 23: ποιούμενος - A rather unusual employment of this verb (with object οἵαν *sc*. συνουσίαν).

[642] Line 24: ἐφημίσθη - According to *LP* a *hapax*.

[643] See below 261 ad 9[VI,9],9,55.

[644] Van Winden, *A crucial passage*, 173.

Van Winden seems to mean that the excursus on Minos stops before τὰ πολιτικά ("or believing that τὰ πολιτικά are not worthy of him") and that τὰ πολιτικά if not referring to Minos' activities, could be assumed to indicate "the activities of a citizen" in a larger sense. However, this suggestion hardly seems to apply here, for it is difficult to make αὐτοῦ refer to someone other than Minos. So if τὰ πολιτικά does have a more general tone, it still refers to Minos' activities. I think it is all meant to explain Minos' title in the Platonic works: *ὀαριστὴς* τοῦ Διός. Plotinus starts to seek an explanation in Minos' being together with Zeus and his lawgiving activities as inspired by his stay with Zeus. In an afterthought (ἢ *καί)* Plotinus comes up with a second possibility to explain the remarkable name by pointing to Minos' supposed wish after he had rejected politics as unworthy of him to always stay with the highest God (ἄνω μένειν), a wish that afterwards is assumed to be fulfilled. So he may be called the (permanent) ὀαριστὴς τοῦ Διός.

Additionally I may spend some words on the phrase with πάθημα. This phrase is commonly misunderstood by scholars who consider it an isolated remark that is not coherent with the context: Harder: "und das wird dessen Haltung sein der viel geschaut hat", Van Winden: "and this will happen to him who has seen much", Bréhier: "ce qui est la manière d' être de celui qui a beaucoup contemplé", MacKenna: "these will be those who have seen much", Cilento: "e proprio questo capiterà a chi abbia assai contemplato". Armstrong: "this is liable to happen to one who has seen much". These translations all obscure the reference of 'this'. First of all we must be aware of the meaning of πάθημα (ὅπερ καὶ πολὺ ἰδόντι γένοιτο ἂν *πάθημα*) which in Plotinus is often 'emotion', 'feeling', 'experience'. In general, 'experience' also belongs to its significations (see *LP*, where πάθημα in our passage is classified under 'emotion' *etc*.). If we start from 'feeling' the sentence means: "which feeling precisely will come even to who has seen much". The feeling concerned must be the desire to remain in the highest transcendency. This desire, the sentence affirms, will happen - the καί, always neglected, is of vital importance - "*even* to a person who has seen much (τῷ πολὺ ἰδόντι)", in other words: however much a person has been together with the Highest Entity, such a person never gets tired of being with the SE. So we must connect πάθημα with ἐθέλει.

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[645] Line 26: On the attitude of Plotinus himself in regard to politics, see the survey in Boot, *Voorzienigheid*, 5.

One could surmise the reading ἐθέλεν (an imperfectum in conformity to ἐτίθει, line 25) instead of ἐθέλει (praesens), but the presens is in conformity with Minos' steady inclination to be in the presence of his father. So the last part of the sentence (ὅπερ καὶ πολὺ ἰδόντι γένοιτο ἂν *πάθημα*) has a more general tone, which is in tune with the fact that Plotinus continues in the plural (εἰδόσι).

In Plotinus' second consideration for the interpretation of ὀαριστής (*Ἢ τὰ πολιτικά κτλ.*) the notion of reporting the message is lost, something that was predominant in the first option (εἴδωλα[646]). Now Plotinus seems to be under the influence of *Republic* (519 D 4 - 5), which emphasizes the natural tendency of all who have seen the Ideas to be eager to stay with them, where solely life may be worthwile. Politics is a grave burden. Here we have a tacit correction of what was previously said about having sufficient communication with the SE (*ἱκανῶς* οἷον ὁμιλήσαντα line 21) which implied that the visitor of the SE can decide to stop the audience when he is satisfied. In fact, Plotinus says now, they never get tired of being with the SE. Later we shall be confronted with other reasons for breaking off of being together with the Supreme Entity[647].

Plotinus continues his argument with a sort of adagium (line 28): "He (the SE/One) is not outside anything/anybody[648] (as he (Plato) says) but he is together with everyone, even when they themselves do not know it". How this phrase fits in with the foregoing is not so easy to find out. Harder even opened a new paragraph for this sentence[649]. There is, however, a line of thought, which implies a Neoplatonic correction of the Platonism of being above (ἄνω μένειν). With a (semi) quotation from the *Parmenides* (138 E 4) Plotinus now confirms that instead of going upward, one can find the SE near his door, anticipating his treatment of the omnipresency of the SE[650]. Ingeniously, also for this correction, he invokes the authority of the Master, Plato: φησιν. We know[651] that Plotinus often uses an isolated φησιν without subject, which in spite of that denotes Plato. Here Plato was already present directly or indirectly in the quotation of the *Minos*, a dialogue of which the authenticity was not problematical for Plotinus. The thoughts uttered in that quotation were Plato's, more or less. The message Plotinus offers now, is only semi-Platonic. HS refer to *Parmenides* 138 E 4, where we learn that the One is neither inside a thing nor outside. This does not amount to say that the SE is together with everyone as Plotinus rewords Plato. Plotinus only quotes: οὐδενός ἐστιν ἔξω, where οὐδενός is definitely not personal, whereas in Plotinus this seems to be meant. In fact Plotinus does not quote exactly Plato's words who said: .....μήτε ἐντὸς εἶναι τινος μήτε ἔξω. 'Φησιν' is misleading, for Plato did not exactly say what Plotinus wishes him to say. One could doubt if one has to print οὐδενός ἐστιν ἔξω widely, marking off a quotation, as HS do. For neither as regards the contents nor as regards the wording we have a literal quotation.

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[646] Line 25: εἴδωλα - The word εἴδωλον 'image' does not seem very positive, but there is no other way to express the report of what Minos experienced. In ch. 11 we find the word εἰκών as a term to describe after the event the soul's reminiscence of having experienced unification with the SE, see 276.

[647] See below 319.

[648] Plato says in the *Parmenides* 138 E 4 that the One is neither inside nor outside a thing (μήτε ἐντὸς εἶναι τινος μήτε ἔξω), neuter. In our context it has to be taken personally.

[649] line 29: οὐδενός φησίν ἐστιν ἔξω - Kirchhoff supposed a lacuna before these words. Vitringa added ὁ θεός after οὐδενός and Müller suggested the addition of οὖν θεός. I can understand why Kirchhoff assumed a lacuna: the train of thought is rather abrupt. The seeming lack of coherence was Harder's ground to start a new paragraph. If my interpretation is correct that the text fits in with what comes before it (see my text), there is no need for any addition. Müller and Vitringa seemed to have desperately missed a subject of ἐστιν and σύνεστιν, because of the mentioning of Zeus (line 24) and the appellation 'father' (line 33) a personal subject like God does not seem inappropriate. However, αὐτοῦ (line 30) in

'Φησιν' here is famous in the philological history of Plotinus' use of the word. Theiler declared once (to be specific in his contribution to the *Sources*[652]) that this 'φησι' could not be referring to Plato, and amazed his audience by suggesting that it refers to Posidonius, a view he was attacked for by Schwyzer, Dodds and Dörrie[653]. In the end he suggested that this 'φησιν' perhaps referred to a collection of Stoical texts of which Plotinus "erweiterte, ergänzte" one[654]. So Theiler maintained his position that this passage could not refer to Plato. 'Φησιν' generally has been said to refer to Plato, but there are exceptions. According to Schwyzer[655] it refers twice to Aristotle (28[IV,4],15,19; 53[I,1],4,26), once to Homer (1[I,6],8,18), once to an unknown Stoicus (2[IV,7],8,2,12) in a clearly Stoical context, and once to an unknown poet (33[II,9],9,22). In our passage it is extremely unlikely that 'φησιν' could refer to Posidonius or another Stoic, since the immediate context is devoid of any Stoicism. Thus whether or not he was right, Plotinus must be supposed to have wished to refer to Plato.

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connection with the mentioning of themselves as meeting point with the Highest Entity, which only can refer to the One, makes it more likely to suppose that the subject required is the One itself!

[650] See 238.

[651] Compare φησιν on p.148.

[652] Theiler, *Plotin zwischen Plato und Stoa, Sources*, 67.

[653] *Theiler, Plotin zwischen Plato und Stoa*, resp. 88, 94, 101.

[654] Theiler, *Plotin zwischen Plato und Stoa*, 101,102.

[655] Schwyzer, *Sources*, 88.

The connection this passage has with the foregoing perhaps turns on σύνεστιν of line 29 which continues what was said before the Minos-scene, about being together with the SE (line 23 συνουσία) and the passage could aim to Neoplatonise the thought, as I suggested: the SE is with you. In any case it generalizes Minos' case: the one is with *all*. Plotinus proceeds with dwelling on the position of people who do not know (οὐκ εἰδόσι). According to Plotinus people who 'do not know' have no awareness of the presence of the SE, because they, themselves, break away from the SE, or rather, they break away from themselves. One cannot catch what one is fleeing from and having lost oneself one cannot seek some one, likewise a child, when outside itself in an outburst of madness, will not recognize its father[656]. However, he, who knows who he is himself, will know his father and his origin (ὁπόθεν). To lose oneself is to lose the only channel to go to the SE (by *epistrophè*).

Here, at the end of ch.7, we meet with the theme of the descended soul, which dispersing itself in the world of genesis and dedicating itself to worldly affairs, ceases to be aware of its high origin[657] and its *de facto* connection with the Highest Entity. In this state of oblivion the soul is prey to mindlessness (ἐν ἀνοίαις), desires, fears and other evils, as we read in a rather early treatise, 6[IV,8],3,3 ff. At this point we have lost our 'selves' (αὐτούς). Locating this 'self' is really a serious problem in Plotinus' psychology to which has been given a lot of attention by *e.g.* Blumenthal[658]. In any case, one can lose it, as Plotinus points out at the end of ch.7. Unfortunately, Blumenthal does not take this loss of self into consideration nor does O'Daly[659]. This form of loss of the self is entirely different from the loss of the self in the union with the SE (see below 310).

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[656] On the notion of father and child and their relation see, Ferwerda, *Images*, 78, who has interesting things to say about the return of the child to the father and makes a reference to Gnostics, who were familiar with the scene (l'enfant prodigue). I cannot understand what Ferwerda (*ib.*, 79) means when he says that the image of the father never coincides "avec l' Un suprême", which happens to be the case in our text.

[657] See on the soul as originating in the Supreme Entity, 319.

[658] Blumenthal, *Psychology*, 109 ff.

[659] In O'Daly, *the Self* we do not come across our passage.

CHAPTER EIGHT

8, 1-10 Centripetal motion of the soul

Translation

> If a soul knows itself during the other period and knows that its motion is not straight, except when there is a kind of break in it, and its natural motion is like the circular motion around something not outside it, but around the centre, and the centre is that from which the circle stems, it will move around that from whence its origin is, and it will depend on this bringing itself towards the same centre towards which all souls had better move, and souls of Gods ever move themselves. Moving thither they are Gods. For a God is what is linked to that centre, what is far removed from it is every man and every beast.

The fact that a new chapter is opened should not lead on to the conclusion that Plotinus is starting a new argument. As regards its contents the chapter is the continuation of ch. 7, for what συνουσία really is, is now explained. Being together is only a necessary condition for becoming really united with the One (SE). In the following chapters the mystery of the union will be dealt with at length. Again and again Plotinus will revert to this theme and he will examine it from different points of view according to the circular mode of his thought.

In the last phrase of chapter 7 the visitor of the SE is supposed to know himself and his origin. Οἶδεν ch. 8, line 1 corresponds with εἰδήσει in ch.7, line 33. If the soul knows itself during the time[660] it does not spend with the SE, and if it is aware of the fact that its motion is not straightforward (as the not knowing soul readily assumes) unless there is some break[661], but that its structural, specific motion is similar to that of a circle, that does not move around some external goal, but moves around its own centre[662], the soul will move around the point[663], in which it originates[664] and to which it will cling. It will make itself circulate towards the centre[665], towards which all souls should make themselves circulate[666], *i.e.* the SE, and towards which all Gods always move, by the continuity of which motion they are what they are, namely Gods. For a God is connected and remains connected with the SE (Θεὸς γὰρ τὸ ἐκείνῳ συνημμένον), whereas what is distant from him is what is called 'everymen' and 'everybeast'. The example of the ever moving Gods is provided in order to make the reader more eager to concentrate on his centre.

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[660] Line 1: τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον - This expression has not been translated by Bréhier; MacKenna (621) renders it by 'its history', Cilento (431) 'in qualche alteria stagione di vita'. Harder: 'sonst'. In my opinion it refers to the periods during which the soul is not fleeing from the One, but rather seeking it. HS' interpretation ('extra tempus summae contemplationis') must be corrected inasmuch soul can not be supposed to always be immersed in earthly preoccupations. See also Igal, *de Uno*, 297, who has the right interpretation.

[661] Line 3: κλάσιν - A *hapax*, see *LP s.v.* It originates in *Timaeus* 43 E 1, breaking, fracture, with λαβεῖν: 'to be deflected'. In *Tim.* 43 E 1 it is said that soul's circular motion is deflected (κλάσεις), even destructed by the turbulating force of the sensations (κλάσεις καὶ διαφθορὰς τῶν κύκλων) to the effect that soul deviates from its structural path (in Plotinus ἡ κατὰ φύσιν κίνησις), from circular motion to movement into all directions.

[662] This centre perhaps is not yet the SE, but the centre of the circle of the soul (see line 10), that has to coincide with the centre the SE is, see lines 19-22.

[663] Line 5 - κινήσεται here the *apodosis* starts (HS κινήσεται incipit apodosis).

[664] In 39[VI,8],18,8 ff. we have a most interesting and important comparison with a circle (see below 242 ff.); in 39[VI,8],18,9 we are told that a circle has its power from the centre. The same is affirmed in 4[IV,2],1,26,27 and in 14[II,2],2,8,9 Plotinus explicitly states that soul and body do not have a centre in the same way. With body it is τοπικῶς, with the circle it is the centre from which the soul is (ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ (soul) μὲν μέσον ἀφ' οὗ ἡ ἄλλη

In order to have more background it is very interesting to notice the parallel with 14[II,2],2,5 ff. in which the circular motion of the soul is also described, that is within the framework of the problem of the circular motion of the heavenly bodies. The soul has a centre that is the centre from which the remainder of the soul is: ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ (soul) μὲν μέσον ἀφ' οὗ ἡ ἄλλη (*sc.* ψυχή). This soul turns out to be the God (not the SE). The soul runs round this God and embraces him lovingly and stays around him as much as it can, for all things depend on him. Since it cannot go to him, it moves round him. This holds good of all souls. At first in 9[VI,9],8 we are kept in the dark what precisely this centre is, but in the argument it turns out to be the God (the SE). This does not seem to mean that it is not justified to speak about the soul as having a centre of its own. In 9[VI,9],8,6 soul is able to come closer to this centre with its own centre, which is not at issue in 14[II,2],2,5 ff.

Plotinus now (line 10 ff.) asks, again in a rhetorical way, two questions (according to the punctuation of HS):

1) Is the socalled (οἷον) centre *of the soul* the candidate for being the SE (Τὸ οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς οἷον κέντρον τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ζητούμενον; line 10)?
or

(*sc.* ψυχή), τοπικῶς δὲ σώματος). The technical term for the unrolling of the circle from its centre is ἐξελίττειν, cf. 39[VI,8],18,18, see Beierwaltes, *Ewigkeit*, 168,169; cf. also 30[III,8],8,36 ff. where Plotinus provides a description of what a circle entails: σχῆμα (shape), ἐπίπεδον (surface), περιφέρεια (circumference), κέντρον (centre, see Bussanich, *The One*, 84 for the meaning of κέντρον here), γραμμαί (radii), τὰ ἄνω, τὰ κάτω (upper and lower parts).

[665] Line 6: συμφέρουσα ἑαυτήν - This is a rather strong expression compared to the normal medium φέρεσθαι, cf. φέρονται (line 7) and φερόμεναι (line 8). This particular mode of putting it is intended to emphasize the 'personal' active effort expected of the soul to set itself in motion together with (συμ-) other moving beings like the ever centripetally striving souls of the Gods. I reject Armstrong's 'bringing into accord' as not literal enough.

[666] Wrongly Bussanich, *The One*, 44 assumes Plotinus to have sense-perception in mind. There is a difference between the straightforward movement and the circular movement of the soul. The straightforward movement has to do with the soul during its absence from the union with the SE, but this does not imply any reference to sense-perception, for in the soul during its absence from the union, the soul not only has sense-perception but it also reasons about the mental impressions, cf. above 167.

2) should we consider it to be rather the centre *of centres*, the centre in which all the soul-centres coincide (Ἢ ἄλλο τι δεῖ νομίσαι, εἰς ὃ πάντα οἷον κέντρα συμπίπτει; 'or do we have to assume some other entity in which all 'centres' coincide?', lines11,12), and which may be compared with the centre of the earthly circle only in terms of analogy? We should notice here that the soul has its own centre, which may coincide with the centre of all souls: the centre of centres. The last centre we also find in 28[IV,4],16,21 where we get the impression that the centre of the soul's circle is the SE. The One/Good is in the centre of mind and soul. Mind has the SE immediately, the soul aspires to it (line 28). This image is quite in line with what we meet in 9[VI,9],8,7 (compare line 12) in which also the centre of soul's circular motion is the SE.

Question number two will turn out to be no question at all, as we shall see. It may be noticed that so far Plotinus has not explicitly spoken about the pure soul centre as such: he introduces it suddenly in connection with the centre of centres (towards which all souls must strive, line 8). It will surprise nobody that the centre of centres must be the SE, the aim of so long a search. However, this is not suggested until line 7 and, then, only in an indirect way (line 15 ἀπὸ τοιούτου does not perhaps refer to the One see my note 669, line 25 ἐκεῖνο does).

Since this centre is of a special type, it requires a specific *centrology* (if I a may introduce this word), which is characterized by analogy to what we expect 'normal' centres to be. We not only encounter a special elevated centrology but also a special doctrine of motion.

It may not escape notice that two motions are involved 1) the *circular* motion of the (individual) soul and an at first glance curious, *centripetal* motion of the soul towards the collective centre. The circular motion directly originates in Plato's *Timaeus* (43 E) and *Phaedrus*, as we shall see, the centripetal motion derives from the Neoplatonic accomodation of a Platonic motion: the motion towards the Ideas, which are of the highest status. This motion is vertical in Plato, since the Ideas are supposed to be part of a higher realm. In Plotinus' thought, on the other hand, the goal of the striving of the soul is the One or the Supreme Entity, which, we are told here, should be on the same level as the soul. These two motions are often amalgamated in Plotinus, but from time to time, where their distinction is of relevance, Plotinus stresses the centripetal motion. Such a centripetal motion is not alien to the mathematical structure of the circle, for it moves as a whole, and we should notice that such a motion is absolutely necessary in Plotinus' doctrine of motion. So the circularily moving soul must also display an approximating, even overlapping motion towards the centre (the SE). In the *Phaedrus* there is question of a vertical motion towards the Ideas, but after having reached the νῶτον of the world, all souls are carried around in a circular motion: ἕως ἂν κύκλῳ ἡ περιφορὰ εἰς ταὐτὸν περιενέγκῃ. Ἐν δὲ τῇ περιόδῳ καθορᾷ αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην *etc.* (*Phaedrus* 247

D, see also 247 C). Hence not only in the *Timaeus*, but also in the *Phaedrus* there is circular motion which is important as a background of Plotinus' doctrine of motion. It is this centripetality that plays an important part in regard to Plotinus' criterium of being a Godhead. Again he makes centripetal what in Plato's *Phaedrus* (249 C) is vertical and horizontal. Standing on the back of the world the souls, being carried around in a circular motion, are able to see the Ideas which are supposed to be perspectively higher than the souls. It is the privilege of the divine soul to always be able to see the Ideas, and it does so continuously during the circular periods. The human soul, on the other hand, runs the risk of falling down and is not in the position to look always towards the Ideas. The permanency of vision is precisely the feature that makes divine souls divine. Transposed to Neoplatonic thought it is the permanency of the now centripetal striving towards the centre of centres that makes the divine souls Gods (compare *Phaedrus* 249 C πρὸς οἷσπερ θεὸς ὢν θεῖός ἐστιν with Plotinus πρὸς ὃ φερόμεναι θεοί εἰσι line 8). They are permanently connected with the centre, never divert from it contrary to the ordinary human soul, which may be in the condition of abandoning the centre. One could ask if the centres of the divine souls continuously overlap the centre of centres. Such a question would be raised if one assumed that the souls of the Gods reside continuously in the SE. I do not know whether Plotinus would have accepted this consequence. As far as I can see, he never jumped to this conclusion. To return to the text: Plotinus' sketch of soul's relation to the centre mirrors Plato's hierarchy of souls: the divine soul is the highest in the scale, and the abandoning soul may descend to the status of the 'Durchschnittsmensch' (Harder translating ἄνθρωπος ὁ πολύς) or even to the body of a beast (*Phaedrus* 248 E - 249 B 3). The parallel with Plato (mutatis mutandis) explains the mentioning of θηρίον in line 10.

8, 10-16 Problems concerning limitations of the centre-image

Translation

> Well then, is that, as it were, centre of the soul what we are looking for ? Surely we must realise that there is some other centre, in which all these so-called centres coincide. We must realise too that the word 'centre' of this (soul)circle is by analogy. For the soul is not a circle in the sense a geometrical figure is, but it is such because in it and around it is its ancient nature, and because it stems from such an origin, and still more because souls are wholly separated.

Although nothing suggests that Plotinus is aware of the historical background of the combination of the centripetal and circular motion, he, certainly, is well aware of certain facts about the circle. The centre is to be counted as belonging to the circle, rather, it is its origin, it is its ἀφ' οὗ (line 5), which from a geometrical point of view is acceptable, but Plotinus knows that what he further teaches oversteps the boundaries of geometry. Hence he operates by means of analogy, which may be regarded as a token of his consciousness in this respect. He consciously formulates the difference between the analogical use and the normal use of the term 'circle' as follows: "for the soul is not a circle in the sense of the figure" (of the circle, meaning the normal geometrical circle: Οὐδὲ γὰρ οὕτω κύκλος ὡς τὸ σχῆμα, line 13,14).

This phrase is part of an extremely difficult passage, which opens with a question, we have already quoted (line 10): "Well then, is the so-called (οἷον) centre of the soul that which we are seeking for (Τὸ οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς οἷον κέντρον τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ζητούμενον; line 10)? " Apparently he has in mind the centre of the individual soul, for he answers his own question in the negative (in *my* translation): "Surely, we must realize that there is some other (centre), in which all these so-called centres coincide ("Η ἄλλο τι δεῖ νομίσαι, εἰς ὃ πάντα οἷον κέντρα συμπίπτει). We must realize, too, that the word centre of this (soul-)circle is by analogy". The interpunction of this sentence is modified by HS (followed by Armstrong). They put ';' after συμπίπτει (where the mss have no interruption) and after τοῦ κυκλοῦ. In this way HS get two sentences, both with a question-mark. The first presents a quite understandable meaning: "do we have to imagine another thing we search for, into which all 'centra' coincide?" The answer we are expected to give is obviously: 'yes'. Only in the SE all centres coincide. Nevertheless I do not see sufficient reason to render the two other sentences questions. On the contrary, the last one certainly is somewhat tortuous: "should we realize that the word 'centre' is by analogy of the visible circle?" I would prefer to take both as affirmations. Harder has no interpunction and believes that εἰς ὃ and ὅτι are on a par, referring to the same antecedens (ἄλλο τι): "und das dem Mittelpunkt eines eines irdischen Kreises nur analogisch entspricht". As I feel it the indefinite ὅτι seems not in harmony with the supposed co-relative εἰς ὅ, which as such is not indefinite. So I agree with HS to make a caesure by interpunction (no question mark!) taking ὅτι not as an indefinitum.

It remains fundamental to raise the question of the subject of the ὅτι-part (καὶ ὅτι ἀναλογίᾳ τὸ κέντρον τοῦδε τοῦ κύκλου). HS take it as follows: "per analogiam huius visibilis circuli centrum esse": 'that by analogy of the visible circle the centre is', making clear in the apparatus what the subject is: *nomen* centri. Harder and MacKenna take the subject to be the centre of centres of the preceding question. MacKenna: "it will be a centre by analogy with the centre of the circle we know". However, I do not think we can be sure that the subject is the centre of centres, which as such is at best implied in the text in the rhetorical question. As I see it, it is equally possible that the centre in question is the 'centre of the soul' from line 10. Then we get information about the nature of the centre of the soul in a restrictive sense. The centre of the soul (or if scholars are right, the centre of centres or the notion 'centre', nomen centri in general) is only by analogy a centre (or with Perna and Creuzer, an analogy ἀναλογία) as

Plotinus underlines. We may have doubts whether or not τοῦδε τοῦ κύκλου is to be taken with τὸ κέντρον or with ἀναλογίᾳ. As a matter of fact, ἀναλογίᾳ occurs regularly on its own, without any attributive determination (see *LP s.v.*). So it is possible if not likely that it features on its own here too. If this is the case, we must connect τούδε τοῦ κύκλου with τὸ κέντρον. In this case τοῦδε does not point to this world as one usually has it (cf. HS 'visibilis', ὅδε points frequently to this (non-transcendent) world, see *LP sub voce* and 9[9[VI,9],11,1), but to the soul(circle). In the end in whatever way τούδε τοῦ κύκλου is to be connected, the message is the same: it is all analogy.

Bearing this in mind the following sentence (line 13 οὐδὲ γὰρ οὕτω κύκλος ἡ ψυχὴ ὡς τὸ σχῆμα) gets its due. The centre of the soul is not a centre in the real sense of the word, for not even the soul is a circle as the mathematical figure is. The sentence at issue opens with οὐδὲ γὰρ (of which οὐδὲ is neglected by the translators): "*not even* the soul has such a form of a circle as the mathematical circle," Plotinus means to express that the 'circle 'of the soul is (for a great deal) an analogy used in order to prove that the centre too is only by analogy a centre. As I feel it, οὐδὲ suggests that τούδε τοῦ κύκλου indicates the circle of the soul.

The following phrase (line 12) in which he elaborates this difference between the circular character of the soul and the character of the mathematical figure is extremely difficult, succinct and obscure to the extent that Harder 1 assumes a lacuna and Harder 2 (*I b*, 482, correcting Harder 1) speaks about 'stichwortartige Notizen Plotins' and affirms: "Der hier sich spannende Gedankenbogen ist nicht ausgefüllt". HS have contributed considerably to the understanding of the phrase; they give the following note in their critical apparatus: "analogia circuli recte usurpatur (filling in a supposed ellips before ὅτι) quia in ea et circum eam est antiqua natura (*i.e.* vera animae natura), et quia a tali (*sc.* ab Uno) originem ducit magisque etiam quia animae separatae a corpore sunt". They rightly criticize Bouillet and Harder, who wish to explain ἀρχαία φύσις as referring to Plotinus 51[I,8],7,6, where ἀρχαία φύσις denotes matter in its pre-cosmic status before the God has interfered. It is amazing to see Harder applying this notion to the context[667], thus destroying any sense of the phrase. HS are right to reject this reference and seem to suggest that matter has nothing to do with the soul here. In the *Timaeus* (90 D 5) and in the *Republic* (611 D 2 see also *Symp.* 192 E 9) and in Plotinus, 23[VI,5],1,16, the expression denotes an original state (of the soul). It is far more likely that this is the sense that figures in our context. We shall come back to ἀρχαία φύσις later on. By filling in the supposed ellips, HS show that they make Plotinus have the intention to say that although the circle of the soul is only a circle by analogy (which has its peculiarities about which we are informed later on) nevertheless, the use of the image of the circle is a correct one. I think they are right. Slightly modifying their addition I propose to read as follows. The soul is not in the same way a circle as the figure, but it is a circle (ἀλλὰ κύκλος ἐστιν ὅτι because/in that a) the original nature is in the soul and around the soul, whereby 'around' suggests a circle[668], b) it stems from such a centre (ἀπὸ τοιούτου)[669], meaning perhaps a centre like the one as we come across in a mathematical circle and c) it is still more similar (καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον[670]) to a mathematical circle in that the souls (plural!) are (still) completely separated from any corporeal appendix. C) stresses the abstract character of both the circle and the soul in its original state. So in these three points we have the congruencies of the soul with a circle.

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[667] It is equally odd that in a note in his translation Armstrong mentioned Harder's untenable idea about matter.

Now I wish to confront the reader with my doubts as regards HS' filling in the ellips in ἀλλ' ὅτι: "analogia circuli recte usurpatur *etc.*". What worries me is that according to Plotinus, the original nature is in the soul and around the soul. Both affirmations seem to be scarcely compatible with the soul as a *circle* (the second is most incompatible). So this point can hardly be adduced by Plotinus in favour of the concept of the soul being a circle. For Plotinus himself asserts that a circle 'travels' around its centre and not the reverse (line 24). If this objection has some validity, we should recognize that Plotinus wished to affirm precisely the reverse of what the interpretation of HS entails. In this case the soul is only a circle by analogy and the soul surpasses the circle in several important aspects as is explained in lines 14 and 15. Now we have to read the sentence in line 13 οὐδὲ γὰρ οὕτω κύκλος ἡ ψυχὴ ὡς τὸ σχῆμα ἀλλ' ὅτι ..., as follows: "not even the soul is a circle in the same way as the figure, but [it is not] because .....". Plotinus indicates the differences: its origin is in and around the soul, it is from such an origin (the One), and it is even less like the figure because souls are completely separated from [the body]. It is difficult to see why these reasons would convince a reader of the congruences of the soul and a circle, as HS will have it. Besides, one would rather expect Plotinus to give reasons why the notion of the centre is only an analogy. I must confess not to know what precisely Plotinus' argument entails. In any case there seems to be an opposition between "completely separated" and the situation now (νῦν). For we are not completely separated in as much our souls are in our bodies.

Before we follow his argument in detail I shall spend a few words on the meaning of the expression *'the original nature'*. Three options may be considered. The expression can denote three different things:

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[668] However, see my note 671.

[669] Line15: ἀπὸ τοιούτου - is comparable with ἀφ' οὗ (line 4, 5). Therefore I assume that it is not so much the One (as HS think) that Plotinus has in mind here, but the fact that in the case of the soul there is, too, some centre from which the soul stems.

[670] Armstrong has left out the translation of καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον (see his *Translation*, 333).

1) the original nature of the soul. In this case this nature is in and around the soul, and there are no problems. The original nature must be the universal soul, surrounding every particular soul.

2) in line with the *Timaeus* 90 D 5 *etc.* it is the original nature, in this case, of the individual soul. On this explanation the phrase 'being in it and round it' is more difficult to understand. Perhaps it means that in the original situation the nature is in the soul and around the soul, which makes sense when the body is not yet around the soul. This stage is explicitly alluded to in the last part of the phrase: "and especially that they, the souls, are as a whole still separated from the body" (as HS take χωρισθεῖσαι). This nature could be the SE.

3) the original nature is the SE, which would appear also from the part of the phrase that stresses the fact that the soul is stemming from 'a such' (ἀπὸ τοιούτου), when 'a such' may be interpreted as the One as HS do: a tali *sc.* ab Uno.

The last possibility (3) is not necessarily ruled out at once by Plotinus' explicit message in line 35 where he says that the SE does not long for being around us whereas we do long for being around the SE, for Plotinus explicitly affirms that the SE is always present (line 34). So the SE has no need to try to be around *us*: it is already there. In *Ennead* 23[VI,5],1,16 we encounter the notion of the original nature (ἡ ἀρχαία φύσις) again[671]. Here Plotinus may have in mind the original unity of the soul, which is said to lead the soul to oneness. In the end I would prefer option 3, because of the reference to the original nature in 23[VI,5],1,16 and perhaps combined with option 2 without any reference to (universal) soul. If option 3 should be preferred, as I do, option 1) is ruled out.

8, 16-35 What does coincidence of the centre of the soul with the centre that is the One, mean?

Translation

> But now, since a part of us is held by the body, as if someone had his feet in water and with the rest of the body was above it, we lift ourselves up with the part that is not submerged in the body and connect ourselves through that part at the centre of ourselves with as it were the centre of all, just like the centres of the greatest circles join the centre of the encompassing sphere, and we are at rest. If however the circles were bodily, and not soul-circles, they would join the centre at a place and while the centre were somewhere in a place, they would be around it. But since the souls themselves are noetical and that One is supranoetical, we must suppose that the contact takes place by other powers in the

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[671] See also 2[IV,7],9,28 about the ancient state of the soul, *i.e.* its original nature τὴν ἀρχαίαν κατάστασιν (τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν). Τὴν ἀρχαίαν κατάστασιν is a quotation from *Rep.* 547 B 6-7.

> way that that which thinks is connected with the object of thought according to its nature, and we must think that the thinking by likeness and identity is more present to and connected with what is akin to it, since nothing keeps them apart. For bodies are prevented from communion with each other by bodies, but the bodiless are not kept apart by bodies, and they are not separated from each other by place, but by otherness and difference. Well then, if otherness is not present, the things which are not other are present to each other. That One, then, having no otherness is always present, but we are present (only) when we have no otherness.

We now follow Plotinus in his development of the argument, after he has stated the original bodilessness of the soul. In our present state, a part of us (the soul) is attached to the body. This situation is illustrated by a comparison. We, that is, the compound of body and soul, are compared with a man having his feet[672] in water, raising the other part of his body above the water. The part above the water is compared with the soul[673], transcending the world of the doxa. It is precisely with this part of us that is not merged in the body (τῷ δὴ μὴ βαπτισθέντι τῷ σώματι), that we rise up (ὑπεράραντες, intransitive, *LP*) and by means of which we connect our own centre with the centre of centres (τῷ οἷον πάντων κέντρῳ), in the same way the circles however large they might be[674], connect their centres with the centre of the sphere they belong to. This is mathematically correct. It is precisely this coinciding of the central points that may instruct us in regarding the quality of our union with the SE. Having made this connection we find rest in coinciding, so the rather isolated remark tells: ἀναπαυόμενοι. We might refer to line 43, 44, where ἀνάπαυλα is the concomitant of having reached our τέλος.

Plotinus now seems to anticipate the objections of readers, who will say that this connection of our soul-circles with the super-centre is in fact hardly imaginable because of local difficulties. Plotinus proceeds: if the souls were *corporeal* circles, instead of being psychical ones, they would coincide τοπικῶς, locally, in a spot, being around a centre which would be on a certain spot. Apparently, in contradistinction to corporeal ones, 'psychical' circles are supposed to have no locally determinable spot of union. The mathematical circles are no longer thought of, since although they are abstractions, they too must be assumed to have topical points of rendez-vous. Those psychical circles have their noetical aspect, and the SE is above[675] this level of mind, so there must be another (vertical) way of union. The comparison with the corporeal or even the mathematical circle now fails and shows its shortcomings for expressing the absolute transcendency of the SE with its own manners of being approached and unified with. We must come to the opinion that contact is made by powers different from the capacity of being locally united. This form of unity must be held to be more similar to that of a thinking subject with what it understands (κατανοούμενον)[676], *i.e.* the object thought about and we must think that the thinking subject is in a fuller sense present[677] near its object (than what is possible with corporeal circles) by likeness and sameness and in a fuller sense connecting with what is akin to it (τῷ συγγενεῖ), since nothing causes separating. HS comment that 'akin' must be taken as 'akin to the One', which I doubt. It is all said of the connection on the level of thought, it is only later on that this form of connection by likeness and sameness is applied to the SE (see line 34). We may derive support for this position in what comes next. Bodies are hampered by bodies to form a communion, but the bodiless is not hampered by bodies in this respect. On the interpretation of HS we would have expected something about the SE not being hampered. The transcendency of the noetic realm does not know of a local distance of the members, only of distance by otherness and difference (23[VI,5], ch. 1 and ch. 2[678]). When otherness is absent, then, what is not other (τὰ μὴ ἕτερα) is present. It is only now that the SE comes in, to which this rule is applied: the SE does not possess otherness[679], so it must always be present. As for us, we are present to the SE when we have no otherness (ἡμεῖς δ' ὅταν μὴ ἔχωμεν sc. ἑτερότητα) which implies that we often are absent from the SE.

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[672] Line 18: πόδας - The image has its oddities. It seems that Plotinus only pictures the feet under water, whereas normally only a small part of our body transcends the water, when we strive upwards. However, just as χείρ can mean the hand including the arm, likewise πούς can denote the foot including the leg (*LS sub voce* πούς). Perhaps the *Timaeus* (43 E) is in the background of the image.

[673] Line 16: ἡμῶν - Soul is the residence of our personality, see note 714.

[674] Line 20: μεγίστων - I translated 'however large they might be', because I am unable to find any other appropriate meaning. If we are to translate attributively: 'the greatest circle', I cannot see why what is said about them in the text would only apply to *great* circles. Perhaps Plotinus is referring to the fact that even the greatest circles one can construe in a sphere, they all may have the same centre as the sphere possesses. Igal, *de Uno*, 298, 299 believes that Plotinus has the circles of the stars of the celestial sphere in mind. I would agree with Ferwerda that the use of mathematical examples in this passage merely has an illustrative function, and that we should not see in them a form of mathematical mysticism (*o.c.*, 36, mystique cyclique). However, I cannot find any ground for his affirmation (*o.c.*, 34) regarding the circle of the soul in our chapter, namely the statement: "Ce cercle est bien loin d'être une forme géometrique, car il n'existe aucun rapport local entre le centre et les rayons". The geometrical aspect, however, is obvious in the lines of this chapter, apart from the fact that in this chapter there are no "rayons" to be found.

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[675] Line 25: ὑπέρ - Here he is exploiting the being higher of the SE as an argument against a mathematical, local connection.

[676] There is some difficulty in the mss, which present either (δυνάμεσι ἄλλαις) ᾗ or ἧ. Changing into ᾗ ('in the same way as', 'just as') will do. As to κατανοούμενον Harder (*I b*, 483) compares *Tim*. 90 D.

[677] Line 27: πλεόνως - In the analysis I choose for understanding this 'in a fuller sense' as compared to the mathematical, topical level. The SE emerges later on (line 33 ἐκεῖνο). It is only the level of the mind that Plotinus is occupied with now. Therefore I reject both the ingenious conjectural emendation of Dodds, πλέον ἢ ὡς, and the explanation of συγγενεῖ by HS as referring to the One. Some mss have πλέον ὡς. The reading πλεόνως (JQ) can be supported by referring to πλεόνως of 9[VI,9],6,2.

[678] See also 14[II,2],2,5 ff.

[679] Cf. 9[VI,9],6,42.

8, 35-45 The dance of the souls round the SE

Translation

> And it does not strive for us in order to be around us, but we strive for it, so that we are around that. And we are always around it, but we do not look always to it, but like a choir, looking outwards, however around the leader, should turn outside the vision, but when it has turned around sings beautifully and is truly round him, so we are always around him, and if we were not, there will be dissolution for us and, we will no longer be, and we are not always looking to him, but when we look to him, then there is our goal and rest and no longer singing out of tune, since we truly dance our divine dance around him.

Being always present the SE does not strive for us, to be around us, but the other way round we strive for him, to be around the SE. Notice that after having abandoned the comparison with the mathematical figure, Plotinus now reverts to it in as much the notion of 'around' returns. While we are always around the SE (with our psychical circle), we do not always look towards the SE.

Now again, Plotinus comes up with a splendid comparison: comparing our souls are like a dancing choir, now looking towards the master of the dance (coruphaios) at the centre, now looking outward to the audience. It will be seen from our discussion of this comparison that there are again considerable difficulties, *viz.* in connection with ἐξᾴδων. Plotinus asserts that we are always around it, but we do not always look towards it. However, just as a choir - and now the difficult ἐξᾴδων comes up, which for the moment I shall leave untranslated - though being around the leader will turn outside the view of the leader, but when it turns around only sings beautifully and is really around him, likewise we are always around him (the SE) and if not we are completely lost and we exist no longer, but we do not look always towards him (cf. line 38) but when we do look to him, then there will be our goal and rest and the end of bad singing (ἀπᾴδειν), when we really dance, a divinely inspired dance around him. Apart from the difficult ἐξᾴδων the scene is clearly described (beit somewhat clumsily), attempting to clarify our usual human condition of turning from the SE and being absent from Him and as opposed to our real destination: being around Him and looking to Him. The image of dancing (especially of the dance of the stars in the Universe) is not uncommon in Plotinus[680].

It requires some courage to write once more about ἐξᾴδων, the crux interpretum which Harder pointed out. Puelma devoted an important study to the question. He appositely pointed out that ἐξᾴδων constitutes a major difficulty. Actually ἐξᾴδων can only mean: 'to enumerate' (seldom), 'praise', or 'sing the Exodus-song', but it can never have the highly suitable *ad hoc* meaning required by Igal, *o.c.*, 303: *dissonare* (cf. ἀπᾴδειν line 44). Puelma believes that we have reason enough for athetising ἐξᾴδων. After having suggested this in his article of 1979, he abandoned this point of view under the influence of Van Winden, who convinced Puelma of the need of an attribute belonging to χορός (Puelma, 1980, 143, n.5). Puelma now proposes to read ἑξῆς ᾄδων, singing in a row ("örtliches ἑξῆς", for which 'Belege' in Homer, e.g. *Od.* 4,580, or "zeitliches: nach einander", Armstrong: 'in the order of its singing' cf. *LP*). To my mind this modification is not quite satisfactory, for it provides no substantial contribution in the context.

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[680] See Ferwerda, *Images*, 183 ff. Line 38: χορός - The splendid example of the ring-dance of the choir is extremely well chosen. By its two kinds of motion, inward and outward, when the choir goes from and towards the central point (the coryphaeus) it elaborates the centripetal and centrifugal motions Plotinus ascribes to the psychical circle. It also harmonizes the circular motion of the soul with its centripetal motion towards the One.

Another attempt to explain ἐξᾴδων therefore seems justifiable. What we do not find in the context is any reference to the choir's looking outwards, when turning to the public, away from the leader. Kiefer[681] adds to his translation, obviously impelled by his own understanding of the text: "looking outwards". My proposal is to read ἔξω ἰδὼν, "after having looked away from the coruphaios, in an outward direction". This results in a very suitable notion. From a paleographical point of view, moreover, ἔξω ἰδὼν is not far from ἐξᾴδων. All that happens is that an Α is changed into a Ω - hardly a drastic operation. The excentric usage of ἔξω has its parallels in Plotinus himself. Although the word occurs in 49[V,3],8,21, the most promising parallel is found in 23[VI,5],7,9, where we read about faces (of multifaced Hermes, see Harder, *II b*, 416). The line of thought is also parallel. When we look outwards, we forget that we are one, just as many faces looking outwards have one skull inwards: Πάντα ἄρα ἔσμεν ἕν. *Ἔξω* μὲν *ὁρῶντες* ἢ ὅθεν ἐξήμμεθα ἀγνοοῦμεν ἓν ὄντες, οἷον πρόσωπα πολλὰ εἰς τὰ *ἔξω* πολλά, κορυφὴν ἔχοντα εἰς τὸ *εἴσω* μίαν. In what immediately follows the word ἐπιστραφῆναι emerges, with all its attractions, just as it does in our text. When someone has the strength to ἐπιστραφῆναι, he would see the revelation of τὸ πᾶν. The atmosphere and ambiance are the same as in our passage. The metaphor - a clever trouvaille - is different, but as far as direction is concerned, it is the same: ἔξω / εἴσω. It is striking that ἔξω should be connected with ὁρῶντες, a strong justification for ἔξω ἰδὼν in Plotinus' idiom. Joining Puelma in his rejection of ἐξᾴδων and exploiting the new parallel, I propose to read ἔξω ἰδὼν, instead of ἐξᾴδων. We may find some support for this view from ἴδωμεν, some lines further on, line 42: ἀλλ' ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸν ἴδωμεν: "When looking to Him (the SE) *etc.*". The element 'looking in a certain direction' is most important. Besides, καίπερ ἔχων περὶ τὸν κορυφαῖον suits ἔξω ἰδὼν better. We thus get an elegant and natural sequence in the text. Additionally I may remark that the choir is said to be *really* (ὄντως) round the leader during the phase they look at him, comparable to our concentration on the SE, although even when looking outwards the choir is said, too, to be around the coryphaios, which apparently comes down to being to a lesser degree (καίπερ ἔχων περὶ τὸν κορυφαῖον), a phase comparable to our wandering away from the SE.

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[681] See Puelma, 1979, 98, n.35.

Notice that HS 2 make the sentence lines 41-42 καὶ .... ἐσόμεθα a parenthesis, changing the comma after αὐτόν into a high comma (cf. Armstrong's translation).

From a philosophical point of view the passage is highly interesting because of its comment on our being with God. We really are dancing around the God. There we find our goal and rest, tokens of the ultimate stage of the journey. In the beginning of chapter nine we are told what this ultimate stage contains, namely what we really see during the dance: the principal aspects of the God. In spite of the use of the terms 'goal' and 'rest' it is not the mystical *union* that is at issue. It is only *vision* of the God and what he is that is intended to be portrayed.

Appendix on Centrology in Plotinus (circle, centre, radii)

In Plotinus the metaphor of the circle, the centre and the radii plays a very important role to clarify metaphysical and transcendental situations and relations between transcendental entities. As Armstrong (*Translation* V, 50, n. 1, see also Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 342) points out, this metaphor (circle, centre, and sometimes the radii) can be made operative at any level in the transcendency, but in 9[VI,9] it is used to help illustrate the relations of soul to the centre of centres, the SE. We shall treat the subject more elaborately now.

It is a good idea to start with 10[V,1],11,10: ἐν πολλοῖς αὖ θεωρεῖσθαι (*sc.* θεόν) καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν δυναμένων δέχεσθαι οἷον ἄλλον αὐτόν ... "He (the God) is contemplated in each and every one of those capable of receiving him as another self", where we hear about οἷον ἄλλον αὐτόν which O' Daly[682] interpretes as "alter ego". This chapter 11 may provide a basic contribution for understanding the circularity in Plotinus. For the question in how far the SE and the soul have a bond of unity, and whether or not the soul and the SE coincide, and, if so, how complete or incomplete this unity might be, is a main topic in Plotinus' doctrine. Atkinson holds that the notion of "alter ego" in 10[V,1],11,10 though acceptable as such does not fit the context, because the notion of an alter *ego* is hardly present in ἐν πολλοῖς since according to Atkinson (*Ennead V 1*, 235) ἐν πολλοῖς refers to *bodies* (*e.g.* an army, a choir *etc.*) basing himself on 9[VI,9],1, on which I proposed some views myself[683], different from Atkinson's views on the unity of these entities. According to Atkinson bodies have an immediate relation with the One. I doubt this because in the preambule of 9[VI,9],1 we do not meet the One as Superunity but a one as the bond of unity substantially belonging to things (an army, a choir *etc.*) themselves, and their participation is only indirect[684]. So we must question Atkinson's position that πολλοῖς denote not only people but also *things*. As I see it, in 10[V,1],11 πολλοῖς is confined to people who have the capacity to receive the God, for in chapter eleven it is all about *people* (cf. ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ ἡμεῖς lines 14,15). The God can be seen in many (souls) in as much they are able to receive (δέχεσθαι) it as another self. The ἐν of ἐν πολλοῖς may reasonably be connected with ἐν ἡμῖν εἶναι (line 6,7 there must be a mind in us *etc.*). Understandably I cannot accept Atkinson's special interpretation of οἷον ἄλλον αὐτόν: instead of the alter-ego interpretation he takes the words to mean "whereever each thing is able to receive it *as something different from what the One actually is*" (taking HS' remark as startingpoint: "quasi alius esset atque ipse est"). Referring to 39[VI,8],18 Atkinson asserts that the *received* One should be different from what the One basically is.

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[682] O'Daly, *Self*, 90. Notice that in 10[V,1],11 the SE is described as God, not as One!
[683] See above 69.
[684] See on this problem, the Appendix III of ch.1

In 39[VI,8],18 we are told that the radii of a circle have their origin and their πέρας in the centre of the circle. This centre as such is greater than, and transcends the totality of the points of the radii in the centre. In line with this view on the centre as something more than the total of its coinciding participants Atkinson translates (*o.c.*, LXV) lines 10-14 of 10[V,1],11: "just as a centre of a circle is independent, but each component of the circle has its point in it, *i.e.* (καί epexegetically interpreted, see *o.c.*, 237) the radii bring to this centre their individual points". The phrase ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ σημεῖον ἐν αὐτῷ is an imprecise way of referring to the radii according to Atkinson and the next phrase opening with the epexegetical καὶ is assumed to explain "the rather vague remark that each of the components of the circle has a point at the centre". I see the function of the two phrases differently and I believe that they have their own messages to convey and their own tasks to perform in the discussion[685]. With the so called rather vage remark (ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ σημεῖον ἐν αὐτῷ), Plotinus prepares us for the important conclusive phrase that we are in contact with the God and are with the God and depend on him by something of his kind in us (τῷ γὰρ τοιούτῳ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν), in short, that we are established in the God, just as the radii have contact with the centre, are with the centre and depend on the centre. There is not only a tendency from the God to us (just as there is from the centre to the radius, which is not explicit in the text) expressed in the word ἀνηρτήμεθα (l. 15), but also from us to the God expressed in οἳ ἂν συννεύωμεν ἐκεῖ (*ib.*): "and those of us who converge towards him are firmly established in him" (Armstrong's translation). It is precisely the task of the epexegetical phrase (καὶ αἱ γραμμαὶ τὸ ἴδιον προσφέρουσι πρὸς τοῦτο) to pave the way for our converging towards the God, just as the radii bring their own point to the centre. I think that this task of line 12 has escaped Atkinson's attention. I also think that I need not show that καὶ αἱ γραμμαὶ τὸ ἴδιον προσφέρουσι πρὸς τοῦτο is not simply an explanation of the so-called vague remark of line 11, 12 (ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ σημεῖον ἐν αὐτῷ); this phrase, too, had its own contribution to make. Nevertheless, it remains strange that Plotinus should bring the word γραμμαί in so late. This provokes us to ask whether or not there is a special reason for coming up first with the indeed rather vague expression, which will prove not necessarily to be regarded as "imprecise", if Plotinus had a special reason for the use of the rather general words ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ σημεῖον ἐν αὐτῷ. This sentence is open to a threefold interpretation, depending on the subject of ἔχει and the syntactical arrangement. The sentence, accordingly, could be rendered as follows:

1) and the God has every (extreme) point of the things in the circle in itself.

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[685] So I cannot agree with Bussanich, *The One*, 85, who praises Atkinson's discussion as "excellent".

2) and everyone of the things in the circle has its point in it.
3) "et chacun des points du cercle le (*sc.* le centre) contient en lui" (Bréhier).

If we understand *chacun des points du circle* as each of the extreme points of the radii (I am not sure this was what Bréhier had in mind), in that case these points, indeed, are supposed to 'have' the God. This fits in with the context marvellously well (δέχεσθαι). Atkinson, however, rejects this translation on the grounds that in 39[VI, 8],18 we are told - as we know already - that the centre transcends the sum of the participant points of the radii and that they only have shadowy images (ἴχνη) of the One. So the radii can not be said to *have* the One. I doubt if this rejection can decisivily be based on so late a treatise (VI, 8 is chronologically no 39), of which ch.18 has an aim so different from the one of 10[V,1],11. Its objective is to demonstrate the possibility that the One is present in being and simultaneously distinct from being, whereas in any event 10[V,1],11 wishes to underline our bond with the SE. As a matter of fact, I would rather make an appeal to the chronologically far more proximate IV (no 4),2,1,24-30. Here Plotinus is already very explicit on the circle-image. The centre (in 4[IV,2] the centre of the domain of *being*) remains at its own ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μένειν (the same point in 10[V,1],11,11) whereas the lines which are inclined towards the circumference let the centre be on itself, although they have sprung from it and have there origin and being from it. They participate in the centre (μετέχουσι μὲν τοῦ σημείου) which does not prevent the centre from being partless, which is the message of the chapter. Linking in this presentation of the relation between the centre and the radii with what we find in 10[V,1],11 we may affirm that option 2 is quite likely to be the preferable rendering: "and everyone of the things in the circle has its point in it". This translation expresses very well the special form of unity the centre and the radii have: being together or even coinciding without sacrificing their identity in any way. Where the centre is to be found, the limits (πέρατα) of the radii are equally present, they even participate in their superior entity (being in 4[IV,2],) or in terms of 10[V,1],11, the top of our mind (the point of the radius) receives the God (the centre of the circle) itself (αὐτός) as it were by the peculiar form of *identity* between the two, although the centre (the God) remains on its own (ἄλλος) by the peculiar *non-identity* of the two. We should be aware of the fact that following the track of the mind means for us bringing our points to the centre, it means converging towards it. This is the ultimate meaning of καὶ αἱ γραμμαὶ τὸ ἴδιον προσφέρουσι πρὸς τοῦτο, and συννεύωμεν.

Returning now to the peculiar expression ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ σημεῖον ἐν αὐτῷ, I would explain these words by pointing out that after writing these words Plotinus apparently wished to add another remark to emphasize the tendency towards the centre, expressing himself more precisely by using instead of τὰ ἐν κύκλῳ the more appropriate γραμμαί. It is not ruled out that τὰ ἐν κύκλῳ includes other figures than the radii (*e.g.* perhaps other circles, of a smaller circumference but with the same centre), which in itself would be a sufficient explanation for the expression. Be this as it may, the two sentences each express a different thought, *viz. having* a point in the centre and *bringing* a point to the centre respectively. After all I think O'Daly's interpretation (alter ego) to be the right one, although a less personal phrase will do as well: an alter self: the points overlap eachother. So the God is the other, actually superior, self of *the receiver.* It is by no means Plotinus' intention to make the God a self in this phrase, O'Daly's first option. It seems likely that, in fact, Plotinus quotes Aristotle's definition of a friend: "the friend is another self (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος *ἄλλος αὐτός, NE* 1166 a 31,32) with an 'egocentric' point of view: a person's friend is like the self of that person. So I have put forward every possible reason to reject Atkinson' s somewhat tortuous explanation.

I may now bring in a very important point. We should sharply distinguish between *the relation of radii to the centre* on the one hand, and *the coinciding of centres of circles* on the other hand (the coinciding is very important in 9[VI,9],8). Indeed, Atkinson is right in stressing the fact that *radii* have a point as πέρας in the centre, and that the centre transcends these πέρατα of the radii. The teachings of 39[VI,8],18 are quite clear in that respect, and we might add that in 10[V,1],11 Plotinus confines himself to speaking about the bond between the God and the rightly directed soul, *i.e.* about the bond between the centre and the radii. However, it should not go unnoticed that in 9[VI,9],8 the coincidence of the centres of *circles* is supposed to be complete and is an image for the total mutual absorption (of the God and the soul, see below 273). The image of the radii allow the centre to be on its own and on itself, whereas the image of coinciding circles with the same centre precisely tries to make the distinction between the coinciding entities disappear, as we shall see.

Additionally, I might refer the reader to Atkinson (236) for a possible origin of the image of the relation of the centre and the radii. He suggests Alexander of Aphrodisias (*Quaest.* 96,14 ff. ed.Bruns), but we should rather (with Henry, *Comparaison,* 434, Schwyzer, *RE,* 574) think of Alexander, *De Anima,* 63,8-13 (ed.Bruns). Alexander used the relation between the centre and the radii for his proof of the incorporality of the *sensus communis* against the Stoics (see Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus,* I, 136,137), so with Alexander it is all in the field of sensation. Incidentally, it is very interesting to notice that in Alexander's text as well the γραμμαί do not figure, which could explain Plotinus' omission of them in his sentence 11, 12 (ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ σημεῖον ἐν αὐτῷ) and his bringing in the γραμμαί at such a late point, in the phrase καὶ αἱ *γραμμαὶ* τὸ ἴδιον προσφέρουσι πρὸς τοῦτο.

CHAPTER NINE

9, 1-7 What we see during the dance

Translation

> And in that dance one sees the source of life, the source of mind, the origin of being, the cause of good, and the root of soul, which are not poured out from him and after that diminish him. For they are not a bulk, otherwise the things generated would be perishable. But now they are eternal things, because their origin remains the same, not divided up into them, but remaining as a whole. Therefore they too remain just as the light too should remain as long as the sun remains.

The image of dancing[686] is continued in the opening of ch.9 and displays the grandness of an ornate and even psalmodic kind of language. Going around the SE one observes both the *source*[687] of life and the *source* of mind, moreover the *origin* of Being, the *cause* of the good and the *root* of the soul. HS compare this sentence with good reason with a phrase of Basilius, *Hom.*, XV, *De Fide* II, p.131, where the same religious voice rings: ἡ πάντων ἀρχή, ἡ αἰτία τοῦ εἶναι τοῖς οὖσιν, ἡ ῥίζα τῶν ζώντων, ὅθεν προῆλθε ἡ πηγὴ τῆς ζωῆς. The partial disparity of the combination of words in Plotinus and Basilius is easily seen: the expression 'source of life' has a dominant position in both, in Plotinus because of its place in front, in Basilius because of its place at the rear of the somehow mystical phrase. However there are more interesting differences. Plotinus speaks about 'the cause of good' (ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίαν), which is absent in Basilius. The sequence of what is portrayed in Basilius is rather systematical: all things, being, life. In Plotinus, at first glance, the sequence does not seem very systematical. Life comes first, then mind, then being; 'good' seems to interrupt the sequence, for systematically one would expect soul to come next. One could wonder why *life* is mentioned as the first item. Is not *mind* the first to originate in the Supreme Entity? Here we meet here the famous trio of life, mind and being[688]. We may recall[689] in 7[V,4] the emphasis laid on the aspect of life of the (almost Mesoplatonian) SE of 7[V,4], even before the special mode of thinking of this SE. We see the same sequence repeated in 7[V,4],2,43,44[690]. So we need not ponder about life's first place. Moreover, perhaps the most important motive to make life go ahead, is the fact that life and the quality of life with the Supreme Entity have a dominant role to play in the scenery of ch.9: *e.g.* line 15 ff: τὸ ἀληθῶς ζῆν ἐνταῦθα *etc.*

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[686] Line 1: χορεία - Thedinga, *Plotin oder Numenios ?* III, 218 reads πορεία, which, however ingenious, should be regarded as an unnecessary emendation. Notice that instead of with 'we' Plotinus continues with 'it (the soul) sees', see Harder, *I b*, 483, and below 314.

[687] Line 1: πηγή - See Ferwerda, *Images*, 41; ῥίζα - Ferwerda, *Images*, 92-96 for the root-image, cf. also Boot, *Voorzienigheid*, 352.

[688] See on this trio, note 330.

[689] See above 41.

[690] See also 30[III,8],9,36 ff.

It may be noticed that ἀρχή and αἰτία, seem almost interchangeable and denote originating and proceeding. 'Ρίζα seems to be less direct. Soul, from a hierarchical point of view, is not the immediate offspring from the SE[691]. Πηγή (source), close to having the same meaning as ἀρχή and αἰτία, and being a frequently recurring metaphor[692], is in the series the main word as appears from ἐκχεομένων[693] at the rear of the sentence, elaborating the notion of flowing which is, strictly speaking, only applicable to πηγή (source); ἐλαττούντων has a wider range of application and more subjects. Although, admittedly, source is the main word, this does not imply that life, being, good and soul are not the subjects of ἐκχεομένων and ἐλαττούντων (HS consider τὰ γεννώμενα (line 4) as the subject of ἐκχεομένων and ἐλαττούντων, which boils down to the same). Their proceeding from the SE (although the latter, soul, does not proceed directly from the SE) does not imply diminishing of the SE[694].

Plotinus provides a remarkable reason for the fact that the products of the One do not diminish its substance. Otherwise there would be ὄγκος (mass[695]) either of the SE (Bréhier, Cilento, HS subi. τὸ ἕν) or of the proceeding products (Harder, *I b*, 484). This 'either-or'-disjunction is difficult to decide on. Perhaps Plotinus had in mind both the products and the SE as not having mass. Anyhow, ὄγκος is introduced as the main characteristic of the sensible world of generation and corruption. Plotinus proceeds by telling us that if there were ὄγκος, the γεννώμενα would have been perishable. This observation makes clear that it is mainly from the point of view of the products that Plotinus reasons which strengthens Harder's claim. The irreality of the assumption of their perishability appears in Plotinus' remark: "but now they are eternal (ἀίδια)". Next he considers the matter from the point of view of the SE: their origin remains in the same position and state not dividing itself into its products, but remaining as a whole. And that is the reason why the products too remain in the same state and position. I cannot help finding a vicious circle in the argument.

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[691] 'Ρίζα can be said of the λόγος of the plant which stems from the One, *i.e.* the mind, 39[VI,8],15,33-36. Here the fact that the SE remains in itself as itself is especially mentioned: it is a characteristic of ῥίζα (and of πηγή). However, mostly ῥίζα is used on the level of the soul as ῥίζα of the universe *etc.*, see Bussanich, *The One*, 108.

[692] Cf. Ferwerda, *Images*, 41. The word πηγή can be used in connection with the One as the source of the mind (30[III,8],10,5) and in regard to the mind as the source of the true soul (25[II,5],3,40). It has the same value as ῥίζα in that it emphasises the undiminished power of the One and mind respectively, see note 568.

[693] Line 3: ἐκχεομένων - See 11[V, 2], 1, 16, cf. Ferwerda, *Images*, 41, 42.

[694] Some mss read in stead of ἐκεῖνον: ἐκείνων. Harder agrees. However, in this case one would have expected ἐκείνων already going together with ἐκχεομένων, whereas as an object ἐκεῖνον fits in very well with ἐλαττούντων .

[695] Line4: ὄγκος - See notes 382 and 564.

A metaphor is now used to confirm Plotinus' remark about the eternal connection between the position of the products and the SE. It is precisely in this manner[696] that as long as the sun (source) remains[697], light (product) remains.

9,7-13 We are not cut off from the One

Translation

> For we are not cut off nor are we separate, even if the nature of the body, having intruded, has drawn us towards this nature, but we recover and are rescued, since that (SE) does not give and has then gone away, but it always bestows them as long as it will be what it is. We are more, when have turned to it and our well-being is there, but being far is being alone and less.

Rather surprisingly Plotinus continues his argument by teaching us that we (!) are not cut off[698] from the SE and that we are not separated from it. This thought is connected with the previous by an at first glance not very lucidly used γάρ, which cannot be regarded as a purely causal γάρ. What reasonable link might be assumed to exist between the fact just mentioned about light being present as long as its source is present and the fact that we are not cut off from the SE? The connection can only be the implied thought that the SE has a standing connection with its offspring. Just as the eternals have their link with the SE, so we have our standing connection with our origin. Undoubtedly γάρ has to be taken as an ellips, to be filled in as follows: 'the sun keeps in touch with its offspring, just as in our case (the origin is linked with us) for we are not cut off from the SE *etc.*'. So γάρ is used in the sense of ἀλλὰ γάρ which as γάρ (but more frequently) is employed in elliptical phrases, where it provides the reason of what is left out. It has to be filled in from the foregoing context (see *LS s.v.*)[699].

We are not cut off from the SE, but that does not mean that our situation is glorious, since our are souls are embodied in the σῶμα. We are not cut off even when the nature of the body has drawn us to the corporeal with force. We are rescued, *viz.* from the corporeal (σῳζόμεθα). So far we may trust the text, except that before σῳζόμεθα the mss have the rather disquieting lecture: ἒν πνέομεν, which does not mean much. These two words have ingeniously been taken together by Kirchhoff: ἐμπνέομεν, we breathe[700] by the SE and are rescued. Nevertheless, this philological move does not reassure me. It is not breathing that we would expect in the sequence of thought. In view of the notion of 'rescue' or 'preservation' I would prefer ἀναπνέομεν - not in the sense of breathing, the only meaning in Plotinus, see *LP* - but in the sense of 'recovering from', see *LS* sub voce (2)[701].

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[696] οἷον εἰ: to give an example cf. 46[I,4,],7,11 (οἷον εἰ καὶ παῖδα ἀποβάλλοι) for other examples of οἷον εἰ, see *LP*. *s.v.*οἷος 727 sub d.

[697] Line 8: μένοι - I can understand Harder, who prefered the reading of AU: μένει. For a fact is at stake. HS maintain the optativus. There is a reason for maintaining the optativus. It is also used in other cases of οἷον εἰ, see the example in the previous note.

[698] The same word (ἀποτέτμηται) occurs in a similar context in 49[V,3],12,44.

[699] Line 6: γὰρ - For the use of γάρ in the sense of καὶ γάρ or ἀλλὰ γάρ see Wolters, *on 'Eros'*, 7 and cf.note 312.

The powers that belong to our corporeal structure tend to draw us towards the body, away from the SE, in a hampering way (παρεμπεσοῦσα[702]), but we are able to recover from this pressure and be rescued from the overpowering strength of the corporeal. This happens because the SE gives without fail and provides as long as it is what it is (ἀει χορηγοῦντος ἕως ἂν ᾖ ὅπερ ἐστί lines 10,11). The last part of the sentence obviously reminds us of the previous thought concerning the connection between the sun and its light, the latter's continuation depending upon the presence of the source. Now we might ask for what is given so generously by the SE without withdrawing (so asking for the objects of δόντος and χορηγοῦντος). In their translation Harder and MacKenna wisely omit an object, like the Greek of Plotinus, but this does not put an end to my curiosity. Searching further, I found that Bréhier chose 'de vivre et de nous conserver'. This suggestion has to do with his accepting Kirchhoff's brilliant conjecture ἐμπνέομεν - 'breath', 'vivre'. I myself has an another idea: the object of the participia seems to me: all his goods (Armstrong, *Translation*, "all his gifts"), especially being. For it is (the degree of) being that emerges in the following sentence.

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[700] This verb ἐμπνεῖν occurs in 47[III,2],4,15, 'breathe', in 10[V,I],2,2 'breathe into'.

[701] Line 9: ἐμπνέομεν - The mss have: ἓν πνέομεν: we breathe the One, which in the context makes no sense. The state of breathing (what ἐμπνέομεν is translated into), even if we are drawn towards the corporeal, is quite normal and is more characteristic of life in this world than it has to do with the SE. Ever since Bouillet, as Harder points out, references have been made to the Discours of the Apostle in the Areopagus. I think they are out of order. Apart from what I have suggested in the text (Ficinus' ἀναπνέομεν) we might a formation of νέυειν consider as an other way out, for it is not unlikely that we must use the verb νεύειν which appears in the following sentence as νεύσαντες (line 11), in combination with πρός. This preposition occurs in line 9, and could have been left out by haplography. Thus we may emend (?) the text with the following result: πρὸς ἓν νεύομεν: we are inclined towards the One and are rescued (σῳζόμεθα). This would be the one and only time Plotinus employed the word 'One' after ch.6. Another possibility would be: ἀνανέυομεν, cf. 1[I,6],2,6, where the verb is used to denote the turning away from the ugly (αἰσχρόν). Finally I might suggest as a last solution to change ἓν πνέομεν into ἐμπνεόμεθα "we are breathed into". The active meaning of ἐμπνεῖν is found in the last sentence of 38[VI,7],23 'breathe into', 'infuse' (*LP*), together with *σῴζει* (cf. σῳζόμεθα)!

[702] Harder, *I b*, 484: παρεμπίπτω 'sich unvermerkt und schädlich eindrängen', cf. 49[V,3],11,27.

Plotinus proceeds with the following remark (line 12): "we are[703] to a higher degree (μᾶλλον ἐσμέν) inclining upwards[704] towards the SE and towards the Good which is present there. To be far from the SE (τὸ δὲ [705]πόρρω εἶναι) is to be alone, *i.e.* isolated from the SE and being to a lesser degree (μόνον καὶ ἧττον εἶναι, in opposition to μᾶλλον ἐσμέν)". Notice that even if we are far away from the SE, we are still said to be! There is a problem, however. Plotinus seems to contradict himself when he says on the one hand that we are not cut off from the Supreme Entity and not separated from it (lines 7 and 8), and that when turned away from it our being is isolated and lesser, on the other. We must admit that translators usually take μόνον not as 'isolated' , but as an adverb with ἧττον εἶναι or they connect it with πόρρω εἶναι. HS quote Ficinus with approval: "hinc procul abesse nihil aliud est quam esse minus". Armstrong (*Translation*) has a similar interpretation: "but being far from him is *nothing else but* existing less". Bréhier, taking μόνον with ἧττον εἶναι: "notre éloignement de lui (n'est pas un eloignement de lui) mais *seulement* un amoindrissement d'être". Harder (taking μόνον with πόρρω εἶναι): "*nur Ihm fern sein* bedeutet Sein geringeren Grades". Cilento: "già il *simplice* esserme lontan". MacKenna's "loneliness" for μόνον εἶναι seems more acceptable. The construction of μόνον in HS and Armstrong (nihil aliud quam, also Bréhier) does not run smoothly, they obscurate in their translations καί after μόνον by neglecting it[706], with good reason for it makes no sense in their explanation. The meanings of their translations, however, are clear. It may be that we are far from the SE, in which case there is only question of a diminution of being, not a being cut off from the SE. This makes good sense in the context, except that the word 'only' seems a little bit strange, because it suggests that this being far from the SE is not so very bad, but only a lesser degree of being. Harder's 'nur

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[703] MacKenna has 'being' for εἶναι, whereas Armstrong has 'exist'. However, there are no degrees of existence (either we exist or we do not, see above 104), but there are degrees of being depending on how far we have turned towards the SE, see above 105.

[704] On νεῦσις see Bussanich, *The One*, 41, who identifies it to ἐπιστροφή when used in the athmosphere of the mystical ascent. Νεύειν, however, is rather simply 'to tend towards', downwards or upwards (see *LP*). The same holds for the substantive νεῦσις. To say that it is synonymous with ἐπιστροφή goes too far, for we have to deal with rather neutral words (νεύειν, νεῦσις) which are coloured by the context. The most famous νεῦσις in the *Enneads* is the νεῦσις of the SE towards itself in 39[VI,8],16,24 νεῦσις αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτόν, which seems to me only to be a very occasional use of νεῦσις connected with the inner life of the One. This νεῦσις emerges in the daring treatise about the free will of the One, a treatise which permits utterances deviating from normal Plotinian usage in order to be able to ascribe to the SE a free will. Bussanich, *The One*, 217 believes νεύειν to have here, in 9[VI,9],9,11 geometrical overtones, "characterized by the geometric analogy of the radii converging towards the centre bringing in the radii of the center". I think it is more neutral: πόρρω εἶναι, its contextual counterpart likewise has no geometric overtones. The geometric comparison is found in ch.8, where radii have no function: it is only circles and centres that matter there.

[705] Line 12: δὲ- is added by Müller, it suits the thought, but is it necessary?

[706] Igal's explanation, *de Uno*, 304 does not neglect καί: "procul esse, esse dumtaxat ac minus esse", but is traditional.

Ihm fern sein' hardly makes sense (the same goes for Cilento). In my interpretation (being alone, *i.e.* isolated from the SE and being to a lesser degree (μόνον καὶ ἧττον εἶναι)) Plotinus has already advanced in his argument one step forward and concludes that being far from the SE is not so good at all, for it means being alone and being to a lesser degree, an altogether regrettable state, in contrast to 'there', where one finds real life and not a trace of it (line 17). In my interpretation, too, the soul still remains *being*, how ever far it may be from the SE. Being 'alone' (μόνον) not necessarily contradicts being 'not cut off from' the SE and separated from it. Plotinus allows himself to suppose in line 16 that a soul be without God (ἄνευ θεοῦ). Later on (lines 23,24) he declares that in this world we have, as it were, fallen away from God and perhaps been driven away. This tendency to stress the nasty circumstances of a life far from the Supreme Entity may be considered to extend itself to μόνον εἶναι. It should be noticed that μόνον has nothing to do with the μόνον of what I called monology[707].

9, 13-25 The happiness of being with the SE

Translation

> It is there that the soul rests and is outside the evil things, having run up to the place free from evil things. And there it thinks and there it is free from passion. And living truly is there. The situation now and without God is a trace of life which imitates that life. And living there is the activity of mind. And this activity generates Gods as well in quiet touch with that (SE), it generates beauty, it generates justice, it generates virtue. For the soul conceives these when filled with God, and that is its beginning and end: its beginning, because it comes from thence, its end, because the Good is there. And having come there the soul becomes itself and precisely what it was. For what it is here and among things here is a falling away, a flight and a loss of wings.

Well then, the soul finds rest[708] in the high realm of the SE and there it is far from evil when it has ascended to this place which as such is free from evil. It is there that the soul practises knowing (νοεῖ). It is there that it is free from affection (ἀπαθής[709]). It is there that it finds true life. Notice the rhetorical repetition of ἐνταῦθα four times in four lines (lines 12-15, in line 15 two times![710], later on three times the equivalent ἐκεῖ, lines 17,21,24 and ἐκεῖθεν, line 21), which is part of the persuasive strategy. Notice also that the soul is not on its way to the SE, it is now the *contact* with the SE that is spoken of here. This may come as a surprise, because previously[711] we learned that thinking and knowing is not the vehicle that ultimately carries us to the union with the SE; this union is a separated and ultimate stage in the journey. Perhaps Plotinus is so carried away by his enthusiasm that he fails to determine the different stages as carefully as he used to do[712]. In the next part he returns to the subject of unification with the SE (line 33) and being together with the SE (line 45) without giving the impression to distinguish the last stages with exactitude. The entire atmoshere of this chapter is distinct from what has been said hitherto in that it is of a serene and religious character.

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[707] See above 157 ff.

[708] Line13: ἀναπαύεται - Rest and relaxation is an important theme, that emerges several times without much ado, cf. 8, 22; 8, 43 and elsewhere.

[709] Line15: ἀπαθής - This realm the soul has arrived at is free from evil. When the soul is far away from the SE, even forgetting the SE, because it is drawn by the body towards this world (line 11), the soul will be preoccupied with the passions of its lower irrational part. In the realm of the intelligible there are no passions at all, cf. 26[III,6],6,1-3. In the region of the soul, they are present. Even demons have passions, in contrast to the Gods who have not, see 50[III,5],6,11. They have μνῆμαι and αἰσθήσεις (28[IV,4], 43,12). See about this entire topic, Wolters, *Eros*, 66. Den Boeft, *Calcidius on Daemons*, 6, affirms that Plotinus has no special interest in demons, but this seems to underestimate what 50[III,5],6,35 ff. has to say about the specific character of the structure of demons. Plotinus, there, assumes that it is their being a compound of form and noetic ὕλη that is responsible for their being. This noetic ὕλη, as ἀοριστία, seems to cause their having passions (see for Eros' passions,

Plotinus' return to mind has to do with the impact of the religious character of Aristotle's description of the holy and elated activities of his God (*Met.* 1072 b 15 ff.), who is the 'impersonation' of thinking. Plotinus' words τὸ δὲ ἐκεῖ ζῆν ἐνέργεια μὲν νοῦ are obviously a hint to Aristotle's formula: ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή (*Met.* 1072 b 27). The whole atmosphere of joy, pleasure and happiness in Aristotle is related to our passage. Aristotle's description of God's thinking activity as life in its highest form is one of the pillars of Plotinus' triad of being, life and mind. The other pillar is the contribution of the *Sophist*, when Plato ascribes life and mind to being[713].

At this point Plotinus has particularly Aristotle's passage of the *Metaphysics* about the Unmoved Mover in mind (ἐνέργεια νοῦ, ἀληθῶς ζῆν). True life is there, in the atmosphere of the SE, which as such is the activity of

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50[III,5],7,13). This compound structure enables them to take air or fire into their structure as a sort of *hyle* 'superaddita' (50[III,5],6,37 προσλαμβάνουσιν). It was common stock in Middle Platonism that demons were a combination of air or fire (Apuleius, *de Deo Socr.* , ch 11 and Maximus Tyrius, see for a later development, Porphyrius, *de Abstinentia*, II, 39). Background is *Epinomis* 984 E, where a third kind, of watery demons, is added. Elsewhere in Plotinus, fiery demons are mentioned: 40[II,1],6,54,55 καὶ ζῷα δὲ πύρινά ἐστι δαιμόνων, which can be made fit in with his remarks in 50[III, 5],6,37 where he says that the demons include air and fire into their already existing structures, which fundamentally may supposed to have ὕλη νοητή as ὕλη. A problem remains. How can demons as beings near to the Gods (50[III,5],6,13,14) be supposed to have passions at all? For passions are to be prevented from going into the higher part of the soul, see 26[III,6],ch.5. Are the demons unable to do this, contrary to man, when he is at best? In any case, in 9[VI,9],9 the soul of man has penetrated the realm of the mind, a domain where passions have no entrance. Concerning the notion ἀπαθής itself, it is interesting to see how in 26[III,6], ch.6 ff. Plotinus vigorously attempts to keep not only the intelligible but also matter free from affections (ἀπαθής) in order to maintain its impassibility.

[710] ἐνταῦθα in line 23 refers to our world.

[711] See above 144 ff.

[712] See above 222, 223.

[713] See Hadot, *Etre, Vie*, 107 ff., 112 ff. and Kremer, *Seinsphilosophie*, 102 ff., see above note 330.

thinking (line 17). In the realm of our world, in the here and now, a life *without God* (ἄνευ θεοῦ) is only a shadow or trace (ἴχνος) imitating the other life. By the way, in this context the soul is described as being without God. This does not seem to contradict Plotinus' previous statement that we are not cut off from the SE in lines 7,8, because, as I said, this isolation is also expressed in μόνος in line 12. It seems a matter of point of view.

In Plotinus the activity of mind as thinking the SE is at once an activity of creation and of production. Plotinus immediately shows the Neoplatonic consequences of the activity of mind. Mind's production is the origin of the Ideas, which are considered Gods in Plotinus (see 10[V,1],7,30[714]). Already in the chronologically first *Ennead*, [I,6,]9,14,15 the Ideas are described as Virtues. Well then, in line 18 Plotinus says that mind's activities create the Gods by means of its quiet[715] touching of (literally 'towards') the SE, thus it creates beauty (according to 1[I,6],9,41 the realm of the Ideas), thus it creates the Idea/God justice and thus it creates virtue. At first glance Plotinus' introduction of Gods perhaps makes a somewhat strange impression, but in this religious context it is not odd, since Neoplatonism identifies Ideas and Gods. Not only Neoplatonism may be held responsible, Platonism also had its impact. In the *Symposion* (212 A) Diotima concludes that in the realm of beauty real virtue is given birth to. She also mentions justice as a product of contact of the soul with the Ideas (*Symp.* 209 A). This background may explain Plotinus' mentioning of virtue and justice here. The confluence of all these influences explains the amalgam in our passage. In Plato we constantly hear (*Symp.* 209 A) that the soul becomes pregnant by its contact with the Ideas. Plotinus incorporates this idea into his observation that soul[716] conceives these things when it is filled with the God. This observation is given as the basis for the creation of Beauty, Justice and Virtue. So it seems that soul at the level of mind is assumed to have this creative activity, which as such is caused by the contact with the God and by being fertilized by Him. Is our soul, then, in its highest creative activities producing Gods? Perhaps this is too farfetched[717]. One has to bear in mind the curious intermingling of individual soul and the universal soul and individual mind and universal mind in Plotinus. The creation of Gods can be mentioned in the athmosphere of the universal mind, in which at its best the individual mind partakes as a part of the whole mind. So we may distinguish individual mind and universal mind. The same goes for soul. Nevertheless I doubt whether this explanation according to Harder's line is satisfactory, since in the whole context we hear nothing more that would entitle us to bring in the universal mind; on the contrary, the entire passage seems to deal with individuality. I may refer to a passage in 39[VI,8], which may entail a special type of relation between universality and individuality. There, too, the individual soul at its best partakes in creating what follows in the emanation[718].

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[714] Line 18: θεούς - In Plato the Ideas are divine (θεῖος), but they are no Gods (θεοί). I may refer here to my *Philosophers, Intellectuals and Religion*, 243, where I discussed this problem of the non-divinity of the Ideas in Plato rather elaborately. The Idea of the Good *e.g.* is not the supreme God. Gods have a lower status than Ideas. Aristotle has described the Godhead as the top Entity who is passive as regards the Universe. The Stoic God, on the other hand, is active in the Universe. The combination of the two notions of the Godhead has led to the Hellenistic topstatus of the Godhead. In the *Sophist* Plato had a tendency to regard the transcendent world as living and thinking, be it that this tendency in the *Sophist* is only incidental. In the *Sophist* Plato is on the verge of a new approach, life and thinking are admitted to the originally unmoved, resting world of the perfect, all-embracing Being (παντελῶς ὄν). It is thinking that makes the centre of the notion of personality (for which the word is absent, but the 'thing' is present, as expressed in ἐγώ or in Plotinus in ἡμεῖς and αὐτός, for ἡμεῖς see O'Daly, *the Self*, 32, 45, for αὐτός 52[II,3],9,31, O'Daly, *ib*., 46, and see below 272). As evidence for all this I may refer to the fact that in Diogenes of Apollonia air is called God (DK fr.4), because of it's capacity to think. Since in Plotinus the mind called God thinks the Ideas and the Ideas are thinking themselves and thus are both subject and object, as parts of the all-embracing mind, it is no wonder that in the whole tendency to personalize the highest principles, as active thinking principles the Ideas are 'personified' as Gods. The survey of Plotinus' doctrines in Harder's edition says that in Plotinus the intelligible Gods are the Ideas. That is correct. However, the survey refers to many places (147), but only 9[VI,9],9,18 and 50[III,5], 6 (not in the survey) may stand proof. In 10[V,1],],7,28 - as the survey itself admits - Plotinus speaks of the beauty of the Ideas and of all the intelligible Gods: πὰν *μὲν* τὸ τῶν ἰδεῶν κάλλος, πάντας *δὲ* θεοὺς νοητοὺς an expression which as such implies a distinction between the two, Ideas and Gods. I suspect that this text presents Plotinus' actual thoughts about this matter. I agree that in Plotinus the Ideas are assumed to be Gods (see Roloff, *Gross-schrift*, 44 ff.), but I do not think that they are the only ones to fill the class of intelligible Gods (see about the mutual position of the Gods, 31[V,8],9,15 ff., they are one (kind as universal God) and yet separated, see also Beierwaltes, *Ewigkeit*, 196). Besides the mind itself, αἰών is to be considered as an intelligible God *etc*. (45[III,7],5,20 ff., see also Beierwaltes, *Ewigkeit*, 194 - 196). Treatise 50[III,5],6,10 ff. most certainly provides evidence that the Ideas are Gods. Plotinus in that passage discusses the problem of the divinity of the demons, and he concludes that they are not Gods, but a sort of demi-gods, beings in between of God and man. Nevertheless Plotinus does consider the Idea of 'demonity' as a God: it is better not to call any being in the intelligible realm a demon, but even if there is an Idea of demon (cf. Wolters, *Eros*, 61 on 6, 20) it is best to say that it is a God (θεὸν καὶ τοῦτον εἶναι). This place (50[III,5],6,20) furnishes extremely important evidence. By and large 50[III,5,],6 is basic for Plotinus' doctrine of the Gods (everything down to the Moon is God, 50[III,5],6,19), see the best chapter on this matter, Arnou, *le Désir*,113 ff., 117 ff., spec. 126 ff., see also Wolters, *Eros*, 58 ff, who, however, has nothing to say on the Ideas being Gods (*Eros*, 61).

Plotinus goes on to say: "and this is the origin and the end for it (καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῇ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος)". We may ask what he means by 'this (τοῦτο)'. The argument makes clear that it is being full of the God that is meant. For Plotinus adduces as a ground for his formula ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος[719] the fact that the Supreme Entity is the origin of the soul, because that is where it comes from, and it is soul's end because that is where its Good lies (Good always implies the aim that is pursued). When the soul has arrived there, it once again is what it (originally) was. The circle is closed in being full of the SE, the ultimate and original union. Here we encounter again the idea that the individual soul was originally one with the SE and that soul stems directly from the SE, as we were told earlier ch. 4,28.

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[715] Line18: ἐν ἡσύχῳ (HS: idem atque ἡσυχῇ)... ἐπαφῇ- The activity of the mind brings forth Gods (Ideas) by the contact in rest with Him, the SE. The mind becomes pregnant so to say, which is parallel to what happens to the soul, as line 20 tells. Here the fact of pregnancy is explicitly mentioned (κύει). The expression 'quiet contact' is from a Neoplatonic point of view no oxymoron, but a token of transcendency, in which domain the contact has no implications of movement as would be necessary in earthly conditions of making love, pregnancy and birth.

[716] Line 20: ψυχή- Again I draw attention to the fact that it is the soul that is mentioned here, but it is a qualified soul, soul in its highest position as mind. In the end soul is the bearer of the personality or self, see note 714.

[717] Harder, *I b*, 484: "*erzeugt es* (nämlich das Leben der Seele) die Götter. Das ist nicht befremdlich, es handelt sich nicht um die menschliche, sondern um die Gesamtseele (vgl. zu 8,9)".

[718] See below note 897. On universal mind and particular mind, see above 119.

Life here, on earth (τὸ ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἐν τούτοις line 23), is nothing but ἔκπτωσις falling away (from its origin, not banishment als *LP* (355) says), φυγή, flight (the reverse of the φυγή of the *Theaetetus* 176 A, see 9[VI,9],11 ad finem), and πτερορρύησις, loss of wings[720]. To complete the list of contributors the last term, the only real Platonic one, of course, reminds us of the *Phaedrus* (246 C), which had its impact and contribution in the entire passage. It is Plotinus' concern to clarify or even prove that the Good (for the soul) is there, *i.e.* with the Supreme Entity.

9, 25-38 Souls and Eros, two Aphrodites

Translation

> Also the soul's innate eros makes clear that the Good is there, which is the reason why both in pictures and stories Eros is coupled with the Psyches. For since the soul is different from that God, but comes from him, he necessarily loves him. When the soul is there it has the heavenly Eros, but here it becomes vulgar. Indeed, we find there the heavenly Aphrodite, but here it is born as the vulgar Aphrodite, as if it had become a whore. And every soul is Aphrodite. And this is symbolised by the birthday of Aphrodite and Eros who is born together with her. The soul then, being in its natural state loves God wishing to

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[719] Line 21: ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος - The origin of the soul is the SE. There was a time that our souls were literally in the SE before their birth, see below 319. This particularity has gone unnoticed by Arnou, which one has to bear in mind when reading his instructive chapter regarding this matter (*Désir*, 90, 91).

[720] Line 23: ἔκπτωσις καὶ φυγὴ καὶ πτερορρύησις - ἔκπτωσις does not mean 'banishment' as *LP* suggests (see *LP s. v.* b). In only one other place in Plotinus it means 'expulsion from power', 46[I,4],7,20, where Armstrong translates "falling from (power)". As a verb we find the stem meaning 'fall away', see in the vicinity, 9[VI,9],11,45. Harder's 'straucheln' is too strong for 'falling away' (see his note on *I b*, 485). His reference to *Timaeus* 85 E 10 makes sense inasmuch ἐκπίπτειν and banishment (but now the person who is banished: φυγάς) figure in the same context, where Plato compares the bile that is driven out (ἐκπίπτουσα) the body with a revolutionary who is thrown out his city as an exile (φυγάς). This comparison impelled Harder 1 to translate "Heimatlosigkeit" which is in Harder 2 replaced by "straucheln", an equally wrong suggestion. I even doubt if we have to translate φυγή by 'banishment', it also can mean 'flying towards something (cf.9[VI,9],11 ad finem) or from something'. If φυγή should signify 'banishment', in this case φυγή before πτερορρύησις (from *Phaedrus*, 246 C 2) would make a hysteron proteron. Consequently I think that φυγή has a more general tone. See also, Wolters, *Eros*, 10 and 27; and see Ferwerda, *Images*, 174 n. 1 for a entirely different meaning of ἐκπίπτειν.

> be unified with him, just like a girl having a beautiful love for her beautiful father (wishing to be united with him). But when the soul has come to be born and is deceived, so to speak, by the blandishements (of her suitors), she barters her love for a mortal love and being without her father she is violated. And hating these insults here below and having purified herself from the things here, she sets out again for her father and fares well.

He points also to the eros, the longing for the Good. Also the fact that eros is connected with and planted in the soul makes it clear that the Good is there. The eros is innate in the soul (ὁ σύμφυτος). The intricate connection between eros and soul is illustrated by the representations of both scriptures and pictures: Amor and Psyche[721]. Perhaps his recollection of the atmosphere of the *Symposion* and the *Phaedrus* provoked Plotinus, thinking about the ultimate goal, the Good, to introduce a rather elaborated discussion on Eros as the companion of Psyche, who each fit in extremely well in the context. The connection of Eros and Psyche in literature and art provides support for Plotinus' theories, support he gratefully accepts. It is because the soul originates in the Supreme Entity, that although the soul is something different (ἕτερον when it has left the SE) from that God[722], it necessarily loves Him. And when the soul is there (with the SE), it has the heavenly eros (whereas in the earthly realm it (love) is low and mean[723]).

The following seems to me elliptical: "the fact that there we meet the Ouranian Love is not strange' (end of the ellips) for there soul is the Ouranian Aphrodite (the usual companion of Love)". Plotinus continues with: "but here (on earth) soul becomes the Pandemic Aphrodite, as if she had prostituted herself as a harlot". Soul *is* Aphrodite, we may even say that every soul is Aphrodite. This remark clarifies both the observation that in the transcendent domain the soul is Aphrodite Ourania and that the soul on earth is the Pandemic Aphrodite as well. So far Plotinus does not go beyond what Plato said in the *Symposion* (180 A ff.). In the speech of Pausanias a similar twofold distinction is made, *viz.* between Eros Ouranios and Eros Pandemos, the companions of respectively Aphrodite Ourania and Aphrodite Pandemos. This last

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[721] Line 25 Ἔρως ταῖς Ψυχαῖς - We may think of the wellknown story of Amor and Psyche (ἐν μύθοις), we may also refer to numerous images of Eros in plastic arts or pictures (ἐν γραφαῖς), see Waser, *RE, s.v.* 'Eros' 5, II, 538, 46 (as Harder observes). One may wonder why Plotinus speaks of Souls (plural). A possible explanation seems to me, that in the following he already has the two kinds of Aphrodites (Aphrodite=soul) in mind. But Harder refers to Waser for the explanation of the plurality of the Souls. In pictures one Eros is often surrounded by more Souls.

[722] Again the theme of the soul's stay in the SE before its birth, see above, the note on *arche* and telos.

[723] Line 28: ἐνταῦθα δὲ πάνδημος γίγνεται - Kirchhoff suggests and Harder accepted that there is question of diplography, but these words do not interrupt the grammatical order as Harder says, *I b*, 485 (subject of ἔχει is soul, subject of γίγνεται is also soul), unless we regard eros as its subject, which seems after all preferable. It is not very likely to state, in contrast to the idea that the soul has there the heavenly Eros, the utterance that *soul* here becomes pandemic, whereas one would expect this to be said of eros (cf. HS). I think that in the end diplography is most likely to be present in the text.

Aphrodite is called a whore in Plato, an expression which is taken up by Plotinus and given to soul.

The subject of the Aphrodites and Erotes is elaborated by Plotinus in 50[III,5], *On Eros*. It is with caution that this discussion may be adduced for elucidation in 9[VI,9], because 50[III,5] is chronologically distant. We must not fall into the error of Pépin, who in his otherwise most interesting book about myth and allegory expressly says that in 9[VI,9] Plotinus *reverted* to the subject of Eros[724], without taking into account that 9[VI,9] is the earlier of the two. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to keep 50[III,5] ready at hand, but not because, as is generally seen, Plotinus' doctrines appear to have been conceived as a whole before he started actually to write down his treatises. Nevertheless it might be in this case of Aphrodite and Eros that chronology has no part in the story, and that consequently Plotinus is likely to have had a rather elaborated and fixed set of ideas in advance. Plotinus' remark about every soul being Aphrodite is made much more clear, when we compare the elaborate discussion of this topic in 50[III,5]. According to 50[III,5] every individual soul is a part of the whole Aphrodite, who as soul of the world comprehends all individual souls. There are many Aphrodites (with the status of daimon, which we discussed already[725]) who emanate from the All Soul (50[III,5],4,20). Sofar the Eros-Aphrodite-doctrine of Plotinus is consistent enough. We shall make more use of 50[III,5] later on.

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[724] Pépin, *Mythe et Allégorie*, 195. Line 30: γίγνεται πάνδημος- We have to take into consideration the possibility that in this context γίγνεται means 'is born' instead of 'becomes'. The opposition to ἐστιν in the previous sentence supports this view. Plotinus' use of γίγνεται seems to warrant that the subject is soul and not Aphrodite, as would be possible in the previous clause. I could not see how the utterance that Aphrodite Pandemos here comes into existence would make any sense in the context. This unlikeliness, in its turn, warrants that in the previous line, too, the soul must be subject of ἐστιν. As to the two Aphrodites, we may refer to Pausanias' speech in *Symposion* 180 D 8 ff. It should not escape notice that although *Pausanias*, and not Socrates, makes the distinction between the Ouranian and the Pandemic Aphrodite, Plotinus makes an appeal to these data as if they were authorative. The idea that the last Aphrodite is so to speak a whore stems from the *Symposion*. In 50[III,5] to which Wolters dedicated his book, Plato quotes the same passage from the *Symposion* to declare "that we (!) say that Aphrodite is double; one, the heavenly, we say is the daughter of Heaven and the other the daughter of Zeus and Dione (50[III,5],2,15 ff.)". Plotinus does not tell us that the heavenly Aphrodite sprung from the foam (ἀφρός) coming from the genitals of Ouranos, which were cut off by his son Kronos (cf. Hesiod., *Theog*., 188 ff.). Plotinus, however, is well aware of the fact that motherhood does not enter this scene (ἀμήτορα, lines 18, 25). This Ouranian Aphrodite is in fact the highest part of the Universal Soul, thought of and located as in the highest realms of the third hypostasis. There is a problem in 50[III,5],2,16 where the first Aphrodite is said to be the daughter of Heaven, Οὐρανοῦ. According to Plotinus' dogmatic interpretation of mythology, Aphrodite must be the daughter of Kronos and not of Ouranos, since Kronos must be identified with Mind and soul springs from Mind. So Wolters, *Eros*, 22 concluded that Οὐρανοῦ must be taken not in the sense of 'daughter of Heaven', but as ' belonging to heaven', referring to 3, 23,24. However, as far as I can see, since οὐρανίαν Οὐρανοῦ is a direct quotation from Plato, where Οὐρανοῦ undoubtedly means 'daughter of Heaven', and also in the following sentence Διὸς και Διώνης is likewise a direct quotation, it seems rather awkward to change the meaning of Οὐρανοῦ by degrading it to 'belonging to heaven', as Wolters does, *Eros*, xxi. However ingenious Wolter's solution may be, I must disagree. The dogmatic approach of Plotinus' Entmythologisierung has to tolerate some inconsistences, of which Plotinus seems well aware. The heavenly Aphrodite directed all her energy of love to Kronos, from which meeting Eros sprung, or to, as Plotinus himself says: Ouranos if you prefer to have it (εἰ βούλει, 50[III,5],2,33). This causes Armstrong to observe: "This shows clearly how little real importance Plotinus attached to myths and their allegorical interpretation" (Armstrong, *Translation* III, p. 176, n. 1). This remark is, to put it mildly, not satisfactory. Why would Plotinus do his utmost to interpret so much material in 50[III,5] and elsewhere when essentially he was not interested? See on Plotinus' views on myth Arnou, *Désir*, 296 ff.; see also Wolters, *Eros*, 21. We may only conclude from Plotinus' remark about Ouranos that he had some trouble to order the data. This is not to deny that he displays a certain flexibility in the allegorical interpretation. The daughter of Zeus and Dione, the Pandemic Aphrodite is soul as it descends into our world, leaving the original domain of soul. This Aphrodite Pandemos was venerated by the hetairai (see Wolters, *Eros*, 24). Corresponding and parallel to this double Aphrodite, we have a double Eros, the ouranios and the pandemic. Ouranios Eros is Aphrodite's child, begotten by her father, as we just heard and therefore this Eros strives towards Kronos (or Ouranos), not actually towards the One or the Supreme Entity, for to mention Ouranos was not Plotinus' own initiative but in fact forced upon him by the tradition, so that he was unable to omit this datum. We must be

Plotinus' next sentence (lines 31,32) affirms: "and this is alluded to in a mythological riddle (αἰνίττεται[726]) by the birthday party of Aphrodite and the fact that Eros was born with her". To most translators this seems to refer to Plotinus' immediately preceding utterance that every soul is Aphrodite, a reference I fail to see. I can hardly understand how the connection of the birthday party with Eros being born may be supposed to prove (γάρ) that every soul is Aphrodite. It seems more likely that it is the close *connection* between Eros (ὁ *μετ' αὐτῆς* γενόμενος[727]) and Psyche (Aphrodite's birthday party) as has been told

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aware of the fact that, indeed, in the much earlier treatise 9[VI,9], ch.9 eros is assumed to be directed towards the Supreme Entity!

[725] See note 709 and 50[III,5], ch.5.

[726] Line3l: αἰνίττεται - See for this verb *LP* and my note 779.

[727] Line 32: ὁ μετ' αὐτῆς γενόμενος - Apart from the question whether it is out of Aphrodite that Eros is born (*Phaedrus* 242 D 9) or together with her (*Symposion* 203 B C, see Wolters, *Eros*, 20) a problem Plotinus was well aware of, there remains another curious difficulty. It says nowhere in the *Symposion* that Eros was *born* on the birthday of Aphrodite. Every commentator (to my knowledge) and even Plotinus himself, makes this mistake or is not alert with regard to this issue. Eros was not born on Aphrodite's birthday, but he was *begotten* (γεννηθείς *Symp.*, 203 C) in the love of Penia and Ploutos. Plotinus says in 9[VI,9],9,32 that Eros is *born* together with the soul (as its physis, cf. line 33): ὁ μετ' αὐτῆς *γενόμενος*, not begotten. The same thought recurs in 50[III, 5],2,12 when he words his dilemma: either eros is born from her (Aphrodite) or with her (εἴτ' οὖν *ἐξ* ἐκείνης εἴτ' *μετ'* ἐκείνης γεγονέναι λέγεται ὁ Ἔρως), see also *ib*, 5,4 ff. So he is quite stubborn in his conviction. In 50[III,5], 7,8 we have a textual problem. There we are told: "we must take into account all that is said in the *Symposion*, in which he (Plato) says οὐκ Ἀφροδίτης γενεθλίοις ἐκ τῆς Πενίας καὶ τοῦ Πόρου", something that yields no coherent sense. Since the mss must have a lacune, scholars make him say: "in which he says that he was not born out of Aphrodite, but at Aphrodite's birthday party from Penia and Poros: οὐκ ⟨Ἀφροδίτης φησιν αὐτὸν γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν ⟩Ἀφροδίτης γενεθλίοις ἐκ τῆς Πενίας καὶ τοῦ Πόρου, which is held to give the appropriate meaning (see Wolters, *ib.*, 19,20). Wolters objects to γενέσθαι which according to him is rare in the sense of 'to be born'. Remembering 9[VI,9],9,32 ὁ μετ' αὐτῆς *γενόμενος* I doubt this. However, Eros hardly can be said to be born of (Penia and) Poros. For I do not think that γενέσθαι is usually said of the man. With both parents we have γεγονέναι (50[III,5],5,4) or εἶναι (50[III,5],9,45 Ἐκ Πόρου οὖν καὶ Πενίας λέγεται εἶναι). Indeed Wolter's suggestion γεγονέναι (cf. 50[III,5],2,12) is more

in lines 25-28, that is somewhat distant to be referred by τοῦτο (line 31): soul having eros. This links up nicely with the next phrase which concludes that if the soul behaves according to its nature (soul and eros) it *loves* the God, desiring to be unified with Him, just as a girl wants to be with her father, when she has a beautiful love for her beautiful father, the God (the Supreme Entity)[728].

The comparison with a girl is elaborated on in the following sentence. Before going into this, it is perhaps worthwhile to spend some more words on the strange, not to say incestuous relationship between father and daughter. In 50[III,5],2,32 ff. we are told that the Ourania Aphrodite directed her activity towards her father Kronos (being mind, according to others Ouranos, Plotinus adds), became intimate with him and filled with a passionate love for him, she brought forth Love. This may explain why in 9[VI,9],9 the image of the father/girl relation is brought in with its incestuous flavour. Plotinus may have already been thinking in terms of this relation between Aphrodite and her father in 9[VI,9],9. The son Aphrodite gave birth to, is called ὁ καλὸς Ἔρως in 50[III,5],2,37. This may help explain the expression *καλὸν* ἔρωτα in line 9[VI,9],9,35, where at first glance καλός is perhaps a rather unexpected epitheton (but see ἄλλον ἀλλαξαμένη *θνητὸν* ἔρωτα line 35). In 50[III,5],4,20 we find two types of Aphrodite, the lower soul and the higher soul, both universal and individual. We should notice a difference in 9[VI,9],9, where Plotinus has only the *individual* soul in mind. In 9[VI,9] both souls, the individual higher and lower ones, conflue into one soul, that can inhabit the high realms of the Father or that may descend unto the world by birth (εἰς γένεσιν ἐλθοῦσα line 35). In this

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plausible, his idea to read γεννηθῆναι is less acceptable, a reading supposedly alluding to *Symposion* 203 C γεννηθείς, begotten, mostly said of the father's activity, for we have just shown that Plotinus is quite stubborn in his conviction that Eros was not begotten but was *born* at the birthday party of Aphrodite.

[728] Line 34: ὥσπερ παρθένος καλοῦ πατρὸς καλὸν ἔρωτα - First of all, I welcome Kirchhoff's brilliant conjecture πατρὸς for πρὸς of the mss. The fact that in line 38 the daughter returns to her father, seems to be sufficient evidence. I have an alternative interpretation. HS - as everyone - take καλὸν ἔρωτα with a supposed ἐρᾷ borrowed from the first part of the phrase, assuming a figura etymologica. I know of no other case of such a distant acc. of internal object in Plotinus. In the following text the girl is imagined to have the wish to return to her father to be with him. This seems to be the main point of the comparison with a girl. This precisely corresponds with ἑνωθῆναι θέλουσα. So, as I feel it, the following seems a very suitable interpretation: 'as a girl having a beautiful love for her beautiful father longs to be (re)united with him'; this addition suggests the assumption of a possible ἔχουσα, derived from the first part of the sentence, together with another ἑνωθῆναι θέλουσα: ὥσπερ παρθένος (ἑνωθῆναι θέλουσα) (ἔχουσα) καλοῦ πατρὸς καλὸν ἐρωτα. Admittedly, the ἔχουσα, taken from the first part of the sentence has in the combination with κατὰ φύσιν a different function and meaning. But perhaps in the Greek it is not impossible that it has a double function. It is not so much the love for the father that seems to be the point, but the wish to be reunited with him. Harder proposes to alter the first καλός into καλή, on the poor grounds that not the father, but the girl needs the predicate. The father should be beyond any predicate of praise. These arguments carry no weight within the framework of the comparison.

world it is led astray so to speak by the courtships of its lovers, which seem to alternate continuously (μνηστείαις). So the soul feels hurt and scandalized in the absence of its Father (the SE). In the end the soul starts to hate all those violations, purifies itself of all these earthly problems (ἁγνεύσασα τῶν τῇδε), goes on its way to its Father and feels well (εὐπαθεῖ [729]): a happy end.

Plotinus' terminology here is conspicuous for its harshness, or even rudeness: ἑταιρισθεῖσα (line 30) which may be rendered with prostituting as a whore, the soul is led astray by its love affairs (ἀπατηθῇ), and is outraged (ὑβρίζεται) that it starts hating (μισήσασα) the violations (ὕβρεις). All those harsh words may be destinated to portray the soul's stay in the world as awful, in contradistinction to the happiness it experiences in the realm of the SE, a notion we had already the opportunity to deal with[730]. This state of well-being may be unknown to many people or readers of Plotinus.

9, 38-55 Experience of the true love

Translation

> And the ones for whom this experience is unknown, must imagine thence from the earthly loves, how it is to get what one loves most and (they must consider) that those earthly loved ones are mortal and harmful and loves of images and that they change, because it was not the truly beloved nor our Good nor what we seek. But there is the truly beloved, with whom one can be together by participating in him and really possessing him, not embracing him with the flesh from the outside. But whoever has seen, knows what I mean, that the soul then has another life, both when it goes to it and having already gone to it and participating in it, so that the soul in this state knows that the giver of true life is present and that it has no more needs. But on the contrary one must put away the other things and stand in that alone and become that alone, having cut away all the other things in which we are enveloped, so that we hasten to go out from here and we must be irritated that we are bound to the other things, that we may embrace him with the whole of us and have no part with which we do not touch God.

Although his terminology obviously suggests a disapproval of earthly love, he goes on with a striking appeal to human feelings in the field of earthly love. Earthly love should instruct them, should function as a prelude in love. One has to practise the 'via eminentiae in amore', I might say (the same in the later 38[VI,7],31). One must further realise that it is only mortal objects of love (which as such are obnoxious), that one has to deal with, only forms of love for shadows or images, which are subject to change (μεταπίπτει). One must realise that this is nothing compared to the real beloved and the Good of us[731] and that it is not yet what we really seek for. There, in the highest realm we find what is really loved in the strictest sense of the word. With this beloved SE we can be together (συνεῖναι[732]), partaking in him and possessing him in the real sense of the word (obviously in contradistinction to the arbitrariness of the earthly possession of the beloved whom we never possess without restrictions and limitations).

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[729] Line 38: εὐπαθεῖ - This word is rather common in Plotinus. It denotes the well being of souls or even plants (46[I,4],1,25), see *LP*. *s.v*. HS print the word widely, as a quotation from *Phaedrus* 247 D 4. In Plato it signifies the well being of the soul during the circular motion on the top of the world. If it is here in Plotinus a quotation at all, it hints to the well being of the soul after returning to its origin and, then, as a quotation of the *Phaedrus* it is a contribution to sketch the serene atmosphere of the highest world. Bussanich, *The One*, 179 also quotes *Rep*. 615 A 3 where it is used to describe the celestial pleasures of the good souls, in his comment on 38[VI,7],35,26. I agree with him that it is rather Plato than the Stoa (*SVF* III, 431-432) who inspired the employment of the term here.

[730] See above 251 ff.

Earthly loves are confined to being together in the flesh, to folding one's body round the body of the beloved one, which prevents us from being totally united with him or her. Heavenly love has nothing to do with folding of the flesh of the bodies around eachother, which will always prevent an ultimate union. The expression 'folding with the flesh of the bodies' (οὐ περιπτυσσόμενον σαρξὶν ἔξωθεν) may remind us of Empedocles' description of the body as the garment of flesh (fr.126 *σαρκῶν* ἀλλογνῶτι περιστέλλουσα *χιτῶνι*). What Plotinus has in mind here is the union which he described earlier in terms of the coinciding of the centres of circles[733].

Plotinus proceeds by making use of an expression that derives from the language of mystery: "He who has seen it, knows what I mean (ὅστις δὲ εἶδεν, οἶδεν ὃ λέγω)", a formula we find not only in Pausanias (I 37,4 ὅστις δὲ ἤδη τελετὴν Ἐλευσῖνι εἶδεν .... οἶδεν ὃ λέγω) but also, in a slightly different form, in Plotinus himself, 1[I,6,]7,2[734]. Appeals to mystery-language whenever the meeting with the highest principles is concerned, are abundantly present in both Plato's *Symposion* and his *Phaedrus*[735]. As an example of commonly unknown meetings in the 'moment supreme' the formula suits the context here extremely well, although Plotinus touched the ultimate meeting with the SE several times before and he will make use of other examples too (going into the adyton of a temple, see later in on ch.11,25). The content of what is known only by the experienced implies that the soul, then, comes across a different form of life, which presents itself when one starts his (mystery) journey (προσιοῦσα line 47[736]), arrives already (ἤδη προσελθοῦσα) and finally partakes in him (μετασχοῦσα αὐτοῦ), the SE, and really (ὄντως ἔχοντα) has the SE, so that he now constantly and actually recognizes and knows[737] that the bestower of real life is present and that the soul needs nothing anymore.

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[731] Line 43: τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡμῶν - The Good of us. We, *i.e.* our souls, have all the same beloved one, the SE. Therefore Plotinus speaks about ἡμῶν.

[732] Συνεῖναι - this important word seems to have sexual connotations here (as in 38[VI,7],31,16). It is said of soul's union with the SE, whereas elsewhere it used in connection with vertical or horizontal relations (see 307).

[733] See about the centrology above 245.

[734] See Arnou, *Désir*, 274.

[735] See note 779.

[736] Line 48: προσιοῦσα - The mss have προιοῦσα. Harder is quite convincing in defending Kirchhoff's correction (*I b*, 485, 486): προ- always denotes a movement from the origin to what was 'before' this origin, seen from the point of view of the origin. In the case of the One this means that προ- points to lower realms, a movement downwards. So if the

In his eagerness to impress his readers Plotinus takes a new run, starting from his last words that the soul has no more needs. On the contrary one has to put down all other things and should take one's stand in him alone (ἐν μόνῳ στῆναι τούτῳ[738]), even *become* him alone (τοῦτο[739]γενέσθαι μόνον), cutting off (περικόψαντα) all that envelopes us (ὅσα περικείμεθα). Περικόψαντα (literally having cut round off) and περικείμεθα (enveloped) are intended to allude to the flesh, which prevents a total unification (περιπτυσσόμενον σαρξὶν ἔξωθεν line 46). We must do away with all this corporeal impediment in order to hasten to leave the body (ἐξελθεῖν ἐντεῦθεν[740]) and to detest[741] the fact that we are tied up with the other things. In the end we shall coil ourselves around the SE with the 'whole of us' (τῷ ὅλῳ αὐτῶν; αὐτῶν nostri see HS[742]) and we shall have[743] no part that does not touch the God. This ὅλον Plotinus speaks about is our spiritual totality, it is all embracing (impossible in earthly conditions); there is no part of the one that does not touch a part of the other.

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other commentators wish to maintain the original reading they have the burden of proving that προ- can point to the other direction. Harder quotes many places that have the downward type of προ. It should not escape attention that προσιοῦσα denotes a rather advanced stage for the soul is already aware of the fact that its life changed considerably.

[737] Line 49: διατεθεῖσαν ("in this state", see *LP*) - There is no reason to accept Sleeman's proposition to alter διατεθεῖσαν into διατεθεῖσα *Notes on Plotinus -III*, 82 nor is there any sense to Harder's reference to ch. 7, line 19. A reference to 38[VI,7],31,9 makes some sense.

[738] Plotinus uses the neuter: τούτῳ (see τοῦτο in the same line 51) although he just spoke about the giver of life in the masculine (ὁ χορηγός). We need not wonder about this sudden change, because almost on every page of Plotinus' *Enneads* we find modifications of gender. We should find a similar expression as ἐν μόνῳ στῆναι in Philo, *De Abrahamo*, 15(IV),17,9: *πέρας εὐδαιμονίας τὸ ἀκλινῶς καὶ ἀρρεπῶς ἐν μόνῳ θεῷ στῆναι*, when when Arnou were right, see Part III, note 943.

[739] See the previous note.

[740] Line 53 ἐξελθεῖν ἐντεῦθεν - Harder "von hier wegzugelangen'" MacKenna "all the earthly environment done away". Bréhier: "sortir d'ici". As I feel it, ἐντεῦθεν must refer to the corporeal embarrassments which are spoken of in the previous phrase. See below 267.

[741] Line: 53 καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν - is rather loosely tied up in the sentence: ἵνα must be connected with (ἐξελθεῖν) σπεύδειν (ἐντεῦθεν); ἀγανακτεῖν is not a consequence of what comes before ὥστε.

[742] Line: 54 αὐτῶν- Creuzer suggested to read αὐτὸν, which I would reject considering that in line 46 περιπτύσσεσθαι is also used without an object.

[743] Line 55 ἔχοιμεν. Kirchhoff proposes ἔχωμεν. It is normal Greek to have after a coniunctive an optative to describe what is concommittant and the result of what the verb in the coniunctivus affirms. So Harder's reluctancy to accept ἔχοιμεν is not justified, which he ultimately does (see also *RE*, 518 about Plotinus' use of both modes. Schwyzer mentions alternation of the modes, *viz*. coniunctive / optative and even vv!).

9, 55-60 The right manner of seeing oneself during the union with the SE

Translation

> Well then, there it is possible to see both him and oneself as it is right to see: oneself in splendour, full of intelligible light, rather light itself, pure, weightless, light, having become God, or rather being God, set on fire then; but the fire seems to go out if one is weighed down again.

It is there (ἐνταῦθα) that the soul is able to see both Him (the SE) and itself as it is right to see ('Ορᾶν δὴ ἔστιν ἐνταῦθα κἀκεῖνον (*sc.* the SE) καὶ ἑαυτὸν ὡς ὁρᾶν θέμις, lines 55,56). This is a most important sentence in regard to the union of the soul and the SE, as we shall see now.

Harder's translation of ὡς ὁρᾶν θέμις leads the reader astray: "soweit Schauen das Rechte ist". In defense of this rendering he says in his commentary: "weil es sich eigentlich nicht um Sehen, sondern um Einswerden handelt (486)". His problem is that since the ultimate goal is to be one with the SE, seeing somehow seems out of place. Admittedly, seeing expresses a too inferior activity for what happens at the ultimate situation when the soul is united with the SE. It is Plato's notion of theoria that induces Plotinus to constantly speak of 'seeing' of the SE. In Plato theoria, indeed, is the ultimate activity: 'the contemplation of the Ideas'. In Plotinus we encounter a far superior activity, *i.e.* the ultimate union with the SE, which as such is unplatonic. The ὁμοίωσις[744] is platonically speaking not a unification of the soul with an Idea but becoming like to a God, who qua God is 'lower' than the Ideas, let alone the ultimate Idea of the Good (SE). In Plotinus the ultimate stage is so far reaching that it is identical with the unification with the SE. Thus whereas for Plato the vision (of the Ideas) is the utmost activity, for the Neoplatonicus there is more: the *union* with the SE. It is this problem of the limitations of Platonic seeing that on many occasions occurs, especially since Plotinus considers himself a Platonist, merely interpreting the Great Master[745]. As I see it, however, this general problem does not emerge here in an acute form where the phrase: ὡς ὁρᾶν θέμις is concerned, although in the end it is the ultimate union about we have just heard about, that is at stake, as we shall see. According to the *LP* θέμις as a term with μή means forbidden *etc.*, whereas without it rather means 'it is right'. Consequently I do not see a restrictive clause here, but a descriptive: 'as it is right', *i.e.* as it ought to be seen, in the real sense of seeing. Harder's view is quite opposite. MacKenna renders the words in a rather vague manner: "Thus we have *the vision that may be* of him and of ourselves". Bréhier, too, seems to miss the point: "autant qu' il est permis d'avoir de telles visions", for it is not permission that Plotinus has in mind, but the right manner of seeing. Armstrong's translation is correct: "as it is right to see".

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[744] On ὁμοίωσις, see below 329 ff.

[745] See above note 82.

It is of great importance to ascertain the exact meaning of Plotinus' words in lines 55-60. These lines play an important role to determine to what extent the soul and the SE become united. Rist[746], following Zaehner, distinguishes several possibilities, of which I wish to quote only two because of their relevance here:

a) the 'monistic' way of union: the soul is completely identical with the Superpower, Atman is Brahman, as the Indian monists would put it.

b) the 'theistic' mode: the isolated soul attains to union and is 'oned' with the transcendent God, though a fortiori it is not itself identical with that God.

One should observe in the secondary literature a tendency to assume that even in the ultimate stage of the union of the soul and the SE, the soul has not completely lost its identity: the soul, as Rist[747] says, is 'neither obliterated nor revealed as the One itself, nor as the only spiritual substance'. To my view it is correct to say that the soul is not the only spiritual substance (see line 43 τὸ ἀγαθὸν *ἡμῶν*) and also that the soul is not revealed as the SE itself. However, I would deny that the soul is said to be obliterated. Leaving this last point aside for the moment (see 307), I may draw attention to the important fact that it is always within the framework of the problem concerning the character of the union of the soul and the SE that the phrase ὡς ὁρᾶν θέμις is brought in to assure that the union involved has its limitations: "likeness is obtained as far as possible" (Rist[748] quoting Arnou[749]). Among other 'as far is possible' passages (καθ' ὅσον δύναται), ὡς ὁρᾶν θέμις is quoted as evidence for the view that the union has it limitations: "as far as seeing is possible" (Harder, Bréhier *etci.*). It may be that all the passages of other treatises of the *Enneads* quoted to testify to the limitation of the union indeed speak about limitations, they certainly do not speak about the limitations of the *union* of the soul and the SE. All quotations in Arnou's respectable book are worthless in that respect. Even Arnou's quotations from 9[VI,9] fail to prove what he intended them to do. He adduces ch.4, line 29 ἤδη δύναται ἰδεῖν ὡς πέφυκεν ἐκεῖνος θεατὸς εἶναι. We already already the opportunity to discover the meaning of these words[750], and came to the conclusion that they did not express any limitative aspect at all. On the contrary, the phrase deals with the possibility to see the SE in its structural aspects. As to the other passage he adduces, *viz. in* ch.11, lines 32,33, Οὐδὲν παραλιπὼν τῶν θείων ὅσα δύναται ψυχὴ ἐχεῖν καὶ πρὸ τῆς θέας, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐκ τῆς θέας ἀπαιτεῖ, Arnou is even less succesful. For ὅσα δύναται ψυχὴ ἐχεῖν is obviously said of the stage before the vision of the SE[751].

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[746] Rist, *Road*, 214.

[747] Rist, *Road*, 227.

[748] Rist, *Road*, 227.

[749] Arnou, *Désir*, 246 (a misquotation for 248, 246 not mentioning any limitation of the kind).

[750] See above 155.

Returning now to the problem of the completeness of the ultimate union, we may conclude at present, that the quotations presented by Arnou (Rist) do not contain any limitative aspect at all, as we have seen. Our phrase ὡς ὁρᾶν θέμις intends to underline a quite different aspect: the perfection and appropriateness (θέμις) of the form of seeing one has now attained. One sees himself (not the 'self' Armstrong) in the right and most promising perspective. Beierwaltes' "soweit Sehen dort das Rechte ist" anticipates what later (ch.10) comes to be the right manner of seeing, but the argument has not reached that stage yet. Moreover ὡς does not mean 'soweit'[752].

Although he rightly critices Rist's position, on which we have still a lot to say later on in Part III, Mamo[753] goes too far along with his opponent when trying to neutralize the sentence by advancing the opinion "that Plotinus' hesitation may be due to Plotinus' view that vision language ... cannot fully express the mystical contact", which comes down to Harder's view. However, ὡς ὁρᾶν θέμις has nothing to do with an excuse; its objective is to demonstrate that one is seeing in the right manner. What seeing in the right manner is, is explained in the subsequent description concerning the supreme stage of soul's journey. Finally I may point to the fact that other scholars, such as Hadot and O'Daly and many others, go along with the (wrong) limitative interpretation. Bussanich dismisses this interpretation[754].

Plotinus intended to say something about both the mystic and the SE (*κἀκεῖνον* (the SE) καὶ ἑαυτὸν ὡς ὁρᾶν θέμις). This is something we may infer from the μέν solitarium (l. 56, but see μᾶλλον *δὲ*). Obviously he does less than he, originally, intended for he ends up by speaking mainly about the mystic. In this ultimate phase one sees himself in splendour (ἠγλαισμένον), which is immediately commented upon by the words φωτὸς πλήρη νοητοῦ, full of intelligible light. Plotinus becomes exstatic and now continuously corrects his words, making an exciting climax in a series of sweeping corrections: μᾶλλον correctivum corrects the passivity of 'being full of noetic light' by saying that one is by now self pure light (μᾶλλον δὲ φῶς αὐτὸ καθαρόν), weightless and light (ἀβαρῆ, κοῦφον). Even this is not enough and has to be surpassed. Thus Plotinus adds: '*becoming* God', correcting himself immediately: '*being* God'. One may have doubts as to whether this stage is the final one. For one is entitled to translate, the mystic is *a* God, whereas we would expect him to say: 'being *the*

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[751] See below 285.

[752] Beierwaltes, *Denken des Einen*, 139.

[753] Mamo, *Mysticism*, 209, 215 n.46.

[754] See below note 884.

God'. Now the Greek is ambiguous, for θεὸν ... ὄντα could be rendered by: 'being *the* God'. It is not impossible to settle the question. As we interpreted lines 56-58, we discovered a climax in his series of selfcorrections. Being full of *noetical* light seems to indicate a stage before the mystical union, but the expression "*being* pure light" may refer to the union, as we find it later in 38[VI,7][755], the more so since even this is strengthened and we hear about becoming, even being God. It is still possible that this does not surpass being a noetical God, but this would not quite be in harmony with the fact that the SE is mentioned in the right way of seeing and that ch.10 seems to continue the discussion on the vision of the SE explaining the totality of this form of seeing in the union. Ultimately I prefer interpreting θεὸν in θεὸν ... ὄντα as the SE. On the other hand, the words ἀβαρῆ and κοῦφον point to another direction. Plotinus would never have made use of such words in regard to the SE. It is all seen from the point of view of the visiting mystic (ὡς ὁρᾶν θέμις .... ἑαυτόν, line 56). Nevertheless, the ultimate stage was at stake. So what he describes, is the stage immediately preceding and ending in the perfect union with the SE, which was spoken of in line 51 (τοῦτο γένεσθαι) and most likely, in line 55 (about the touching of all parts). Consequently one must not overlook what he says in line 56: "that one may *there* (ἐνταῦθα) see the SE and oneself as it is right". Plotinus touched upon the last stage, but he only *touched* it. Later when he describes this encounter, we shall see him revert to the deficiencies of expressing the ultimate union (see in ch.10) in terms of seeing.

The last words of this chapter show the imperfection of the stage in terms of the temporality we meet 'there'. Certainly the mystic may be kindled and aflame then (τότε), but if one will become heavy again, one will be quenched, so to speak (ὥσπερ). This point is explained further in the opening lines of ch.10.

We will revert to the problem of the extension of the union in the following in a separate Part[756], but anticipating my results I may state already that according to my view a complete identification of the mystic and the SE is promised by Plotinus.

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[755] See below 315.
[756] See below 307 ff.

CHAPTER TEN

10, 1-9 Why is the unification interrupted?

Translation

What is the reason why he does not remain there? Certainly, it is because he is not completely departed (from the body). There will be a time when there will be a continuous contemplation, when he is not hampered by any hindrance of the body. And what has the vision is hindered, but not the rest, which, when the vision stops the contemplation, does not stop knowledge, which consists in proofs and demonstrations and soul's dialogue. But seeing and what has the vision is no longer reason, but greater than reason and resting on reason, just as it is the case with what is seen.

Ch. 10 does not change the subject of ch. 9. Thus, again, the incision is somewhat artificial. It goes into the details of soul's leaving its high position close to the SE to descend to lower realms. The opening question of ch. 10 is, how it is that the mystic does not stay there, close to the SE. The answer is not so easy to understand. Plotinus says that he has not yet got out entirely (ὅλος ἐξελήλυθεν[757]), without saying a word about what it is why it had to leave and what it is that is still a hindrance to it. Most translators refuse to make clear what this may be. From the next sentence we may gather that it is still the body that prevents the mystic from attaining perfect and continuous vision. Plotinus promises that there will be a time that one will have continuous vision, and is no longer hampered by bodily troubles. I guess that this will happen to the mystic not during the lifetime of the individual but after his death[758], when the body is no longer there to embarrass the soul. The highest thing one can achieve during one's life is being one with the SE for a certain period, or periods of time, but one can never stay continuously with the SE. As we know, Plotinus himself was from time to time elevated (four times during Porphyrius' stay with his master) to the SE, not continuously.

In connection with this stay some more problems figure in Plotinian research. I cannot understand the reality of the problem of the permanence of the union as is dealt with by Bussanich[759], who says: "Certainty is not possible on the question whether the mystical union is permanent". Apart from the fact that Plotinus is said to have experienced this magnificent event four times during Porphyrius' stay with him (and this obviously rules out that the state of being unified is permanent) the present sentence expresses clearly enough the untenability of the thesis. It is the person (cf. ὅλος), *i.e.* the soul (or the self) that is assumed to be unable to stay permanently. Plotinus asks: "Why does he not stay there?" In this chapter we come across utterances like: "when that what has the vision ends the vision" (line 5), "how could a person report on what he has seen" (line 20); such a report presupposes ending of the unification. In ch.11 Plotinus provides - as a comfort for after falling away from the vision - the possibility to resume the procedure of ascending towards the SE. So as a reaction to Bussanich' remark that "Certainty is not possible on the question whether the mystical union is permanent", I would regard a fact that to Plotinus' eye there is no permanency of vision during one's lifetime and that this is not a problem either.

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[757] Line1: ἐξελήλυθεν - ἐξελήλυθεν is a repetition of ἐξελθεῖν of ch. 9, line 53, see 262. Harder offers the rendering: "Nun, weil sie noch nicht gänzlich herausgelangt ist". MacKenna: "Because it has not yet escaped wholly"; Bréhier: "C'est qu'on n'est pas tout à fait sorti d'ici". Armstrong: "not yet totally come out of this world". In the next line we are told that it is the corporeal impediment that is preventing us from an uninterrupted vision of the One. So here we get proof for what we have already said concerning ἐξελθεῖν in ch. 9, line 53. This word refers to leaving the body, as it does here.

[758] Line 2: τὸ συνεχές - For the possibility of the soul to be in the One after death, see 319.

[759] Bussanich, *The One*, 188, 189.

In connection with a possible permanent union with the SE, there is a related problem. According to Hadot[760] the union of the *intellect* and the One is eternal, but the unitative experiences of the *soul* are exceptional[761]. However, is the first part of the thesis right? This doctrine derives from 38[VI,7],35,29,30. There we are told that mind has two forms of mental activity, a power which sees the things in itself, and a power which sees that which transcends it. A problem is raised by Plotinus himself whether those two forms are alternatively present in the mind. The common scholarly answer is no, they are both *always* present in the mind: "but mind always (ἀεί) has its thinking and also has its not thinking, but looking at that God in another way (Παρὰ μέρος δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἐκεῖνος ἄλλα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλα ὁρᾷ; ἢ οὔ· ὁ δὲ λόγος διδάσκων γινόμενα ποιεῖ. ὁ δὲ ἔχει τὸ νοεῖν ἀεί, ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ νοεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλως ἐκεῖνον βλέπειν)". When set in contrast to with ἄλλοτε, ἀεί can only mean "always" and not 'eternally', which is not to say that the activities are not eternal.

There is another possibility which perhaps does more justice to the Greek. Plotinus presents ἀεί only with the first ἔχει, the second ἔχει has no ἀεί, and possibly has nothing to do with the previous ἀεί. This would have the surprising result that the *vision* (which is referred to by 'not-thinking', which is superior to thinking for it is looking at God) of the mind is not continuous or permanent, but only its *thinking*. Be this as it may, the main point to bear in mind is that this is all said of the mind, not of the soul. Any permanence of seeing the SE by the mind in that other way (ἀλλὰ ἄλλως ἐκεῖνον βλέπειν) has no impact on a so-called permanency of union of the *soul* and the SE. In the same passage of treatise 38 we learn that the soul must *become* mind and united by the goodness of the SE to be one with the mind in order to get the vision of the SE. So there is one problem less in Plotinian research: there is no permanency of the union of *the soul or the mind* with the One during one's lifetime.

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[760] Hadot, *Spirituality*, 245 and *id.*, *Traité 38*, 342 ff.

[761] See also Bussanich, *The One*, 188.

From a philosophical point of view, however, there is a problem. The unification of mind and the Good can be only ascribed to the soul of a particular person, it is the highlight of what I may call 'metaphysical dynamics'; this form of dynamics of the union is not extended to the universal soul and mind. The relation between the SE and the universal mind (and soul) remains a purely static one. The hypostases are of a statical ontological order. Thus the relation man has with the SE is a privileged one. What the universal mind and soul is not allowed to experience, is permitted to man.

As it stands the subsequent phrase (line 3 ff.) makes hardly any sense. According to the traditional text it is not the part that has the 'vision (of the SE) in possession' (τὸ ἑωρακός, the perfect tense can only clumsily be rendered), that is hampered, whereas according to the traditional interpretation of the translators the rest of the phrase demonstrates the reverse. Harder: "Diese Belästigung trifft übrigens nicht das Schauende in uns, sondern das andere welches, während das Schauende die Schau ruhen lässt, nicht ruhen lässt die Wissenschaft die in Beweisen und Argumenten und einem Selbstgespräch der Seele sich vollzieht". MacKenna: "Not that those hindrances beset that in us which has veritably seen; it is the other phase of the soul that suffers, and that only when we withdraw from vision and take to knowing by proof *etc.*". Bréhier: "La partie de nous-même qui voit, n'est pas celle qui est entravée par cet obstacle; et même si elle cesse de contempler, son activité se manifeste par la connaissance scientifique qui consiste en des démonstrations, en des preuves, et en un dialogue de l' âme avec elle même. . . .". Armstrong: "But it is not that what has seen which is hindered, but the other part which, when that which has seen rests from vision, does not rest from the knowledge which lies in demonstrations *etc.*". All these translations, containing as many interpretations, seem to be not entirely satisfactory, since as long as we maintain οὐ as it stands in line 4, the part of the soul in possession of the vision of the SE is said not to be in any trouble, whereas one would rather expect it to be in trouble, for it has to interrupt the continuity of its work and functioning as is suggested by lines 2 and 3 and confirmed by line 5: ὅτε τὸ ἑωρακὸς ἀργεῖ τὴν θέαν. To remove this oddity I would propose a transposition of οὐ: ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἑωρακὸς τὸ ἐνοχλούμενον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ ἄλλο *etc.* Ms A may be supposed to have had trouble in connection with οὐ, as may appear from HS' apparatus, for originally it had δὲ οὐ which it corrected by erasing οὐ. If I understand it correctly there originally must have been two οὐ-s, but I do not know of anyone having made proposals to transpose οὐ. The consequence of all this would seem the positing of οὐ right before τὸ ἄλλο. Reading a comma after ἀργεῖ τὴν θέαν we get: "the part that has the vision is the troubled one, *not* the rest (of the soul, in fact the logos) since it is when what has the vision is inactive *qua* vision, not inactive regarding knowledge, proof *etc.*". Continuing this line of thought, the subsequent sentence consistently observes that seeing and having the vision is obviously higher in rank than *logos*[762]. This presupposes that it is quite unlikely that τὸ ἑωρακός could be occupied in reasoning with proof *etc.*, as is implied by Bréhier's explanation. A similar possibility to regain contact with the SE after having fallen back occurs at the end of ch.11[763].

It remains rather mysterious why exactly the impediments of the body prevent the soul from continuing the vision of the One. The theme is recurrent in the *Enneads*[764]: matter is the root of all evil. There is, however, some comfort: the procedures on a lower level of the soul continue and seem to be a starting-point for a new ascent to higher realms. Plotinus declares that seeing and having vision is higher than *logos*, coming before *logos* (seen from the point of view of the SE) and 'resting on logos', as I render ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ which is mostly translated by 'above *logos*' (*e.g.* Harder: "über der Vernunft"[765]). Although this rendering is quite acceptable, it does not have much to say after the remark 'before *logos*', which suggests that the realm above the *logos* is referred to. In this connection *logos* apparently means reasoning of the soul using proof *etc.* In fact it amounts to the τῆς ψυχῆς διαλογισμός of line 6 (see *Theaetetus* 189 E and *Sophistes* 263 E).

10, 9-21 'Seeing' is not a satisfactory term to describe the union

Translation

> Looking to himself then, when he sees, he will see himself as such, or rather he will be together with himself as being such and he will perceive himself as such, since he has become simple. One should not, perhaps, even speak about 'he will see' and 'what is seen', since one is forced to speak about these things as two, the seer and the seen, without speaking about both as one. The argument, indeed, is bold. Then the seer does not see and does not distinguish and does not imagine two, but having as it were become someone else, and no longer himself nor belonging to himself there, and having become to belong to that he is one, as if having connected centre to centre. For also in this realm when centres coincide they are one, and they are two when separated. In the same way we now mean 'other'. Therefore the vision is difficult to explain. For how could one report as about another when one did not see another when one had the vision, but one in relation to himself?

Now Plotinus again starts his journey to the highest point, *viz.* to the SE. He proceeds by reverting to the problem of seeing, a subject to which he now devotes most important and *decisive* observations. To his remarks about the superiority of seeing and having vision in regard to the *logos* he adds: "as it is the case with the object of seeing" (ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον): the SE. It goes for the SE too that it is superior, of course. This remark does no more than to create an opportunity to come back to the fundamentals of seeing. 'Looking to himself (the visiting person), when he is seeing himself, he will see himself as belonging to that superior level (τοιοῦτον ὄψεται), or rather (μᾶλλον correctivum), he will be together with himself[766] in such a superior position, and he will perceive[767] himself in such a quality, because he has become simple (which means that he lost every burden be it corporeal be it ontical)'. Plotinus now seems to be fully aware of the shortcomings of 'vision' and (spiritual) 'seeing' and is prepared to discuss them into details. One should not even[768] speak about 'he will see', and 'what has been seen' (οὐδὲ "ὄψεται" λεκτέον, "τὸ δὲ ὀφθέν"[769]), for[770] in that case one has to speak about the two (things), the seer and the seen instead of making both one[771]. Seeing always implies an object and as such, we may comment, is unsuitable to specify the ultimate act of union. "Τὸ δὲ ὀφθέν" is introduced because it echoes τὸ ὁρώμενον of line 9.

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[762] Line 6: ἀποδείξεσι - For logos, reasoning by means of proof, *etc.*, see 167.

[763] See 9[VI,9],11,46 ff. see below 289.

[764] See *e.g.* 51[I,8,],7,14: ὡς ὁ γὲ συνὼν τῷ σώματι καὶ ὕλῃ σύνεστι, for he who is with the body is also with matter, which is the evil (τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ κακόν *ib.*, 20).

[765] Line 8: ἐπί-'above'is one of the meanings of ἐπί, see *LP*. 'Resting upon' is a notion which is found *e.g.* in 38[VI,7],33,15 and still more evident *ib.*, 33,35: τὸ δὲ *ἐπὶ* τῇ ὕλῃ εἶδος παρὰ ψυχῆς κτλ.

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[766] Mss CQ read in line 10 αὐτῷ, apparently referring to the SE. This is quite understandable, for it is a rather strange observation that a visitor be with himself as such. 'Being with' (συνεῖναι) presupposes an other 'to be with', and in this context who is more likely to be the other than the SE? However, HS' choice of αὑτῷ is equally understandable and even preferable, for it would be odd to make τοιοῦτον change as regards which it belongs to. The first τοιοῦτον obviously refers to the visiting mystic, consequently the others have to follow.

[767] Line11: αἰσθήσεται - At this level a remarkable word (but see 31[V,8],11,11) shows Plotinus' difficulty to express the unexpressable. Neither *logos* nor seeing will ultimately do, so he has to escape to different descriptions, in this case to doxical terminology.

[768] οὐδὲ of οὐδὲ "ὄψεται" reinforces the correction of ὄψεται of line 9 τοιοῦτον ὄψεται by μᾶλλον δὲ (one will not see, but one will be together); οὐδὲ "ὄψεται" means that one must not only correct seeing by 'being together' but one should not utter 'will see' at all.

[769] Line 11: Τάχα δὲ οὐδὲ "ὄψεται" λεκτέον. These words were deleted by Heintz as a gloss. Harder followed, declaring that these words would be a second correction. The first correction was μᾶλλον δὲ αὑτῷ τοιούτῳ συνέσται. Harder's supposition is that Plotinus could hardly correct the same word twice. Besides, Plotinus would at once use again the rejected word 'seeing', an unbearably awkward move if the correction had preceded. In this way the deletion is accounted for. What Harder failed to see, however, was that it is seeing that is rejected because of the fact that ὄψεται and ὀφθέν imply the duality (δύο) of subject and object (ὁρῶν and ὁρώμενον), as Plotinus himself clearly says: the seer and the seen instead of denoting the being one of both. Interpreted along this line ὁρῶν and ὁρώμενον are not a clumsy use of a corrected and rejected word as Harder has it, but they are part of the explanation of the coinciding of subject and object. As to ὄψεται and τὸ ὀφθέν, perhaps HS are right. According to my view HS rightly reject Heintz's proposition to delete them, but I fail to understand their argument: the words concerned must be translated: "fortasse ne dicendum quidem 'videbit hic, illud autem visum est' " and now their argument follows: "nam si quis communi sermone de duobus distinctis loqui cogitur, neque ὄψεται neque ὀφθέν dicendum". I fail to see how *sermo communis*, common speech, may be brought in to explain what Plotinus meant. Or do HS mean a common expression? I think I fail, then too, completely to grasp what they mean. As to ὄψεται and τὸ ὀφθέν themselves perhaps HS are right to take them together in the act of seeing and being seen regarding the same event: videbit hic, illud autem visum est: whereas the one sees, the other is seen, which implies a condemnable duality. I considered it a possible explanation that both, ὄψεται and τὸ ὀφθέν, separately, are assumed to imply the duality of a seer and an object of seeing. In the end, however, HS' explanation seems preferable. Then it is not a universal rule, but a rule applied to the particular case of the visiting mystic, (ὄψεται, ὁρῶν) and the visited SE (τὸ ὀφθέν, ὁρώμενον). Armstrong misses the point completely by taking τὸ δὲ as separated from ὀφθέν. He translates: "But perhaps one should not say 'will see', but 'was seen' *etc.*", as if the latter ('was seen') would be legitimate and imperative. The essence of the passage, being forbidden to use the word 'see' at all, is lost in his interpretation.

[770] εἴπερ does not mean 'if' (Armstrong) or 'wenn denn' (Harder) or 'if indeed' (*LP*) but 'since as a matter of fact' as in 9[VI,9],5,25 (see note 510).

Since the word 'seeing' turns out to be deficient, Plotinus continues with some paradoxical remarks, announcing[772] what he has to say with the words 'Indeed (μέν), bold is our argument (τολμηρὸς μὲν ὁ λόγος[773]): τότε μὲν οὖν οὔτε ὁρᾷ οὐδὲ διακρίνει ὁ ὁρῶν οὐδὲ φαντάζεται δύο κτλ. On the 'moment suprême' who is seeing neither is properly seeing nor properly distinguishing, nor is he imagining two (taking 'two' as object with φαντάζεται) both himself and the SE (in line 9 we are expressly told that he is also looking towards himself). Rist[774] holds that οὐδὲ φαντάζεται δύο has to be rendered as "they do not *appear* (Rist's italics) two", implying that while they may not seem two, they in fact *are*. This 'conclusion' is one of Rist's weapons to attack the position that the union of the soul and the SE involves a complete loss of selfidentity of the soul. However, this weapon is useless, and in fact no weapon at all, for the Greek does not allow for any such translation. The verb, in this case, should have been in the plural, which it is not, the only subject in the phrase being ὁ ὁρῶν. What we actually learn is that the 'seer' does not see and does not even imagine two. Plotinus, immediately, adds: "but as it were (οἷον, notice Plotinus' warning to be cautious in taking everything too literally or earthly) he becomes another and no longer himself nor self-belonging" (οἷον ἄλλος γενόμενος καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸς οὐδ' αὑτοῦ). This implies that he is merged into the SE, that his identity is lost and sunken into the SE: he can even be said to have no longer the disposal of his person or personality (οὐδ' αὑτοῦ). Under these conditions he belongs there (συντελεῖ ἐκεῖ[775]). And belonging to the SE (κἀκείνου γενόμενος) he is one (ἕν ἐστι), or *the* One (both are possible in the Greek for ἓν ἐστι, but the latter possibility is unlikely, for the One is not the same as the top of the visiting soul), having linked up his centre with the centre (of what there is called the SE). So we all but exagerate if we declare that the personality of the person is obliterated and has vanished into the SE (against Rist).

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[771] Line 13: ἀλλὰ μὴ ἓν ἄμφω has to be connected with εἴπερ.

[772] Armstrong connects the utterance (τολμηρὸς μὲν ὁ λόγος) regressively, but the boldness of the argument is still to come, so a progressive connection is appropriate. HS suggest the same as Armstrong's connection does. They read a high point before τολμηρὸς μὲν ὁ λόγος and put a point after these words. Τολμηρὸς λόγος is used of the supposed thought of another school in 39[VI,8],7,11. Τολμᾶν used of a bold statement in 38[VI,7],21,2.

[773] The small sentence τολμηρὸς μὲν ὁ λόγος has a μέν solitarium, which as such does not require a δέ, because it is a μέν emphaticum: "indeed". The same use of a μέν emphaticum is found in 38(VI,7),2,17: τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἀληθές, see *LP*. Plotinus is rather emotional in this passage, for apart from this μέν he uses twice μέν οὖν (line 9 and line 14), which to draw attention he links with actions of seeing.

[774] Rist, *Road*, 227. On page 226 he renders οὐδὲ φαντάζεται δύο by "they no longer seem to be two", equally wrong. It is interesting to note that οὔτε is followed not by οὔτε but by οὐδὲ - οὐδὲ which in Plotinus is not unusual, cf. *LP*, 784.

[775] HS pertinet illuc: belong to that ? I can not see why αὐτός should be an "every day self" as Daly says (*Self*, 85).

The centre-syndrome is again adduced, being Plotinus' most apt comparison to express the superunity[776]. And (you are able to imagine this, ellipse καὶ γὰρ) because here, in our world, two centres that coincide (συνελθόντα) are one; and then[777] two, when they are separated. In the same manner we now mean 'other' (ἕτερον). What does Plotinus mean by 'in the same manner' (οὕτω) and 'now' (νῦν line 19) ?

'In the same manner' must refer to the manner we use to imagine mathematical circles and their coincidence of centres here on earth, especially how we imagine them to be other (ἕτερον). The other word 'now'[778] is a reference to the time we are speaking about the union of the SE and the soul (or the 'he' of the visitor). So we must try to imagine this form of otherness in the same way as we imagine the coincidence of circles. This type of otherness is extremely difficult to imagine. In fact this otherness is limited in otherness to such an extent that it is coincident. Consequently, Plotinus adds, the vision is very difficult to explain. For how could one report *about an other*, if, in the act of seeing one did not see an other, but a one (ἓν) in regard to oneself (πρὸς ἑαυτόν)?

All this is in line with the trend of Plotinus' thought concerning the interrelation between subject and object. In the realm of mind subject and object, though distinguishable, coincide. The higher one comes in the hierarchy of the transcendent world, the more unity one finds. Above this last and highest stage of the mind no form of difference between subject and object is left; all has vanished into the SE. To speak about subject and object at this level does not make any sense. It is this type of amalgam of subject and object that Plotinus wishes to clarify here, if it can be clarified at all. For this form of unity goes beyond any form of intelligence or perception. Thus, the sheer declaration and confirmation of the fact must suffice, although words ultimately fail. Comparison takes over the task of information. In chapter 11 the mysteries are brought in in order to clarify the mystical union of the soul and the SE.

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[776] See above 245.

[777] Reading τότε δύο, ὅταν χωρίς line 18: HS τὸ τε δύο, ὅταν χωρίς - According to HS Kirchhoff and Müller have the right explanation, splitting up τότε into τὸ and τε. HS: "τὸ τε δύο *sc.* ὑφίσταται recte intellegit Mü in versione". I think they mean to translate as follows: 'and this (what has unity by coincidency of the centres) becomes two again, when separated'. Perna and Creuzer wrote τότε and Vitringa and Volkmann τότε δὲ, feeling the need of avoiding an asundeton, which, however, as such is not uncommon in Plotinus. In HS it is not clear what the mss have except for J. In HS' explanation, which equally goes for Kirchhoff/Müller, τό remains rather vague, whereas τότε ὅτε can be Plotinian usage, cf. line 9. Harder puts a comma after ἓν, before ἐστι, which however ingeniously done, has the disadvantage of making the first part of the sentence verbless. I do not think that we must add ὑφίσταται, but I hold that ἐστι must be repeated.

[778] Line 19: νῦν. It is odd to see how differently such a simple word as 'now' is liable to be interpreted. According to MacKenna it means *after* the vision, to Harder's view : "so sprechen wir auch *gewöhnlich* vom Einen als einem Unterschiedenen". In my interpretation it concerns the period of the union of the soul and the SE.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

11, 1-4 Comparison with the mysteries

Translation

> Because the command found in the mysteries here below intended to make clear not to divulge to the uninitiated, since that is not disclosable, the command has prohibited to divulge the divine to another who had not been fortunate enough to have already seen himself.

Harder is right in concluding that the opening of ch. 11 does not make a fresh start but continues the track of the last part of ch. 10. I do not think he is right when he remarks that in line 4 'Επεὶ τοίνυν *etc.*, after a short recapitulation something new comes up. In fact, one can hardly make an incision, for it is the same subject that is dealt with, namely what the being one of the union of the soul and the One means. A report of what happens to the soul in this union is something almost impossible to provide as the end of ch. 10 told us. Plotinus now introduces a comparison with the mysteries[779], a subject, he does not return to often[780], although it has influenced him[781]. It is this impossibility to report about the union that the mysteries express because they forbid to divulge the divine things and to reveal the secrets of the initiation to the crowd of uninitiated people, making an exception of the initiated, who were so fortunate as to have already seen themselves. Indeed, we do not know for sure what in the last stage of initiation was shown to the initiandi.

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[779] Line 1: τῶν μυστηρίων- The mysteries are not very often alluded to or introduced by Plotinus. The word μυστήριον is only used once, in 10[V,1],7,33 (chronologically no.10!) and its cognate μυστικῶς only once as well (26[III,6],19,26). Τελεταί, the proper initiation, is found twice (1[I,6],6,3 and see 26[III,6],19,26) and μύειν only once, 'initiate into mysteries' (9[VI,9],11,2). These words are often found together with αἰνίττεσθαι, "to indicate darkly" as *LP* says (see 10[V,1],7,33 ὡς τὰ μυστήρια καὶ οἱ μῦθοι περὶ θεῶν αἰνίττονται and 1[I,6],6,3; *ib.*, 8,11,19; 26[III,6],19,26; 9[VI,9],11,27). We find a similar employment of αἰνίττεσθαι as early as in the *Theaetetus* 152 C. Indeed the mysteries merely indicate certain things, they do not speak in clearcut language. Their activities have profound significations, for they refer to hidden truths. The infrequency of Plotinus' use of these words is as such after all not so much surprising considering the fact that in their ultimate stage of initiation the mysteries offer only vision, not union. Arnou (*Désir*, 277) rightly asks where mystery ends and mysticism begins. Besides, what mysteries have to indicate concerning vision, had already taken shape in Plato and Platonism. Plato himself in the *Symposion* 210 A and the *Phaedrus* 249 C, 250 C uses the word ἐποπτεία (ἐποπτική) the technical term for vision of the sacred objects that were ultimately shown. In Plato it is theoria in which the ἐποπτεία is subsumed. In Plotinus ἐποπτεία does not occur. In the last stage of the Plotinian journey into the SE even vision fails, not being identical with union. Mystery is not mysticism, because for the latter the union with the God, or the being 'oned' with the God, as Rist puts it (see *Road*, 221 and Arnou, *Désir*, 247) is fundamental. In mysticism vision is only a prelude, not the song, although the borderline between vision and union, prelude and song may be rather vague and difficult to indicate. In antiquity mysticism with its ultimate union with the God seems absent until Philo; other philosophers of the Platonian school and Plotinus introduced it and shaped it, especially in 9[VI,9], see Part III, 326 ff. We may end our observation by spending some words about another term from religion of mystery, *viz.* purification, that is being pure and clean (καθαρός) which indeed has an ample lemma in *LP*. Purification is an important activity in the field of mysteries. The fact that in contradistinction to the other terms mentioned, Plotinus frequently uses words expressing purity, is understandable. To be pure, already important in Plato's *Symposion* 211 C, emerges on different levels in Plotinus, the process of purification starts already when one turns from the corporeal and earthly affections and pleasures, and the process must be continued to the last levels of the mind. In 9[VI,9],3,26,27 it is the highest level in mind that must be pure and as such see the Pure; καθαρός is now even transposed to the SE. This many-sided purification has grown into a complete doctrine in Plotinus (and earlier), of which mostly the origin in the mysteries (but being pure was demanded in every religious

I shall now translate the first sentence: "Since the rule of the earthly (τῶνδε[782]) mysteries so as not to divulge to the uninitiated, wishes to make clear this irreportability (Τοῦτο, line 1) because the SE (HS: the One[783] or "the supreme of the initiation" as MacKenna has it, Harder confuses the ἐκεῖνο and τὸ θεῖον of the following line) is not to be divulged (ὡς οὐκ ἔκφορον ἐκεῖνο ὄν), it (*sc.* the rule) prohibited to make clear to another the divine thing, unless he was fortunate enough to have already seen it". 'This' (Τοῦτο, line 1) refers regressively to what was previously said about the difficulty of reporting about the union, but it also has also to do with the phrase ὡς οὐκ ἔκφορον ἐκεῖνο ὄν which may be considered to be syntactically connected with τοῦτο beyond the contents of the command (ἐπίταγμα): not to divulge to the uniniated (τὸ μὴ ἐκφέρειν εἰς μὴ μεμυημένους). Since τοῦτο is an acc., ὡς οὐκ ἔκφορον ἐκεῖνο ὄν, too, may be regarded as a rather loose causal accusative-construction. HS even consider the words concerned to be an accusativus absolutus.

It makes a considerable difference if ἐκεῖνο (ὡς οὐκ ἔκφορον *ἐκεῖνο* ὄν) should refer to the SE or to the moment suprême of initiation (MacKenna) or to the divine (τὸ θεῖον, *LP s.v.* ἔκφορον, a hapax). On the first interpretation Plotinus supposes that the intention of the mysteries is to express the ineffability and irreportability of the SE. On the second and third interpretation, it is only that the mysteries have the same problem as to the reporting about the union of the soul and the SE. I would prefer HS' solution. The word ἐκεῖνο regularly refers to the SE (cf. line 6). Moreover, MacKenna's and *LP*'s interpretation would require the inversion of ἐκεῖνο and τὸ θεῖον.

11, 4-16 Status of the mystic, 'enthousiasm' of the mystic during the unification

Translation

> Well then, since he was not two, but the seer himself was one in relation to the seen, as it was not being seen, but unified, when recalling what he became

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activity) was no longer felt. The same goes perhaps for the notion of theory, *i.e.* vision, which equally had a place of its own in Platonic doctrine, the origin of which had vanished into the background and was not constantly present in the consciousness of the philosophers.

[780] Ferwerda, *Images*, 192, 193 has practically nothing about this subject.

[781] See Arnou, *Désir*, 276 ff.

[782] τῶνδε-HS: terrestrium Harder recte.

[783] Armstrong, suddenly, translates ἐκεῖνο by 'the Good'.

> when he was mixed with him, he would have with him a picture of that (SE). And he was one himself and he had no difference in himself in relation to himself or in relation to other things. For nothing moved with him, he had no affect, no desire for anything else, when he had ascended, but there was neither reasoning nor a kind of knowing, nor a self at all, if we must even say this. But he was as if carried away or quietly possessed by a god in a solitary and motionless state, in no way departing from his being nor revolving around himself but entirely in rest and so to speak having become rest.

Plotinus now turns to the problem, what, if there can be no report to others, the one who enjoyed the benefit of the union carries with him from the union. Well then, since he was not two but one, *viz.* the seer himself in regard to the object of seeing in the sense that it was not really an object of seeing, but a partner in union (ἡνωμένον[784]), he will have with him a picture (εἰκών) of the SE, if he recalls who he was when he was mingled[785] with him. Plotinus' problem was, of course, that one can have no fantasy, or revocable vision, because actually during the 'moment suprême' there was no vision, but a union to be experienced. So one could wonder how the privileged person could possess any image. Extremely carefully Plotinus expresses in a potentialis (εἰ μεμνῷτο,.. ἔχοι ἄν ...) that if the visitor could remember the union, only then he will have with him a picture (rather than image, contra *LP*, for in the remainder of the chapter it is used in the sense of picture[786]). Apparently, this problem bothered Plotinus also for personal reasons. He, too, felt the need to remember and so he declares that in recollection a picture of the SE can emerge. I must draw attention to the fact what one carries with him is a picture, εἰκών, not an ἴχνος. For the latter word denotes a trace of the One in the structure of a lower entity, which as such has the capacity to inform the unity of the structure of that entity. We may gather this from 32[V,5]10,1,2.

The seer himself was one, neither having any difference or distinction in himself in regard to himself nor externally in regard to other things[787]. For after the ascent there was no motion in him, no affection, no desire for some other thing. There was not even the λόγος nor any kind of thinking nor even the 'self'[788]at all (οὐδ' ὅλως αὐτός, an observation that excludes any remainder of the identity, which is unfavourable, if not crushing, for the position of Arnou-Rist), if we must say even that (if we must be consistent in our position[789]). The person (αὐτός), as it were, is carried away or inspired by the divinity[790] and after

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[784] It is interesting to notice, that ἡνωμένον does not refer to a union with the *One*, but with the *SE*.

[785] Line 7: ἐμιγνύτο - a very strong expression, not in favour of the anti-unification supporters. Its sexual flavour is undeniable.

[786] See below ad line 21 and line 44.

[787] Line 9: κατὰ ἄλλα - HS affirm that κατὰ ἄλλα is continued by line 11 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ λόγος and consequently they made a parenthesis - οὐ γάρ τι . . . . ἀναβεβηκότι -. Any difference from other things (διαφορὰ κατὰ ἄλλα) is expressly denied in the text, a difference that regards things different from the self of the seer. Nothing in him is moved to affect the unity of his soul by causing difference. There was no affect, nor was there a desire for some other thing; (ἐπιθυμία) ἄλλου refers to κατὰ ἄλλα which has now been clarified. Plotinus elaborates his observation about the absence of an affect (θυμός) and desire (ἐπιθυμία) and confirms that not only affect and desire, are absent, but even λόγος is absent just as a form of knowledge is absent and -as a climax 'überhaupt' (ὅλως) - the self is not present (to disturb the unity of the seer with the SE). So as I see it, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ λόγος is connected with and continuing the phrase that starts with θυμός. Therefore within the framework of my explanation a parenthesis (as HS propose), does not fit in and has to be rejected. I may draw attention to τις with νόησις, which to my view points to a superior form of knowledge, even the highest possible. Finally I may observe that the translation of θυμός by

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Harder and Bréhier is not very felicitous: 'Zorn' (also Bréhier: 'colère'), for anger is the last thing we expect from our initiandus. *LP* does not give a meaning like that for θυμός. Armstrong's rendering is correct: "emotion". In connection with this point it is of relevance to note that the combination θυμός with ἐπιθυμία returns in 53[I,1],5,22: "Η, ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ καὶ ὁ θυμὸς τοῦ θυμικοῦ καὶ ὅλως τοῦ ὀρεκτικοῦ ἡ ἐπί τι ἔκστασις; (Armstrong: "Is it because the desire belongs to the desiring part of the soul, and passion to the passionate part and in general the movement out towards anything to the appetitive part?"). Here θυμός certainly does not mean 'anger', but 'desire'.

[788] I regard Armstrong's translation (the same translation in Bussanich, *The One*, 184) "and he himself was not there" as rather misleading. For the words οὐδ' ὅλως αὐτός do not mean that 'he' was not there, but they affirm that 'self' was absent, *i.e.* belonging to the Other (cf. ch.10,15,16: ἀλλ' οἷον ἄλλος γενόμενος καὶ οὐκ *αὐτὸς* οὐδ' αὑτοῦ συντελεῖ, κἀκείνου γενόμενος). Better Harder: "ja überhaupt sein Selbst war nicht da".

[789] Line 12: εἰ δεῖ καὶ τοῦτο λέγειν - A rather difficult sentence, which literally rendered says: "if it is necessary to say even that". Harder translates: "wenn denn auch das gesagt sein soll". MacKenna: "to dare the word". Bréhier: "puisq'il faut le dire" (omitting καὶ and giving εἰ the sense of εἴπερ). Armstrong: "if we must even say this". Giving καὶ its due, we may interprete: "if we must complete our line of thought and push it to the ultimate end". Compare εἰ δεῖ καὶ τοῦτο λέγειν with 9[VI,9],10,13,14 τολμηρὸς μὲν ὁ λόγος which has the same function with regard to *ib.*, 15 οἷον ἄλλος γενόμενος καὶ *οὐκ αὐτὸς* οὐδ' αὑτοῦ as εἰ δεῖ καὶ τοῦτο λέγειν has with regard to οὐδ' ὅλως *αὐτός* (ch.10, lines 11,12).

[790] Lines 12,13: ὥσπερ ἁρπασθεὶς ἢ ἐνθουσιάσας - ἁρπασθείς is a rather strong word, *LP* 'plunder', 'carry away', said of something stolen, 3[III,1],2,5, stealing of food; 47[III,2],8,19, double stealing; 47[III,2],15,41, robbery (like ἁρπαγή 47[III,2],5,46). Catching by a mirror of a form 27[IV,3],11,7. Harder (*I b*, 487), very aptly, refers to 49[V,3],4,12, where the compositum συναρπάσαντα occurs: man's snatching up of himself to higher regions of the mind συναρπάσαντα ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸ ἄνω. It is expressly said that in his ascent man has become someone else entirely (παντελῶς ἄλλον γενόμενον) within the framework of himself (εἰς τὸ ἄνω μόνον ἐφέλκοντα τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄμεινον). Although the text in 9[VI,9],11 makes less allusion to theft, there is some notion of taking away and loss of identity involved. In any way (συν) αρπάζειν is not an innocent 'taking away' but it contains a notion of losing one's property to be stolen and taken away. In this case it is the αὐτός that is 'stolen' and no longer in the possession of the seer, but in the possesion of the God. The harshness of the metaphor, already indicated by ὥσπερ, is, however, immediately mitigated by an expression that starts from the other side: ἢ ἐνθουσιάσας. The vacuum, caused by the theft of αὐτός, is replenished by the God, rather possessed by the God. So ἁρπασθείς and ἐνθουσιάσας form two sides of the same coin. What is taken away by the God, the self, is replaced by the God by means of his 'oneness'. Our explanation of ἐνθουσιάσας may be confirmed by the one and only place elsewhere where Plotinus uses this word again: 49[V,3],14,9. This is where he discusses the problem of the (im)possibility to speak about the One. This impossibility does not prevent us from having him, just as those who have a God within them (οἱ ἐνθουσιῶντες) know that they have something greater within them, even if they do not know what. The words οἱ ἐνθουσιῶντες are directly explained in the addition κάτοχοι γενόμενοι. Κάτοχος means possessed. Armstrong renders it by: "in the grip of divine possession". This is precisely what is indicated in the context. The possessed have a feeling that they have a great power within themselves and that it is a God that dominates and moves their speech and actions. If we are allowed to adduce this passage from a relatively remote treatise (49), which in this case does not seem too audacious (it is unlikely that there would be an evolution as to this point in Plotinus), it is easily seen that

that he has entered a solitary[791] and calm, motionless condition[792], as far as his own being[793] is concerned, not turning anywhere nor moving around himself or (with mss RU) around the SE[794] (thus, that is, no linear or circular movement), since he is completely in rest, or rest itself, so to speak. This means that the proof of the absence of motion (see line 9 οὐ γάρ τι ἐκινεῖτο παρ' αὐτῷ) is now completed. The person, being the rest itself, has no (e) motions carrying him to other, external things. So now Plotinus may continue the hierarchic scale of things left behind by the ascending soul.

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any translation that amounts to 'being inspired' is not sufficiently concrete: ἐνθουσιάσας literally means that a God (the SE) has taken his seat in us replenishing the vacuum caused by his stealing our 'self' (less satisfactory Brèhier: "ravi par l'enthousiasme"; MacKenna rather well: "caught away", "filled with God", omitting ἢ ; Harder "oder vielmehr in ruhiger Gotterfülltheit". Armstrong: "possessed by a God".

[791] Line 13: ἐρήμῳ - This word means 'solitary', 'lonely', see *LP*. It it is somehow peculiar here, since in the context one does not expect loneliness but rather quiet and rest. If Dodd's clever conjecture ἠρέμῳ should not be accepted, ἐρήμῳ may perhaps refer to the absence of the enlisted qualities of the soul: θυμός, ἐπιθυμία . . . . . αὐτός.

[792] Line 13: ἡσυχῇ - What this word is to be connected with is difficult to determine (see Harder, *I b*, 487). It is mostly taken together with ἐνθουσιάσας (Harder: "in ruhiger Gotterfülltheit"), HS even call it an oxymoron. They could have referred to in 9[VI, 9],9,18 where we find a similar oxymoron: 'quiet touch' (ἐν ἡσύχῳ τῇ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἐπαφῇ). According to Harder (*I b*, 487, 488), Kirchhoff attempted to connect it with ἐρήμῳ as a feminine substantive and Armstrong translates accordingly: "in a quiet solitude". In 10[V,1],2,14 we have the combination: ἡσύχῳ τῇ καταστάσει (the whole passage is interesting to compare for its elaborate description of the quiet that surrounds the soul in the transcendency). Armstrong obviously disagrees with Harder, who says that Kirchhoff's suggestion is: "sprachlich kaum möglich". Ultimately I would prefer HS' oxymoron, for if we do not connect ἡσυχῇ with ἐνθουσιάσας we are stuck with a very harsh contradiction in the phrase: "Carried away or possessed he is in quiet solitude and in a motionless state", whereas by connecting ἡσυχῇ with ἐνθουσιάσας we can understand that he is *quietly* possessed which makes it less strange that despite of his being carried away and possessed he is in solitude and in a motionless state. The word ἐρήμῳ may be a substantive, which is how we translated it in the previous sentence. It can also be an adjective (with καταστάσει); in that case, however, its position as an adjective next to ἀτρεμεῖ in the phrase is rather strange. Perhaps ἡσυχῇ taken together with ἐνθουσιάσας is meant to correct the unusual (ὥσπερ) activity in the realm suggested by ἁρπασθεὶς. See on ἡσυχῇ and Atkinson's view on this matter note 503. Decisive seems to be that ἥσυχος is also feminine.

[793] Line 14: τῇ αὐτοῦ οὐσίᾳ- I find these words very difficult to interpret. Tentatively I would suggest the following explanations. The words in question stand for the absence of the person's οὐσία because his οὐσία was 'stolen' together with his αὐτός. It could also mean that what is now left of his 'being', there is nothing that can make him move in whatever direction.

[794] Lines 14,15: οὐδὲ περὶ αὐτὸν στρεφόμενος - In Plotinus we encounter the notion of the soul being a circle around its own centre as in 9[VI,9],8,4 ff. and there is the centre of (soul)centres to encounter, see above 230,231. So it is very difficult to decide whether mss RU have the correct reading αὐτόν (=the SE) or not. In the context of meeting the SE RU's reading is preferable.

11, 16-35 A comparison with the God in the temple

Translation

He had not to do with beautiful things, but he had already run up beyond them, and had even gone past the choir of virtues, like a man who has entered the inside of the shrine and has left behind him the statues in the temple, which statues after his coming out of the shrine become the first things to meet after the vision inside and the intercourse with that which is not a statue or a picture but with (the God) itself. These statues became the secondary visions, but that first vision, perhaps, was no vision, but a different way of seeing, a going out yourself, and a simplification, a surrendering of oneself and striving for touching and rest and thinking around for adjustement, if one really is going to see in the shrine. But if he sees in another way, then nothing is present for him. These things are only imitations and they indicate enigmatically to the wise man among the interpreters how that God should be seen. A wise priest who has understood the enigma could make a real contemplation of the shrine, having entered there. And even if he did not enter the shrine and had come to consider the shrine as an invisible thing and a source and an origin, he will realise that by the origin he sees the origin and that also to the like the like will become united. And having neglected none of the divine things, which the soul can have even before the vision, he will seek the rest from the vision. And for him who has transcended all things, is the rest, what is before all things.

The initiant does not even have anything to do with the beautiful (Οὐδὲ τῶν καλῶν[795]), the last stage before attaining the SE. He has already run beyond the beautiful, and gone beyond the choir of virtues.

The image of the choir of virtues is elaborated in the following by another image, the holies of the temple and the images of the God before the holies of the sanctuary. First of all we must say something about the beautiful and the choir of virtues. According to 1[I,6],9,36 ff. (I, 6, being number 1, perhaps chronologically not remote from our 9[VI,9]) there is a domain of superb Beauty in the shape of the Ideas, which as such are a preliminary to the Superbeauty of the One, or the Superbeauty that is the One. As an example of the Ideas in question the virtue of the σωφροσύνη is offered (1[I,6],9,14, 15). So we may interpret the beauty concerned as the beauty of virtues like self-control, justice and courage, some of which are mentioned in the context

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[795] Line 16: Οὐδὲ τῶν καλῶν - It is difficult to find out what the syntactical construction may be. MacKenna translates : "He belongs no longer to the order of the Beautiful", obviously assuming an absent ἐστι. This solution is more attractive than to add λόγος as is done by HS and νόησις by Harder. The latter meet two objections 1) both words (line 11) are too remote to be easily supposed here to dominate the construction 2) both words denote a particular form of knowledge and can not easily abruptly change their object and acquire a 'general' meaning. Thus both λόγος and νόησις can hardly mean here: 'there is (no) question of or there is (no) thinking of the Beautiful'. Therefore, I can fully understand why Ficinus manipulated the text (see HS' critical apparatus). Still having περὶ αὐτὸν στρεφόμενος in mind, he added περὶ and adapted τῶν καλῶν to its demands: τὸ καλόν certainly causes the fact that in the immediately following τὸ καλόν (singular !) emerges. Perhaps we should add: περὶ τι which enables us to leave τῶν καλῶν untouched. If this proposal does not seem acceptable, I would prefer MacKenna's solution.

(1[I,6],6,1,2). Sometimes Plotinus ascribes a special status to Beauty[796]. However, within the context of the choir of virtues in 9[VI,9],11, it must be the beauty of the Ideas that is spoken of.

Plotinus now brings in the comparison between the sanctuary and its holies. It is just as when a person has entered the holies of a sanctuary, leaving behind him the statues of the Gods. When he returns and leaves the adyton after the vision in the adyton and his being there with what is essentially not a statue or a picture but the Godhead itself, it is these statues that he first of all encounters. Those statues become only secondary visions (ἃ δὴ γίγνεται δεύτερα θεάματα) to him, but not unimportant for they represent the Forms and mind.

There is only one other place where Plotinus uses this comparison between the God in the holies and the statues outside the sanctuary, *viz.* in the chronologically very close treatise *On the three Hypostases* (number 10); in this tract we are told that the contemplator must contemplate the statues that are outside the temple, whereas the God is, as it were, inside of the temple, the adyton (10[V,1],6,12 ff.). It has an athmosphere comparable with the one of 9[VI,9],11, but there is a different feature of the description in 9[VI,9],11 in that it so strongly emphasizes the *return* from the holies. Perhaps this has to do with the fact that in Plotinus' mind there is still the notion of report after the union, which is absent from 10[V,1],6,12 ff. Be this as it may, Plotinus affirms that the vision in the sanctuary is perhaps not entitled to be called a vision but according to a different way of seeing, one should rather speak of ecstasy, simplicity and so on. Here we encounter one of the most famous descriptions and the most famous row of descriptive terms ever to be met in Plotinus with regard to the union[797]. We shall study them successively in the notes. In my text it suffices to underline that they are all aporetical terms, merely approximately correct, for ultimately it is impossible to describe the activities on the part of the soul. Ἔκστασις has nothing to do with trance. It would be the one and only place to mean a kind of ecstasy, whereas in Plotinus it always denotes (non - exstatic) movement outwards: so it could mean: 'standing out of oneself' to go to the SE[798]. Ἅπλωσις, simplification, as a term does not seem so difficult, meaning the radical laying aside of any quality or activity, in order to become entirely one, but there is another very good possibility too: *viz.* 'unfolding of oneself', 'making oneself open for' (the contact with the SE)[799], which would be an activity similar to what can be meant by ἔκστασις. Ἔπιδοσις αὐτοῦ means the complete surrender to the SE[800]. Ἔφεσις πρὸς ἀφήν is the desire to get in touch with the SE[801]. Στάσις being at rest, is a bit odd after ἔκστασις. It could be that one should either alter ἔκστασις, or delete στάσις, as Theiler did (see note on ἔκστασις). Περινόησις πρὸς ἐφαρμογήν has its problems, but it can only indicate the revolving of one's 'thinking around the SE' to adjust to the SE[802]. All these terms denote the necessary activities if one really desires to see

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[796] See note 96.

[797] See *e..g.* Arnou, *Désir*, 237 ff.

[798] Line 23: ἔκστασις - We are in danger of losing ἔκστασις in the sense of ecstasy in Plotinus, a word that plays an important role both in our denoting the elevation of the ultimate stage in the unification with the SE and in the philosophy to come We should not forget, however, that *e.g.* in Proclus this use of ἔκστασις is also absent! In Plotinus the word denotes a movement outwards, surely, not in upward direction, as the usual connotation of the English word 'ecstasy' (but not to lower regions of the transcendent hierarchy as Ferwerda, *Images*, 192, 193 has it, see also Trouillard, *Purification*, 97 ff.). Occurrences: 53[I,1],5,23; 49[V,3],7,14 ἔκστασις is denied to mind but could imply a higher direction; 44[VI,3],2,20. So it is also in 9[VI,9],11 that it could mean 'standing out of itself towards a higher direction', *viz.* to the SE, but even then there would remain a difficulty. It is surprising to see in line 23 that ἔκστασις would rank with its counterpart στάσις. Theiler (Harder, *VI b*, 174) proposes to alter ἔκστασις into στάσις and to delete στάσις in line 24. Theiler's deletion of στάσις in line 24 is to be seriously taken into account since categorially it is not

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in tune with the other qualifications that all contain a notion of activity, including the two that immediately surround στάσις: ἔφεσις *πρὸς* ἀφήν and περινόησις *πρὸς* ἐφαρμογήν (so *περί*στασις?). To change ἔκστασις into ἐκτασις would do. Ms C writes a τ above στ. In the mss ἔκτασις regularly alternates with ἔκστασις (see *LP sv*. ἔκστασις). To stretch oneself out to the SE would be an acceptable explanation. If ἔκστασις is to be maintained (which is favoured by Beierwaltes, *Denken des Einen*, 140, note 40, see also, *Die Metaphysik des Lichtes*, 110, note 121), we should be fully aware of the fact that it is not the enchantment of the soul that is meant, for such a condition of the soul has nothing to do with the situation, but rather unification with the SE is indicated, *i.e.* being deprived of any sensational feeling to the greatest extent possible.

[799] Line 23: ἄπλωσις - as a noun is a *hapax* in Plotinus (but we have also ἁπλότης, simplicity, see *LP*). The adjective ἁπλοῦς frequently occurs: 'simple', and is used for several notions: *hyle*, body, soul, mind (9[VI,9],2,37), the One (God, the First, 9[VI,9],3,49; 9[VI,9],5,24), see *LP*. In connection with the SE to be 'simple' means the absolute unity of the SE. Obviously the ascending soul must cast off every capacity or quality. Arnou, *Désir*, 239 quotes 53[I,1],12,18. The ascent of the soul requires its dropping everything that was added to it in its descent into the human body. Ἄπλωσις does not appear here, and as I feel it, the notion of being simple is as yet not a reference to the ultimate stage of union. But, surely, the soul has to drop anything embarrassing. Arnou also quotes 1[I,6],9,16, which is more helpful. One has to be pure (!), and have nothing to keep him from becoming one in this way and having no other thing mixed with him, being wholly (him)self, nothing but true light. The point here is the vision of Beauty, *i.c.* the Ideas themselves. There is still no question of the ultimate unification with the SE. Nevertheless, just as the soul must be one (light) to see the light of the Beautiful, likewise the soul must be nothing but one to encounter the SE. Ficinus translates 'diffusio', unfolding oneself and the verb ἁπλοῦν has no other meaning than unfolding (see *LP*). Having such a meaning ἄπλωσις would signify unfolding oneself for the contact with the SE, which *qua* activity would entirely hit in with ἔκστασις as standing out of oneself.

[800] Line 23: ἐπίδοσις -There is one other place in Plotinus where ἐπίδοσις is used, meaning 'increase' like the verb means (see *LP*, the verb only occurs in Plotinus once, meaning 'to increase' (36[I,5],6,19). Immediately after ἄπλωσις, however, ἐπίδοσις can hardly be assumed to have this meaning. So consultation of *LS* may help. 'Free gift' or 'giving freely' is the main signification. Thus the ascending soul gives its 'self', in a free act, see Arnou, *Désir*, 239, n. 5.

[801] Line 24: ἔφεσις πρὸς ἀφήν - It is remarkable that it is only here that ἀφή is used of the (abstract) touching of the One. All the other places given by *LP* concern a concrete touching. This fits in with the fact Plotinus introduces several hapaxes or hapaxical uses of significations to denote the union (ἔκστασις, ἄπλωσις, ἐπίδοσις, and as we shall see περινόησις and ἐφαρμογή), now that words of seeing are set aside as inappropriate. It is characteristic for his aporetical situation. In this connection I may point to the fact that other terms of touching, ἐπαφή, συναφή and θίξις (see Arnou, *Désir*, 237, 238) are mobilized for the description of the union, see below 304 ff..

what is in the adyton. With ἔφεσις *πρὸς* ἀφήν and περινόησις *πρὸς* ἐφαρμογήν this is obvious. All the other terms (except στάσις), however, may denote the same preparatory activity of the soul. So readers should be warned that in the secondary literature the fact that it is all said in connection with the subject, the soul, is often neglected and that in fact none of these terms denote the actual *union* as such[803]. Plotinus had other terms to describe the union of both partners[804].

Note that all these terms are intended to describe *within the framework of the comparison* not so much the meeting with the SE as the encounter with the God inside the adyton. Nonetheless, metaphor and reality are mixed together. Therefore, there is no serious objection against transmitting - as is usually done - these terms to the meeting with the One with the proviso that they illustrate the question in connection with the visiting soul only.

If one sees in another way (ἄλλως), *i.e.* not 'seeing' in the adyton, in the specific way just described, there will be nothing present to the seer (lines 25,26). This is a rather vague statement, which only can be fathomed when one is aware of the theory behind this passage. I suppose that in the holies there are objects to be seen by the priest: the Godhead itself is present only for those who do the seeing in the right manner: it is entirely a question reference, the objects only function as references. Plotinus is not so simpleminded to hold that the Godhead is the direct object of vision. When one does not look in the right manner (ἄλλως), there is nothing, no Godhead. It is suggested that when the seer 'sees' in the right manner, there will be a presence (πάρεστι) of the Godhead.

Bearing this theory of explanation in mind, Plotinus' following remark makes sense: "Indeed those things are imitations" (Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μιμήματα). There must be some objects in the holies as I already suggested, for we are told that one sees *τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀδύτῳ*, perhaps not a statue or a picture[805]. For elsewhere

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[802] Περινόησις must mean 'think around' and not 'careful thought' as the *LP* has it. The soul will adapt itself to the SE on all sides (see *LS s.v.*II), all around it. This περί is found elsewhere in 9[VI,9) in this local sense, ch.3, 53,54 (see also Beierwaltes, *Metaphysik des Lichtes*, 80), ἐφαρμογή is a hapax (see *LP s.v.*), the verb ἐφαρμόττειν is used frequently (see *LP*), but as far as I can see not in connection with the SE.

[803] So *e.g.* Bussanich, *The One*, 171 (see also 179), who says "that ἔκστασις, and its equivalents ἅπλωσις and ἐπίδοσις αὑτοῦ signify the soul's self-transcendent mystical union with the One", is one bridge too far.

[804] See my last chapter, p.304 ff..

[805] Atkinson, *Ennead V. 1*, 133,134 regards our passage to be connected with the mysteries in Eleusis, not with the Egyptian temples, as Harder holds. In Eleusis the anaktoron was inside the telesterion, in which the cult-statues of Demeter and other deities were placed. In the opening of ch.11 we find the command of the mysteries not to disclose the secrets of the mysteries to the uninitiated (τὸ τῶν μυστηρίων τῶνδε ἐπίταγμα *etc.*), a remark that convinces Atkinson "that the example which follows also refers to a mystery cult". In that case, I think there must be some objects of the cult in the shrine (adyton), and the phrase Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μιμήματα could refer to these objects in the adyton, which indeed it does in my view. The rule of the mysteries at the beginning of our chapter 11 is, however, no sufficient indication to claim that also the temple-scene should refer to a mystery cult.

it is expressly said that it is the Godhead self (αὐτό) that one is to meet in the adyton, neither a statue (ἄγαλμα) nor a picture (εἰκόνα)[806]. There are other possibilities to be considered, but as I see it they are less plausible[807].

The next sentence may be linked with this remark by taking ταῦτα as the subject of αἰνίττεται (alternative a). These imitations (the statues or objects?) are an enigmatic indication to the wise among the interpreters (commonly interpreters of the will of the God, but here not of the will of the God but of the significance of the holy objects), how that Godhead is to be seen (ὁρᾶται con. dubitativus[808]). The alternative (b) is that τοῖς σοφοῖς is taken as a dativus auctoris: "and by the wise men among the interpreters it is indicated as a riddle, how the God is to be seen". In this case (b) the wise priest in the next sentence is different from and not among the wise interpreters. Although this is possible as such, a dativus auctoris is less likely, because such a dativus auctoris (with a present tense) does not occur very often and is rather poetic form of expression. For the interpretation of the passage as a whole the preference the choice for either a or b is hot very important.

The wise priest, Plotinus continues, sees through the enigma and so he will have the right vision of the adyton when he is there (in the adyton). HS would like us to have τοῦ ἀδύτου dependent on ἐκεῖ, but apart from the oddity and harshness of this partitive genitive construction, the subsequent sentence makes clear that it is primarily the vision of the adyton that is at issue and not the vision of the Godhead. For in this phrase we learn something about the true vision of the adyton. The expression 'true vision' indicates that the true vision of the adyton may alternate with an 'untrue vision'. Apparently the true vision goes beyond the adyton that is entered by the priest. This is confirmed by what follows. The priest discovers that the (true) adyton is something invisible (τὸ ἄδυτον τοῦτο ἀόρατόν τι χρῆμα) and that the (true) adyton is the source and origin

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There is no sign whatsoever of any initiants being involved, the only human beings who play a part at all are the wise priest and the wise prophet, two people, if they are not one and the same. In the other passage, we quoted in the text, where we find the outside statues, there is no question of mysteries in the context (10[V,1],6,12 ff.) which is not in favour of Atkinson's view that both in 10[V,1],6,12 ff. and in our passage Plotinus refers to a mystery cult. The passage 10[V,1],6,12 ff. is extremely short. Perhaps Plotinus assumed that his readers were acquainted with our temple-passage.

[806] In 1[I,6],8,2,3 it is said of the SE that it inhabits, as it were, the inner shrine (οἷον ἔνδον ἐν ἁγίοις ἱεροῖς μένον οὐδὲ προιὸν εἰς τὸ ἔξω), and will not come out for the profane to see it.

[807] Ταῦτα of ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μιμήματα could be assumed to refer to the statues outside the adyton, which were only secondary visions. In that case it is perhaps best to consider the whole description of the other manner of vision as a sort of parenthesis, so that ταῦτα can more easily be regarded as referring to the statues, which are only imitations. Harder takes ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μιμήματα as referring to the most inner part of the Temple ("er weiss dass die Bezeichnung 'innerster Tempelraum' nur ein bild ist (27 μιμήματα))". Since ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μιμήματα is a plural, this expression can hardly refer to the adyton, singular.

[808] Harder takes ὁρᾶται as a coniunctive, Armstrong as an indicative, which seems less preferable.

(of the divinity). This holds *even* when the priest is not in the adyton of the temple (*καὶ* μὴ γενόμενος δέ, I may draw attention to the rather backward δὲ which indicates that *καὶ* means 'even'). He will realize "that he sees the origin (the Godhead) by means of the image of the origin and that the like comes together with the like" (lines 32,33). What is like the God refers to what it is like, the God himself, in the same way as the picture vanishes into the original later on in line 44,45. The real Godhead is in the real (invisible) adyton.

The whole metaphor is employed to characterize the mystic's meeting with the SE, and to portray what 'vision' really means. Although the seer/priest continues to be the subject of the activities in the comparison, the soul shines from time to time through the imagery. This is, I think, especially the case, when Plotinus deals with the right manner of seeing in lines 23 and 24: neither ἔκστασις nor ἅπλωσις, nor ἐπίδοσις αὐτοῦ seem specific for the priest's activities in the holies, whereas they do seem to belong to the necessaries of the journey of the soul. Nevertheless, after these terminological explications Plotinus emphasizes the temple-image: "since our man wishes to see what is in the adyton". The priest-seer is restored to his rights and dominates the scene till line 32 (Οὐδέν *etc.*), where ψυχή takes over. It is fundamental to recognize that also the last phrase of the comparison (lines 31-32) is still to be regarded as dealing with the activities and experiences of the priest, which, as I may gather from their translations, is not recognized by most of the translators. Translations in terms of 'by principle he sees principle' reveal the misunderstanding of the translators that already the union of the soul and the One (SE) is involved. A translation such as the one mentioned is not very felicitous, for directly after πηγή the term ἀρχή (Plotinus used the very word on the same level with πηγή 'source') can hardly be taken in the sense of principle[809]. Most translators render ἀρχή by 'principle', which, if it makes any sense at all, gives the impression that it refers to the *interpretation* of the metaphor and thus no longer seems to belong to the framework of the comparison *e.g.* Bréhier: "qu'on ne voit le principe par le principe". MacKenna: "since by principle they (?) see principle". Cilento: "egli saprà tuttavia che solamente il Principio vede il Principio" (following Harder). Harder is right so far as he translates: 'Urgrund', but there is no need to change ἀρχῇ into ἀρχή, as he does (followed by Cilento): "dass nur (?) der Urgrund den Urgrund erblickt". There is a perfect reason for the word ἀρχή to be in the dativus, for in the context of the metaphor it is by means of this adyton as ἀρχή that one concentrates on and sees the Origin.

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[809] It will be obvious to any reader of Harder's note (*I b*, 488) how much I am indebted to his explanation, in spite of many differences as to the details. I do not think it necessary to assume - as Harder does - that the wise among the interpreters (προφήτης) is different from the wise priest, who has the permission and the habit of going into the holies. In my view the μιμήματα are the imitations pointing to the divine power and employed in the right manner evoking the presence of the God, whereas according to Harder they are denoting the fact "dass die Bezeichnung 'innerster Templeraum' nur ein Bild ist". Further, Harder suggests in his commentary (not in his translation) that the person who is μὴ γενόμενος (ἐκεῖ), line 30, is different from the γενόμενος ἐκεῖ, line 29 which is unlikely.

The last part of the sentence, *viz.* καὶ συγγίγνεται καὶ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον as a parallel to ἀρχῇ ὁρᾷ ἀρχήν, can be interpreted along the same line: and that also (καὶ) to the like (what is liking to God) the like (God) becomes united. This part of the sentence expresses as it were the final stage of the whole metaphor. Καὶ (the second) applies ἀρχῇ ὁρᾷ ἀρχήν to συγγίγνεται καὶ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον. To return to Harder's proposal to change ἀρχῇ into ἀρχή, apparently he thinks that Plotinus has already abandoned the framework of the metaphor. Moreover, what is that nominative ἀρχή supposed to mean in connection with the union of the soul and the One? From whatever perspective one should look upon it, the soul never qualifies for the name of 'ἀρχή'. It is much more likely to believe that Plotinus is still partly operating within the machinery of the metaphor. The one who realizes is the one who sees, the priest. So it is this person who by means of the origin sees the origin, and who realizes that the like comes together with the like. Nevertheless, we are on the verge of leaving the metaphor, for already the combination of ἀρχή with πηγή can hardly be meant to actually refer to the adyton and the particular God of the temple. The expression already alludes to the SE, the entity, which in the opening of ch.9, is called ἀρχή and πηγή. With the sentence συγγίγνεται καὶ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον we have reached the ultimate goal of the metaphor. That we have now practically abandoned the metaphor, appears from what follows. The soul takes part in the action.

At this point (line 32) HS rightly suppose a new sentence to begin. Harder at least omitted a comma before οὐδέν. Armstrong (cf. HS 2) transposed the seemingly slightly redundant, second καί in line 32, which had already been deleted by Dodds, to begin the new sentence καὶ οὐδέν (κτλ.). However, we have found an appropriate explanation for this second καί. Thus I do not feel the need of any transposition. The subject in this sentence (οὐδέν παραλιπών κτλ.) still seems to be the priest, but the transition to the soul - for a moment- is evident from the use of the word 'soul' in the subordinate clause. He (the priest) will not neglect anything of the divine things or activities the *soul* is capable of having or doing (ὅσα δύναται ψυχὴ ἔχειν καὶ πρὸ τῆς θέας) before the vision. We may remind our readers of Arnou's attempts to minimize the union of the soul and the One[810] on the basis of among other sentences the expression ὅσα δύναται of this phrase (line 33). It is easily seen, however, that ὅσα δύναται in line 33 has no relevance whatsoever to the problem because it only has to do with the stage *before* the vision (*πρὸ* τῆς θέας) and nothing with the vision or union itself. Besides, the expression has nothing to do with limitation or confinement. On the contrary, it implies that the priest maximized the efforts before the vision of the God. Moreover, it is still the priest that is in the picture. So only in a metaphorical way this stage could be applied to the ascending soul.

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[810] See above 264.

The rest the *priest* (*not the soul*) expects from the vision itself. In the following sentence all that is done by the priest and his expectation ('the rest') is transposed to the 'owner' of the soul, *viz.* the *person* who has gone beyond all (ὑπερβάντι).

11, 35-51 The soul does not arrive at not-being, but touches the Highest

Translation

> For the nature of the soul certainly will not arrive at what is completely not, but when the soul has descended it will arrive at evil, and in this way at not being, not at absolute not being. And if it runs the opposite way, it will not arrive at something else, but at itself, and being thus not in another, it is not in nothing, but in itself. Being in itself alone and not in something means presence in that (Supreme Entity). For a person himself does not become being, but above being in as far as he is communicating with that. If one sees that oneself has become this, one has oneself as a likeness of that, and if one passes from himself, like a picture to the archetype, one would have 'the end of the journey'. And when one falls back from the vision and wakes again the virtue in oneself, and when one has perceived that one is adorned with them one will be lightened going by virtue to mind and wisdom and through wisdom to that (SE). And that is the life of Gods and divine and blessed men, deliverance from the other things here below, a life free from delight in the things here below, a flight of the alone to the alone.

The rest for who had transcended everything is what is before everything. In his typical way of writing (and thinking) now (line 35) Plotinus rather abruptly abandons the theme of vision to introduce the question of *being and not-being*. He proceeds: "For (γάρ) the nature of the soul certainly will not arrive at what is utter nothingness" (πάντη μὴ ὄν). This 'for' again seems to give a reason for something elliptically left out: (Soul arrives at something beinglike, not something entirely not-being.) "For *etc.*" Plotinus seems to consider it characteristic of soul as a genus (cf. φύσις) never to arrive at complete not-being, neither in its ascent to the highest union nor in descending to the outer rim of being, the ultimate border of the Doxa. He admits that the soul descends to evil (κακόν) which is not-being (μὴ ὄν), but this not-being is not complete not-being (τὸ παντελὲς μὴ ὄν line 38). The combination of evil and not-being is nothing uncommon in Plotinus. Evil is the evil of the world of the Doxa or perhaps of its basis, the *hyle*, for in the rather near treatise 12[II,4],16,25[811] *hyle* is identified with evil, which as such is not being[812] but never complete not-being. Complete not-being would destroy the soul, something which cannot happen in Plotinus' philosophy, according to which the soul is never exstinguished. Plotinus seems to assume that just as in its descent soul never will encounter complete not-being, in its ascent on the base of its structure it will never reach not-being either. However, this is in the background of his mind, for he continues by elaborating another aspect as we shall see: going the other way round. Before examining this phenomenon, it is perhaps worthwhile to give first a survey of the types of being or not-being that are involved in the text (for more types, that not feature in the text see my note 813). Two types of not-being have been introduced:

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[811] 12[II,4],16,25: Πῶς δὲ οὐ πάντη κακόν; Must it (*sc.* matter) not be utterly evil (Armstrong' s translation)?

[812] 12[II,4],16,3 and 14,21 ff.

1) the πάντῃ μὴ ὄν[813] or παντελὲς μὴ ὄν, the most radical kind of not-being, which means absolute nullification.

2) not-being in the sense of what is not *being* (transcendent), *i.e.* the world of the Doxa.

It is presupposed that what *is* not, does not lack existence. Both the SE and the world are not *being*, but they do exist. As to the not-being with regard to the union with the SE Plotinus merely expresses himself by implication. When going the other way round, that is, ascending instead of descending, the soul will not attain anything other than itself. I think that there is a connection with the foregoing in so far that what is before everything (line 35), must be in the sense that at any event it is the soul itself that the soul encounters there, which as such is not not-being. In this way the soul is in nothing[814], because it is not in some other thing, but in itself. And to be in itself alone and not in being amounts to being in the SE[815]. For one self[816] becomes not some being, but beyond being[817]; so one participates in what is described in the famous formula ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας in sofar as one communicates (ταύτῃ ᾗ προσομιλεῖ) with the SE.

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[813] Line 36: τὸ πάντῃ μὴ ὄν and (line 38) τὸ παντελὲς μὴ ὄν - These expressions remind us of expressions in Plato: *Rep*. 477 A 5 τοῦ μηδαμῇ ὄντος, 478 D 4, τοῦ πάντως μὴ ὄντος. Παντελὲς reminds us of τὸ *παντελῶς* ὄν in Plato's *Republic*, 477 A 2 and his *Sophist* 248 E. Note the adjective παντελές in Plotinus, where Plato has the adverb. In Plotinus παντελής may denote the absolute completeness of a negative expression: *e.g*. ἀοριστία παντελής, 15[III,4],11,12. It is the absolute nothingness of not-being; already in Plato (*Rep*. 477 A 5 τοῦ μηδαμῇ ὄντος, 478 D 4, τοῦ πάντως μὴ ὄντος) we encounter the need to express next to this notion not-being in a qualified sense. For not-being in a qualified sense we have τὸ μὴ ὄν in the *Sophistes*, in the sense of being other. See my article, *Kleine geschiedenis van het begrip Niets*, 217 ff. So we have five types of not being: 1) complete not-being; 2) not-being of *hyle;* 3) not-being of the world of the Doxa, genesis; 4) not-being as otherness; 5) and the not being of the One (9[VI,9],5,30; 38[VI,7],38,1). This last form is the Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato's formula ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας which as such in Plato denotes the not-being of the SE (Good), but Plato is not consistent to that score, see *Rep*. 518 C, where the Good is called τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανότατον, an expression which implies the beingness of the Good; the same applies to 526 E τὸ εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ ὄντος and to 532 C πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου ἐν τοῖς οὖσι θέαν. See for an excellent survey of the history before and after Plotinus with regard to the five distinctions of not being, Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus*, I, 167, ff., espec. 170 (where matter is added).

[814] Line 39: ἐν οὐδενί ἐστιν - Thedinga, *Plotin oder Numenios ?* III, 215 very ingeniously proposes to put οὐκ before ἐν οὐδενί ἐστιν accepted by HS. 'The soul is not in nothing but in itself'. I prefer to have the text as it stands: 'the soul is in nothing (*sc*. .of being, *cf*. line 38 οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ) but in itself'. The entire passage has the notion of not-being above being as central. The soul must be supposed to be in not-being, which notion is lost in Thedinga's proposal. The expression corresponds also with line 41 οὐκ ἐν τῳ ὄντι.

The famous Platonic formula was bound to come up in the zenith of Plotinus' essay. When a person sees himself coming to this position (τοῦτο (*i.e* ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας) αὐτὸν γενόμενον) he has[818] himself as a likeness (ὁμοίωμα) of the SE. One might be inclined to quote another famous Platonic theorema: ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν (*Theaetetus* 176 A); *in Plotinus* the phrase κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν would mean not so much the belittling of the total identity as it would the temporal aspect of the union. Needless to remind the reader that in Plato's *Theaetetus* the ὁμοίωσις means nothing more and nothing less than following the Gods in being temperant and righteous[819] by imitating the Gods, not being a part of the God or being the God. That Plotinus somehow has this Platonic formula in his mind may be gathered from the fact that in the famous last sentence of essay 9[VI,9] he hints at the flight from here to thither, which is also an allusion to same place in the *Theaetetus*. However, it is very interesting to see and should not escape notice that in ch.11 *he does not use the word ὁμοίωσις*, which for Plotinus, as we shall learn later on[820], also has a very narrowly defined meaning which does not include union with the SE.

The sentence 'he has himself as a likeness (ὁμοίωμα) to the S' seems admissable as proof for the Amou-Rist position, although one could maintain that 'having himself as a likeness to the SE', is not yet equal to being the SE to the extent of losing the self. However, Plotinus surpasses the range of his remark about the likeness by coming up with a splendid comparison. Plotinus now manipulates the notion εἰκών, by giving it a turn different from εἰκών in line 7, where it was the relict of a brief encounter. Now, Plotinus proceeds, the portrait turns into its original. The person passes from himself ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ μεταβαίνοι (reminding us of the famous μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος[821]) as a picture passing into its archetype, a splendid and admirable metaphor to express the absoluteness of the union. This metaphor of the likeness of pictures pleased Plotinus, for he also uses it elsewhere[822]. Here in ch.11 it is expressly said that the seer merges into the Seen. When a picture fades into the original, there is no longer any difference, but there is complete absorption. This last sentence ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ μεταβαίνοι is seldom quoted, particularly not by those scholars who wish to belittle the union.

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[815] Line 40: τὸ δὲ ἐν αὑτῇ μόνῃ καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῳ ὄντι ἐν ἐκείνῳ - Being in itself alone and not in something being (I accept Harder's τῳ for τῷ, because of ἐν οὐδενί, too, is particular) means the presence in Him, the SE. HS have rightly: ἐν ἐκείνῳ praedicatum'. Harder wrongly translates: "und nur insichselbst und nicht in jenem als in etwas Seiendem", because τὸ is neglected. The phrase is a conclusion of what has been just said about the not being of the soul in another but only in itself. In these conditions the soul must be in the SE. For such a person too becomes not being himself, *i.e.* above being (precisely as the SE is not being), but he only goes beyond being in sofar as he becomes associated with the SE. We must bear in mind that above being there only can be the SE. In this realm there is no absolute not-being.

[816] Line 41,42 γίνεται γὰρ *αὐτός τις* οὐκ οὐσία, ἀλλ' ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας ταύτῃ ᾗ προσομιλεῖ (A *person self* does not become being, but beyond being in sofar as he becomes associated with the SE). Harder: "man wird selber insofern man mit Jenem umgeht, nicht mehr Sein, sondern Übersein". Armstrong: "for one becomes, not substance, but 'beyond substance' by this converse". Bréhier: "car lui est une réalité, qui n' est pas une essence, mais qui est au delà de l' essence, pour' l'âme avec qui il s'unit", making αὐτός the One, which in combination with τις is unlikely. I think αὐτός (τις) is neglected by Armstrong. Given τις in line 43 it seems best to interpret αὐτός τις not as 'a self', but as the mystic.

[817] I do not accept Armstrong's translation 'substance' for οὐσία. Being has a more general connotation. The same goes for Bréhier's 'essence'.

[818] Not: "he sees himself as a likeness", as Bussanich, *The One*, 96 says.

[819] Meijer, *Intellectuals*, 248.

[820] See below 329 ff.

Then, we should have reached the ultimate goal of our voyage (τέλος τῆς πορείας[823], another quotation from Plato, *Resp.* 532 E 3, where the end of dialectics is said to be an ἀνάπαυλα and the end of the spiritual voyage). Note again that in Plato the aim is the *vision* of the Good, whereas in Plotinus it is the *unification* with the SE.

This union is not to last long and there is always the disappointing falling back (ἐκπίπτειν) from the vision. However one can always revert to the SE, when one awakens the virtue hidden in oneself, and realizes that one is adorned with these virtues. In this case we are again elevated by our virtue (moral virtue as we have earlier seen depicted in the case of the ascending soul), we proceed towards mind and wisdom (which is in the top region of the mind and very aptly used to denote the last stage before reaching the SE[824]), and going through this wisdom we attain again the SE. Such is life of gods and the godlike blessed men[825], that means, Plotinus says, liberation from the other things, which are on earth, a life, in which the earthly is not enjoyed, in short an escape[826] of a solitary to a solitary: φυγὴ μόνου πρὸς μόνον. The last phrase admirably surveys the whole procedure of ascent to the SE, although elsewhere Plotinus is fully aware of the fact that *in Plato* the phrase has nothing to do with flying up to the divine realm[827]. Here in ch.11 it denotes the ascent to the private audience of the majestic SE (μόνος) who receives the pure (μόνος[828]) self. The phrase φυγὴ μόνου πρὸς μόνον is a very dignified and concise recapitulation of the whole journey into the SE.

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[821] Bussanich, *The One*, 151, is not justified in taking μεταβαίνειν as synonymous with ἀναβαίνειν here. It is not the upward movement that is at at stake, but the transition of the portrait into the archetype, the original.

[822] In 19[I,2],7,29 Plotinus reference to likeness (ὁμοίωσις) of two good men means the likeness two pictures of the same subject bear to each other, the likeness of a man to the Gods is likeness to a model. In this treatise Plotinus does not go so far as to make the portrait vanish into the model. See also 18[V,7],1,21, where Plotinus speaks of the portraits of Socrates in relation to their original, where the word ἀρχέτυπος emerges just as in our passage.

[823] Line 45: τέλος - In 9[VI, 9],8,43,44 the end of the journey is connected with rest in the same way in Plato's *Rep*. 532 E 3: οἱ ἀφικομένῳ, ὥσπερ ὁδοῦ ἀνάπαυλα ἂν εἴη καὶ τέλος τῆς πορείας. Plotinus leaves rest aside here, for he directly proceeds to speak about falling away from the SE (ἐκπίπτων). Elsewhere in 9[VI,9] the rest we find at the end of the journey is a recurring theme: 9[VI, 9], 3, 9; 4, 19; 8, 22; 9, 13.

[824] This wisdom is the essence of being itself, as Plotinus declares (31[V,8],5,15 ff.). Σοφία always has to do with intellect. Even in its lowest form (cf.19[I,2],6,12 ff.), *i.e.* the wisdom of the soul, it is the turning of the soul to paradigms in the mind (19[I,2],7,7). Wisdom often has to do with virtue (cf. also 46[I,4],15,5), although wisdom itself can not properly be called virtue. Virtues belong to soul (19[I,2],6,15). Superior wisdom provides soul with the standards and the general vision of how to act (φρόνησις) in conformity with which soul has to act and the general vision of how and if to act (φρόνησις) at all (20[I,3],6,10 ff.). In its higher form it is the wisdom of the mind/being (commonly connected with *episteme*), a form of wisdom, that has its knowledge ready at hand and directly available. Reasoning, dialectics *etc.* are not a part of this form of wisdom (31[V,8],4,35 ἡ δὲ ζωὴ σοφία, σοφία οὐ πορισθεῖσα λογισμοῖς), they operate on a lower level. True wisdom is true being, they coincide (31[V,8],5,15 ff.). In Greek σοφία often

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entails something connected with skill. No wonder that it is employed to picture the creative power of being (and as such it can be compared to the skills of the technician, cf. 31[V,8],ch.6). Not only mind/being has its wisdom, but also man has his (corresponding) superior wisdom (5[V,9],11,22 ff.). Small wonder that in the final chapter of 9[VI,9] σοφία comes forward. It is a person's top knowledge, which enables him to go to the SE. It may be regarded as the last stage before the SE, and hence not unlike the stages we distinguished previously (see above 222). Plotinus mentions it in one breath with mind, but makes it come after mind as a point of culmination. Arnou's remarks (*Désir*, 84, n.6 and 237, n.2) about σοφία are incomplete inasfar he refers only to the σοφία of being.

[825] Line 49: Καὶ οὗτος . . . βίος - see *Phaedrus* 248 A 1 (καὶ οὗτος μὲν θεῶν βίος) where the blessed life is pictured of the souls of the Gods who enjoyed the food consisting in the vision of the Ideas. In every Platonist this wonderful picture comes to mind, although in Plotinus the quotation is elaborated and also applied to the divine and happy men (philosophers) who came later on in the *Phaedrus* (248 C, 249 C). To quote the *Phaedrus* or to refer to its athmosphere (which was habitual throughout 9[VI, 9]) is extremely appropriate because without much ado this enables Plotinus to evoke an atmosphere of joy, blessing and happiness that goes far beyond his own sober words.

[826] Line 51: φυγή - see *Theaetetus* 176 A 1-2, and 1[I,6],8,16, see also below 320.

[827] In 51[I,8],6,9 he says expressly that "'flight' is not going away from earth but being on earth 'just and holy with the help of wisdom'". What he means is that we must flee from wickedness ".... (*Φυγὴ* γὰρ, φησιν, *οὐ τὸ ἐκ γῆς ἀπελθεῖν*, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὄντα ἐπὶ γῆς δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον εἶναι μετὰ φρονήσεως, ὡς εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον φεύγειν κακίαν δεῖν ...). The same moral interpretation in 52[II,3],9,20. In 15[III,4],2,12 we come across the literal notion of flight to the God as we have it in 9[VI,9],11. Considering these places one is inclined to observe a chronological distance between the literal (9[VI,9] and 15[III,4]) and the moral interpretation of the flight (51[I,8] and 52[II,3]). Whether this observation has any value is doubtful.

[828] Line 51: μόνου πρὸς μόνον - see for the 'monology' above 157.

PART THREE

THE MYSTICAL UNION

CHAPTER ONE

PROBLEMS

9[VI,9] provides a large, substantial and a chronologically quite early (only 1[I,6] and 6[IV,8] precede) contribution to the description of Plotinus' great spiritual adventure: the union with the One/SE. Being united with his Supreme Entity must have been a great happening in his life, which he savoured four times during the period of Porphyrius' stay with him. It must have happened *more* than four times, for as early as in the treatise 6[IV,8],1, written before Porphyrius' arrival and stay with Plotinus, Plotinus himself says that he had had the experience frequently (πολλάκις)[829]. Porphyrius complains that he himself had experienced this extraordinary event only once in his lifetime. If Porphyrius does not misrepresent his situation and he really once had went through such a union with the One, he obviously knows what he is telling about in connection with this miraculous experience. In any case he did not underestimate this mystical union, nor did he depreciate it or neglect it. On the contrary, he envied Plotinus. Whatever we may think ourselves about such an experience and the psychological truth behind it (it could be a regression to a prenatal stage of undeveloped consciousness[830]), we should be guilty of a grave methodical mistake to neglect or depreciate such an event because for Plotinus himself - certainly in 9[VI,9] - it is the crown of all his laborious efforts as a writer and philosopher. Moreover, it is the warrant of his entire philosophical activity, that not only was meant to produce a complete philosophy about this world and the transcendent domain above it, but was also intended as a road to realize the highest form of happiness and life, in harmony with the spirit of his days. His philosophy proves to work, and it proves its veracity, if, indeed, one can follow the path to the ultimate Entity and attain to it. The entire way before this union is *philosophically* elaborated, the experience has nothing to do - as Dodds righly puts it[831] - with breathing exercises, navel-brooding, or hypnotic repetition of syllables nor, may I add, with voices, visionary visions and gymnastics or ascetism. Stress has been laid on the fact that for Plotinus it is a *natural* event, not a *supernatural* grace as in Christian mysticism[832].

Plotinus has written several times more or less elaborately about his experience with the Supreme Entity or depicted the union in a more general way (1[I,6],9; 6[IV,8],1; 9[VI,9],4 and ch.7-11; 32[V,5],7,30 ff. and ch.8 ff; 38[VI,7,] 34-37; 49[V,3],17,15 ff.). The question keeps coming up what precisely the mystical element in this union with the Supreme Entity may assumed to be and, more generally, what, if anything, 'mysticism' is supposed to entail.

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[829] Porphyrius, *Vita Plotini*, 23,13. But see note 836.

[830] Zaehner, *Mysticism*, 40.

[831] Dodds, *Tradition*, 7.

[832] Dodds, *Tradition*, 7 and Rist, *Road*, 225, Zintzen, *Mystik*, 85, Armstrong, *Salvation*, 127 ff., see also Bussanich, *The One*, 144.

The word stems from the Greek verb μύειν which as such does occur in Plotinus beit only once, 9[VI,9],11,2, meaning 'initiate into mysteries' (see *LP s.v.*). The cognate word μυστικῶς, too, emerges only once, 26[III,6],19,26, and also has to do with initiation into mysteries. We have already spent some words about the basic difference between mystery and mysticism, so there is no need to repeat this here[833]. What modern preconception or definition one starts from, that will determine one's approach to Plotinus' mysticism or - just like a pair of glasses, that are not the right ones - will corrupt or distort one's perspective. Hadot[834] adopted a definition of mysticism (union with *a* God, not only *the* God) that enabled him to proclaim that even the union of the soul with mind is a form of mysticism. For convenience' s sake I shall call this *noetic* mysticism. Hadot makes a good point when he distinguishes this form of noetic mysticism. According to Hadot if one fails to appreciate this form of mysticism one will make a grave mistake, that many interpreters are guilty of[835]. Although Hadot's observations are by no means pointless, and, indeed, this lower union has many features of Plotinian mysticism[836] and is clothed in similar terms, his claim does not seem very productive in regard to the union with the One, as the union of soul and mind is only preliminary to it and displays features of its own. It is only a pre-stage, beit the final one before the great union. Moreover, Hadot deprives us of the happening of 6[IV,8],1, by proclaiming that is the union of the soul and the intellect (so noetic mysticism) that is depicted by Plotinus, instead of his union with the SE[837].

Rist[838] sides with Zaehner's approach[839] to mysticism by partly adopting his fourfould classification of mystical systems. Basing his arguments on Indian, Muslim and Christian mysticism, Zaehner claims to have developed a rather objective approach by recognizing four basic mystical positions which are assumed to embrace the field of mystical experience in general. Rist borrowed two positions[840] from Zaehner's system as coordinates for determining the Plotinian mystical experience. Zaehner himself did not try to let his system embrace Neoplatonian mysticism. Fortunately, he did not wish or in any case did not undertake this task, because his one and only remark on Neoplatonian mysticism is completely off the mark[841].

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[833] See abovenote 779.

[834] Hadot, *Les niveaux*, 243.

[835] Hadot, *Les niveaux*, 245.

[836] Hadot, *Les niveaux*, 244, 245. On p. 257 Hadot points to soul's being drunken and full of nectar of the soul when it becomes one with intelligible God, something that is also said of the union with the One, see below 317. 31[V,8] chapters 10 and 11 describe a union with the divine Intellect, which indeed resembles a mystical union, cf. 30[III,8],11,30 ff.

[837] There are several reasons against Hadot's position concerning 6[IV,8],1. It seems unlikely that Plotinus would have described the union of his soul with the divine Intellect as having taken place *often* (πολλάκις). It is far more plausible that by 'often' he indicated the highest form of mystical union, be it that it is not yet the One he believed to be joint with (see above 34). It is perhaps decisive that in the *Life of Plotinus* Porphyrius uses the same formula to denote the union with the highest. Compare Plotinus: ὑπὲρ πᾶν τὸ ἄλλο νοητὸν ἐμαυτὸν ἱδρύσας with Porphyrius, *Vita*, 23, ἐκεῖνος ὁ θεὸς, ὁ μήτε μορφὴν μήτε τινα ἰδέαν ἔχων, *ὑπὲρ δὲ νοῦν καὶ πᾶν τὸ νοητὸν ἱδρυμένος*.

[838] Rist, *Road*, 214.

[839] Zaehner, *Mysticism, sacred and profane*, Oxford1957.

Rist regards Plotinian mysticism as a form of monist or theistic mysticism. *Monistic* mysticism implies the identification of the isolated soul with the power behind the universe; in *theistic* mysticism the isolated soul attains to union and is 'oned' with a transcendent God, though - as Rist put it - a fortiori (does he mean 'a priori' ?) it is not itself identical with that God[842]. The phrase opening with 'though' is a clause that Rist concocted himself condensing as it were the contents of his reading of Zaehner's book. I was not able to find any such clause in Zaehner's work. From a methodical point of view by using Zaehner's classification for describing Plotinian mysticism one runs the risk of being anachronistic, because Zaehner devised his system for extra- and post Greek mystical experience, and thus exposes oneself to the dangers of misinterpretation by using an invalid framework. Anticipating my discussion of Rist's operations with this twofold monistic-theistic framework of mysticism, I can only conclude that such a theistic view, with the stipulation that the soul is unable to become identical with the Godhead, distorts his interpretation by using a kind of rule which Plotinus never adhered to. I, myself, adhere to a phenomenological approach, trying to let the facts speak for themselves, however old fashioned and impossible this method may seem. In any case I attempt to not interrupt Plotinus in advance by forcing on him rules or positions, of which he had not the slightest notion.

One of the maior problems will turn out to be the question as to how far this union with the Supreme Entity goes, that is, whether this union is an absolute submerging and unification to the extent of vanishing of the soul into the Supreme Entity including obliteration of the soul of the mystic. Given his rule Rist's answer is predictable. There is no question of obliteration. Dodds[843], too, denies any obliteration of the mystic's soul: "In Plotinus the self is not obliterated but regained, he sees the experience as an 'awakening to myself' (cf. 6[IV,8],1,1)"[844]. Atkinson[845] asserts that "we have no right to interpret statements of unity as statements of identity". Krämer does not participate in the discussion, without much ado he accepts that the Supreme Entity and the soul of the mystic become identical[846]. Recently, Beierwaltes affirms that the union does not amount to "Vernichtung (annihilatio)" of the self as it occurs in later Mysticism[847]". Still more recently Bussanich vigorously advocates a complete submerging of the soul into the One[848]. In his commentary on 38[VI,7], however, Hadot declares: "mais le moi n'est pas annihilé, car il se souvient après l' experience de ce qu'il a éprouvé"[849]. Sorabji, proceeding with caution, assumes that "union involves something less than identity", because the subject experiences a feeling of well-being: *eupatheia*[850].

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[840] Zaehner firstly distinguishes a panenhenic position: the individual soul is merged into nature, secondly a position which aims at the complete isolation of the soul from nature by ascetism. These forms have nothing to do with Plotinus.

[841] Zaehner, *Mysticism*,167 holds that the mind in Neoplatonism is the "second aspect of the Deity", not differentiating between the Neoplatonists and Philo, who are irresponsably heaped together.

[842] Rist, *Road*, 214.

[843] Dodds, *Tradition*, 7.

[844] For the problem of regaining the self see 309.

[845] Atkinson, *Ennead V. 1*, 105.

Before tackling the problem concerning the depth or range of the unification, I may point to an interesting fact. We should rather speak of unification or union with the Good or the God, the Father, or better still with the Supreme Entity, instead of union with the *One*. The striking fact should not go unnoticed, that Plotinus speaks about union with the *One* on only very limited scale. In 38[VI,7], 34-37 it is the Good the soul is unified with, in 6[IV,8],1 the Divine. Even in 9[VI,9] from ch.7 onwards the One is no longer mentioned, it is only the God or It (ἐκεῖνο) or Him (ἐκεῖνος) that comes to the audience to be met by the initiant. Before developing the last program in ch.7 ad finem of 9[VI,9] for the final approach of the One, the Supreme Entity is called the Good (τἀγαθόν). I may refer to my discussion of this problem above[851], saying here only that mostly (but not always) a specific aspect of the Supreme Entity in the context determines what name is used for it. The notion of oneness does not seem the most dominant where the meeting with the Supreme Entity is concerned. It is only in 49[V,3],17 that we hear of union with the One, but in the moment suprême the SE is called αὐτός (ch.17, line 30).

In connection with the foregoing one must observe that there does not seem to be such a substantial and essential change in Plotinus' attitude towards the union with the SE during his activities as a writer, as we had to conclude in case of the SE itself. For unification with God, *i.e.* the Good played a most important part ever since 1[I,6],7,13 (βουλόμενος αὐτῷ συγκερασθῆναι), although it is only the expectation of a union that is expressed here. Also later it is especially the SE as the Good that is sought to be unified with, not the SE as the One. Thus an attempt to coordinate all places about the union with the SE and bringing them into an overall scheme does not seem inappropriate or inconsistent with our previous attitude towards the development of the SE as the One in Plotinus[852]. This activity of creating an overall scheme, however, will be accompanied by observing the different features, accents and nuances to be found in the contributing passages. For in this field, too, Plotinus does not confine himself to a strict collection of features, but, as usual, in handling his doctrines, he allows himself some flexibility and differences in focus, to put it mildly.

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[846] Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 362.

[847] Beierwaltes, *Denken des Einen*, 143.

[848] Bussanich, *The One*, 147, 148, 185,192, where Bussanich points to Beierwaltes and Mamo as defenders of "some version of the identity-thesis".

[849] Hadot, *Traité 38*, 339; see about the remembrance of what happened during the union, ch.11, above 276.

[850] Sorabji, *Time*, 160. On the issue of *eupatheia* see below 317.

[851] See above 58 ff..

We shall now first examine the activity of the soul and the mind before it is united with the One (the premystical stage). After that it is the union with the Supreme Entity, that deserves our attention.

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[852] See above 52.

CHAPTER TWO

THE PREMYSTICAL STAGE (SOUL'S PRELIMINARY ACTIVITIES)

One has to bear in mind that, of course, the downward movement of the soul and its descent into the body during its alienation from its Origin as is portrayed in several places in the *Enneads*[853] has to come to an end. It is the exercise of the civic virtues that opens the ascent backwards to the SE. This amounts to a first purification of the soul. Additionally, it has to cast away its functioning in the field of discursive reasoning, which for the sake of convenience may be called 'dediscursivation'. Discursive reasoning in fact focuses on the sensible world, in order to catalogue the phenomena according to the patterns of reason, the Ideas as they descend from mind[854]. It is quite the reverse that is required for the ascent. In 1[I,6],9,1-7 the soul follows the hierarchically organized stages of beauty (more or less in accordance with the stages in the *Symposion*) in attaining the beauty of the Ideas (*ib*., 35) and the ultimate end of beauty, the Good, to which beauty is the porch, so that we can speak of the Good as the First Beauty. Or - as Plotinus himself says[855] - the Good is only the cause of beauty, when you separate the intelligible world with its beauty from the Good[856]. Thus the ascent to beauty is assumed to lead to the highest point to be encountered in early Plotinian philosophy. The description of this ascent already entails many features of the ascent to the One or rather the Good as portrayed in later *Enneads* and may be regarded, in spite of the fact that it concerns beauty and does not speak about union as such (only vision), as a proto-mystical-union text, because ultimately it is the Good that is attained.

A very important manoeuvre is soul's becoming mind. As early as in 1[I,6],9,35 this phenomenon is to be found. There soul becomes mind in order that it may contemplate beauty at the level of the intelligible. This emerges in all later descriptions of the mystical union. Now the soul's becoming mind entails its unification as such and thus makes way for a basic change in the manner of thinking; all the other descriptions of the union with the Supreme Entity perform the ascent via the way of thinking, not via the recognition *of beauty* in hierarchical structured entities. This difference is deeply rooted in the philosophy of Plato. There are no dialectics that lead to Beauty. The Idea of Beauty can only be known by immediately recognizing from one's memory of the original contact one had with the Idea of Beauty (*Phaedrus* 250 B ff.). On the other hand, dialectics (as *e.g*. developed in the *Republic*) pave the way back to the other Ideas. So it is understandable that in 1[I,6],9 Plotinus leaves out any form of dialectics, although this does not free him from the need to make the soul equal to what is superior to it, mind. Elsewhere[857] it is discursivity that is dropped, and instead the mastery of the intelligible by means of Ideas leads the way, but even this is replaced by simultaneous thinking. However, the soul - in its highest function identical to mind - must abandon any form of plurality, it must empty itself of every form (ἀνείδεον, ἄμορφον), including its own intelligible form. At this stage soul even despises thinking[858]. A maximum of possible unity has been attained and the soul-mind is open to the beauty of the Ideas (of the virtues, the whole expedition started off with) as a token of the arrival of what might emerge: the Supreme Entity. What then takes place, is what all efforts were made for: the union with the Supreme Entity. We might summarize the premystical stage in 8 steps:

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[853] 6[IV,8],1,1-9;10[V,1),1 *etc.*

[854] See above 167.

[855] 1[I,6],9,37 ff.

[856] However, he does not insist on the need of seeing things in this way, for he adds that one might put the Good and primal Beauty on the same level, his words suggest that he himself did not yet meet his later standards to vigorously separate the One of the noetic world, see above note 96.

1) the turning away from the sensible world (19[I,2],chs 2 and 3)

2) the exertion of virtues (19[I,2],chs 2 and 3; 9[VI,9],11,46) after which no good nor bad is left, which means that every moral level is transcended, in order to be alone, 38[VI,7],34,6-8.

3) the ascent by a) hierarchically mounting grades of beauty (1[I,6],9,1-7 only)
    b) 'dediscursivation' (elsewhere, *e.g.* 49[V,3],17,22 ff.).

4) mastering the intelligible by concentrating on the Ideas, simultaneous thinking (the characteristic of mind), *epistrophè* (turning into the self), transcending knowledge (ὑπὲρ ἐπιστήμην ... δεῖ δραμεῖν, 9[VI,9],4,7), and even despising knowledge (38[VI,7],35,1, see also 1[I,6,]7,19).

5) the soul becoming mind (38[VI,7],35,4, and 37, see also 31[V,8], chs.10 and 11 about the union with mind), giving up things by means of thinking away τὰ πάντα in their accidental modes and even their form (9[VI,9],7,19,20).

6) thinking away the form of soul and even the form of mind (38[VI,7],34,4), even oneself (9[VI,9],7,20).

7) the encounter with beauty (of the virtues) as the porch of the Supreme Entity (not only in 1[I,6,], 9, 37 ff. but also in 9[VI,9],11,16 ff.) .

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[857] 49[V,3],17,22.

[858] Despite Armstrong's contention of the contrary: "This way of thinking does not imply either in Plotinus or in Philo any despising of the intellect" (Armstrong, *Architecture*, 73).

8) waiting for the advent of the Supreme Entity (32[V,5]7,32 ff.; 38[VI,7]34,12-14; *ib.*, 36,18,19; 49[V,3],17,29).

It must be noticed that Plotinus can speak about unification of the soul, the mind and the self with the Supreme Entity. We now have the opportunity to turn first to an outline of aspects involved in the mystical union and next we shall examine them in detail.

CHAPTER THREE

THE MYSTICAL STAGE

summary

The mystical stage contains several phases, which we present in the form of a summary:

1) Sudden advent of the Supreme Entity (32[V,5],7,33-35)

2) What happens during the stay with the One

a) The vision of the Supreme Entity, συνουσία, ὁμιλεῖν with the SE

b) 1) The unification with Him, losing the self (9[VI,9],10, 15,16; 38[VI,7],34,20;38[VI,7],34,30-32); belonging to him (9[VI,9],10,15-16), being entirely identical with the SE (*ibidem*; 38[VI,7],34,12 ff.; 32[V,5],8,21).

2) The 'as far as possible-formula' (for places see discussion)

3) Multiple union (idem)

c) Becoming light 9[VI,9], 9, 57; cf.32[V,5] 7,30), becoming even God (9[VI,9],9,58; 38[VI,7],35,18). Consequences of being light, creation of Gods

3) The inner life of the mystic's soul during the stay with the One

a) Having still some form of consciousness, discerning and knowing that it has attained its goal(38[VI,7], 34, 25 ff.)

b) Not having any emotion (9[VI,9],9,15 ἀπαθής) or fear (38[VI,7], 34, 35), but being as it were in love with the Supreme Entity, a condition that can be compared with being drunken (38[VI,7],35,24,25, see also 9[VI,9],9,24 ff.)

c) Being in the highest stage of well-being (εὐπαθεῖν 38[VI,7], 34,30 and 38)

4) The continuity of the stay with the Supreme Entity.
a) The continuous stay with the Supreme Entity (9[VI,9],10,2)

b) Being hampered by the body

c) The possibility of reviving virtue in order to repeat the ascent by following the same stages (9[VI,9],11,46 ff.)

5) After the union

a) Having an image (εἰκών 9[VI,9],11,8) of the Supreme Entity

b) Returning to the sensible world, reporting to others on the ὁμιλεῖν with the SE (cf. Minosscene), how difficult this task can be because of other people's ignorance

6) Activity on the part of the Supreme Entity, 38[VI,7],35,19; 38[VI,7],35,36- 40)

a) Is the union an automatic event?

b) The rapture of the mystic's self (9[VI,9],11,12-14), the SE's reaching out towards the soul/mindcombination, connecting itself with the soul/mind combination, running over it and making it one, giving it a feeling of happiness and a vision, elevating it to the extent that it is nowhere (38[VI,7],36 ff., filling it with itself (38[VI,7],35,20; 9[VI,9],11,13), and arousing of eros (38[VI,7],22,18,19)

I shall now examen the several phases in detail, following the order of the summary just given.

1) Sudden advent of the One

The advent of the Supreme Entity is *sudden*[859], for ultimately the ascent need not result automatically in the emerging of the Supreme Entity. The soul has to wait for the impressive event, even if it is fully prepared for it, having gone through all the stages. We shall see later on (see under ad 6) the consequences of this suddenness for the interpretation of the union.

2) What happens during the stay with the One

a) Seeing, touching

a) *Seeing* (θέα, θεᾶσθαι) or contemplation of the Supreme Entity belongs to the standard-terminology 9[VI,9] passim, 38[VI,7],34,12,13 *ἰδοῦσα* ἐν *αὐτῇ* ἐξαίφνης φανέντα, 38[VI,7],35,7 ἐπὴν δ' ἐκεῖνον *ἴδῃ*. However, in 38[VI,7] 35,18,19 the term seeing is 'corrected': καὶ οὗτος οὐκ κατ' *ὄψιν* φανείς ἀλλά τὴν ψύχην ἐμπλήσας τοῦ *θεωμένου*. In 9[VI,9],11,22 Plotinus suggests that we are dealing with a different way of seeing: ἄλλος τρόπος τοῦ ἰδεῖν (see also 9[VI,9],10,9 ff.) Next he speaks of ἔκστασις, ἅπλωσις *etc*.[860]). Upon closer inspection these terms are expressions of activities, that are part of the preparation *before* the union, as we have seen in our treatment of them in ch.11; to pick out the most instructive terms: it is ἔφεσις *πρὸς* ἀφὴν, *περινόησις* *πρὸς* ἐφαρμογήν.

Plotinus uses other terms to denote the particular kind of having contact with the Supreme Entity: θίξις (θιγχάνειν), ἐπαφή (ἐφάψασθαι) and προσάπτειν. In normal life touching as such is a more intimate activity of perception, especially in the field of (Plotinian) erotics[861], than seeing, for the latter always entails a minimal distance between subject and object. So it is fully understandable that Plotinus falls back on terms of touching when he wishes to describe the contact with the Supreme Entity. They have the advantage just mentioned in comparison with terms of seeing[862]. In the works of Arnou and Rist there is a tendency to neglect the difference between the nuances of these terms. Perhaps we should go into this terminology into some detail.

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[859] It is interesting to notice that in 9[VI,9] the sudden appearance of the SE is not given any attention to; we do not even know whether Plotinus had this feature in mind when he was writing 9[VI,9]. It is only in the later treatises that this aspect is repeatedly stressed: 32[V,5]7,32 ff.; 38[VI,7]34,12-14; *ib*., 36,18-19; 49[V,3],17,29. One may refer to Plato's *Symposion* (210 E ff), *Ep*.VII (341 C D) and perhaps the *Parmenides* (156 D E) as the background for the notion of the SE's sudden appearance. Bussanich (see his useful commentary, *The One*, 136 ff.) has the idea that Numenius fr. 2 may have had some influence (see above 160). In any case, in Plato it is the enlightment of the mind and its sudden insight into the Ideas in the soul. In Plotinus it is the appearance of the Supergod, the SE, so the notion of waiting for the appearance of the God is of an entirely different nature in Plotinus (see further in this chapter the paragraph entiteld "Activity on the part of the supreme Entity", see below 321).

[860] See above 280 ff.

[861] See 9[VI,9],9,56: there is no part with we do not touch the God (ᾧ μὴ ἐφαπτόμεθα θεοῦ).

The terms at issue are not only used vertically to signify the contact with the Supreme Entity, but also horizontally in that they denote the special type of thinking at the top level of the noetical realm. So we encounter both terms θίξις and ἐπαφή in 49[V,3],10,42 as signifying the characteristic activity of the mind at the stage when it just came from the Supreme Entity: now we do not find them in regard to the *union* with the Supreme Entity. Next to the unifying form of seeing we have met in Plotinus the prenoetic type of knowledge (see above 154). These types are not to be confused. In 19[I,2],6,13 ἐπαφή also has a horizontal sense (there is no trace of an encounter with the Supreme Entity): noetical knowledge that is directly available. On the other hand, there is also the vertical kind of touching found in the framework of the union with the Supreme Entity, denoted by the same terms. In 38[VI,7],36,4 ἐπαφή signifies the contact with the Good. In 49[V,3],17,25,26 we find νοερῶς ἐφάψασθαι: vertical touching as fits the mind, which is very interesting as expressing the union with the Supreme Entity ("As long as you touch the Supreme Entity (ὅτε ἐφάπτεται), you have no time to speak[863]"). A similar use of ἐφάψασθαι is found in 9[VI,9,]4,27: it denotes the process of making contact with the One (as θιγχάνειν in 9[VI,9],4,27 and 9[VI,9],7,4, whereas also we find ἐφάψασθαι referring to the contact with the SE in the field of erotics in 9[VI,9],9,55). Moreover there is a productive type of seeing, which causes the Ideas to come into existence. The mind turns towards the Supreme Entity, contemplates it without aiming to be united with the Supreme Entity, and thus gives birth to the Ideas[864].

It should not escape notice that in 9[VI,9],9,19 we have ἐπαφή as a *productive* form of touching the Supreme Entity. By touching the SE the mystic produces Gods (virtues). From the fact that in 49[V,3],10,42 before ἐπαφή and not before θίξις we encounter the mitigating οἷον (θίξις καὶ *οἷον* ἐπαφή), we may gather that for Plotinus ἐπαφή is less abstract than θίξις. Apparently he considered it rather daring to employ the word ἐπαφή, thus it is likely to be more concrete than θίξις. In connection with the identification of subject and object, θιγχάνειν already figures in Aristotle, as Arnou observed: νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται (the mind of the prime unmoved mover): θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν[865]. As to ἐφάψασθαι Arnou refers to Plato, *Rep.*, 490 B[866], where Plato uses the word for the immediate grasp of the real nature of a thing.

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[862] This is Rist's position Rist, *Road*, 222. Bussanich, *The One*, 183 disagrees with Rist and denies that contact-language implies a higher degree of unity than vision. I do not see why he should be right, however. We have the unquestionable fact that in ultimo Plotinus uses contact-language.

[863] ἐφάπτεσθαι expresses both making contact and being in contact.

[864] We have to distinguish between two corresponding forms of *epistrophè*, see below note 878.

Finally, we may notice that προσάπτειν is once used to denote contact with the Good (38[VI,7],40,2). This term, however, seems somewhat more general than ἐφάψασθαι (see *LP* 'to have dealings with'). Also συναφή and συνάπτειν have to do with unification, see below ad 2 b).

In spite of the deficiences of the term 'seeing' Plotinus uses it again and again, even after having voiced his disapproval and having corrected it. Plotinus dislikes the abolition of terms, he prefers to recolour them. In 9[VI,9],11,34 he affirms that after a good preparation one should expect the remainder from the seeing: τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐκ τῆς *θέας* ἀπαιτεῖ. In 9[VI,9],11,46 *e.g.* we encounter the term 'seeing' again: ἐκπίπτων δὲ τῆς *θέας*, similarly in 38[VI,7],35,11,30 and especially *ib.*, 36,11, and 18,19. In Plato the contemplation and seeing of the Ideas is common stock, but they have nothing to do with becoming united with the One or the Good, which as such does not occur in Plato. Thus all the relevant passages in Plato had to be transformed in order to fit in with the Neoplatonian mode of thinking and by doing so the Neoplatonists felt they were being comfortably orthodox. This is one way to explain the recurrence of the term 'seeing' even after it has been disapproved. The other explanation can be gathered from what Plotinus himself says in 9[VI,9],11,22-23: it is a *different* way of seeing: *ἄλλος* τρόπος τοῦ ἰδεῖν. So if one realises its shortcomings, there is no longer a need to discard the term. In 9[VI,9],10,20,21 we are told that this higher form of seeing, as a form of actually being united and one with the Supreme Entity, makes it impossible to see the Supreme Entity as ἕτερον: it is one in regard to yourself[867].

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[865] Arnou's reference to *NE* 1072 b 20 should be corrected into *Met.*1072 b 20, Arnou, *Désir*, 237, n.5.

[866] .... οὐδ' ἀπολήγοι (*sc.* the lover of science) τοῦ ἔρωτος, πρὶν αὐτοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἑκάστου τῆς φύσεως ἅψασθαι ᾧ προσήκει ψυχῆς *ἐφάπτεσθαι* τοῦ τοιούτου.

[867] Bussanich, *The One*, 186 has a very intriguing but speculative theory that the state of unification involves a kind of vision. For apart from the expression ἀρχῇ ἀρχὴν ὁρᾷ 9[VI,9],11,31,32 (see above 284) there is a special form of seeing of the One: the One is described as identical with its self-vision 39[VI,8],16,18-21. The vision of the soul could be assumed to have merged with the self-vision of the One. I have three objections to this theory. It is dangerous to appeal to such a late and *exceptional* treatise to conclude that the rejected way of seeing in 9[VI,9] does not exclude vision in the state of unification. Indeed, 39[VI,8] is exceptional in that it deviates considerably from what Plotinus himself had said in 38[VI,7],41,32, that the Good does not look towards itself, for there is nothing to gain for it by looking towards itself (οὐδὲ βλέπει δὴ ἑαυτό), a strange collision with his utterance in 39[VI,8],16,18-21. This discrepancy is only explicable, if one takes into account the special aim Plotinus pursued in the treatise on the will of the SE, namely to lay down a foundation for a free will of the SE by ascribing to it a kind of 'mental interior' (see about 'awakeness' and ὑπερνόησις of the SE note 156). Secondly, even if there is some vision involved we know nothing about soul's vision merging with the self-vision of the One. For in 9[VI,9] soul's vision of the One is rejected, and there is no question of self-vision of the One either. Thirdly, even in 39[VI,8],16,18-21 we hear nothing of vision of the soul or of the soul in general. When Plotinus was speaking about the self-vision of the One, the notion of unification was far from his mind.

Other terms to denote the meeting with the Supreme Entity are συνεῖναι, συνουσία, ὁμιλεῖν. These terms are quite vague and thus philosophically speaking rather innocent, for they do not have as many implications as some others have, although συνεῖναι, and συνουσία have sexual overtones and a broad range of application, not only vertically but also horizontally[868]. However, their occurrence should not escape attention, for they are in use as common terms. Surprisingly, a term expressing 'union' does not emerge in Plotinus at all: the meeting with the One could have been baptised 'henosis' (ἕνωσις), but actually the use of this term is confined to the union of the soul and the mind (28[IV,4],2,26). Beierwaltes baptized the mystical union 'henosis', although he is fully aware of the limitations of the word ἕνωσις as such[869]. As a term to signify the ultimate unification with the One I would welcome its introduction, but one should bear in mind that for the meeting with the One Plotinus himself had other terms in his mind, which all have less to do with unification[870], but rather with social intercourse, companionship, or touching. Sofar terminology.

When we wish to realize what the *meeting itself* really meant for Plotinus, we must examine what unification implies and how it is described.

b) Unification: what does it entail for Plotinus?

As a preliminary I may point out the fact that in 1[I,6],9,37 ff. the notion of unification concerns the union with Beauty and at best the union with the Good/Beauty. In 6[IV,8],1,5,6 there is (only?) question of identity with the divine (τῷ θείῳ εἰς ταὐτὸν γεγενημένος). We just heard that there is in fact no other (ἕτερον) to be seen; in 9[VI,9] we come accross a perfect identity with the Supreme Entity and the soul of the mystic. In 9[VI,9],10,11 ff. Plotinus rejected terms related to seeing, for they do not justice to the fact that the two, *viz.* the subject of seeing and the object, are one. Plotinus himself is thrilled by the boldness of his utterance: τολμηρὸς μὲν ὁ λόγος (9[VI,9],10,13-14). The seer does not see or discern and he is not imagining two entities (a sentence tortured by Rist, see for the whole passage the analysis of ch. 10[871]). He is - as it were - another, and no longer himself, nor is he the property of his self, but he belongs to another (the Supreme Entity). Next Plotinus refers to the perfect coincidence of the centres of circles, in which the key word is συνάπτειν meaning, 'to unite' (also used of the uniting of the soul with itself, 41[IV,6],3,17)[872]. Συναφή is also relevant, because it indicates the unification with the Supreme Entity (9[VI,9],8,27-28, where συνάπτειν has the same meaning). In 38[VI,7], ch. 34 and ch. 35 Plotinus again and again stresses the completeness of the union of the mystic and the Supreme Entity, unreservedly, there is not the slightest evidence that he wishes to recant the drastic terminology of 9[VI,9] or to diminish the vigour of the thought about unification. He asserts again that there is nothing between the soul of the mystic and the Supreme Entity (38[VI,7],34,13-14): μεταξὺ γὰρ οὐδέν (not quoted by Rist in his enumeration of 'union-passages', *Road,* 226) οὐδ' ἔτι δύο, ἀλλ' ἓν ἄμφω (quoted by Rist). οὐ γὰρ ἂν διακρίναις ἔτι, ἕως πάρεστι. What one could have predicted turns out to be the case: Rist fails to quote the last sentence. One would venture to say that he left it out because it does not fit in with his 'Zaehnerism'. By (mis)interpreting the phrase οὐδὲ φαντάζεται δύο (9[VI,9,]10 15, see analysis of ch.10, p.272) and the phrase ἀλλ' ἓν ἐκείνῳ ὢν καὶ οὐ δύο (32[V,5],8,21) by italicizing 'with' in translating it: "being one *with* that and not two", he believes to have succeeded in having neutralized these texts so hostile to his thesis[873]. However, one does not find 'with' in the Greek, nor does the phrase at issue signify a notion of separation and of the ultimate preservation of the partners in the identity. The word ἐκείνῳ is a simple dativus of similarity as we already encountered earlier (6[IV,8],1,5,6 there is identity with the divine (*τῷ θείῳ* εἰς ταὐτὸν γεγενημένος)). Armstrong has a similar argument as regards μεταξὺ γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἔτι δύο, ἀλλ' ἓν ἄμφω. οὐ γὰρ ἂν διακρίναις ἔτι, ἕως πάρεστι 38[VI,7],34,13-14). According to Armstrong, *Translation* VII, p.192,193 "ἓν ἄμφω is always used by Plotinus of a perfect union in which the two united retain their distinct natures". This is nonsense, however, for how could Plotinus continue his story by οὐ γὰρ διακρίναις ἔτι, ἕως πάρεστι. Especially the phrase "retain their distinct natures" is wrong, on the contrary it is losing one's self, one's nature, that is at stake in the union of the soul with the SE and it is even temporarily lost. Armstrong' s evidence 28[IV,4],2,29 ff. is believed to support his thesis about the distinct natures: "Its use (the use of ἄμφω) in 28[IV,4],2,29 ἕν ἐστιν ἄμφω καὶ δύο, of Soul and Intellect, brings out its meaning clearly". However, it is precisely the addition of καὶ δύο that mitigates the unity of Soul and Intellect. It proves nothing in regard to the meaning of ἄμφω. As I see it, the conclusion that the soul of the mystic and the Supreme Entity are identical cannot be avoided.

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[868] See above 140.

[869] Beierwaltes, *Denken des Einen*, 123, see his note 1. In favour of his proposition to name the union 'henosis' 9[VI,9],11,6 ἡνωμένον, he could have adduced Numenius, fr.42, where Iamblichus says of Numenius that the latter seemed to have a doctrine of henosis of the soul with its Principle, see below 328.

[870] In 9[VI,9],9,33 the verb ἑνωθῆναι (θεοῦ) is used of the soul's desire to be united with the God (SE). So there is ground for Beierwaltes' henosis, but to make it analogous to ἅπλωσις and ὁμοίωσις as Beierwaltes proposes, will not do. "Απλωσις turned out to be an activity of the soul (see note 799), and ὁμοίωσις will appear to fall short for referring to the supreme union (see below 329).

[871] See above 272.

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[872] Arnou, *Désir*, 237 quotes a passage in 9[VI,9],4,7,8 where he believes to find συνημμένον, expressing contact as contemplation. The place has to be corrected: 9[VI,9],*8*,7,8, where there is no question of contact as contemplation. In 9[VI,9],*8*,7,8 we learn about what makes a God God, see above 232. Arnou is rather carelessly followed by Rist, *Road*, 222.

[873] Mamo, *Is Plotinian mysticism monistic?*, 207 critizes Rist in regard to his interpretation of this sentence, without, however, giving the right linguistic criticism as I hope to do in my text.

Beierwaltes[874] has an interesting contribution to make. He rejects the notion of obliteration of the self in the mystical union. He asks:.." ob bei diesem Vorgang (the union) nicht die Individualität oder das Selbst des Sehenden total ausgelöscht würde? Ob die Selbstaufgabe oder die nicht mehr denkende Transformation in die absolute Negativität des Einen (in das 'Nichts' des Einen) nicht der aus späteren Mystik bekannten "Vernichting" ('annihilatio') gleichkomme?" After having stated that this question is somewhat anachronistic he refers to 9[VI,9],11,35 ff., where Plotinus affirms that the soul does not attain radical nothingness, when seeing the Supreme Entity, but that it enters into itself and is in itself, as a proof of the fact that the soul does not enter into total nothingness. This consideration leads Beierwaltes to the conviction that Plotinus did not have "eine derartige "Vernichtung" des individuellen oder personalen Selbst" in mind. Indeed, Plotinus did not think of such an an*nihil*ation, such a destruction of the person. This approach to the problem can only claim validity within the framework of the Supreme Entity as Nothing(ness), 'das Nichts'. However, if the Supreme Entity's not-being equals supertranscendency, and indeed the Supreme Entity is never said to be not-being in the sense of being nothing (οὐδέν, μηδέν), then Beierwaltes' question and answer is anachronistic and identification or union with the Supreme Entity can not be annihilation, becoming 'das Nichts'[875].

This, however, does not settle the question of the temporary obliteration of the self of the mystic, in its total identification with the SE. Irrespective of any issue of annihilation the self of the mystic could be thought of as having vanished into the Supreme Entity, which is not to be regarded as destruction at all, but as the ultimate elevation of the self. The question what happens to the self remains. On the one hand Plotinus proclaims the (temporal) obliteration of the self, its becoming ἄλλος (9[VI,9],10,15),[876], and belonging to another *etc.*, on the other hand the union is presented as a completion of the self going into the self and finding there the Supreme Entity. According to Dodds[877] even the true self is regained: "awakening to myself" ἐγειρόμενος είς ἐμαυτόν (6[IV,8],1,1). This last expression ἐγειρόμενος είς ἐμαυτόν has to be carefully examined as to its real meaning. Plotinus continues by saying : "I entered myself" (γινόμενος ... ἐμαυτοῦ δὲ εἴσω), which means that by saying ἐγειρόμενος είς ἐμαυτόν Plotinus only meant turning away from the outside and the corporeal;

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[874] Beierwaltes, *Denken des Einen,* 143.

[875] It is interesting to note that Plotinus talks of the confusion and obliteration of the mind in the ascent: 38[VI,7],35,33-34: 'Η δὲ ψυχὴ οἷον συγχέασα καὶ *ἐφανίσασα* μένοντα τὸν ἐν αὑτῇ νοῦν, but he corrects himself by saying that it is the first part of the mind in the soul that contemplates.

[876] The preceding οἷον could be taken as expressing a restriction, especially if it is connected with ἄλλος (ἀλλ' οἷον ἄλλος γενόμενος κτλ) and not with the subsequent words as well. In any case it appears to mitigate the notion of being an other and perhaps also the idea of belonging to the SE, but see the decisive words οὐδ' ὅλως αὑτός (9[VI,9],11,11,12).

[877] Dodds, *Tradition*, 4,7.

later on he says that he established himself above all intelligible. So the 'awakening to my self' seems to be only a first step.

We find a series of 'epistrophical' utterances which all advise to go inwards into the soul, the mind or the self in order to start seeking and finding the SE[878]. There are other expressions in 9[VI,9],11 that tend to go along the same lines as Dodds' interpretation of ἐγειρόμενος εἰς ἐμαυτόν. The soul will come not to an other than to itself, and so it will not be in another thing, but in itself (9[VI,9],11,38-39 ἥξει οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο, ἀλλ' *εἰς αὐτήν* quoted by Dodds). For Plotinus says that soul's being in itself alone is identical to its being in the SE: τὸ δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ μόνῃ καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῳ ὄντι *ἐν ἐκείνῳ* (*ib.*, 40-41). Expressions of this type, however, mean that the soul has reached its upper limits and goes beyond the boundaries of being. As a matter of fact in 9[VI,9],11 Plotinus goes on to tell us about what will happen *after* that the soul had come to itself, culminating in the message that one goes on from one's self (καὶ εἰ ἀφ' αὑτοῦ μεταβαίνοι, 11, 44,45). And earlier, in ch.10, we are not told that the union with the SE consists in the mystic's regaining his true self, but rather losing the self: the self is transferred to the SE (κἀκείνου γενόμενος 9[VI,9],10,16). So ultimately the (true) self is not regained, but temporarily lost in the total union. One must not become guilty of mixing up the self of the mystic and 'souls coming to itself' as Dodds does. I do not think that the accounts of the self on the one hand and the obliteration of the self on the other hand are irreconcilable in the end. We should not attempt to harmonize these positions as Beierwaltes does by regarding the union as the highest form of self-consciousness (see under 3 : the inner life of the mystic's soul during the stay with the One).

In connection with these problems we must pay attention to the fact that the location of the union can change places. Both in 9[VI,9] and 38[VI,7],34 we come across the notion that the One comes towards the soul and enters the soul. In 9[VI,9],11,13 the mystic is filled by the God (ἐνθουσιάσας), a similar notion returns in 38[VI,7],35,19: ἀλλὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐμπλήσας τοῦ θεωμένου and very characteristically in 38[VI,7],34,12: ἰδοῦσα δὲ *ἐν αὐτῇ* ἐξαίφνης φανέντα κτλ. However, in an equally characteristical way it is said in 9[VI,9],11,41 that the soul is in the SE ἐν ἐκείνῳ (*sc.* the SE), with a change of location or at least a change in the way the location is referred to (Plotinus was aware of the problem (32[V,5],7,35).The same occurs in 9[VI,9], where we find many expressions to indicate the process of the mystic's becoming the SE and belonging to the SE, *e.g.* 9[VI,9],10,16: κἀκείνου γενόμενος. We can not play off one side of the question against the other[879]. If there were only texts expressing that the SE comes into the soul and not vice versa, complete unification would become less plausible, but since there is the other side of the coin too, there is nothing against it.

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[878] See *e.g.* 9[VI,9],2,35,36; 9[VI,9],7,17-18; 10[V,1],10,10; 32[V,5],7,32. See also Bussanich, *The One*, 136. It is correct to remind the reader of other forms of ἐπιστροφή, *viz.* he turning of the universal mind backwards to the One, a process that entails the creation the Ideas. This form does not play any role in the ἐπιστροφή of the particular soul, see for the universal ἐπιστροφή e.g. 11[V,2],1,10 and Bussanich, *The One*, 37-41. In Appendix III of ch.1 we have met a third form,*viz.* ἐπιστρέφεσθαι πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν of the uninformed body in order to be informed, see above 98.

As final evidence for a 'holistic' interpretation of the union I may quote here the superb metaphor Plotinus employs in the last part of the final chapter of 9[VI,9],11,44-45: "when the mystic passes from himself (losing his identity) as an picture passes into its archetype". I do not know of a more splendid manner to portray the union, the perfect covering of each other, the complete merging into eachother.

The totality of the unification has important consequences for what soul experiences in this encounter (as we shall see under 3). However now we have another barrier to overcome. Rist refers[880]to Arnou. As regards the issue of the completeness of the identity Arnou pointed out that Plotinus uses several restrictive clauses, especially in 9[VI,9] but also elsewhere in the *Enneads*.

1) The 'as far as possible'-formula (καθ' ὅσον δύναται)

Arnou[881] presented a series of texts all containing in one way or another the restrictive formula καθ' ὅσον δύναται, 'as far as is possible' or 'as far as it is able' as evidence for his view that there cannot be question of a complete identification of the partners in the unification. Apart from phrases in 9[VI,9] he quotes passages that mainly stem from 22[VI,4], which deals with participation in the intelligible being (not in the Supreme Entity cf. 22[VI,4],5, 10; *ib.*,8,40; *ib.*, 11,7;23[VI,5],3,14,15), as, incidentally is the case with 23[VI,5][882] that originally formed one treatise with 22[VI,4]. No wonder that the formula is frequently employed here, because in the hierarchy of souls, which are the entities that participate in the intelligible being, there is a difference as regards their ontological status. The ontological position of the soul determines its degree of participation: the souls participate, of course, in intelligible being καθ' ὅσον δύναται, more or less. Sofar nothing special.

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[879] As does O'Daly, *The presence of the One in Plotinus*, 161 who writes: "This uncertainty - in the last resort , an uncertainty about whether to describe the One as immanent or transcendent - is, despite some more forthright assertions of Plotinus on the unitative nature of vision, symptomatic of his refusal to posit complete identity between the self and the Absolute". It is interesting to notice that O'Daly fails to quote expressions as οὐ γὰρ διακρίναις ἔτι, ἕως πάρεστι (38[VI,7],34,13-14) and οἷον ἄλλος γενόμενος καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸς οὐδ' αὑτοῦ, whereas he does quote the subsequent κἀκείνου γενόμενος ἕν ἐστιν ὥσπερ κέντρῳ κέντρον συνάψας (9(VI,9],10,16) in an attempt to reconcile the notion of the coincidence of the centres with the obliteration of the self, by asserting that the coincidence does not exclude the individuality of the self or the soul (O'Daly, *ib.*, 161). See for the coincidence of centres and its interpretation above 229, 230, 245.

[880] Unfortunately his reference to p.246 is incorrect, it should be p.248.

[881] Arnou, *Désir*, 248.

[882] See above 98.

Furthermore, Arnou quotes 6[IV,8],6,17, which also deals with participation in mind[883]. Arnou does not ask whether it is correct to apply the restrictive mode of thinking (καθ' ὅσον δύναται), as found with the soul's participation in the intelligible, to participation in the Supreme Entity, something I would strongly oppose to[884]. For the union with the One is not a matter of participation, but of identification. In a mystical union all structural and hierarchical boundaries are in fact transgressed or done away with. So Arnou's claims have to be firmly rejected. In my discussion of 9[VI,9] I already had the opportunity to dispell Arnou's evidence, which mainly concentrates on two passages[885]: 9[VI,9],4,27-29: "when he is, as he was when coming from him, he, at last, is able to contemplate in the *way* (ὡς) the One is capable of being contemplated". There is nothing restrictive here, but only specification in the sense that, reversely, there could be present a reference to the special mode of seeing: union! The other evidence Arnou claims to find in 9[VI,9] is the phrase: ὡς ὁρᾶν θέμις (9,57), 'as is it the just way to see', which as we have shown, indicates: the right manner of seeing: seeing in the full and rich manner as is expounded in the next lines, contrary to what Arnou would have Plotinus say.

It is rather odd to notice that neither Arnou nor Rist make mention of a passage of Plotinus' treatise *Against the Gnostics*, 35[II,9],9,50,51. It is here that Plotinus affirms that by thinking that he is above even the noetic Gods the arrogant gnostic deprives himself precisely of becoming God (or *a* God) *as far as this given to the human soul: ... ἀποστεροῦντα ἑαυτὸν καὶ ὅσον ἐστί δυνατὸν ψυχῇ ἀνθρώπου θεῷ γενέσθαι*. It could be that this remark implies a certain limitation to becoming a God, which in turn would have its implications for the completeness of the union with the SE, but in this context , Plotinus speaks of 'next to God' and of 'with God' and 'room for others' (εἶναι χώραν παρὰ τῷ θεῷ line 48 as we shall see soon under 2b 2: 'multiple union'). So it is not the union with the SE that is at stake, only divinisation and coming among the noetic Gods. I would be inclined to accept that ὅσον ἐστί δυνατὸν expresses a form of limitation. However, the passage deals - as I showed - with 'becoming *a* God', not becoming the Supreme Entity (see further under 2b 2). The latter form of union seems to be far from Plotinus' mind here. So in the end I cannot see that this passage supports the interpretation of Arnou-Rist, or to take not Plotinus' word for it, when he speaks of identification and melting of the partners involved.

Mamo[886] considers the καθ' ὅσον δύναται - passages as a mere echo of Plato's καθ' ὅσον δύναται - utterances. So they do not affect the notion of total identification. I do not believe that we can get rid of the problems by referring to Plato. For Plato these phrases may have expressed a serious qualification, but not for Plotinus. We have discovered that almost everywhere, where Plotinus uses the καθ' ὅσον δύναται - phrase, it has an authentic meaning in the context and is not introduced to honour Plato. It is precisely the occurrence of these individual meanings that lends support to the view that Plotinus' teaching included the complete union of the soul and the SE. In any case if the καθ' ὅσον δύναται- phrases are interpreted correctly, they do not resist any such notion of union.

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[883] See above 100.

[884] This is also Mamo's objection, *Is Plotinian Mysticism monistic*?, 209 and Bussanich, *The One*, 185.

[885] For 9[VI,9]11,32 οὐδὲν παραλιπὼν κτλ see 285.

[886] Mamo, *Is Plotinus' Mysticism monistic?*, 209.

A last barrier to overcome is the issue of multiple union, *i.e.* the union of not only one mystic but a plurality of mystics. This is what Rist[887] comes up with defending *his* position on the nature of the union.

2) Multiple union.

The union with the Supreme Entity is not the privilege of a single mystic, *e.g.* Plotinus. Porphyrius experienced it as well. We know that the Supergod is the centre of centre*s* and, as Rist points out, to join in the chorus and to turn to the Supreme Entity in 9[VI,9],8 means the end of the journey. To be sure, Rist rightly introduces the problem of multiple union with the Supreme Entity. In *Against the Gnostics* (33[II,9],9) Plotinus explicitly defends the 'divinisation' of more mystics against the gnostic thesis of the real gnostic's elevation above his fellowmen and even above the Gods[888]. In the eyes of Plotinus the latter position is sheer blasphemy, which as such is enough to disqualify the gnostic mystic and deprives him of becoming a God in so far as it is granted to the human soul to become a God (33[II,9],9,50)[889]. Plotinus is fully prepared to answer the question of the 'multiple divinisation'. So the multiple union with the One as a problem must have been a problem not far from his mind.

Rist launches the passage on the dance as proof for his assumption that the soul is only filled with God, but not identical with Him: "The members of the chorus are blended together when they sing, but it would absurd to say that they had no individual differences of any kind. If they were not individuals, they could not form a collective unity"[890]. According to Rist this passage suggests that the individual soul is preserved in the 'blending'. We must bear in mind, however, that the dance passage does not aim to prove the individuality of the soul during the dance or the singing, but is provided to show that it is not the Supreme Entity that seeks us, but that we have to search for it and turn ourselves to it. It is not given to think about the collective union of the mystics. Incidentally, the notion of a collective union would not be surprising for Plotinus, for the Supreme Entity is the centre of *centres* and consequently there is the possibility of a simultaneous identification of more than one single soul with the Supreme Entity. For in this connection it is precisely the main feature of the overlap of circles that their centres coincide, as we have seen earlier[891]. However, I believe that in 9[VI,9],8 the issue of collective union was far from Plotinus' mind. In the following chapter (9[VI,9],9,1) he immediately returns to the singular. When describing the procedures of the union he never talks about a union of more than a single person.

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[887] Rist, *Road*, 227.

[888] This remarkable arrogance is sometimes found in the Stoa, Sen., *Epistula 53*, 11 ff, see Merki, *Angleichung*, 17.

[889] "Then the man of real dignity must ascend in due measure, with an absence of boorish arrogance, going sofar as our nature is able to go, and consider that there is room for others with God, and not set himself alone next after God; this is like flying in our dreams and will deprive him even of becoming God as far as it is granted to a human soul" (33[II,9],9,46 ff.). See also 33[II,9],10,79: "and he does not attribute the ability to himself alone".

[890] Rist, *Road*, 227

In connection with the foregoing there is an intriguing issue. According to Dodds there is no flight through the universe, but one finds the One in the soul by *epistrophè*. This is undoubtedly true, be it only one side of the issue[892]. Armstrong[893], however, stresses the fact that we do not go alone to the One. The self - Armstrong says - has before the union become the All. Together with the All "we seek God enlarging ourselves to unity with all that he brings into being". Indeed, Plotinus himself could have had in mind the notion that we have become the All, for he explicitly affirms that during the union with the One the soul does not speak of itself as something else, *i.e.* not as man, not as living thing, or as being or as *all* (πᾶν, 38[VI,7],34,16ff.). Armstrong, however, does not adduce this remark; he rather loosely refers to chapters 34-36 of 38[VI,7]. Despite Plotinus' remark there is no indication whatsoever that leads us to believe that soul has to become the All and that the ascent is not a solitary act. He mentions the complete blending of the two, the soul and the SE: οὐδ' ἔτι δύο, ἀλλ' ἓν ἄμφω. οὐ γὰρ διακρίναις ἔτι, ἕως πάρεστι (38[VI,7],34,13-14). It is all seen from the viewpoint of the solitary soul: even if everything surrounding the soul were to be destroyed, the soul would welcome it, if only it be *alone* with the SE. Soul must become mind and is carried on the surge of the wave of mind and lifted on high by a kind of swell it suddenly sees. According to Armstrong this mind must be the universal mind: "it is an ecstacy of the *whole intelligible cosmos* by which we are carried out of our selves", but we have already[894] met with the remarkable phenomenon that Plotinus so easily changes from the universal mind to the particular. This wave of mind which carries the soul and leads it to the SE is not necessarily a wave of the *universal* mind, and even if so, it still does not mean in Plotinus' way of thinking that the soul experiences the union with the whole intelligible cosmos and the All as a collective happening. So far the evidence of the late treatise 38[VI,7] does not deviate from the contents of the earlier tract 9[VI,9].

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[891] See above 230.
[892] See above 309.
[893] Armstrong, *the Apprehension*, 196,197.
[894] See above 119.

I cannot understand why Armstrong should think that to interpret the phrase "flight of the alone to the alone" as expressing that there is a stage in the ascent when soul stands isolated, apart from the whole, aware only of itself and God, is incorrect. On the contrary, it seems to me a masterful summary of all Plotinus has taught in 9[VI,9] and elsewhere.

We shall now see the identification in terms of light and how a the mystic acquires a divine status.

c) Photology (becoming light)

It is not my intention to discuss Plotinus' *photology* in detail. I may refer to Beierwaltes' contribution to the reader of the 'Wege der Forschung': 'Plotins Metaphysik des Lichtes'[895]. Seeing turns out to be filling the eyes with light but not in the sense that one sees another by means of this light, but rather that seeing is the light itself. Light sees light and as such this procedure could itself be a form of unification. Hence in 9[VI,9],9,57 Plotinus can say that the mystic himself becomes light, light of a superior order[896]. In the later treatise 38[VI,7],36,19 ff. Plotinus pays attention to some quite interesting features of seeing light. The mystic sees the light of the Supreme Entity: as far as thinking reaches, he is settled firmly in Beauty. Subsequently the mystic is carried out of thinking by the surge of the wave of mind itself and lifted on high by a kind of swell. Then the mind suddenly sees the SE, not exactly knowing how this vision emerges. The mind is filled with light. This light does not show by itself some other thing, but the vision is the light itself. Now we are told why the mind sees nothing but light. In it (the SE) there are not two things, *viz.* something that is seen and the light that shows it, nor is there something that thinks and that is thought (there no subject/object-relationship). All this proves that there is nothing to see but light: radiance (αὐγή). Plotinus then shows how the this radiance generates mind and its object as a lower entity, without losing anything of itself (αὐτὸς δὲ αὐγὴ μόνον γεννῶσα κτλ.)[897]. Elsewhere in

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[895] *Die Philosophie des Neuplatonismus*, ed. C. Zintzen, Darmstadt 1977, 75-117 and *idem*, *Henosis*, 139.

[896] See above 265.

[897] The Supreme Entity is creative light, as we are told in 38[VI,7],36,20 ff.: "For in it there is no object of seeing or light of it nor mind and an object of mind, but there is radiance producing those things to later entities and allowing them be with it (αὐτῷ)". The 'it' (αὐτῷ) must be identified with the Supreme Entity and the radiance is the radiance of the Supreme Entity. According to Beierwaltes, *Denken des Einen*, 139 this αὐτῷ is "der Schauende", in *Metaphysik des Lichtes* , 110 he translated παρ' αὐτῷ by "bei ihm", of which as such it is not clear whether it should refer to the SE or the "Schauende". However this αὐτῷ must refer to the Supreme Entity (cf. Harder, *III b*, 513). For in the next sentence

32[V,5],7,29 ff. Plotinus explained 'seeing light' on the part of the mind, that is how the mind can see light without an object, by comparing it with what happens when squeezing one's eyes, by which one can see pure light without any object. So in the mind pure light can emerge when it withdraws into itself. This light is the light of the SE.

What we have learnt so far about vision, is, photologically seen, not yet identical to identification. At best what is implied by saying that the eyes of the mystic are filled with light and by the comparison with "squeezing of the mind', is that the mind of the mystic is filled by the light of the SE itself. However, in 9[VI,9],9,57 Plotinus has gone further and could affirm that the mystic himself becomes light, light of a superior order and that he becomes God himself. In the end the photology does nothing to prevent us from accepting the notion of complete identification, for vision of this kind does not entail seeing objects, and thus there is no question of plurality in it.

Plotinus continues by speaking again about αὐτός, undoubtedly to be identified with the SE and in ch.37 Plotinus carries on, again, with αὐτῷ, referring to the Supreme Entity. Therefore if I am right, αὐτῷ in line 23 concerns the Supreme Entity. So Plotinus tells us that the Supreme Entity *qua* radiance generates mind only, while the radiance remains that what it was, losing nothing of itself in process of generation. Mind comes into existence because of the pure existence of the Supreme Entity. It is according to Plotinus' view that in the soul a parallel procedure takes place. For he tells us in 38[VI,7],35,30-32 that by seeing the SE the soul acquires offspring and the soul observes that they (the offspring) are generated in it and are there. A similar thought was already expressed in 9[VI,9],9,18, perhaps going further. In that chapter Plotinus describes the fact that by touching the Supreme Entity the soul produces Gods, which, apparently, are the Ideas of virtues. It is always very difficult to decide whether Ideas of the universal mind or Ideas of a particular mind are concerned. Perhaps one should not distinguish them too much, while universal mind and individual mind in a way coincide. I touched on this subject earlier and I may refer to that discussion, see above 119. In the passage 38[VI,7],36,20 ff. we should instead interpret the products as universal Ideas. In the background there is the Platonian photology, but in Plotinus it is elaborated and extended: the power of the Good (comparable with the light of the sun) is responsible for the existence of the intelligible being (*Rep.* 509 B).

3) The inner life of the mystic's soul during the union (having still a form of consciousness, no emotions, state of well-being)

In fact, if it is true that the union amounts to total absorption of the mystic, there is no room for any form of an inner life. Nevertheless we are told that the mystic has an inner judgement and inner knowledge of the fact that he has attained his goal. Hence he must have a certain form of consciousness. His situation is portrayed rather extensively in 38[VI,7],34,25 ff. Not only does the soul know that eventually it has found its aim, but it is also capable of positing that nothing is better than the Supreme Entity. The soul cannot fail to know this, for the place in which he finds himself, *viz.* with the Supreme Entity, knows of no misleading. What the soul says the Supreme Entity to be, is correct (what it later has to say about it, is correct as well) and without words (which are impossible to have there) soul speaks and says that it enjoys well-being; it does not err. Soul is even capable of contemning all it enjoyed earlier, such as power, riches, beauty, and knowledge. Soul has no fear at all as long as it is with the Supreme Entity. Let everything, heaven and earth, be destroyed if only it may stay with the SE. Such a high state of joy it reached. Soul is not only without fear, there is no πάθος left either (ἀπαθής), as 9[VI,9],9,15 teaches and 9[VI,9],11,9-11 elaborates: during the union there is no inner movement *etc.*: οὐ γὰρ τι ἐκινεῖτο παρ' αὐτῷ, οὐ θυμός, οὐκ ἐπιθυμία ἄλλου παρῆν αὐτῷ ἀναβεβηκότι. Plotinus does not appear to regard this observation as contradicting soul's feeling of well being. In the Stoic doctrine about virtue, which could have been a model for Plotinus, the so-called εὐπάθεια is a genuine feeling which suits the Wise[898]. If Plato was his model[899] εὐπάθεια is equally justified. These εὐπάθειαι are the counterparts of the passions, the πάθη. In ch.38[VI,7],35,25, however, mind's feelings are even compared to being drunk of nectar[900]. In this case perhaps Plotinus goes beyond his own rule that there is no passion in the region of mind [901], let alone in the domain above mind. Even if we take into account that he speaks about being 'full of *heavenly nectar*', and not of earthly wine, which could be supposed to neutralize the notion of passion, nevertheless, one could object that there cannot be any motion at all, and this is a necessary condition for having the feeling of being well[902].

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[898] See also Sorabji, *Time*, 160. Hadot, *Les niveaux*, 263 quotes the passage about εὐπάθεια in connection with his first mystical stage, that is, the unification of the soul with the intelligible God. In fact here we are at the level of the union with the One.

[899] See above note 729.

[900] We must not consider the *Symposion* as the only source responsible for description of the ascent and the union as Porphyrius (*Life* 23) and Rist do (Rist, *Road*, 193 ff.). The *Phaedrus* and the *Republic* also have something to do with it.

[901] See above 276.

[902] The εὐπάθειαι which are recognised as respectable by the Stoa, are described by Cicero, *Tusc.* 4,6,12-14 (see Sorabji, *Time*, 160 and 160, n.37) as tranquil and rational.

If the notion trance can be introduced anywhere in the ascent, it can only be here, at the end of all activity, and nowhere else during the ascent. If it exists at all in Plotinus, ecstasy[903]is the state of enchantement during the union with the Supreme Entity, it is happiness in the genuine sense.

I do not believe that Plotinus' theory about the union is consistent. On the one hand he emphasizes the absoluteness of the union, and on the other hand he ascribes certain feelings to the mystic during his stay with the One. Some feelings - as the notion to have reached the ultimate goal - can be said to emerge *before* the union in the proper sense, but others cannot made accounted for in this way. On the whole, we must accept that his views are not entirely consistent on this point, but I do not think that therefore one should abandon the idea that the union is meant as being absolute. One should rather let these inconsistent views coexist than jump to conclusions, that are inacceptable considering Plotinus' lucid remarks concerning the completeness of the union.

Consequently, I cannot agree with Beierwaltes' very clever suggestion, that we should ascribe to the mystic the highest form of "Selbstbewusstsein, analog dem Gedanken, dass das Eine als Über-Denken und Über-Sein die intensivste Form dessen ist, was es als solches, d.h. als Form der Differenz überschreitet"[904]. It is - as we know[905]- an extensively studied problem in the research on Plotinus to what degree the Supreme Entity may be assumed to have a form of consciousness and a (super)form of thinking. I do not believe that Plotinus thought of ascribing to the mystic a share in this possible superconsciousness of the Supreme Entity. Such a thing when describing the union of the SE and the soul, was far from his mind. On the contrary, he tries his utmost to banish any such notion. In 9[VI,9],11,8 ff. any form of emotion and even any form of thinking (τις νόησις) was described as hostile to the unity of the mystic event ("He, the seer, was described as one having no difference in his self nor in regard to other things") and is firmly rejected. So we have to accept that the two inconsistent points of view were part of Plotinus' own thought: *viz.* the absoluteness of the union on the one hand and the feelings on the part of the visiting soul on the other.

However, even if we take these aspects into account, the εὐπάθειαι cannot function at the level of the One for as far as the One is concerned there is no rationality at all.

[903] See my note 798 on 9[VI,9],11,23. Armstrong, *Translation* VII, 343 leaves the tracks when affirming "that there is no good reason for describing the mystical union according to Plotinus as an "ecstasy". It gives a very misleading impression of this austere and quiet mysticism". In its turn Armstrong's description of the union as 'austere and quiet mysticism' is misleading as well, for it does not reckon with the large measure of joy that is experienced by the soul in the union.

[904] Beierwaltes, *Denken des Einen*, 144.

[905] See above 45 ff.

4) The continuity of the stay with the Supreme Entity (continuous stay, hampered by the body, repetition of the ascent)

The soul wishes to stay with the Supreme Entity as long as it possibly can (cf. 9[VI,9],7,27 ἀεὶ θέλει μένειν ἄνω[906]). In 9[VI,9,],10,2 we learn that it is not until sometime in the future that the vision will be permanent, not hampered by any thing corporeal. We are told elsewhere that to have the vision means to return to the original state of man after his birth: in 9[VI,9],4,28 Plotinus describes a condition of man "when he was as he was when he came from him (the Supreme Entity)". In 6[IV,8],1,1 ff. Plotinus asks what provoked the descent of the soul from its high original status into the body; 49[V,3],7,8-9 says that one comes from there (the Good: ἐκεῖθεν γενόμενος). In 38[VI,7],34,31 Plotinus portrays the well-being of the soul in the union and alludes to its original state of well-being: in the union the soul "becomes what it was long ago (πάλαι), when it was happy" (ὅτε εὐτύχει[907]). All this, taken together, points to the notion that originally, before its descent into the body, soul was one with the Supreme Entity and that it will be so again after death[908]; both times Plotinus alludes to the need of liberation from the flesh. For as long as the soul is in the body the union cannot be savoured continuously, but is only a temporary one. The soul falls away from the union but the union can be repeated when elevated by practising and riviving of virtue, again one follows the prescribed stages (9[VI,9],11,45 ff.). This remarkable promise of regaining salvation at the end of 9[VI,9] is stated as a fact in 32[V,5],12,33,34: the Good is gentle and kindly, and there present for anyone as he wishes (καὶ ὡς θέλει τις, παρὸν αὐτῷ). For poor Porphyrius this promise did not work out. He experienced the happy event only once, without succeeding in repeating it, in any case before his 68th year, much to his regret [909].

5) After the union (having an image, returning to the sensible world)

Being prevented by the flesh to continuously remain with the Supreme Entity, the soul descends again to its 'normal' conditions (in fact the stay with the Supreme Entity is normal!). The only thing that is left of the meeting is an image (εἰκών), a portrait of the Supreme Entity. When the mystic recalls the encounter, he is able to preserve it as a memory, this image, however difficult that may be. For the identification was complete, there is no other; the other is 'one' in regard to yourself (9[VI,9],10,20-21). Plotinus does not go so far as to deny the possibility that one can even have a memory of the encounter[910], thus suggesting that the identification was not as complete as it appeared. Earlier we saw features of the meeting that are incompatible with the complete obliteration of the soul, but such features do not entitle us to reject it. Likewise the possibility to have a memory of the meeting can not serve as evidence against total unification. For Plotinus this possibility obviously had no effect on the totality of the union, for he nowhere connects it with his notion of unification in his treatises. Later in the chronologically advanced 49[V,3] he even goes so far as to say that one is able to *reason* (!) about the Supreme Entity *after* the meeting: ὕστερον δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι (49[V,3],17,27).

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[906] See above 225.

[907] This is the translation that features *e.g.* in Hadot, *Traité 38*, 172; however, Armstrong, *Translation* VII, p.193 has: "when it is fortunate". One could rightly refer to ch.34, line 8: ὅταν δὲ τούτου εὐτυχήσῃ ἡ ψυχή ...., where undeniably the verb means 'to succeed'. In the context of 34, line 32, however, the soul has already succeeded and is in a condition of being with the SE. The fact that εὐτύχει is in the present tense is of no harm for our interpretation..

[908] See also Beierwaltes, *Denken des Einen*, 145.

[909] See *Vita Plotini*, 23.

Because of the lack of otherness, the vision is so difficult to explain to others: Διὸ καὶ δύσφραστον τὸ θέαμα (9[VI,9],10,19-20). How is one to report about the Supreme Entity, when there actually was no other to be seen? You were one yourself, *i.e.* you had no mental function left (9[VI,9],11,8ff.), and you had even lost your 'self'. Notwithstanding these difficulties Plotinus does not exclude the possibility of such a report. In the Minosscene we learn that Minos transmitted his knowledge in the form of laws and right; before that in 9[VI,9],7,22-23 we are told that after the encounter one returns to report about it (τὴν ἐκεῖ συνουσίαν) to others. Because of the difficulties to bring out what the experience entails, Plotinus proclaims his reservations by the restriction εἰ δύναιτο. In 9[VI,9],11,1 ff. he compares the difficulty of the message coming across with the prohibition to reveal the secrets of the mysteries to the laity. In 9[VI,9],9,46,47 he appeals to the formula of experience of the listener: "He who has seen it, knows what I am saying" (quoted by Pausanias in connection with initiation, see p.261). And he makes a similar move in 32[V,5],8,25-26: "he who knows would be surprised if the opposite were true"[911]. So Plotinus is fully aware of the problems both for the reporter and for the listener as well. However, if this barrier could not be overcome, his entire philosophy would have lost his interest. Thus he appears optimistic in the end: report is not only possible, it is a must and for him it is a fact: "What the soul says the Supreme Entity to be, is correct as what it says later" (38[VI,7],34, 28-29 "Ο οὖν λέγει, ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, καὶ ὕστερον λέγει).

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[910] See also 32[V,5],10,11: "ὅ τι ἂν μνημονεύσῃς" whatever you remember about him (the Good)". However, it could be that this remembrance is related to the status of the soul before coming into this world.

[911] The same type of appeal to experience is found in 39[VI,7],34,12: ἡ δὲ παρασκευὴ καὶ ἡ κόσμησις δήλη που τοῖς παρασκευαζομένοις.

6) Activity on the part of the Supreme Entity (an automatic event? rapture of the self)

There is some ambiguity in the descriptions of what the Supreme Entity has to contribute to the meeting. On the one hand we find Plotinus asserting that the SE arouses the eros and desire for the meeting and is quite active in the process of the unification of the soul with the mind and even with itself. On the other hand he suggests that the unification is not an automatic event, even though the right preparations might have been made. I first wish to focus on this last point.

We have already seen that the SE comes suddenly. In 32[V,5],8 we have one of the best known descriptions of the activity of the SE, for the poetical value of which interpreters buckle at the knees. In this passage Plotinus compares the advent of the SE with the arrival of the sun at dawn. Mind has prepared itself to contemplate and quietly waits for the SE to appear (διὸ οὐ χρὴ διώκειν, ἀλλ' ἡσυχῇ μένειν ἕως ἂν φανῇ 32[V,5],8,3). Rising on the horizon (mind) the sun offers itself to be seen. Mind turns to the Beautiful, the increasing light that announces the sun, and becomes more beautiful itself because it comes closer to it. Then, paradoxically, the SE arrives as coming from nowhere (the SE is nowhere and everywhere!). This description[912] makes clear - as other passages do which underline the sudden appearance of the SE - that evocation of the SE is not an mechanical event.

There are two complementary passages, however, that assign a more active role to the SE, *viz.* 38[VI,7],35,33 ff. bringing out the efforts the SE (here it is called the Good) makes to unify soul and mind and the combination with itself. Treatise 38[VI,7],22,18,19 tells us that even the desire to meeting the SE derives from the SE itself (here, similarly, it is called the Good) and that it calls back the erring soul to come to rest with the Good.

I shall start by examining 38[VI,7],35,33 ff. Soul and mind are unified to the extent that they are one. Plotinus expressed this issue in rather curious terms. It is the seeing that comes to the first part of the mind and even to the soul (ἔρχεται δὲ ἡ θέα καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν (*sc.* ψυχὴν) καὶ τὰ δύο ἓν γίγνεται 38[VI,7],35,35[913]). It is the activity on the part of the SE that causes the unification to take place. This side of the process sometimes seems neglected by the interpreters. In the following sentence this notion of the SE's activity is even strenghtened. The SE reaches itself out to the combination soul/mind and assimilates with it. The SE runs over the combination and makes it one, giving it the feeling of happiness and the vision (hendiadys for: the happiness of the vision): ἐκταθὲν δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς καὶ συναρμοσθὲν τῇ ἀμφοτέρων συστάσει ἐπιδραμὸν καὶ ἑνῶσαν τὰ δύο ἔπεστιν αὐτοῖς μακαρίαν διδοὺς αἴσθησιν καὶ θέαν (lines 36-38). The SE elevates the combination so as to no longer be in a place or in another. 'Elevating' (αἴρειν) is used to characterize this phase[914]. Obviously then the SE has a considerable contribution to make to the process of unification, even though elsewhere it is presented as the proper activity of the soul. The next passages goes even farther.

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[912] See on this passage the interesting comment of Bussanich, *The One*, 140 ff.

[913] The last part of this sentence Rist (*Road*, 226) adds to a list of similar similar expressions use by Plotinus concerning unification. On p.227 he assumed it to refer to the unification of the soul with the One, whereas obviously only the unification of the mind and the soul is at issue.

In 38[VI,7],22,18,19 Plotinus goes so far as to ascribe to the SE the arousal of eros, the desire for the SE in the soul, which without this stimulating activity would only be indolent and inert. The moment the warmth, as it were, radiating from the SE descends to it, it awakens and is elevated "by whom gives eros to it" (22,18,19 αἱρομένη ὑπὸ τοῦ δόντος (*sc.* the Good) τὸν ἔρωτα). The activity of the SE is described in ch.38[VI,7],23,1 ff. quite impressively: the SE drags the soul towards it and calls back the erring and wandering soul to come to rest with it. One can hear Christian undertones, cf. Harder (*III b*, 500) who quotes Augustine, *Confessiones*,1,1: "πρὸς Αὐτὸ(ν) ἀναπαύσαιτο (inquietum est cor nostrum, donec) requiescat in te".

What is said here, seems tantamount to and is hardly to be distinguished from the Christian type of grace Dodds and others deny Plotinus. To furnish this 'grace' there is no need for the SE to turn into the direction of the blessed. I can understand why Rist[915] would reject Aubin's[916] claim that the Supreme Entity is forced to turn to the seeker, since the Supreme Entity cannot be located in a place because it is everywhere (and nowhere). This is the atopical character of the SE, which in fact is nothing other than its omnipresence. The SE does not need such a turn, because it is present to the blessed, to aid the mystic in his becoming prepared.

Reviewing the issue one might claim that the slight ambiguity mentioned in the opening of this paragraph is undeniable. Since the SE has a great part to play in the realisation of the union, one could wonder why the elected soul has to wait for its appearance. This ambiguity could be mitigated, if not eliminated, if one were to regard the suddenness of his appearance as a feature deliberately introduced to bring out the majestic character of the SE, coming as to an audience (an image recurring in the *Enneads*) or coming as a God in the theophany. Both elements of this word are present in the *Enneads*. Plotinus emphasizes in 32[V,5],8,2,3 the φαίνεσθαι or not φαίνεσθαι of the SE and in 49[V,3],17,30 he compares the parousia of the SE to a real theophany of another God: "You only know the God (not the SE) is present when he enlightens the house he was invited to visit". So the solemn and majestic character of the appearance of the SE is expressed by the waiting of the soul till the SE condescends to appear. This is well expressed in the passage on the waiting for the sun who, incidentally, is regarded as a God by Plotinus. The encounter is grace: not only the contribution to the preparedness of the mystic is a form of grace but also the ultimate revelation is grace on the part of the SE. All the same, the mystic must go a well defined way in the ascent, *viz.* via the prescribed stages. That is the 'natural' side of the matter: using the ladder of hierarchical structures in the personal ascent. So I can understand why some scholars (Dodds[917]) speak about a natural event, apparently in opposition to the Christian use of the term 'grace', where it is taken to mean that all inspiration and activity comes from the Godhead to the rather passive, or even unwilling blessed (cf. Sint Paul's conversion on the road to Damascus). However, this is only part of the matter, for the grace and activity of the SE have to play their part too. In any case I would deny that Zintzen's remark: "Nicht wird die Vereinigung erreicht durch ein Herabneigen des Höheren zum Niedrigen. Nicht ist sie ein Gnadenakt"[918], is justified. We should immediately add that this does not mean that the Plotinian notion of grace is the same as the Christian view takes it to be. As to the term 'supernatural', a term often used in connection with grace, the supernatural belongs mainly to the SE, and one might conclude that in fact this activity on the part of the SE is hardly in tune with its essence of total rest and quiet as a non-active Entity. As to the mystic, I think, there is nothing supernatural about him, for it seems part of the nature of the soul to go all the way to the SE. So in the end it is grace that leads to the unification, but not a supernatural grace like in Christianity.

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[914] 38[VI,7]22,17,18; In 38[VI,7],22,34,35 for the notion of being elevated ἀνακεκούφισται is used.

[915] Rist, *Road*, 225.

[916] Aubin, *Image*, 376.

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[917] Dodds, *Tradition*, 7.
[918] Zintzen, *Mystik*, 85.

7) Prayer has nothing to do with the union of the soul and the One

Commentators tend to link prayer to the unification. According to this view prayer to the One is a very specific form of preparing for the "sage capable of attaining the mystic vision". Prayer is preparation, meditation and reflection on the One that precedes the (sudden) advent of the One coming to the waiting mind, as we are told in the impressive passage 32[V,5],8,1 ff., we met earlier[919]. This is Rist's[920] view on the issue. It is even said by Atkinson that prayer *is* (*my* italics) unification[921], in his comment on 10[V,1],6,9-11. Although Plotinus devotes some attention to prayer (on which one may read Rist's chapter "prayer" and Atkinson's useful comment on 10[V,1],6,9-11[922]) it is only once connected with the One, *viz.* in 10[V,1],6,9-11. Plotinus, conventionally[923], invokes God, when he starts off a very difficult issue: the proceeding of mind from the One, and says: "Let us speak of it in this way, first invoking God himself, not in spoken words, but reaching out with our souls towards him, being able in this way to pray alone to him alone" ("Ωδε λεγέσθω θεὸν αὐτὸν ἐπικαλεσαμένοις οὐ λόγῳ γεγωνῷ, ἀλλὰ τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκτείνασιν ἑαυτοὺς εἰς εὐχὴν πρὸς ἐκεῖνον, εὔχεσθαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον δυναμένους μόνους πρὸς μόνον). Because of the expression μόνους πρὸς μόνον the passage is taken by Rist/Atkinson to say something about the unification. We have already come across this expression of the encounter of the soul with the One[924]. So on first glance one could foster the impression that indeed, in the specific method of praying by extending the soul to the One the unification is the issue. Rist takes it in this way and Atkinson, following him, goes even further by saying that prayer *is* unification, as we have already seen. Unfortunately, however, nowhere in this chapter 6 is there any trace of unification to be found. The entire chapter deals with the proceeding of mind from the One, and the remaining of the One in itself during this process. It is a difficult subject, so a prayer is appropriate. For one is about to know something which goes far beyond human knowledge. If there is anything at stake, then it is this birth of the mind, which is difficult to understand for there was no person to assist. So one has to derive one's knowledge on this matter from God himself, so to speak. It is a prayer to understand this complicated situation, that from the One something (mind) springs, without there being any movement on the part of the One. Plotinus continues his remark about the specific manner of praying by introducing the comparison with the temple, we came across earlier[925]. So we must interpret the μόνους πρὸς μόνον-formula in this specific context of the difficult situation of explanation of mind's birth, which has nothing to do with unification of the soul and the One, something, that was far from Plotinus' mind at this point. Thus we are absolutely forbidden to transpose what is said about prayer in this context to the unification, nor are we to give prayer a place in the ascent as 'preparation' of the soul for the advent of the SE, let alone that we should affirm that prayer *is* unification. The rejection of prayer as playing a part in the ascent or unification squares entirely with the fact that nowhere in the context of unification prayer emerges. Consequently in connection with the unification prayer has to be dismissed, however disappointing this may be for some readers of Plotinus. In later Neoplatonism, *viz.* in Proclus, however, prayer does belong to the essentials of the unification of the one of the soul with the one's of the Henads and the One itself[926].

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[919] See above 321.

[920] Rist, *Road*, 211,212.

[921] Atkinson, *Ennead V. 1*, 131.

[922] Atkinson, *Ennead V. 1*, 128-131.

[923] We already find such an attitude in the *Timaeus* 27 C ff., see Atkinson, *Ennead V. 1*, 129. See also Meijer, *Intellectuals*, 240 ff. on prayer.

[924] See above about the 'monology' 159.

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[925] See above 280.

[926] Proclus, *in Timaeum*, 206 ff., esp. 210-213.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PERFECT UNION.

1) *Unification and Philo, Numenius and Albinus*

It would be very interesting to know what source inspired Plotinus to his daring and adventurous notion of unification of the mystic's self with the Supreme Entity. Armstrong[927] considers it a fact that there was no precedent for Plotinus in Philo, although there are similarities in his doctrine of ecstasy and union with God, but which are neutralized, or even undone, by a larger group of dissimilarities. The same goes for Numenius, nor was there any such concept of unification in Albinus (I may add), although it seems possible that the identification with *a* God, as realisation of ὁμοίωσις, belongs to Albinus' doctrine.

It is a vexed question whether or not Plotinus had read Philo. Guyot thinks he has demonstrated that Plotinus had read Philo, whereas Arnou believes he has not[928]. One could emphasize the dissimilarities, indeed there are great differences, but we also find astonishing similarities. I think we must distinguish *two aspects* of Philonian ecstasy. On the one hand there is the inspiring arrival of the divine light, making the soul possessed so as to inspire it to prophecies and on the other hand there is the ascent[929] to God to visit him, to see him, and to know him. As far as I can see neither Arnou and Armstrong nor Jonas have made such a distinction. To me it seems amazing that such a long time before Plotinus Philo would anticipate the major position of light. Like in Plotinus, the divine light penetrates the soul. There is an important difference, however. In Plotinus we have learned that the SE's light blends with the light of the soul, thus becoming indistinguishable, whereas the light of the soul in Philo sets in, when the divine shines on and penetrates the soul[930]. This event is accompanied by a state of ecstasy, mania and possession. We find possession in both, and moreover, and for mania in Philo[931] we have the state of being drunk in Plotinus, when it comes the the highest form of union.

Jonas[932] was the one to bring forward the idea of the "Auslöschung des menschlichen Eigenwertes", and "das Todesmoment in der Extase" (as Beierwaltes summarizes Jonas' point of view). This phenomenon presents itself not only in the prophetical ecstasy, but also in that other form of ecstasy, the ascent[933]. Beierwaltes suggests that Jonas' point of view is to be regarded as distinguishing the Philonian from Plotinian idea of ecstasy[934], but this is not the decisive difference (as we shall see later on), for in a similar way the soul in Plotinus loses its self and is possessed[935] by the God. Philo already talks about loosing oneself[936] and his ecstasy can end in τὴν τοῦ ἑνὸς[937] ἐπίγνωσιν[938]. There are other common features in Philo's and Plotinus' doctrines: the idea of awakening to oneself as from sleep, the notion of initiation into mysteries[939], the dominant role of the mind, the seeing of mind[940], and the concept of purification (νοῦς καθαρός)[941]. In both Philo and Plotinus the soul must wait for the arrival of the God[942], who does not come automatically, but is granted to the soul. In Philo this is the highest form of happiness: ἐν μόνῳ θεῷ στῆναι[943], and in Plotinus (9[VI,9],9,51) we find a similar expression: καὶ ἐν μόνῳ στῆναι τούτῳ.

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[927] Armstrong, *Architecture*, 70 ff.

[928] See for Philo and Plotinus, Bréhier, *Philon*, 196 ff., Arnou, *Désir*, 260 ff., Armstrong, *Architecture*, 70 ff., Beierwaltes, *Denken des Einen*, 140, note 40.

[929] Philo, *de Abrahamo*, 122: ὑπερβᾶσα (*sc* .διάνοια ὁρατική).

[930] Philo, *Quis rerum divinarum heres*, 264,265. Arnou and Armstrong discuss the relevant passages in Philo rather elaborately.

[931] Philo, *Quis rerum divinarum heres*, 264,265.

[932] Jonas, *Gnosis und spätantiker Geist*, II,1,99 ff.

As to the position of God there are noticeable differences : Philo's God seems to remain more himself and more in himself, for the being possessed by the divine is going from the divine pneuma [944]to the soul and does not end up becoming a union as in Plotinus. Philo uses an expression to restrict καθ' ὅσον οἷον τε ἦν ἰδεῖν τὸν βλέποντα[945], which according to Arnou is in Plotinus too, but we know already[946] that in Plotinus such phrases are not to be interpreted as posing a restriction with regard to the unification. The Philonian phrase καθ' ὅσον οἷον τε ἦν ἰδεῖν τὸν βλέποντα itself, however, is only restrictive in that God has to show himself. The limitation does not concern the quality of the vision.

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[933] Philo, *Legum allegoriae*, III, 32-35. In par.35 we read about the human being who is not converted: νεκρὸς ὄντως αὐτός.

[934] Beierwaltes, *Denken des Einen*, 140, n.40.

[935] Possession is involved in both forms of ecstasy, cf. Philo, *Quis rerum divinarum heres*, 69 and *ib*, 264,265.

[936] Philo, *Legum allegoriae*, III,41: ὑπεκστῆναι ... ἑαυτοῦ; *id.*, *Quis rerum divinarum heres*, 68: καὶ καταλελοιπώς , εἰ οἷόν τε τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν, 69 ἔκστηθι σεαυτῆς (*sc.* ψυχῆς) .

[937] This word ἑνὸς does not express the notion of the One, but refers to the monotheistic position of the Hebrew God.

[938] Philo, *Legum allegoriae*, III,48.

[939] Philo, *De Abrahamo*, 122

[940] Philo, *Legum allegoriae*, III,100-102: the vision, however, is called ἔμφασιν λαμβάνειν 'getting an impression in you'. In *De Abrahamo*,79,80 we have the 'seeing' of the God: καθ' ὅσον οἷον τε ἦν ἰδεῖν τὸν βλέποντα and ἡ ὁρατικὴ διάνοια, *ib.*,120.

[941] Philo, *Legum allegoriae*, III 100-102; *id.*, *De Abrahamo*, 122.

[942] Philo, *de Abrahamo*, 79,80: the wise cannot grasp the God, if he does not show himself: μὴ παραφήναντος ἐκείνου ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἐπιδείξαντος. In *Quis rerum divinarum heres*, 264 it is said, that after the right preparations it is plausible (κατὰ τὸ εἰκός) that there will be ecstasy *etc.*(this concerns the prophetical ecstasy).

[943] According to Arnou, *ib., 264*, but I could not find this quotation in Philo. Philo, *De Abrahamo*, 15(IV),17,9?

[944] See also *Legum allegoriae*, I,37.

[945] Philo, *De Abrahamo*, 79,80. Arnou, *Désir*, 263, note 1 mistakenly believes that ἦν δύνηται has restrictive force, for in Philo, *Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat*, 89,90 ἦν δύνηται means " *if* possible" (the mind does not confine itself to the universe... and aiming at proceeding further, and at apprehending *if possible* the nature of God, which, beyond the bare fact that He is, is inapprehensible).

[946] See above 311 ff.

Armstrong[947] makes a reference to Philo's mention of prophecies when the God comes to the soul and the precedence of physical and emotional disturbances. However, this concern the prophetical ecstasy only. As to the two forms of ecstasy, I think the main and decisive point is that in Philo there is no complete union[948], at best there is only an arrival of the light of God in the soul, making it possessed so that it becomes inspired to prophecies or to ascent to see and know him, which may lead to possession too. Nevertheless, there are so many striking similarities in the ecstatical event in Philo and Plotinus, that plausibly they must have had some common background, from which they develloped their ideas. However, we are not in the position to prove any historical connection or precise affiliation. Armstrong thinks that the connection could not have been formed by Numenius (for in his opinion there are no fragments left of Numenius to indicate "traces of mystical devotion") and he does not mention Albinus, probably rightly. There is more to say about Numenius, however, when it comes to the union with God.

In spite of Armstrong's denials Numenius could have formed a link between Philo and Plotinus. To be sure, in Numenius' second fragment we only hear of the soul received in audience by the SE, as we have seen when discussing the monology[949]. In this fragment we find no indication that the two become identical. In another fragment, however, according to the testimony of Iamblichus, Numenius (fr.42 "Ενωσιν μὲν οὖν καὶ ταὐτότητα ἀδιάκριτον τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὰς ἑαυτῆς ἀρχάς) seems to have defended the unification and identity of the soul with its principles (that is, the mind and soul of the World, or the first God and the Demiurg[950]) without there being any distinction. This is where Beierwaltes could have found his concept of '*henosis*'. The term ἀδιάκριτον is especially intriguing, for it denotes the complete merging of the the soul and the God, and it is easy to recognize in ἀδιάκριτον Plotinus' affirmation *οὐ* γὰρ ἂν *διακρίναις* ἔτι, ἕως πάρεστι 38[VI,7],34,12 ff. The word ταὐτότητα is also Plotinian: in 6[IV,8],1,5,6 one finds the identity with the divine (τῷ θείῳ εἰς *ταὐτὸν* γεγενημένος) and in 19[I,2],5,2 (οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ ὁμοίωσις τίνι φανερὰ καὶ ἡ *ταυτότης* τίνι θεῷ). Thus we have evidence that Numenius also taught the complete identification with the God (who in his doctrine is not the Superone), and considering what we find in Plotinus, especially in his early accounts on identification, *viz*. the identification with God or *a* God (not yet the Superone), there is much to say in favour of a connection with Numenius in Plotinus. Unfortunately, we cannot be completely sure that what Iamblichus tells us are the facts, and he himself presents his testimony with a slight hesitation (φαίνεται) and moreover we cannot be sure that his way of expressing things is authentically Numenian, although the term ἕνωσις, which is as such absent in Plotinus, may give some hope. It could be that the Numenian henosis refers to a situation after death. This is what Festugière[951] asserts, but I am not sure about this point in relation to fr.42. Even if Festugière is right, Numenius' notion of *henosis* could have opened Plotinus' eyes for forms of unification.

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[947] Armstrong, *Architecture*, 72.
[948] This point is rightly stressed by Jonas, *Gnosis*, 110.
[949] See above 160.
[950] See Numenius, ed. Des Places, 90 and 122.

2) *Unification and ὁμοίωσις.*

One could start from the assumption that ὁμοίωσις as an important notion expressing 'being alike' must have played a part in developing the idea of unification. Becoming like God (Plato talks of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν) could be assumed to amount to being God, but we must immediately add that in Plato the notion ὁμοίωσις has everything to do with living a virtuous life: it is δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετά φρονήσεως γενέσθαι, and nothing with becoming a God. In the *Theaetetus* 176 A, the most fundamental passage always quoted by Platonists, this life even has nothing to do with the Ideas, it seems confined to exerting virtuous life[952]. Albinus[953] (presumably Plotinus was acquainted with him, see note 540) discusses the notion ὁμοίωσις extensively and has an open eye for the application-range of this notion, referring to Plato's *Phaedo*, *Republic* and, of course *Theaetetus* 176 A. It seems likely that ὁμοίωσις in Albinus does not go beyond simply being virtuous and may not be assumed to imply becoming a God, as may appear in my argument. It is virtue that has the pivotal role and the reach of virtue is confined to assimilation to the lowest God. Albinus makes a significant observation by limiting the ὁμοίωσις to the God of the Heavens, not to the God above the Heavens (τὸ ἐξομοιωθῆναι θεῷ, θεῷ δηλονότι τῷ ἐπουρανίῳ, μὴ τῷ μὰ Δία ὑπερουρανίῳ) adding: 'the God who has no virtue, but is better than virtue', virtue does not lead to assimilation with the highest God, a thought that will also turn up to be present in Plotinus too in a way[954], as we will see. Anyhow, the assimilation with the *highest* God is regarded as impossible by way of virtue and ὁμοίωσις.

It could be that next to ὁμοίωσις, as leading to the (lower) God by being virtuous, 'becoming like God' (for which Albinus uses a term different from ὁμοίωσις, *e.g* . γενέσθαι ὅμοιοι θεῷ[955]) entails becoming like a *higher* God, for in this case it is by way of practising musical theory, arithmetics, astronomy and geometry that one comes to being like (the higher) God[956]. Those sciences have nothing to do with being just and temperate, the central activities with ὁμοίωσις in Albinus. The notion ὁμοίωσις as such does not go beyond the lowest God. Ultimately, a problem remains: it is far from certain that Albinus' idea of assimilation includes any form of unification. Here, again however, in the same way as with Numenian *henosis*, Plotinus could have received only some inspiration in forming his own concept of unification.

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[951] Festugière, *Révélation*, III, 47.

[952] Meijer, *Intellectuals*, 247 ff.

[953] *Didaskalikos*, XXVIII,1-4 . There is no such thing as a moral sort of ὁμοίωσις in Numenius. In fr.6, line 13 the word occurs, but without the usual ethical meaning.

[954] See below 331, 332.

[955] Albinus, *Didaskalikos* XXVIII, p.4.

[956] Albinus, *Didaskalikos* XXVIII, p.4.

Quite in line with the Porphyrian chronology the first *Ennead* to make use of the term ὁμοίωσις is the very first treatise: 1[I,6], about Beauty. In this work ὁμοίωσις is still used in connection with the exercise of virtue: the soul's becoming good and beautiful amounts to becoming like God, who is the Good and the Beauty itself (Διὸ καὶ λέγεται ὀρθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεσθαι ὁμοιωθῆναι εἶναι θεῷ 1[I,6],6,18-20). The encounter (not the identification) with the Good is vision, culminating in the vision of the God in his purity, alone with the self alone (1[I,6],7,10). This is were Numenius' idea of the audience comes in. However, identification is still no more than the expectation, the desire to be mixed with the God: βουλόμενος αὐτῷ συγκερασθῆναι (1[I,6],7,13). Indeed, συγκερασθῆναι is a very strong term, but here it does not necessarily entail a total identification such that the human partner vanishes; there is only said to be a desire, but not a factual union[957]. Hence thus far we are not entitled to connect ὁμοίωσις with the (complete) union in Plotinus.

Is our undertaking to see what ὁμοίωσις meant for the development of the notion of union bound to be a failure? The first treatise to teach the *identification* with the Divine is 6[IV,8],1,6 the famous passage about Plotinus' own experience of awakening to the self: τῷ θείῳ εἰς ταὐτὸν γεγενημένος. However, in this treatise the term ὁμοίωσις is nowhere to be found. Plotinus, then, has already drifted away from Plato's conception of ὁμοίωσις purely in terms of virtue, for in the chronologically second treatise IV,7 the tendency to assimilate the soul with the Divine in a literal sense has reached its first peak. The treatise 2[IV,7] is an investigation into the problem of the immortality of the soul. Soul is a noetical microcosmos and as a κόσμος νοητός it is illuminated by the Good[958]. This makes the soul follow Empedocles in his exultant cry: "I am for you an immortal God", and Plotinus emphatically adds: "after having ascended to the divine and concentrated on the likeness (ὁμοιότητα) to the divine (2[IV,7],10,39)". Here, undeniably, the Plotinian shifting of ὁμοίωσις towards *being a God* instead of being *like a God* could have pushed its way. However, we should not fail to notice that he uses the word ὁμοιότης, which is repeatedly[959] used in connection with the union, where we never find the term ὁμοίωσις[960]. This is not to say that being a God is as yet identical in Plotinus with being united with the *Supreme Entity*. If Plotinus had connected this interpretation of the ὁμοίωσις with the perfect union at all, there is no evidence for it in the *Enneads*, neither before 9[VI,9], in which for the first time the identity of the mystic and the Supreme Entity is fully examined. Again, later in his treatise particularly and mainly devoted to the ὁμοίωσις, 19[I,2] (so considerably later that 9[VI,9]) ὁμοίωσις and unification turn out to be alien to each other, as can be judged from the fact that Plotinus, although elaborately going into the issue of ὁμοίωσις, does not spend a single word on the union of the soul with the *Supreme Entity*. Nevertheless, he extensively discusses the problem of the divinisation of men by ὁμοίωσις. Quite to the point he asks, what God it is we become like (19[I,2],1,6,7). At first he answers that we become like a God who is himself virtuous, namely the soul of the world and its principle, but this principle aspires to the intelligible, and consequently we share in this aspiration, which is implied in our being like that Principle[961]. Exerting civic virtue falls short, We must concentrate on the higher virtues. So justice will have an important part to play in soul's activity towards the intelligible, self-control (σωφρονεῖν) will be the turning inward of the soul towards the intelligible, courage will be freedom of affections according to the assimilation (καθ' ὁμοίωσιν) it looks for, which is free from passions (the intelligible). And yet we are on our way. Plotinus affirms that we are not in search of being free from sin, but we seek to become God (ἀλλ' ἡ σπουδὴ οὐκ ἔξω ἁμαρτίας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ θεὸν εἶναι, 19[I,2],6,2). Civic virtue and the preparatory exercise of virtues all take place at the level of soul. The intelligible has no virtue (cf. Albinus[962]) but it has their paradigmata. Going further on this road, our purification will provide the revelation as to what God we become like (οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ ὁμοίωσις τίνι φανερὰ καὶ ἡ ταὐτότης τίνι θεῷ 19[I,2],5,2). The use of ἡ ταὐτότης points to total identification (as in 6[IV,8],1,6) but in the end we are promised only that we will become intelligible Gods and follow (analogically to the *Phaedrus* 246

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[957] The word συγκερασθῆναι is an interesting term (together with συγκρίνειν 38[VI,7],34,15) when the mystical union is compared to the union of lover and beloved, see also Rist, *Road*, 223, Bussanich, *The One*, 183. It should be underlined that συγκεράννυσθαι is a very strong word. It is employed to denote the complete blending of the vision and the seen in 38[VI,7],35,14: ἀλλὰ τὴν ὄψιν αὐτοῦ *συγκεράσαιτο* τῷ θεάματι.

[958] In Harder's commentary it is said (*I b*, 405) " hier tritt das ἀγαθον d.h. das Eine auf, das Plotin angeblich noch nicht 'kennen' soll". Here we find the modern rejection of the idea that there has been development in the notion of the One in the flesh. Sofar as 2[IV,7] we never heard about the 'One'. See about the passage (and its possible Posidonian background), Theiler, *Vorbereitung*, 109.

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[959] 9[VI,9],4,27 θιγεῖν ὁμοιότητι; 38[VI,7],34,11 ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα καλὴν καὶ εἰς ὁμοιότητα ἐλθοῦσα (*sc*. the soul).

[960] In 38[VI,7],35,44 we do find the verb ὁμοιοῦσθαι in the sense of becoming like the SE, but this does not go beyond being alike the SE in not having thinking.

[961] One suspects influence of Albinus, or of a common source (cf. Dörrie, *Vom Transzendentem im Mittelplatonismus*, 225). In any case there is a difference: in Albinus virtue does not lead beyond the God of the world (ἐπουράνιος θεός), whereas in Plotinus virtue can extend beyond the soul towards the noetic realm. It is agreed among scholars that Plotinus polemizes against Albinus in regard to the range of virtue (see *e.g*. Dörrie, *Vom Transzendentem im Mittelplatonismus*, 215, 225). Nevertheless, they are on the same ground. Albinus has another way that leads to the noetic domain and its highest level (see above in the text and note 956). The difference is not that great, however. In fact in Plotinus the virtues only have preparatory capacities for the road to the noetic domain, as we said in the text.

[962] See above 329.

E ff.) the First (19[I,2],6,7). No word or thought about our identification with the Supreme Entity. Nowhere in the *Enneads* is there a trace of ὁμοίωσις as having had a *direct* influence on Plotinus' doctrine of identification[963]. It does seem that at best ὁμοίωσις can lead someone in the direction of the level of mind, but that this notion was not the incentive for Plotinus' mind to draft the identification with the Supreme Entity. It seems that the notion of ὁμοίωσις was too much confined to the field of virtue to apply it to the domain of the Supreme Entity itself. In any case to do so did not occur to Plotinus. I am afraid that ultimately we are not in the position to trace the doctrine of union *with the Supreme Entity* back to any other incentive than Plotinus' own inspiration, although we have noticed the elaboration of certain tendencies already in Philo, Numenius and Albinus. Perhaps Philo should be left out, for we do not know if Plotinus ever had read him, but Plotinus' way of stretching Plato' doctrine and ultimately allowing the mystic to become God may have been influenced by Albinus and Numenius: in Albinus he could have learned identification with lower Gods, entities that do feature in Plotinus in noetical mysticism, the union with the intelligible God, in Numenius (fr.42) he could have learned about he identification with the highest God. Apart from Albinus and Numenius Gnosticism may also have had a maior influence upon Plotinus. Numenius himself is commonly agreed to have been very close to Gnosticism[964].

Because of doctrinal similarities in regard to unification with God there is a possibility that Plotinus' hausted from Gnostic sources. Jonas[965] indicates several striking congruencies. In the *Poimandres* death is followed by ascent and one's going to the Father, entering the Godhead and becoming God (this is the good end of those who have attained gnosis: to become God[966]). According to Mani the ultimate stage is man's becoming a God again [967]. To the mind of Jonas[968] (*ib.*, 60, 61) "Plotinus draws the full mystical conclusions from the (gnostic) metaphysics of 'Unity versus Plurality'". Indeed, Plotinus was acquainted with (Valentinian) Gnostics[969]. Moreover the (Sethian or Valentinian) Gnostics Plotinus himself so heavily attacked in 33[II,9] (see above under the heading multiple union) adhered to a doctrine according to which they themselves were even more God than the celestial bodies (which were Gods in the eyes of Plotinus). Unfortunately, however, any borrowing or influence from Gnostics must remain uncertain, because of the fact that if there were connections as regards the notion of unification, it is almost impossible to decide who was influenced by whom, for chronologically it is equally possible that Gnostics have drawn from Plotinus and perhaps other Neoplatonici or at least from earlier Platonists or the other way round. Valentinus (who lived during the first half of the second century, and stayed at Rome perhaps from 138 - 158 or 166) himself may be regarded as a Platonist or at least as Platonicizing[970]. It could be that ideas about unification were alive in preplotinian Platonism (*e.g.* the same source that Philo used). Considering the issue of the multiple union in 33[II,9] I would not be surprised if Plotinus had in fact been influenced by Gnosticism, be it that ascent in earlier Gnosticism seems to be confined to the situation after death. Be this at it may, in the end Plotinus himself was left with the great task to establish the union with his new Supreme Entity (already during lifetime) within the new framework of his philosophy. One has the impression that at minimum this was left to be his own initiative and his own invention, perhaps supported by his own experience of emptying the mind. This in fact led to the design of a new procedure of attaining his God, a procedure we have portrayed in this Part.

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[963] One could not reasonably adduce Plotinus' utterance in 9[VI,9],11,32: συγγίνεται τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον about the like that comes together with the like, for even if this remark concerns a union, it is seen from the point of view of the temple-metaphor: one acquires knowledge of the invisible inhabitant of the adyton by starting from the earthly adyton. The word ὁμοίωσις is not mentioned in the context (see above 288). Thus the context appears to have nothing to do with the concept of ὁμοίωσις as we have depicted it now in our text.

[964] Puech, *Plotin et les Gnostiques*, 178.

[965] Jonas, *Gnostic Religion*, 165 ff.

[966] *Poimandres* I,26 : καὶ δυνάμεις γενόμενοι ἐν θεῷ γίνονται, τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν τέλος τοῖς γνῶσιν ἐσχηκόσι, *θεωθῆναι*. Jonas, *Gnostic Religion*, 153. Cf. also Festugière, *Révélation*, III, 130

[967] Jonas, *Gnostic Religion*, 222.

[968] Jonas, *Gnostic Religion*, 60,61.

[969] Puech, *Plotin et les Gnostiques*, 178

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[970] Stead, *In search of Valentinus*, 75 ff. shows how difficult the matter of Valentinus' Platonism is.

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9[VI,9],1,27	*ἐστιν* ὅ ἐστιν
9[VI,9],2,45	οὕτω γὰρ οὐκέτι ἓν ⟨ἂν⟩ εἴη.
9[VI,9],5,27	*ἐν* αὐτῷ
9[VI,9],5,45	ὁμοιῶσαι *αἰεί*
9[VI,9],6,12	Ὅταν γὰρ *ἓν* αὐτὸ νοήσῃς
9[VI,9],8,38	*ἔξω ἰδὼν*
9[VI,9],10,4	ἐστι δὲ τὸ ἑωρακὸς τὸ ἐνοχλούμενον, ἀλλ' *οὐ* τὸ ἄλλο
9[VI,9],11,40-41	τὸ δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ μόνῃ καὶ οὐκ ἐν *τῳ* ὄντι ἐν ἐκείνῳ (with Harder)